

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND HISTORY OF EDUCATION

Volume 48, 1998

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Printed in the United States of America

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IN MEMORIAM

Henry R. Weinstock, 1931 - 1997

We have all been saddened by the death of our colleague and friend Henry Weinstock. Henry joins the growing list of members of our Society that can no longer be with us in our quest to improve education. Each colleague left a unique and rich legacy from which much can be learned. I want to briefly address what I believe to be a significant part of Henry's legacy.

Perhaps I knew Henry as well as anyone in the Society. For more than twenty years Henry and I had many hundreds of hours of mostly intellectual discussions, and on several occasions jointly published works on matters of common interest. Although Henry was a private person, on very rare occasions a specter of a second Henry, one who died around the age of nine, would surface to tell bits and pieces of a personal, harrowing tale of unspeakable terror for anyone, let alone a mere child. The images of this terror would be indelibly imprinted on the soft tissues of his then young mind and would haunt him for the rest of his life. In this he joins the sad ranks of those who survived the ovens of the Holocaust but not its eternal horrors that would forever lurk in the deep recesses of the mind, waiting patiently to surface at the slightest sign of weakness.

The young Henry said that he first became aware of a problematic future on a March day in 1938. He was holding his mother's hand while standing on a street corner in Vienna watching a seemingly endless wave of jack-booted Nazi SS troops marching by in goose step fashion when his mother looked down at him and said, "Heinz, this is bad, very bad indeed." Soon after, his happy middle-class family life would undergo radical and lasting change.

He vividly remembered that the police first came and took his father's car. Then the Jewish families in his neighborhood were no longer allowed to shop for food at certain store. His non-Jewish friends were no longer allowed to play with him. Finally, one night, his father was taken away by the Gestapo and did not return for more than six months. He learned much later that his father was put into the infamous Buchenwald camp. Luckily, he was released during the very brief period in 1938 when Hitler was using such releases as propaganda about his "good intentions" toward the Jews.

The very day after his now frail father came home from Buchenwald, he and Henry went to a hotel in Vienna and got ten "Jewish sounding" names from a New York phone directory. His father wrote the ten asking if they would sponsor his family as immigrants to the U.S. Of the ten, only an elderly woman, a school teacher, agreed.

Luckily, again, his family got permission to leave Germany. Henry and his father would go first, followed soon by his mother, older sister, and brother. All of his many other relatives were never heard from again. They were likely among the six million Jews that, once in camps like Buchenwald, Auschwitz, Dachau, and Bergen Belsen, never came out. Like many others who, from whatever good luck, survived the physical death of the Holocaust, Henry would always feel deeply guilty that he escaped while others perhaps more worthy did not.

To the best of his memory, the difficult passage to New York was through France and Holland. Compounding the loss of a childhood stolen from him by the Nazi terror, soon after the family was together in New York, his father and mother separated.

Second only to his family, Henry's love, appreciation, and respect for America was very deep indeed. On several occasions he said that his proudest achievement was his commission as an officer in the U.S. Navy, having already served several years in the Army. His greatest love and complete dedication were for his wife Joyce, his children Cathy, Bess, and Timmy and his three step children. His most cherished professional experiences were those he spent with his friends in this Society.

We can learn many things from Henry's life—truthfulness, love of knowledge, family loyalty, lack of prejudice toward any social group, and the importance of freedom, to name but a few. As educators, I believe that Henry's personal confrontations with hate, prejudice, and terror should be of special concern to us. America has its own legacy of repression, discrimination, terror, and an unspeakable record of ultimate racism-slavery. The seemingly intractable legacy is the single most important challenge which we all must confront both individually and collectively. What is eminently clear from studies of the Holocaust is that humans can be taught to hate. In this regard, the Nazi system of education was, indeed, very effective. We must ask ourselves: Do our schools promote

hate either explicitly or implicitly? The specters of both Henries will be with us until we can answer that question. If the answer is yes, then we must unceasingly work to eradicate it forever.

Goodby good friend and colleague. We wish you the peace that you struggled so hard to find for you and others while you were with us.

Charles Fazzaro, University of Missouri, St. Louis

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SUGGESTED USES FOR THE SOCRATIC METHOD IN TODAY'S SCHOOLS

Neal Brown

Texas Tech University

Plato's Meno gives modern educators an example of how the Socratic method is used in teaching, and thus as a function in the process of learning. In reading the dialogue, I was impressed by several features of the technique, including the emphasis on defining terms relevant to the subject, the overview of the learning process and problem solving techniques. I feel that many of the attributes of the Socratic method are not unlike those found in many classroom situations of today.

During his visit with Meno, Socrates stresses the need for defining terms relevant to the nature of virtue. After hearing Meno's question, Socrates immediately guides his student toward the meaning of virtue. In a humble expression, Socrates implies that he does not know the meaning of the term, eliciting a response from the student. This is an example of the respectful tone Socrates maintains throughout the dialogue, which I find admirable given the fact that he was not required to teach this annoying student.

Throughout the dialogue, Socrates politely insists that a definition of virtue be agreed upon. While Meno gives examples instead of defining the term, Socrates guides him back to the subject at hand. I applaud Socrates in that he credits Meno for his attempts, rather than admonishing him for not understanding the difference between an example and the essence of virtue.

I feel that the analytic technique employed by Socrates is crucial to the success of the Socratic method. Like many students today, Meno's motive for questioning seems to be a selfish one. For instance, Meno seems to be interested in showing how much he knows and, in particular, desires a quick, simple answer that will stand true in all circumstances. Socrates, not willing to dignify Meno's motive, understands that no accurate answer can be given without defining the term.

In my sixth grade history class, I feel the analytic element is crucial to student success, just as it was in the dialogue. I stress the need for students to understand geographical and historical terms to facilitate their understanding of world history. Like Meno, many

students want a simple, concrete answer that will be correct in any given situation. In many areas, this type of answer is not sufficient and will not benefit students in future lessons.

Like philosophy, geography and history are not static, unchanging disciplines. Rather, they require assuming certain truths and using the known to discuss and understand the unknown. Students who understand the truths are better suited in problem solving activities because they employ logical reasoning skills to arrive at an answer that previously was unknown to them. Students who do not use learning process skills well often struggle with new material because they do not refer to the truths that they have already learned.

Not only did Meno lack the desire to define virtue, he lacked an understanding of the learning process as a whole. Socrates provided remediation in the example of the slave boy. I view the slave as serving two purposes in the dialogue. Primarily, the boy's problem solving demonstrates Socrates' use of the known to discover the unknown. Also, the boy gives Meno a good example of a willing student. Although the boy was not educated and apparently had little experience with geometry, he allowed himself to be taught. Such intrinsic motivation helped Meno to understand the learning process. I find it ironic that Meno learned this from the example of someone whose social status was far below his own.

Socrates claimed that the boy knew the answer all along, but that it had to be brought out of him. I disagree somewhat with this principle. I see a difference in knowledge and understanding. Perhaps I have confused the idea that a person may have knowledge of a concept without fully understanding it. The slave boy may have understood the answer to the problem, but will this transfer to a similar situation in the future?

In my classroom, I attempt to interest students in a subject to the point where they desire to know more about it. If I can foster intrinsic motivation in my students, I feel that I have done my job. One of the newer aims of education is to provide an atmosphere that facilitates a desire for lifelong learning. I think Socrates probably enjoyed teaching the slave more than

Brown — Suggested Uses for the Socratic Method

he did Meno, because Meno's attitude towards learning was negative.

I feel that today's students do not differ greatly from the students Plato writes about. Mankind has advanced greatly in terms of technical invention, but the process of learning remains similar to that of the ancient Greeks. I feel that the aim of modern education should be teaching avenues and skills necessary to solve problems and make decisions to better ourselves and our society. This seems consistent with Plato's concerns over government and citizenship in his era. If education does not produce students who can think critically and reason with problems and disputes, I fear that our future government will rely too heavily on stopgap measures, rather than addressing the causes and consequences of societal disputes.

If students are to solve problems logically, their approaches must be rooted in some type of moral understanding. The Socratic method might be an answer for school officials to teach what parents should have done in discussing morals. To many children and adults who experience generational poverty, the way to end a dispute is often violent. I suppose that such individuals place a high value of respect of self and family because this notion is a source of pride. A lack of material possessions would contribute greatly to this premise. If these students were engaged in a Socratic type of conflict resolution, it would increase their understanding of acceptable interaction. However, this technique must be used in a timely and consistent manner in order to make a drastic change in how students react to situations.

I have serious concerns about how this moral

education should be administered. The current movement regarding cultural awareness demands that educators account for ethnic differences in the classroom. This might be one obstacle in teaching morals, as some groups accept what other groups might find questionable. Also, parents may take issue with this teaching and how it affects family religious views, as is often the case with sexual education in science and health classes.

In addition to the positive attributes of the Socratic method, I see some problems. Primarily, the Greek philosopher appeared to teach students in a one to one or small group setting. Today's school classroom does not provide an appropriate setting for this type of learning. It is quite difficult to speak with one student for several minutes, let alone for a period of time sufficient to answer a serious question such as Meno's inquiry. Therefore, the approach must be modified to suit an entire group of students. Widely ranging ability levels compound the difficulty of ensuring term analysis and learning processes are understood. These concerns must be addressed by the instructor, who ultimately must decide what teaching techniques are best for most of the students involved in the lesson.

The Socratic method described in Plato's Meno is an interesting and potentially beneficial teaching technique. The use of term analysis and a rational learning process would appear to benefit students in traditional fields of study, along with moral education. Although the method faces logistical problems when used in modern schools, I feel that the potential for progress merits its use.

ENHANCING THE VALIDITY OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH

Perry L. Collins

Cassie J. Collins

Texas Tech University

Introduction

The goal of enhancing the rigor and robustness of qualitative research is not a new concept. Many have addressed the issue of validity in qualitative research in great detail (Dobbert, 1982; Goetz & LeCompte, 1984; Wolcott, 1994). Even before the 1950s, the ideas of validity and reliability were a key issue. However, in that era, these terms were associated almost exclusively with testing. Still, the notion of validity has not been totally ignored in qualitative arenas.

As qualitative research has evolved, the literature demonstrates that there has been much debate on questions of validity in its general sense of obtaining accurate data (Becker, 1958). Furthermore, other key issues that have been explored include assessing the validity of data already collected (Vidich & Bensman, 1954), drawing valid meaning from data (Miles & Huberman, 1984), and validating theoretical ideas (McEwen, 1963).

According to Dobbert (1982), "most anthropologists rank informants for validity and reliability, at least in their own minds" (p. 263). Goetz and LeCompte (1984) argue that we already have it [validity] as "our major strength" (p. 221). Campbell in 1975 mentioned external validity as the single greatest weakness in case study research. Phillips (1987) argued that "in order to be believed, it is absolutely necessary to have the property of being true or false" (p. 10). The aforementioned ideas are just a few of the many writings on validity issues in qualitative research. Thus, much has been written on validity in qualitative research. But, there seems to be a lack of general consensus on what validity is and how we go about ensuring a valid qualitative study.

From the literature, validity is variously presented as a twosome: external and internal; as a threesome: instrumental (pragmatic, criterion; also predictive, concurrent), theoretical (construct), and apparent (face);

and as a foursome: content (face, apparent; also, sampling), predictive, concurrent, and construct (or theoretical). Still, there are other mentions of validity that do not fit as well. For instance, the literature has produced writings of conclusion validity, ontological validity, overall validity, and practical validity. There are also references made to consensual validation (Phillips, 1987, p. 19), cross-validation, final validation, self-validation (Geertz, 1973, p. 24), validity coefficient, and even "validity-seeking hermeneutics" (Campbell, 1986, p. 109). With all these facets of validity, there are a couple of more current sources that attempt to make sense of these various aspects of validity (Brinbert & McGrath, 1982; Weber, 1985).

Would the real definition of validity please stand up?

Cronbach's 1971 article "Test Validation" provides one definition of validity as he states: "The process of examining the accuracy of a specific prediction or inference made from a test score" (p. 443). Cronbach went on to state that validation refers to the "soundness of all the interpretations of a test-descriptive and explanatory interpretations as well as situation-bound predictions." He continues by saying that "For some writers, to validate means to demonstrate the worth of, but I intend to stress the openness of the process-i.e., to validate is to investigate (p. 443). Roger Brown mentioned that "the problem of validity is the problem of what the data indicate. Have we measured what we have undertaken to measure?"(1965). Another definition of validity was provided by anthropologists Pelto and Gretel Pelto in 1978:

"Validity" refers to the degree to which scientific observations actually measure or record what they purport to measure . . . In their field research anthropologists have invested much effort to achieve validity, for we generally assume that a long-term stay in a community facilitates the differentiation of what is valid from what is not, and the assembling

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of contextual supporting information to buttress claims to validity. (p. 33)

Goetz and LeCompte in 1984 provide us with still another definition of validity:

Validity is concerned with the accuracy of scientific findings. Establishing validity requires (1) determining the extent to which conclusions effectively represent empirical reality and (2) assessing whether constructs devised by researchers represent or measure the categories of human experience that occur. (p. 210)

In search of validity in qualitative study

In reference to field studies in general, Wolcott (1994) states that "to get somewhere with the matter at hand is to intensify the suspicion . . . that you are not quite getting it right." (p. 347). Wolcott suspects that many qualitative researchers talk too much and hear too little. They become their own worst enemy by becoming their own best informant. He furthers that we often presume to "know" what is supposed to be happening and consequently may never ask the kinds of questions we would ordinarily ask. Wolcott (1984) suggested that researchers need to be wary of this "ethnography minus one" approach.

Yin (1984) explores several criteria for judging the quality of research designs when conducting qualitative research. He feels that "because a research design is supposed to represent a logical set of statements, you also can judge the quality of any given design according to certain logical tests. Concepts that have been offered for these tests include trustworthiness, credibility, confirmability, and data dependability (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1990). According to Yin, four tests are relevant to case study research—one of the more popular types of qualitative research. The four tests include the test of construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and reliability. With each of these tests there are several strategies that may be employed to enhance the validity of the qualitative research. For instance, to increase construct validity, one might use multiple sources of evidence, establish a chain of evidence, and have key informants review a draft of the case study report. The use of multiple sources of evidence and establishing a chain of evidence should occur during the data collection stage of the research while having key informants review a draft should occur during the composition phase of the research. With regard to internal validity, the researcher should conduct pattern-matching, utilize explanation-building,

and do a time-series analysis. All of these tactics are employed during the data analysis phase. For external validity, the qualitative researcher should use replication logic when conducting multiple-case studies. Such a strategy should occur during the research design stage of the research project. Finally, reliability can be increased by using a case study protocol and by developing a case study database. These strategies to enhance reliability occur during the data collection phase of the research. Some of these tactics (tests for construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and reliability) occur during data collection, data analysis, or compositional phases of the research. Lecompte and Goetz (1982) and Kennedy (1979) also suggest several qualitative methods based upon the work of Yin (1984), Lincoln and Guba (1985), and Merriam (1988) to enhance the quality of research. Some of these methods include reflexivity, explication of theoretical constructs, theoretical sampling, thick description, cross case analysis, prolonged exposure, persistent observation, peer debriefing, triangulation, referential materials, and member checking.

Putting it all together

With experience Wolcott feels that validity in qualitative research begins to come naturally to the researcher without having to expend as much thought in structuring the methodology. To put this idea in his own words, "I think I sense when I am getting a straight story, when I am getting a story straight, and when I am on a detour of my own or another's making. If the latter, I usually try to swing by that way another time. I never confront informants with contradictions, blatant disbelief, or shock, but I do not mind presenting myself as a bit dense, someone who does not catch on too quickly and has to have things repeated or explained." This is what Kirk and Miller (1986) describe as "willing to look a fool for the sake of science" (p. 49).

However, until a researcher becomes seasoned in qualitative research, there are several suggestions that may enhance the validity of a study. First of all, record as accurately as possible, and in precisely the very words of the informant. If unable to record notes during the observation or interview, the researcher should make them as soon as possible (Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw, 1995). Also, it may prove beneficial to begin a rough draft soon after fieldwork begins instead of considering writing as a final stage of research. The researcher should share their writings early in the research with other colleagues who are knowledgeable in that particular setting. Feedback from others can be very

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valuable in becoming more contextually sensitive to the phenomenon that is being investigated. Such a research partner should be asked to play "devil's advocate" and critically question the researcher's analyses (Marshall and Rossman, 1995). Time is another major factor in enhancing the quality of a research study (Glesne and Peshkin, 1992). Time at the research site, time spent interviewing, time spent establishing rapport-all contribute to trustworthy data. Triangulated data including observation, interviews, and questionnaire data all help to corroborate the research findings. The researcher should also be aware of their own biases and subjectivity, which can taint interpretation of the data. Furthermore, when striking a balance between providing too much detail and too little, it usually proves better to err on the side of too much. In addition, between overanalyzing and underanalyzing data, the researcher should say too little rather than too much. The investigator should report fully and be candid whenever possible as well. Finally, the researcher should realize the limitations of the study. Detailing circumstances that limit the study helps readers understand the nature of the data.

Conclusion

Although there seem to be limitations and dangers of directly applying the tenets of reliability and validity as used in conventional research to qualitative approaches, exploring the application metaphorically may be useful (LeCompte and Preissle, 1993). If introduced cautiously, it makes practical heuristic for introducing the assessment of qualitative design to novices. Also, it helps scholars from different perspective find their commonalities and refine their distinctions. Perhaps the day will arrive when someone will find or coin qualitative research's appropriate equivalent for "validity." Unfortunately, we have no esoteric term now. For the present, understanding seems to encapsulate the idea as well as any other everyday term.

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CONSIDERED CONCERNS OF A CONSERVATIVE

Jed Arthur Cooper

University of North Texas

During the more than thirty years that I have been affiliated with this society I have presented papers on such individuals as Thomas Jefferson, Leo Tolstoy, Rabindranath Tagore, Robert M. Hutchins, Clifton L. Hall, Max Rafferty, Mortimer Adler, James Mitchener, and William Bennett. Today I am going to share with you a few concerns of the educator I know best, Jed Arthur Cooper of the University of North Texas. I am now in my thirty-fourth and last year as a member of the academic professoriate. In less than four months I will finish my apprenticeship as a senior citizen and become a full-fledged member of that segment of society known as the elderly! Frankly, I'm looking forward to retirement. It's not that I don't enjoy what I'm doing. I have simply reached a point where I would enjoy not doing it more!

As I reminisce about my professional life since obtaining the doctorate in 1964, I am forcefully reminded of the concept of irony. With my Peabody degree in the foundations of education, I anticipated a joyous career teaching, researching, and writing in the history and philosophy of education. My first position at the University of Arizona enabled me to teach social foundations of education at the undergraduate level and comparative education at the graduate level. Students were courteous, colleagues friendly, and the climate enjoyable. The new dean, however, was disturbed with my off-duty participation in religious activity. He assured me that the Mormon Church expected too much of its members, and that I could never expect to be successful professionally if I were to continue with my dedicated Mormon lifestyle. Since the dean himself was a somewhat disgruntled Mormon, I could not understand why he was not familiar with such dedicated Mormon educators as Howard McDonald, former president of Los Angeles City College; Meredith O. Wilson, former president of both the University of Oregon and the University of Minnesota; and G. Homer Durham, then president of Arizona State University. Their distinguished professional careers were convincing evidence to me that my dean didn't know what he was talking about! After this first caution, things seemed to go rather smoothly until the beginning of my second year when I accepted a calling as president of the local married-student branch of the Church. The dean was quite upset about that, so I decided to look elsewhere for

employment.

Forrest Rollins had completed his course work at George Peabody College for Teachers and had accepted a position at North Texas State University, later to become the University of North Texas. He enjoyed his work there and when the dean of education asked him about another applicant from Peabody, he answered that he didn't think that person would be a good fit for North Texas but Art Cooper would be. The dean called me, made an offer, and I accepted.

Arriving at North Texas in 1966, I found a tremendous *esprit de corps* among the education faculty, friendly students, and a generally pleasing ambiance. There were few classes in the foundations, however, and they were taught by a couple of senior faculty, one whose academic specialization was in foundations and one whose specialization was in secondary education curriculum and instruction. So my teaching load was primarily in secondary education including teaching methods, curriculum, educational psychology, and supervision of student teachers. This was disappointing to me because, frankly, I was never that interested in pedagogy. I would not have done graduate work in education had I not been introduced to the historical and philosophical foundations and been able to obtain my graduate degrees in that area.

I took an eighteen-month leave of absence in 1970 to serve on a USAID contract with Santa Maria La Antigua University in Panama as resident consultant for a program in administrative and curricular reform. When I returned, some administrative restructuring had occurred at the North Texas College of Education and I was assigned to the department of educational foundations and research. Things were looking up! I was able to teach an undergraduate course in educational philosophy, a graduate course in educational history, a graduate course in comparative education, and a doctoral course in the social and aesthetic foundations of education.

This happy state of affairs continued for only a couple of years because the required core in foundations was dropped without consultation with the foundations faculty. A required graduate course in human development was housed in the foundations department and that course became my teaching load for several

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years although I had minimal training in the area and even less interest!

In 1978 something called multicultural education appeared in the NCATE standards and became required by the Texas Education Agency for degrees and endorsements in teacher education. The foundations department was given responsibility for the graduate course in multicultural education and it has been my major source of livelihood ever since. For ten or twelve years I taught a doctoral course in educational philosophy one time each year. That course was dropped from the schedule three years ago.

Fortunately, my training in social foundations of education together with my personal cross-cultural experiences with the Spanish-speaking peoples of the Southwestern United States, Mexico, Ecuador, and Panama and a year in Saudi Arabia with the Air Force prepared me well for working in multicultural education. I enjoyed it very much until multiculturalism became politicized. I was grateful to get out of the human development area.

Obviously, my career has been quite different from what I had expected it to be at the beginning. It is ironic that one who was so enthused about the historical and philosophical foundations of education and one with excellent training in that area would have so little opportunity to work in it during a thirty-four-year career. Nevertheless, my career has been a rewarding one in many ways.

Working with students, particularly the good ones, is a pleasure. Reading and writing about things of personal interest while preparing for the annual meetings of this organization has afforded me an enormous amount of satisfaction as has the social interaction at the meetings. I firmly believe that this professional society has attracted many of the very best members of the American professoriate. I genuinely appreciate your friendship and scholarly influence.

I find it a sobering thing to contemplate the significance of my career. Each time I do so I am reminded of the old saying about putting one's fist in a pail of water then pulling it out and seeing how big of a hole remains. I expect that pretty accurately describes my influence! I do hope, however, that there are a few former students out in the schools who are a little more appreciative of their profession and a little less bigoted towards those who are different than they might have been without my courses. The only tangible evidence of my career is the Gallery of Great Educators on the

second floor of Matthews Hall and the location of a large bronze Eagle statue on the campus of North Texas. The Eagle is likely to be a permanent fixture. I don't know how long the Gallery of Great Educators will last. It is all that is offered in the history of education at North Texas!

At the end of my career, I am greatly concerned about a number of things in education and in society at large. I am concerned that administration in all facets of society has ceased to be a means to an end and has become the end in itself. Large impersonal bureaucracies spend many hours and enormous financial resources in developing unnecessarily large and complex policy manuals, doing strategic planning, and holding administrative retreats which have minimum positive effect on getting the job done. Those in the trenches doing the job have little opportunity for input into the making of administrative decisions. On the modern university campus such input, even when supplied through official channels such as a faculty senate or faculty grievance committees, is considered strictly advisory and is accepted or rejected at the whim of the administrators. The necessity for making profits exerts some control on business administrators, but those in government and education have no such restraints.

In education I am greatly concerned about the fascination with paradigms and the assumption that every worthy person in a given situation must follow the same approved paradigm. In order to gain tenure and/or promotion on virtually any campus today, a person must fit a given teaching, research, service paradigm. There is so little common sense left in academe that the paradigm is the same at an Ivy League institution or at the University of North Texas. We all know that in personnel decisions poor teaching can hurt an individual, but good teaching can do one no good unless there is an adequate number of refereed journal articles. Now the proper teaching paradigm must include technology, meaning computers. The best teaching technology I have ever seen was a piece of chalk in the hand of Clifton Hall! Today there would be no place on the campus for a Clifton Hall, a Harold Benjamin, or an Edgar Knight. At least they would never be promoted or given a merit raise! They were characters possessed of great confidence in their own abilities. They were permitted to use those abilities and their unique personalities to motivate learning in their students. Their activities were not restricted by some exterior paradigm. Today professors are advised by their administrators to be smart and do only those things for which they will be

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given points by the personnel affairs committee. Don't waste time doing things that don't count, even if they are valuable activities. Do nothing for which you won't get credit. This is the antithesis of one of my favorite maxims. "There is no limit to the amount of good a person can do if he/she doesn't care who gets the credit." I am grateful that Clifton Hall was not restricted by the paradigm! Incidentally, I have refused to bend to the paradigm. That's why it took so many years for me to become a full professor and why my current salary is lower than that of most full professors. But I have maintained my integrity!

I am concerned that our institutions of higher learning are no longer interested in producing the educated person in the classical sense. Liberal education is dead. Specialization is emphasized to such an extent that most recipients of academic degrees see little or no relationship between their academic area and other disciplines. Nor are they able to consider their own discipline against the backdrop of human history or its contributions to Western civilization. Few of today's students seem interested in seeking the true, the good, and the beautiful.

Most are simply seeking a diploma or a degree in order to become gainfully employed at a higher salary than they could otherwise obtain. Seldom do I see a student who seems genuinely interested in the pursuit of an abstract idea.

Perhaps my greatest concern is that we now spend so much time and effort emphasizing and preparing for change that we seriously neglect the permanent. Many in the academic world and in the society at large have become convinced that the only permanent thing is change. I am absolutely convinced that not all change represents progress. I am likewise convinced that the most important things in existence are the enduring, unchanging things--the eternal verities. I realize that this places me in the company of Idealists, Realists, and Thomists. This doesn't bother me at all. I can defend their absolutes and universals not only through revealed religion, but also in a pragmatic way. It seems to me that the pragmatic rule of evaluating phenomena on the basis of their results orients one much more readily to an objectivist metaphysics than it does to a positivistic world-view where truth and value are in a constant state of flux.

In his book, *Ten Philosophical Mistakes*, Mortimer Adler suggests that in the realm of ethical or moral values, rejection of absolutes and universals reduces the whole enterprise to a matter of opinion. In the area of

subjective opinion all views are equally acceptable since there are no genuinely authoritative guidelines for evaluation. Consider what has happened in American society since the Ten Commandments have become simply the ten suggestions. There have been significant increases in the divorce rate, in teen-age pregnancies, in drug use and abuse, in teen-age runaways, in juvenile violence, in spousal abuse, in armed robbery, in homicides, and in lawbreaking in general. From a pragmatic point-of-view, is this what is wanted? Certainly there was some lawlessness when the Judeo-Christian ethic was quite generally accepted in our society. But it was never rampant as it has been during the past thirty years or so. Those who violated the moral codes admitted to being sinners and sensed they would be held accountable. Today they deny any guilt or responsibility. Old-fashioned sin has become a fashionable alternative lifestyle!

In the early 1980s Senator Gary Hart was driven from the presidential race by sexual peccadillos much less severe than those of Bill Clinton who was elected president in 1992 and reelected in 1996. Despite his scandal-ridden administration, Clinton today enjoys popular support of nearly two-thirds of the electorate. About three weeks ago Tim Russert of NBC News was asked to explain Clinton's popularity. He replied, "Everyone knows that he is a rogue, but they think he is a likeable rogue." What a dreadful commentary on contemporary American society when people are happy to have a rogue in the White House!

Until a year ago I was at a total loss when trying to understand Clinton's chameleon-like approach to the issues. I just couldn't figure out how he could change his position so rapidly with no concern at all for what he had previously said or even promised. Last year at this meeting someone presented a paper on post-modernism that I thought I understood. It explained how postmodernists deconstruct and reconstruct their reality on an ongoing basis. Eureka! Clinton is simply a post-modernist!

I close my professional career totally confident that all human efforts to explain the metaphysical, epistemological, and axiological questions are superfluous if they do not take into account natural law and divine commandment. No amount of deconstructing and reconstructing will set aside the immutable will of God. The last time we met in Fayetteville, Arkansas, Jim Bolding, that delightful statistician and moralist, said he tried to live a Christian life because he didn't want to take a chance on going to the other side and find

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that he had

committed a Type 2 Error. I commend his logic! I sincerely believe that if every person would diligently seek to learn the will of God and strive mightily to live in accordance with it, the ills of the world would be resolved.

May I close with the words of Jacob, a Book of Mormon prophet, that I think might well be inscribed at the entrance of every academic building or, at least, placed upon the desk of every professor?

O the vainness, and the frailties, and foolishness of men! When they are learned they think they are wise, and they hearken not unto the counsel of God, for they set it aside, supposing they know of themselves, where-fore, their wisdom is foolishness and it profiteth them not. And they shall perish. But to be learned is good if they hearken unto the counsels of God. (2 Nephi 9:28-29)

Fazzaro: What is Normal? An Inquiry . . .

What is Normal?

An Inquiry Into the Relation Between Scientific Reasoning, Education, and Social Order

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September 1997

Introduction

The adjective *normal* is common in everyday discourse. It might be used to describe what kind of day it is ("I've had a *normal* day") or to describe a particular physical characteristic ("Her height is *normal*") or, more importantly for this discussion, a characteristic that is not directly observable ("She has *normal* intelligence"). The signifier *normal* is derived from its parent noun *norm*. Out of context and in its most general form, *norm*, according to *Oxford English Dictionary*, signifies "a standard model, pattern, type." The tenth edition of *Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary* goes further and defines *norm* as an "*authoritative* [emphasis added] standard, model, principle of right action, average, [or] rule." At first glance one might focus on only the noun equivalents--"model," "pattern," "principle," "average," or "rule." But to be equivalent each of these nouns must be supplemented by the adjective "authoritative," which is derived from its noun form *authority* and defined as a person or body of persons given the ground or warrant to make a claim. In short, *norm* must always be viewed through the transparent supplement *authority*. What effect does this deeply embedded supplement--*authority*--have on social, political, economic, and, especially, education discourses within which both the notion *norm* and its variant *normal* are central? What role has the notion *normal* played in fulfilling or suppressing the human emancipation side of the Enlightenment ideal? In particular for this paper, as an archetype of like notions, what role does the notion *normal* have in American public education discourse in light of the relations between education, democracy, and liberation (freedom to choose a "good life") at the end of the Twentieth century? This paper is an archaeological and genealogical inquiry into these questions.

Law and Order

One cannot inquire into the abstract notions of democracy and liberation without first understanding

that these notions are conditioned by the structure (relationship) of humans in a particular society. The overall complex structure of a society is constituted by the interaction of at least three broadly defined structures--*social*, *economic*, and *political*. Each of these structures is likewise conditioned by a set of interacting substructures. For example, the social structure is constituted by a variety of substructures including, but not limited to, family, church, education, and all dimensions of what generally might be called *culture*.

As we have come to know them through the long history of humankind, societies establish both formal and informal *laws* to regulate (*order*) structures. Assuming that stable societies could be placed along a continuum of *law*, at one extreme would be those societies that require the most elaborate code of formal laws to secure their structures. Here, order is maintained through many technologies of coercion (including death) justified in formal, codified laws. At the other extreme of the continuum would be societies that have no formal laws. Here, order exists because the nature of the social structure has become universally and "voluntarily" accepted. But Roberto Calasso reminds us that, in and of itself, a system of formal *laws* does not equal *order*. He argues that the equation is, *Law + Sacrifice = Order*.¹

In this equation *Law* is a formal technology (a technique, strategy, method to accomplish an objective) employed to maintain *Order*. In times of violent revolution (i.e., the French Revolution) one or more significant groups in a society believe that the equation is unbalanced, their *Sacrifice* too great. The aim of social revolution is to change one or all three components of the equation in order to compensate for the perceived inequities inherent in the *Sacrifice* being required to maintain the existing *Order*. On the other hand, in societies that endure for very long periods without open, hostile revolution, *Sacrifice* is made

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willingly in the service of *Order* and, except for voiceless minorities, is accepted by all regardless of social and/or economic status. That is, in stable societies there are law-like, deeply held beliefs that justify *Sacrifice*. This is the condition of the Gramscian notion of hegemony.

Hegemony in the Service of Order

Gramsci believed that hegemony was influenced by leadership and consent, not by domination and coercion. In this view, hegemony has to do with how one social group influences other social groups by making certain compromises with them to gain their consent for leadership (authority) in the society as a whole.² In this regard, hegemony operates at the level of consciousness and is the automatic reflection of the "deeper" social and economic processes within a culture. Gramsci conceived culture as all aspects that constitute man's humanness, and the instrument of hegemony to be language (as discourse) operating through education in its broadest sense.³ If this is the case, then how do relatively stable socially and economically stratified societies maintain *Order* under the guise of democracy? For example, in the United States, where freedom of choice in seeking the "good life" is a core value, *Order* is often characterized officially in terms of three broad hierarchical categories of Social Economic Status (SES)--Upper, Middle, and Lower. These categories have remained relatively stable over generations despite the fact that over at least the last generation the percentage of the population controlling most of the wealth has been constantly shrinking (It has been estimated that presently 10 percent of the U.S. population controls 90 percent of the wealth). Assuming that universal, compulsory education contributes to the constitution and maintenance of a society's social, political, economic, and cultural *norms*, then what are the hegemonic (law-like) notions operating as technologies within American public education that contribute to both establishing and maintaining social and economic division, isolation, and hierarchy that transcend generations?

Establishing and Maintaining Socioeconomic Structures

As Michel Foucault has thoroughly documented, in modern, stable industrial societies socioeconomic structures are forged and maintained through a transparent, discursive carceral network of productive disciplinary technologies.⁴ That is, technologies intended to ultimately transform the body into a positive productive force. Foucault argues that the

transformation to the modern political economy of the body occurred historically in three stages. The first stage began in Medieval times and extended well into the seventeenth century. Control over the bodies of those who transgress social norms, such as criminals and the insane, was through exclusion, including death, abandonment, and, later, confinement. The second stage, which took place in what Foucault calls the Classical period, generally parallels the Enlightenment. While continuing the first stage practices of exclusion and confinement, the emphasis in the second stage was on correcting the morals of transgressors through work, training, and education.

The third stage began about the early part of the nineteenth century and extends to the present. Here the correction of transgressors is no longer concerned primarily with pastoral moral transformation through work, training, and education. The range of technologies is expanded by combining the forces of the technologies of the first two stages. This provided intellectual space for the newly developing modern human sciences. That is, once isolated, confined, and subjected to technologies of moral transformation, those confined in instructional spaces, including prisoners, the insane, those in the military, and students in schools, were convenient subjects for study and analyses. Although all three stages depend to a large extent on the discursive nature of architecture (e.g., prisons, asylums, the factory floor, hospitals, military barracks, and schools), only the third stage, because it is dominated by technologies of control legitimated through the human sciences, is predominantly linguistically discursive. This allows for the exclusive supervision and control of what counts as knowledge about humans in the hands of the human science professionals, including educators. It is at this stage that control of the body as a productive force becomes a political economy. That is, because politics is the allocation of values and resources in a society, the order represented in socioeconomic structures ultimately is an expression of a dominant socioeconomic ideology maintained through the political control of discourse, in particular, the discourse of what counts as knowledge.

The Notion *Normal* as a Technology of Order

One among many of the modern technologies of order is the notion *normal*. Operating as an intellectual *norm* through schooling practices, the notion *normal* is a productive disciplinary technology transformed into a cultural moral *norm* not to be transgressed. This transformation takes place in America, at least, because

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the social system is driven, in part, by the cultural economic moral imperative of individual performance embedded within a Puritan work ethic, which has become a central aspect of our "civic religion." As an internalized cultural moral *norm*, the notion *normal* operates as a technology for affecting the inner-disciplining of the *self* necessary for one's complete hegemonic normalization into an existing social system.⁵ In regard to hierarchically stratified social systems, the notion *normal* is not intended to justify inclusion but, instead, exclusion. But what is the epistemological spine of what passes for legitimate pedagogical knowledge that informs modern schooling practices? Although the answer to this question lies ultimately in Kant's attempt to join the synthetic knowledge of empiricism and the analytic knowledge of rationalism, what passes for legitimate knowledge after this event is the focus of this discussion. That knowledge is science, which occupies a broad intellectual plateau resting on a common set of assumptions. Although the intellectual territory claimed by science is divided into three broad areas--physical, biological, and human--the historically defined chain of fundamental scientific reasoning goes from physics to biology to the human sciences.

The Epistemology of Modernity: An Archaeology

In general, the power of science is not in its claim to explain the present in terms of some observed past or present events, but that this claim is, in fact, a prediction of the future. This is so because scientists state theories, hypotheses, and, ultimately, laws not from observing *all* events of a particular phenomenon in question, but only a limited number of past and present events. From this limited set of observations predictions are made about all such events, including those that might occur in the future. From these predictions, actions are often taken to structure a world according to some ideological view.

But modern historians of science such as Georges Canguilhem and Thomas Kuhn have shown us that the quest for truth through science has not been continuous but, instead, punctuated by the correction of successive errors. Consequently, what presently constitutes scientific knowledge (truth) is only the most recent error. Foucault recognizes that

. . . if the history of science is discontinuous, that is, if it can be analyzed only as a series of "corrections," as a new distribution of true and false which never finally, once and for all, liberates the truth, it is because there, too, "error" constitutes not overlooking or delaying a truth but the dimension

proper to the life of men and the time of the species.⁶

Although the temporal valorization of error presents some moral and ethical problems in physics and chemistry, any such problems are compounded in biology and, especially, the *human* sciences. This is so because the central focus of physics and chemistry is analysis at the fundamental level of the interaction of the material substances. Consequently, at least at the beginning of investigations in physics and chemistry both life and death are never concerns because they are moral and political issues; therefore, they are, at base, issues of philosophy not of science.

The role of biology, on the other hand, is to analyze the processes of living beings.⁷ In his introduction to Canguilhem classic book, *The Normal and the Pathological*, a history of the biological sciences, Foucault explains that

. . . for the physicist a genetic mutation is neither more nor less than substitution of one nucleic acid base for another. But it is in this very difference that the biologist recognizes the mark of his object. An object of a type to which he himself belongs, since he lives and he manifests the nature of the living being, he exercises it, he develops it in an activity of knowledge which must be understood as a "general method for the direct or indirect resolution of tensions between man and the environment." The biologist must grasp what makes life a specific object of knowledge and thereby what makes it such that there are at the heart of living beings, because they are living beings, some beings susceptible to knowing, and, in the final analysis, to knowing life itself.⁸

Concerning the historically situated nature of moral and ethical concerns in biological science, Canguilhem notes that, "When disease is considered as an evil, therapy is given for a re valorization; when disease is considered a deficiency or excess, therapy consists in compensation."⁹

Moral and ethical concerns are multiplied even further in the human sciences. This is so because central to the human sciences--in particular psychology--is the exclusive dependence on hypothesizing about the unseen. That is, in attempting to analogically mirror quantum physics, the human sciences hypothesize that, like the traces of atomic particles in a cloud chamber, selected observable physical human manifestations are traces of deviations from an assumed "normal"

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psychological state. Not unlike the physical sciences, the problem with this reasoning is that, through the circulation and valorization of “professionalized” discourse, hypotheses in the human sciences can assume to transcend subjectivity, thus elevating them to the status of universal *laws of nature*. These “laws” become part of institutional practices in the form of technologies designed to effectively engineer the futures of selected humans. But the social sciences, in particular, cannot escape language and all of its subjectivity. Although his work was generally ignored until the 1960s when it was reexamined by those engaged in what has become to be known as postmodern inquiry, Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), at the end of the nineteenth century reminded us of the subjective nature of the language of science.

Scientists do no better when they say 'force moves, force causes' and such like, --all our science, in spite of its coolness and freedom from emotion, still stands exposed to the seduction of language and has ridded itself of the changelings foisted upon it, the 'subjects' (the atom is, for example, just such a changeling, likewise the Kantian 'thing-in-itself');¹⁰

Human Science Research

Like the research in the physical sciences, research in the human sciences is used to justify authoritative universal claims contingent on its promise of ultimate truth. Also, like the physical science, this search is not linear and continuous. It is, instead, only a series of partial modifications, never a complete recapitulation of the fundamental assumptions of science itself. As such, the human sciences continually authenticate themselves through the sovereignty acquired only analogically from physics, leaving open the possibility for a form of reasoning that is at once dogmatic and despotic. But what is the nature of the epistemological links between the physical and human sciences that allows the human sciences to be so powerful in shaping human lives?

Although one might mark the beginning of modern science with Galileo, or Kepler, or Harvey, or Francis Bacon, or Newton, or Hobbes and his mechanistic world view, the actual beginning is of little concern here. For this discussion, the beginning of the history of the modern human sciences that help explain how the notion *normal* acquired its transcendent quality can be marked by the work of Adolphe Quetelet (1796-1874). His work, when linked to that of Francis Galton (1822-1911), James Clerk Maxwell (1831-1879), Ludwig Boltzmann (1844-1906), Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), and Karl Pearson (1857-1936), constitutes a

genealogy of discursive elements that presently operate as modern technologies of subjectification which when exercised through institutional practices contributes ultimately to human subjugation.

Adolphe Quetelet

By the beginning of the Nineteenth century, Western rationality, and its claim to universal validity, was in the service of a political hegemony consistent with the economic rationality of market capitalism--explained first by Adam Smith (1723-1780) then operationalized by David Ricardo (1772-1823). This system of economics was completely compatible with the then rapidly developing and expanding factory system that would require an ever-growing number of workers gathered in a single architecture to do repetitive tasks for many hours on end. This required a general transformation of the human from at least a quasi independent farmer that controlled the means of production to compliant productive workers with no legal claim to the means of production. This transformation was to take place over the better part of a century. First, descriptive numerical models of the physical man were constructed. Second, hypotheses were formulated about what the models represented. Lastly, the hypotheses themselves became the knowledge of technologies to transform docile bodies into productive ones.

The first reported use of descriptive mathematics to analyze an accumulation of data about purely physical human attributes was in 1662 by John Graunt (1620-1674). Graunt pioneered the use of what became known as “political arithmetic” for the purpose of formulating good public policy. To this end, he wrote:

That whereas the Art of Governing, and the true Politicks, is how to preserve the Subject of Peace and Plenty; that men study only that part of it which teacheth how to supplant and over-reach one another, and how, not by fair out-running but tripping up each other's heels, to win the Prize.

Now, the Foundation or Elements of this honest harmless Policy is to understand the Land, and the Hands of the Territory, to be governed according to all their intrinsic [sic] and accidental differences.¹¹

But almost two hundred years passed before Quetelet, in the early part of the nineteenth century, would use descriptive mathematics to make judgements about non physical (unseen) attributes from purely observable (seen) physical characteristics.

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Quetelet was an astronomer by education and training. But he was to gain his fame by applying mathematical calculation in the form of the "astronomical error law" to a wide variety of physical data about humans. The error law was represented in the now familiar bell-shaped curve. The statistical concept represented by this curve would be standardized much later by the famous statistician Karl Pearson as the "Normal curve."¹² But long before this, Quetelet would have already used "average man" (*l'homme moyen*) in his depiction of physical measurements such as chest size, weight, and heights.

It was in his analysis of data representing the heights of conscripts into the French army that Quetelet first made judgements about a non material human attribute, *morals*. Upon plotting the frequencies of the heights of a very large sample of conscripts for the French military, Quetelet found a bimodal curve. To the left of the larger mode was a smaller mode representing the frequency of those conscripts that would be deemed not tall enough for military service. Quetelet's belief in an irrefutable social physics led him to conclude that the curve should not be bimodal but, instead, be the near-perfect bell-shaped curve of the error law. He concluded that what caused the smaller mode was not some natural, physical irregularity in the continuous range of heights, but something that the conscripts near enough to the exclusion height did to corrupt the measurements. That is, somehow these men nefariously deceived the examiners (they cheated) in order to avoid conscription into the army. Consequently, to explain an apparent anomaly in his notion of social physics to which he was committed, Quetelet went from evaluating a directly observable (seen) physical characteristic (height) to making a judgement about something he could not directly observe (unseen) character disposition (*morals*). Quetelet's analysis was later shown to be inaccurate because his bimodal curve did not represent a single homogeneous population but, in fact, two somewhat distinct populations, one on average shorter than the other. But because of his reputation, Quetelet's analysis in this case allowed for similar analyses in the future. Quetelet's intellectual leap across the metaphysical abyss separating science and philosophy would prove to be vitally useful to those who would champion human engineering on "scientific" grounds.

Sir Francis Galton

The next vertebrate in the epistemological spine of the modern human sciences was the work of Sir Francis Galton. Galton, a cousin of Charles Darwin (1809-

1882), is perhaps best known as the father of eugenics. But for the case at hand, Galton's contribution to statistical analysis and the discourse of the human sciences are far more important. Although Galton respected Quetelet for his use of the error law, he disagreed with applying the error law to human variations as would a physicist to explain everything exceptional as a flaw.¹³ That is, Quetelet used the error law to explain deviations from the expected. Galton, instead, turned his attention to applying the statistical methods to analyze the nature of real variation *within* data, not explain it away. In doing so he would more firmly give authority to reasons for differences that *exclude* one from the expected of the error law. But Galton would contribute even more.

In the 1800s, as Foucault documented, the intent of the human sciences was to improve the human character by manipulating the physical environment within which one functioned. Galton rejected this notion. Instead, he believed that "social worth" was a function of biology and that biological determinants alone accounted generally for differences in income and wealth. In advocating this explanation of poverty, and because of his scholarly reputation, Galton is recognized as the person who added the terminology of the nature-nurture binary to the human sciences discourse.¹⁴

Lastly, although it was not necessarily his explicit intention, through his work Galton helped too more firmly link the imprimatur of the fundamental authority of physics to the human sciences. Almost simultaneously with physicists James Clerk Maxwell in 1873 and Ludwig Boltzmann in 1872, Galton in 1869 proposed that a large indiscriminate sample of a particular population (people for Galton, gas molecules for Maxwell, and molecules related to kinetic theory for Boltzmann) could accurately represent that population. All three came to this conclusion based on the work of social statisticians like Quetelet. Galton, in particular, reasoned that although not perfect in principle, the social statistics analogy for analyzing large populations was reliable in practice.¹⁵

Karl Pearson

The work of Karl Pearson and his contribution to statistical analysis are significant indeed. Although he now is likely to be known only for his method of calculating the correlation coefficient (Pearson product-moment r), his work singularly established the foundation for the entire field of mathematical statistics when he defined the central problem of statistics as the form of *natural distributions*.¹⁶ From this he invented

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terminology to describe his notions. It was this terminology that compounded the impact of his statistical thinking on effacing human subjectivity.

In his first statistical paper in 1894, Pearson coined the term "normal curve" to describe a perfect binomial distribution around a mean. In his words, "When a series of measurements gives rise to a *normal curve* [emphasis added], we may probably assume something approaching a stable condition; there is production and destruction impartially around the mean."¹⁷ But his notion of normalcy was not to be confined to merely to statistical calculations. His much grander scheme, as Theodore M. Porter describes, was to create a "statistical biology as a basis of effective eugenics and, concomitantly, the development of a mathematical statistics that could be applied to virtually all areas of human knowledge."¹⁸ The newly developing field of Education was no to be spared. By the 1950s, the belief in the power of mathematical statistics centered on the notion of the "normal curve" dominated the entire field of education research. It seemed that the field of Education capitulated entirely to the notion that learning, as all other human behaviors, could be explained in strictly objective, material terms.

Important in establishing a connection between physics and the human sciences is another notion essential to the interpretation of statistical data. That notion is *standard deviation*. Pearson developed this notion not in examining biological data but from an analogy with the "spin" or "swing radius" or "moment of inertia" of a bar balanced on a rough pivot and with weights at various locations from the point nearest the pivot to the two ends of the bar. Galton goes on to describe the rest of the experiment:

[I]f the bar is set rotating on the given rough pivot at a given speed, friction will bring it to rest in a certain time. Now the greater concentration of weights about the pivot, the sooner the bar comes to rest; the farther out from the pivot the weights are, the longer it takes to come to rest. In other words, the time the bar takes to come to rest is a measure such as we are seeking of the concentration or scattering of the weights along the range. . . . Now physicists tell us that this time is proportional to the square of a certain quantity termed the spin--or term radius, and which I will denote by the Greek letter ρ is then shown to be the mean of the squares of all the individual deviations, and in our quantitative study of evolution ρ^2 is termed the *standard deviation*.¹⁹

The power of Pearson's scientific and statistical reasoning and its pervasive acceptance into the broader culture can be seen in his 3 May 1936 obituary in the *New York Herald Tribune*. After giving Pearson "credit" for his fame to the "unrespectable" science of eugenics and his classic book *The Grammar of Science*, the obituary goes on the say:

His enduring fame probably will rest, however, on his shaping of the new science of statistics his proof that even though one knows almost nothing of a single object one can learn much from many objects of the same kind.²⁰

To Pearson's credit, the obituary goes on to absolve him of any misuse of his statistical work that is so prevalent today in such distortions as Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray's 1994, *The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life*.²¹

The first third of Pearson's life in science he was trying to get these statistical methods used at all. The second third he spent trying to get scientists not to misuse them. During the last third he tried to apply them himself to the difficult problems of human heredity. . . . In [all] these [scientific] fields if any man has kept figures from lying or made liars more careful about their figuring Karl Pearson is that man.²²

Clearly the assumption of normality is central to the most powerful statistical techniques. For example, in 1938 the statistician A. E. Waugh wrote, "Many phenomena of biology, economics, psychology, education, etc., even though not exactly normal in distribution, can be described roughly by the normal curve."²³ This notion was not lost on those whose work would eventually have profound effects on schooling practices, in particular Alfred Binet (1857-1911) and his claim to be able to measure human intelligence. Once translated into a numerical quotient, measures of intelligence were used to justify division, separation, and hierarchal stratification. But, like Pearson, others also were concerned for the misuse of statistics. For example, as early as 1891, F.W. Bain wrote, "The planning away of all gnarled and knotty characteristics, the reducing each individual too precisely the same external appearance. This is the essence and the consequence of the impulse to normalism."²⁴

The Confluence of the Discourses of Subjectification

By the time the signifier "normal curve" entered the discourse of the human sciences other discourses that were using statistical mathematics to analyze data about

human behaviors were set to find many uses for it. At the turn of the century Frederick Winslow Taylor (1856-1915) applied scientific rationality and statistical analysis to efficiently structure manufacturing processes. This proved to be significant for the institution of public education.²⁵ Ellwood P. Cubberley (1868-1941) and Franklin Bobbitt (1876-1956) would, in turn, find Taylor's work important in forging a foundation for both structuring and managing schools already architecturally structured by the ubiquitous "Quincy box" in virtually every community that could claim a graded public school. School administration would find even greater use for statistical analysis in the 1950s when it turned to social science theories for explaining the intricate dynamics of school administration. This is not to ignore the widespread use of the notion *normal* in the birth of intelligence testing around the turn of the century and later "standardized" achievement testing. The interpretation of these mental assessment "instruments" is likely to be in terms of some notion of *normality*.

Regardless of its use, the notion *normal* carries the mark of *authority* both for the "professional" speaker and the transcendent quality ascribed to the notion because of its connection to mathematics and science. Its power to exclude is not only significant for those deemed *normal* on some criterion, but more importantly for those deemed somewhat less than *normal*. When applied by an institution such as

education, being assigned a label signifying a deficiency is paramount to branding with a scarlet letter warning all others of the deficiency, albeit often no more than a discursive invention of well intended but misguided "professionals."

Conclusions

At the close of the twentieth century, after several centuries of waiting for the promises of scientific reasoning to bring about the full expression of the human emancipation side of the Enlightenment discourse, attitudes about science are everywhere uncertain at best. Granted, science has, at least temporarily, halted the spread of organisms of mass death, given humankind means of rapid transportation and communication, and extended our life-span, which we seem to squander in overcrowded shopping malls, gazing hollow-eyed at television or into the ever-changing visual environment of computer screens. But is humankind today generally and significantly more emancipated than our forebears? Have we asked too much of science? Because its foundations are rooted in the materiality of nature, science leaves no space in its rationality for morals and ethics. I doubt that many in the Western world, at least, including myself, would want to live in a world without science. But is it now time to relegate to science only the seen materiality of life and to philosophy to the discourse of morals, ethics, and emancipation?

ENDNOTES

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- 2 Anne Showstack Sasson, ed. *Approaches to Gramsci* (London, UK: Writers and Readers Publishing Cooperative, Ltd., 1982), 13.
- 3 Walter L. Adamson, *Hegemony, Philosophy, and Culture in the Young Gramsci* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1980), 51.
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- 7 For a very good brief discussion of these differences see Edward C. Moore, "Introduction: Charles S. Peirce and the Philosophy of Science," in *Charles S. Peirce and the Philosophy of Science*, ed. Edward C.

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- 9 Canguilhem, 275.
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- 12 Porter, 311-312.
- 13 Porter, 128.
- 14 Porter, 129-130.
- 15 Porter, 112.
- 16 Porter, 307.
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- 18 Porter, 311.
- 19 Karl Pearson, *The Grammar of Science*, 2nd edition (London, UK: Adams and Charles Black, 1900), 386-387.
- 20 "Karl Pearson," *New York Herald Tribune*, 3 May 1936, sec. II-I, p. 6.
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- 22 Karl Pearson,"*New York Herald Tribune*.
- 23 A. E. Waugh wrote in *Elementary Statistical Method* vi, 94.
- 24 F. W. Bain in *Antichrist*, ii (1891): 113.
- 25 For a full discussion see the classic, Raymond E. Callahan, *Education and the Cult of Efficiency: A Study of the Social Forces that have Shaped the Administration of Public Schools* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

SOME RANDOM THOUGHTS OF A CURMUDGEON

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It has been my wont to be preoccupied with word analysis at the beginning of a paper of this kind.¹ And habits are difficult to shake; further, there may be some merit in holding to certain kinds of habits. So, let me state at the outset that the word "curmudgeon" at least (so I hope) isn't entirely apropos in this instance.²

One of the first "random thoughts" which occurs to me is the rapid drift toward hi-tech--a drift mainly encompassing computers and all the technological marvels which are somehow related to computers. And while I recognize that no more can we live in our world without these "marvels," at the same time I ask the rather obvious question: Does, what has across the years been tabbed as "material progress," automatically add up to human progress?

Many of you, my listeners and/or readers, will recognize that I am leaning in the direction of a discussion of so-called "cultural lag." Yes, indeed, I am leaning in that direction! And although I have never looked upon Newsweek magazine as some kind of a bible-for-intellectuals, I confess that one of the most cogent statements I have read along these lines was authored by Meg Greenfield in her column, "The Last Word," appearing in Newsweek for January 27, 1997. This thoughtful woman titled her piece, "Back to the Future." And her sophistication was reflected in an historic context, mentioning such true seminal thinkers as Leonardo the renaissance man par-excellence, and Alfred Lord Tennyson of more recent historic times. Humanists they both were--and without overworking the term, she zeroed in upon such thinkers and their contributions, and then makes the pointed statement: "What I am saying is that the humanists' insights will probably always be more to the point than the imagery of technological marvels yet to be." Meg, being more of a journalist than a professional student of our culture, never got into professional jargon; but she is just as sharp as the real pros, as witness one of her follow-up statements: "There are not and never can be any scientific rules whereby we can perfect ourselves the way we perfect certain objects and processes in the physical world."³ Meg has a point!

A second "random thought" I have decided to

examine is the one which a couple of well-known authors have tabbed "The Manufactured Crisis."⁴ Although I admit at this point in time (April 1997, while working on the rough draft of my remarks, I have not read the book in its entirety) much of the well-nigh hysteria which has accompanied the negative criticism of American public education, precisely fits the title which Messrs. Berliner and Biddle chose as a headline for their opus.⁵

Most of my listeners and/or readers are probably tired of hearing about "the reform of education"--and so I will try not to labor the point; however, if we are to remain in some logical context, we cannot completely escape analysis of terms. And according to the definition of "reform" with which I am familiar, the foregoing term adds up to something closely related to social and/or political action, leading to the improvement of the overall living conditions of humankind. In other words, we become more civilized.⁶ Irrespective of my analysis of this meaning of "reform," I hasten to add that we who may be referred to as "liberals," admit that we don't have a monopoly on the precise definition of English usage.

I believe that it is viable to state that "reform" within the context of the widespread criticism of American education, has almost universally been interpreted in quantitative terms, such as test scores on standardized, so-called "objective exams." Under the circumstances, it appears to be warranted to quote the late, great Bill Drake, who uttered the following remarks some years ago, but alas, the quote still seems apropos:

The mastery of the scientific and technological information which is to lay the groundwork for the new social order, even though involving the assimilation of great quantities of data, can be accepted as a simple task when compared with the problems confronting man as a moral and political being. There will be constant pressure for efficiency, precision, adjustment and conformity as contrasted with the need for love, understanding, personal freedom, self-esteem and a sense of creative worth.⁷

Inevitably, the pros-and-cons which are involved in

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the rhetoric regarding the issue of whether public education in the United States "is all that bad," does take on subjective considerations. The reason for this is quite obvious--in short, if we who are interested in such problems accept the original postulate of the opposition, then the implication is that such acceptance is an admission on our part that the opposition is on solid ground. In short, so it is argued, "The test scores prove that public education in the United States is falling behind the education which young folks are receiving in other nations." Well, we don't accept their reasoning to the effect that these kinds of "test scores" are all that matter in determining whether or not students are being educated.⁸

To this author and consistent with the above statements, it seems inevitable that if we are to make progress in bringing together, at least to some extent, the various elements which have been involved in the debate regarding American public education, then as a starting point it must be admitted that the discussion must remain largely on the subjective level. Within this context, I will cite two commentators who are representative of what we think about whether or not public education in the United States has indeed failed:

"Manufacturing a Crisis in Education" is the subhead provided by the authors as cited on page 2 of their opus, and they quote Clark Kerr, the well-known President Emeritus of the University of California (19912): "Seldom in the course of policymaking in the U.S. have so many firm convictions held by so many been based on so little convincing proof."⁹

And further:

Sir Norman Angell, the respected winner of a Nobel Peace Prize, in the course of a lecture at Ohio Wesleyan University while he was on the circuit presenting his reasoned approach to problems related to peace vis-a-vis war, commented on why it was that the vaunted educational program in Germany before Hitler, failed to prevent the rise of Naziism. His response, on this as well as on other occasions, was to the effect that the failure of the program in Germany was the failure of a system based almost exclusively on the learning of facts rather than upon a study of values.¹⁰

A final observation regarding the crisis (so-called) and those who have manufactured it: If such crises lack validity, ordinarily they die of their own weight. But don't count on it. Thus, those of us who have refused to be steamrollered have an obligation--inside and outside the classroom--to attempt in a balanced sort of way to

lend reasoned opposition to the bad-mouthing of public schools in the United States.

A third "random thought," and one which has generated considerable interest among educators, definitely including the present author, may be tabbed as Privatizing.¹¹ As is well known, the effort to "privatize" this and that is by no means limited to education. Even the President of the United States, Bill Clinton, has shown himself to be not above converting the White House into some kind of a motel; that is, if it will bring in piles of cash to support the Democratic Party, including his own, special reelection campaign endeavors.¹²

While our main concern is with educational issues, we should not ignore what is happening on the social/political front. As I am sure you are aware--since this is a nationwide problem--the evidence is daily increasing that those who are least able to defend themselves as program after program feels the brunt of the demise of governmental funding and "the return" to private sources, such as churches and the Salvation Army of all sorts of social services, it is children who are the main victims of present trends.

Although this is of significance to all of us, still of greater significance is to be found in developments on the educational front. The word "vouchers" kind of sums it up. If parents are permitted to send their children to any schools of the parents' choice, including permitting them to enter their kids in private schools with direct or indirect governmental help, then under these circumstances the public school as we have known it will go down the tubes. And if indeed such should occur, one of the fundamental cornerstones of our democratic way of life will also go down the tubes. Period.

Although there are plenty of "random thoughts" that are virtually begging for some considered attention, I will mention only one more: Violence in American life. Whether an observant citizen considers television and other so-called "escape hatches"; or whether one is simply reading the newspapers or watching the daily news-hours on television, it simply is inescapable that Americans are preoccupied with violence. And in some Freudian sense, they must indeed enjoy what is happening, otherwise they would find some way to turn it off!

However, I will not labor the point, at least, not in general terms. Rather, I will in retrospect return to a scene in this city of Dallas which occurred at 1:30 p.m.

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on November 22, 1963, when Lee Harvey Oswald assassinated John Fitzgerald Kennedy, the President of the United States of American.¹³

As a personal friend of Jack Kennedy's as well as an obvious admirer of his, I would not claim that William Manchester was 100 percent "objective" as he researched and as he was writing a remarkable opus. But who is 100 percent balanced and objective? Possibly, a zombie is such a "person." On the other side of the coin, I prefer one of John Dewey's comments--speaking of an aspect of pragmatism--truth is related to warranted assertability.¹⁴

Irrespective of what one may have thought about JFK's short tenure in the White House,¹⁵ I would guesstimate that historians will judge him, quite definitely, in a favorable light.¹⁶ And that is how I judge him. Oh, I am aware of the Bay of Pigs catastrophe in the very early part of his tenure, and there is his part in getting the Viet Nam War started by sending those "military advisors" out there. I am also aware of his extracurricular activities, so-called, in the moral realm. Still and all, when one considers his having served in the House of Representatives as well as the Senate before he occupied the White House, and the further fact that on both sides of his family, political instincts and behavior were so strong that one could virtually state that politics was in-the-blood of the Kennedys--and it is still in the blood of JFK's progeny!

'Twas well known by the youthful generation throughout the world that here was a man who represented them and, in the sense of public service, represented them very well. The outpouring of grief (accompanied by a copious flood of tears) as the news of our president's death was flashed around the world, may be only described as overwhelming! Perhaps at this point it is well to interpolate that what happened in Dallas on November 22, 1963 was not entirely unexpected. Indeed, JFK had been warned by a number of close friends and advisors not to go there, but he refused to accept the notion that there was any place in the USA where the president could not visit in relative safety.¹⁷

One criterion of genuine popularity expressed in crowd-response is reflected in the behavior of a massive gathering of persons--are these gathered together acting only intuitively, or do their feelings have greater depth? In the context of such an appraisal, there can be no doubt that as preparations were made for the funeral of President JFK, it became virtually impossible to make the kind of plans which, once made, would remain in

place. While formality was supposed to be "the order of the day"--such as finding answers to problems of proper protocol based on rank, etc. of various members of the diplomatic corps--ordinary citizens were not prepared to pay much attention to what the ranking authorities had planned. More likely was the feeling of Mr./Ms. ordinary citizens to prevail; such an attitude as, "He was our man and our president, and no one is going to prevent us from acting accordingly!" Thus as William Manchester has made clear in his remarkable opus, that which on the television tube seemed to viewers as a funeral ceremony which passed the test of efficient planning, was in actuality really something quite different.¹⁸

It is time to bring these random remarks to closure. Actually it might be stated that any one of the four topics with which I have dealt is a fit subject for extensive treatment. However, rather than solving any of the issues which I have raised, I have been motivated to generate some thinking and/or discussion regarding some problems concerning which there might be in the future be solutions. Indeed, if solutions are to be found, the United States would be a better place in which to live.

For whatever it may be worth, I will mention in synopsis the four major, "random thoughts" that have interested me--and I hope that likewise they have interested you: (1) Hi-tech: computers, etc. Does the rapid "race" all over the world toward more and more of it, mean absolutely that this kind of "material progress" inevitably lead to human progress? (2) Has there been a "manufactured crisis" facing our schools and education generally? My answer is YES. But that does not mean I expect everyone to agree with me. (3) With regard to my third topic, the effort to privatize educational institutions which are now public, it should be kept in mind that this problem, although an important one, is only part of a much broader problem including "welfare reform," so-called, and other endeavors motivated in the direction of undoing all sorts of programs which, in reality, date back to the FDR years and his New Deal. I don't mind stating that, although the privatizing endeavors may have modest and temporary results, the long-run effect whether in education or other institutions of our society, will be disastrous.¹⁹ (4) Violence in American life. On this one, I admit that I "bent over backwards" to make my point, when I chose the assassination of President John Fitzgerald Kennedy as a major illustration. I admit also that, possibly, a little progress has been made since that dark and threatening day in November of 1963 when a president at the peak

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of his powers was cut down in the coldest of cold blood. But as I wrote these lines, I was not only being emotional, I was stating some facts based upon the concentrated research of a respected historian. So, I am forced to reconsider whether progress has been made in combating violence as it asserts itself in the various walks of American life. May I state, finally, that in the foregoing comments I

have attempted to follow a kind of "Socratic approach"--in short, while I have raised a lot of questions, I do at the same time hope that the questions will generate some answers.

NOTES

- 1 While I am not a philosophical-analysis-type, I have nonetheless stated more than once that without careful use of words, philosophy becomes virtually impossible.
- 2 *Webster's New World Dictionary*, second college edition (Simon and Schuster, 1980), states that a curmudgeon is, "a surly, ill-mannered, bad-tempered person." While those who know me best of all (including my wife, Ruth) will agree that there's an element of truth to what Webster has stated--such persons will also state that this negative appraisal is not the total story. As the trite-but-true quote has it: "Nobody is perfect."
- 3 The quotes are on page 96 as per the above-cited date, and I doubt that I have quoted her out of context. The whole editorial is very much worth reading.
- 4 Cf. 1997 copyright--title as above indicated. Authors: David G. Berliner and Bruce J. Biddle.
- 5 It is generally known that this "reform movement," most of it in negative terms by its major author, Terrel Bell, got its birth in April of 1983 with the publication of *A Nation at Risk*. I had something to say, quite pointedly, at the meeting of SWPES, said gathering at the University of Oklahoma in November 1984. My remarks were published in the Proceedings of said organization in 1985, Dalton B. Curtis, Jr., Editor. Some kind of "hint" as to what I had to say may be found in my title: "Educational Ferment and Jacksonian Democracy." Suffice it to add that my approach to the Terrel Bell opus was approximately as negative as was his approach to American public education.
- 6 See *Webster's*, op. cit., pg. 1194 under reform. "Make better" is included frequently, as is: ". . . correction of faults or evils as in government or society."
- 7 Proceedings, op. cit., as above cited, pg. 210. In my remarks, I cited one of my favorite quotations--in this case 'twas Bill Drake's--but actually it's one of my favorite quotes. Period.
- 8 Is some kind of "quantitative analysis" necessary in making the assumption that a large segment of the public which is critical of our public schools are basing their criticisms upon various kinds of standardized test scores? I think not.
- 9 See *The Manufactured Crisis* (Longman Publishers, 1997) p. 2.
- 10 See *Proceedings of SW. Philosophy of Education Society* (1985) as previously indicated; the present author's citing of the remarks of Sir Norman Angell, p. 209.
- 11 One aspect of this issue is the historic one of the separation of church and state--at least so far as schooling is concerned. I happen to have a special interest in this question inasmuch as a law professor at the University of Montana, one Rob Natelson, has generated considerable heat (more heat than light, in my opinion) throughout the state by his public advocacy of measures to "return" to private control all sorts of programs which have been under the aegis of the government since the times of FDR's New Deal. And it follows that he is in favor of tax credits for those parents who send their kids to private schools. It also follows, quite naturally, that he sends his own children to private schools.

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- 12 As a registered Democrat (surprise?), it has been, I admit, a bit difficult to face up to certain trends in the Democratic Party leadership. But an important consideration in the context of the current milieu is the one of just plain honesty. And we who have supported the Democrats for lo these many years, should honestly admit that what has been occurring within Democratic circles since Bill Clinton entered the White House, at least to some extent, reflect the kind of double-dealing which we had hoped disappeared from the top levels of government once Richard Nixon met his political demise.
- 13 It seems very well established that Oswald murdered Jack Kennedy. Whether he was acting in a solo part, without any additional help whatever, has been debated from the day of the murder to the present day. The chief source of these remarks is the book by William Manchester, *The Death of a President* (NY, Harper and Row, 1967). As of now, April 1997, as I compose the rough draft of these remarks, I am trying not to take sides on various aspects of Jack Kennedy's presidency, including his assassination--was it indeed a solo act, or was Oswald "the center" of some conspiracy? Neither will I take sides regarding President Kennedy's policies, foreign and domestic, during the relatively short time during which our first Roman Catholic President occupied the White House--that is, I'll not take sides other than to state that I voted for him, and sans a few "mistakes," I supported him both before and subsequent to his entering the White House. I will further state that the Manchester book--written with the full approval, indeed the invitation of his widow, Jacqueline--is one of the finest books (fiction or nonfiction) that I have ever read! As a student and teacher of history, I stand in awe of the documentation, based upon years of intensive research, that this volume has provided.
- 14 Clearly, Dewey was not the only pragmatist who leaned strongly toward the use of "warranted assertability." Some of the left-leaning reconstructions also were attracted to this term.
- 15 Jan. 20 of 1961 to Nov. 22 of 1963 is less than three years.
- 16 The point is worth making that during his first two years as President, JFK had to "work" with a Republican majority in the Congress. Then in the election of 1962, this was turned around in the direction of the Democrats. Subsequently, his program of social reform on the domestic front and the effort to come to terms with the Soviet Union in the attempt to slow down the proliferation of nuclear armaments--these policies which may be clearly defined as "liberal," came to a halt when the President was cut down. (A qualification is in order: "Came to a halt" isn't quite accurate. When Lyndon Johnson succeeded to the Presidency, most of JFK's proposals for legislative action regarding domestic issues, were passed under LBJ's leadership. But the war in Viet Nam was escalated. What might have happened regarding Viet Nam, had JFK lived, is a problem that I and others really cannot answer.)
- 17 Senator William Fulbright and Adlai Stevenson (the latter at the time our Ambassador to the United Nations) were just two among the sophisticated advisors who told JFK to stay away from Dallas. Indeed, feelings against the liberal president in Dallas were so strong that when the actual and dreaded mortal event occurred, the rest of Texas was quite relieved. The tendency was to blame "the hornets nest" that had been stirred up there by The Dallas Morning News and other arch right-wingers. The Manchester volume claims that while Dallas got the bulk of the criticism, outside of Texas and in the USA at large, the state of Texas got considerable blame. And further, abroad more than one observer was quoted to the effect that when the United States was fortunate in the choice of JFK, "then you kill him!"
- 18 Cf. See Manchester's "Epilogue - Legend," beginning on p. 623. In this and in other chapters, Manchester makes clear that ordinary people (along with the VIP'S) were determined to "share a day in the sun" along with their beloved deceased leader. Manchester also makes plain that this is precisely the way JFK would have wanted it!
- 19 As for "welfare reform," I doubt that it is exaggerating to state that those who, most of all, will feel the deleterious effects of this so-called "reform," are defenseless children.

TWO DOGMAS OF EXCELLENCE: DISSONANCE IN
THE DISCOURSE ON EDUCATION¹

Joe Green

Texas Tech

There is excellence in art, in music, in craftsmanship, in human relations, in technical work, in leadership, in parental responsibilities. There are those who perform great deeds and those who make it possible for others to perform great deeds. There are path finders and path preservers. There are those who nurture and those who inspire. There are those whose excellence involves doing something well and those whose excellence lies in being the kind of people they are, lies in their kindness or honesty or courage.

John W. Gardner

Excellence (1984)

The *Soilure* of Excellence

In the language of educational aims, 'excellence' is now a protean word. Like Proteus, the sea god of the Romans, 'excellence' is able to assume many shapes, take on many meanings. To the uncritical mind, all uses of the word are right, and most are good, in the same general way that words such as 'honesty,' 'courage,' and 'virtue' are both right and good. This is precisely the reason politicians, educational leaders, and business executives so often appropriate 'excellence' for their own ends, whether noble or ignoble. Hence, a certain *soilure* now attends the word's use in the discourse of educational aims. A result -- perhaps the major result -- of this soiling or staining of 'excellence' in the language of education is that it masks a great tendency toward undemocratic influences and consequences in our system of education. Once detected, this *soilure* compromises the infallibility of 'excellence' as an aim, and jeopardizes the positive, uplifting quality we tend to associate with it. But then, who wants to come out against "excellence in education," even when the slogan is used to ordain the meanest uses of the school as an instrument of class, race, and gender repression; to deny the primacy of students as subjects (not objects); or to sustain varieties of corporate greed, or, in general, to implement undemocratic forms of social control?

Here I shall attempt to delineate two dogmas of

excellence -- only one of which is commensurate with the aims of education in a just and democratic state. In my differentiation, I shall illustrate these dogmas in a way that will, I trust, make the case deductively that one must be embraced by educators, and the other abandoned as insufficient.

The Discourses of Excellence

The dissonance within the democratic discourses on educational aims is a direct result of different conceptions of democracy itself. Recognizing this, it is helpful to keep in mind the operative meaning of 'aim,' as distinct from 'goal,' 'outcome,' or 'objective' in our normative talk. In this, I take Richard Peters's work to be authoritative, *viz.*, that an aim for education is a directional statement, generalized, idealized, and therefore not to be expected ever to be fully achievable.¹ For example, we say for the sake of broad distinction, that Plato advocated "education for justice," Rousseau wanted "education for freedom of the individual," and John Dewey, in his sophisticated advancement of each of these, embraced the aim of "education for democracy,"² which he understood to be a conjoint form of social and moral group relationship in which no member of the group -- from "family" to "humanity in general" -- is denied the opportunity for optimal growth experiences.³ If such statements as these, which reduce the educational aims of Plato, Rousseau, and Dewey to

¹A version of this paper was presented as the Bill Drake Lecture at the 1997 Meeting of the Texas Educational Foundations Society.

mere slogans, are viewed as vague and general, it is because they are aim statements, not goal or outcome or objective sentences. These latter statements of educational purpose are, in various ways, intended to be achievable or terminal, the only variables being those of time and condition. Thus the overriding question of this inquiry is “How can good and generous persons of a strong democratic disposition vary so widely in the proposals they proffer for education in America?” The answer, I believe, is to be found in their “aim language,” or in their lack thereof. This is the source of the dissonance referred to in the title of this paper.

The Complexity of Excellence

Here I trust you will grant me some privilege as I place the cart before the horse. I have examined numerous normative documents on education over many years, and have found none expressing statements of democratic educational aim that cannot be reduced to one of two logical types. I shall only allude here to these myriad texts, in as much as entire volumes have sought to reproduce, summarize, explicate, classify, or critique them. Nevertheless, without reviewing the manifold data upon which my reduction is based, I contend that we must acknowledge the fundamental nature of two very different kinds of prevalent educational aim as a prerequisite to any mature appreciation of what is going on in education. Accepting this, let me offer a differentiation of the two. This I shall attempt along lines of the concept of excellence.

If ‘educational excellence’ qualifies as a conceptual conundrum, it is, nevertheless, one that can be approached by means of a clarification of the logic of its aim language. For starters, ‘excellence’, like ‘loyalty’ is such a happy word that few are willing to interrogate it. But like our old friend John Densford, who two decades ago treated us with his paper “Loyalty and Other Evils, Or, Get on the Team if You Want the Cream,”⁴ we must draw a line in the sand where ‘excellence’ is concerned. Or, to appropriate and paraphrase our friend and colleague, Jim McClellan’s words in his 1971 “Response” to the Presidential Address of Professor Jonas Soltis to The Philosophy of Education Society, what we must do is draw a line and defend it against certain “excellence-mongers.” It must be marked: “Beyond this point, no more bullshit!”⁵

In understanding the meaning of ‘excellence’ we must consider its uses, which involves consideration of its *family* of uses.⁶ An entailment of the dominant sense of ‘excellence’ is a singular sense of the word. This I

shall ordain SE, referring to “Singular-sense Excellence.” The other, more complex sense of ‘excellence’ carries, contra SE, qualities of plurality or multiplicity of meaning, making it the more abstract and elusive. I shall label it PE, for “Plural-sense Excellence.” It is what Maxine Greene has in mind in her plea for “a diversity of excellences.”⁷ A differentiation of SE and PE is complicated by the fact that neither type is necessarily exclusive of characteristics of the other. In fact, they do not at all constitute logical categories equal in scope and connection. As a result, SE and PE, if not thoughtfully considered, can be causal agents in the propagation of the type of logical fallacy identified by Gilbert Ryle as a “category mistake.”⁸ For example, PE is a concept which includes, but does not entirely subsume, some very basic elements of SE. *Ergo*, many of the truth cells in the SE matrix are amenable to, if not necessary conditions of, PE. The reverse, however, is not the case. This explains why advocates of SE can speak glowingly of individuals and entities as exemplars who justify SE’s successes, irrespective of the playing field of education. SE proponents throw up models of achievement, often culturally eminent individuals, as evidence of the efficacy of their concept of ‘excellence’. These cases always appeal to conventional criteria, except in certain quite technical areas of competence, and are determined by questionably objectifiable criteria. If a class of thirty-six ghetto children has two who go on to high achievement in society, for example, these are established as examples of the assertion that, “It *can* be done, but only if you study hard, persevere, and keep your eye on the ball -- or prize.” While it is a truism that motivation, discipline, and tenacity of purpose are all ingredients of excellence, whether of the SE or PE variety, John W. Gardner has enunciated the SE fallacy in lucid terms:

Everyone agrees that motivation is a powerful ingredient in performance. Talent without motivation is inert and of little use to the world. Lewis Terman and Catherine Cox found that historical geniuses were characterized not only by very high intelligence but by the desire to excel, by perseverance in the face of obstacles, by zeal in the exercise of their gifts.⁹

Gardner goes on to point out that:

Some people may have greatness thrust upon them. Very few have excellence thrust upon them. They achieve it. They do not achieve it unwillingly, by “down’ what comes naturally”; and they don’t stumble into it in the course of amusing

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themselves.¹⁰

On these assertions, there appears to be no significant disagreement between SE and PE. The rub comes in the application of these beliefs and in the politics behind these applications.

Gardner raises the perplexing question, Can we be equal and excellent too? He answers it in the affirmative, and does so on the basis of a PE conception of 'excellence.' For him excellence is not one thing, or one kind of thing. It is not only many things, but many kinds of things, involving multiple conditions and criteria. In developing his argument, Gardner points out the reason why Americans feel so little compunction to discriminate "nicely between excellence and mediocrity" in, say, athletics, while, on the other hand, refusing "to be similarly precise about differences in intelligence." For Gardner, this is not a matter of our being more serious about athletic ability. Rather, it is "because we do not take these as total judgments on the individual or as central to his self-esteem."¹¹ For who among us has not heard the pithy point that "Nice guys finish last?"

Gardner's argument is exemplary of the PE vision for education. He is at his best as he argues that PE need not limit SE, as some would have it. His argument is advanced by the introduction of what he terms Americans' "principle of multiple chances."

The European system used to separate youngsters at ten or eleven years of age on the basis of ability and then prepare some for the university, others for less demanding levels of education. This was in some respects an efficient procedure; and there were critics here at home who thought we should have a similar system. But in recent years some European countries have modified the system, and we have never found it attractive. In the American view, it presents a host of difficulties, only one of which need be noted here: early separation of the gifted and the less gifted violates our principle of multiple chances.¹²

Gardner goes on, providing content to illustrate his principle of multiple chances in a way that suggests his intimacy with the philosophy of John Dewey,¹³ while anticipating Lawrence A. Cremin's notion of "a cacophony of teaching voices"¹⁴ and "the theory of multiple intelligences" advocated so successfully in our own decade by Howard W. Gardner.¹⁵ John Gardner speaks in popular terms about "successive opportunities" for self-discovery, the dilemma of "the

late bloomer syndrome," the last chance fallacy, the problem of cultural influences, meritocratic public universities, and the sorting function of schools (which he rates as "very nearly the most delicate and difficult process our society has to face").¹⁶ Gardner's final point in his principle of multiple chances is this:

The traditional democratic invitation to achieve the best that is in them requires that we provide each youngster with the particular kind of education suited to his or her special abilities. That is the only sense in which equality of opportunity can mean anything. The good society is not one that ignores individual differences but one that can deal with them wisely and humanely.¹⁷

Another premise in the PE argument is that, ideally, everyone wins; nobody loses. But this is not likely to be a very satisfying slogan to a body politic of Americans who have been hammered long and hard with athletic analogies of competition -- winning and losing -- over all matters of aggregate public experience, whether economic, political, industrial, social, or educational. Even organized religion -- no newcomer to this competitive fray -- fills its share of the public debate over excellence and educational aims with its own often convoluted form of discourse on winning and losing, victory and defeat, conquest and submission, or some other analogy to athletics or war. In their worst form, athletic and military analogies of excellence yield equally detestable forms of nationalism, racism, classism, sexism, and religious bigotry.

Bertrand Russell, for all of his personal warts, seems to have known this instinctively, if not fully, when in 1916, he formulated his "principle of growth" in fervent opposition to Britain's entry into what her patriots termed The Great War. Russell describes this theory as "an instinctive urgency leading [people] in a certain direction, as trees seek the light":

This intimate centre in each human being is what imagination must apprehend if we are to understand him intuitively. It differs from man to man, and determines for each man the type of excellence of which he is capable.¹⁸

This is precisely the reason we must not recoil immediately from positive, especially democratic slogans or proverbs such as those mentioned above. Instead, if they ring right to us, it is worth our energies to bring about creative ways of investing them with one or another democratic form of excellence, i.e., a desired version of PE. Philosophically, the job before us is to blow away the smoke of the linguistic battlefield of

'excellence' and attempt to understand the scope of its uses. This is no small task.

It is helpful, for starters, to begin with worst-case scenarios of the simplest, nay silliest, sort. For example, I cannot help remembering a painfully incompetent but aggressive former colleague who taught educational administration, and whom Joe Kincheloe and I used to vilify privately and frustrate publicly. On this man's desk, which he sat behind while facing the door to his office, was a finely wood-carved piece that said "Excellence." *A Nation at Risk*¹⁹ had just appeared and he accepted it heartily. Ironically, he was exactly the type of professor who posed the greatest risk to university education -- a bureaucrat to the toenails; loaded with unexamined assumptions; possessing absolutely no record of research, scholarship, or publications; devoid of any sense of nuance and complexity; and, in short, a defender of the *status quo*; an apostle for convention; and a willing vessel for the domination of education, at all levels, by the corporate power that threatens us all.

Other examples are less obviously flawed in that they are expressed logically and in erudite form. Consider Alexander Astin's trenchant challenge to America's universities to abandon traditional views of excellence associated with reputation, resources, and outcomes on the ground that continued adherence to these criteria can neither expand educational opportunity nor enhance the overall quality of the nation's system of higher education. In a decidedly PE vein, he proposes an amended notion of institutional excellence based on students' personal and intellectual development.²⁰ John Dewey would undoubtedly agree.

In contradistinction are the numerous conservative and reactionary notions of excellence as seen in, for example, the Reagan administration's *A Nation at Risk*, or Mortimer Adler's *The Paideia Proposal* of 1982,²¹ both embodiments of the SE type of excellence. And then there are the ubiquitous varieties of excellence advocated by the champions of business and industry. These are always of the SE variety and seldom made in the name of personal or intellectual development, but most often couched in a language of profit-seeking, increased productivity, national defense, improved standardized test scores, or technological primacy, invariably in a climate of a worldwide economy and increasing competitiveness for world markets. Subtext: We must find ways to market our products -- including carcinogens, poisons, cultural trash, and weapons of destruction -- in other countries, preferably by "opening up new markets." This is why comedian George Carlin

refers mockingly to marketing as the most evil subject taught in universities. It is aimed at making people feel a need for things they don't need.

The Politics of Excellence

Inherent in all politically driven plans for SE is an explicit or implied delay or abandonment of our educational efforts, especially since the 1960s, to achieve some enlightened level of equity of educational opportunity. Using an often malevolent form of patriotic language, such plans are frequently grounded in a misappropriated notion of the national interest, a concept which, since 1980, has come to be understood in primarily economic terms. *A Nation at Risk* is a paradigm case of this version of SE. As a presidentially driven report of the National Commission on Excellence in Education, *A Nation at Risk* was enormously important. It has had a polarizing effect on educational discourse since its appearance in 1983. Although it was only one of many reports on equality, equity, and excellence to appear in the decade of the 1980s, *A Nation at Risk* was politically the most important. Others included *Action for Excellence*²² from the Task Force on Education for Economic Growth, *Academic Preparation for College*²³ from the College Board, *Educating Americans for the 21st Century*²⁴ from the National Science Board's Commission on Precollege Education in Mathematics, Science, and Technology, *Horace's Compromise*²⁵ by TheodoreSizer, *High School*²⁶ by Ernest Boyer, *Making the Grade*²⁷ from the Twentieth Century Fund, *A Place Called School*²⁸ by John Goodlad, and Mortimer Adler's previously cited *The Paideia Proposal*.

Carl Grant and Christine Sleeter have studied these reports and pointed out that four of them "were oriented primarily toward preparing workers for an increasingly technological economy, while two were oriented toward developing cognitive, and, to some degree, affective sensibilities of young people in order to improve the quality of individual and collective lives. The other three can be placed between these orientations, as they contain features of each."²⁹ These writers go on to conclude that the first four of these -- the "economically- and technologically-oriented" reports -- proffer a quite different vision of American society than that outlined by Grant and Sleeter earlier in their paper:

It is a vision in which most jobs will or should become highly technological, in which the nature of work people will be performing will be humanly satisfying, and in which there will be much less stratification of people in terms of reward for their

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work -- or at least in which such stratification is not an issue.³⁰

Calling this vision naive on its face, the authors point out these reports' flaws in several ways,³¹ all of which support my contention that these influential documents conceive 'excellence' in terms of singularity; they are, to a fault, examples of SE excellence, and therefore insufficient as statements of educational aim for a democratic society. All that is required of the enlightened critic of these flawed aim-statements is to ask the questions, "Who wins? Who loses?" The answers are obvious and predictable.

According to Grant and Sleeter, even the more humanistically oriented of these reports are flawed, but in a different way. Sizer's *Horace's Compromise* and Adler's *The Paideia Proposal*, in their "attempt to be 'color-blind' in a culturally diverse and differentiated society," ignore the lessons from "the sociology of knowledge" and the "Lebenswelt" of individual Americans.

Only one [of these nine reports] even entertains the notion that student experience and student interest need to be taken into account when planning curriculum. The rest discuss curriculum as if students did not bring to school personal, cultural, or gender identities with them that might affect the meaning they derive from a curriculum, and that might suggest fruitful avenues of learning for their growth.³²

If we comb the literature on excellence in education, we detect conceptions of 'excellence' ranging from the believable to the bizarre to the absurd. One curious example, a brief but interesting piece in the *Journal of Aesthetic Education*, finds British philosopher John Haldane calling for a return to "taste" as a criterion for "excellence" in education. Haldane recognizes that "two strongly individualist and utilitarian lines of thought" -- one liberal and intellectualist, the other commercial and pragmatic -- have dominated recent discussions about the justification and content of education. He concludes that taste is "clearly a more encompassing notion than artistic sensibility," and therefore must serve to give direction to these lines of thought about the aim and content of education, thereby making taste education's aim.³³ When one considers Plato's "education for justice," Rousseau's "education for freedom," and Dewey's "education for individual growth in a liberal democracy," "education for taste" somehow resonates as regressive. At its best, it begs the questions of

"Whose taste? What taste?"

Against the sordid but exceedingly influential SE versions of 'excellence' advanced since 1980, it is inspiring, to say the least, to read such counterperspectives as that of Maxine Greene, who challenges us to compare older, presumably more "conservative" statements of educational aim -- such as those of Plato, Rousseau, and Dewey -- with those above. She points out that:

It is interesting to ponder older views: the classical conception of *areté*; Erasmus's notion of the moral virtues and Christian piety; Jefferson's idea of developing the reasoning faculties of youth, enlarging their minds, cultivating their morals; Cardinal Newman's description of the person "who has learned to think and to reason and to compare and to discriminate and to analyze." There is something strange about the report writers' choosing to evoke the old humanist tradition in their effort to legitimate a certain range of largely technical competencies to promote what is called the national interest.³⁴

Greene wants us to appreciate that, although these older conceptions of educational excellence may be viewed as conservative according to the liberal standards of the past century, their conservatism is of a strikingly different character than that witnessed since 1980. But Irving Howe might have said it best when he wrote that "the very word 'excellence' ought to make us cringe a little, so thoroughly has it been assimilated to the prose style of commission reports, letters of recommendation, and hair spray commercials." He moves on to say that 'excellence' has been co-opted as a code word for "educational Reaganism," and thus associated with tougher testing, increased discipline, and merit pay. (Here one might also include vouchers, massive federal aid to private schools, tuition tax exemptions, teacher testing, endless standardized testing of students, a rhetoric of higher standards, and the nourishing of an increasingly hostile climate for public schools, not to mention the resegregation of American education by means of accelerated tracking policies, magnet schools, and charter schools.) During the 1980s and into the present decade, the Reagan and Bush administrations set into motion policies of recognizing schools of excellence at official White House ceremonies, a practice that inspired widespread resentment among professional educators owing to the sociologically differentiated populations of American society and the philosophically differentiated roles of American schools. The criteria for determining "schools of excellence" involved written applications, a

process of state and regional and national elimination, quantitative data (involving student test scores), and letters of recommendation. Howe describes this new and narrow sense of 'excellence' as anti-humanistic, both in intent and overtone.³⁵ Whatever the case, it is clearly reactionary and, one hopes, constitutes a worst-case scenario of SE in our age. This is just why people of conscience must Just say 'No!'

Because of the political baggage and conceptual encumbrances that 'excellence' now brings with it, some have found it puzzling that Nel Noddings, in her 1993 presidential address to the Philosophy of Education Society argued "that excellence ought to supplant equality as the guiding educational ideal."³⁶ For Kenneth Howe:

The Crux of Noddings's argument is her identification of "equality" with "sameness," in terms of both the curriculum and the goals held for different students. . . . [She] maintains that we could make students equal by providing them with equally miserable conditions. Noddings identifies "excellence," by contrast, with varying the curriculum and its goals so as to coincide with the different things different students might be good at and might want to pursue.³⁷

Yet, far from junking Noddings's argument, Howe places it within a larger framework of "participatory educational opportunity," which emphasizes education's political dimensions, "can accommodate and be enriched by a view like that of Noddings, which emphasizes the personal dimensions," and thus contributing to a reconciliation between the goals of liberal democracy and feminism.³⁸ The several versions of excellence advanced by each are illustrative of pluralistic excellence and a richness of possibility inherent in PE.

The Logic of Excellence

I want, now, to return to the SE/PE conceptual maze. If excellence, simply understood, is a word intended merely to ascribe status or high quality to an object, then it is reasonable in a just society to view it in pluralistic terms. But let us for a moment consider the simplest, singular senses of excellence as ascriptions of value to objects or entities. This allows us a fairly clear notion of what is going on when the critic speaks of art, or when the collector assesses the value of a rare baseball card. Ascriptions of excellence in such usage range, of course, from the innocently naive to the deeply appreciative and insightful. Often, when used for commercial or profit-seeking purposes, the criteria for

the word's use are suspicious and contradictory owing to its user's conflicting interests and agenda. Indeed, it often becomes impossible to separate certain users' biased self-interest from the word itself. Our actual or imagined conversations with used car dealers illustrate this problem. The distinction (which is really a sliding scale of distinctions) necessary to understanding the different forms of SE usage is always located in a complex matrix of detachment of judgment, enlightenment, and honesty of the word's user. This makes absolute clarity often difficult and elusive. For example, "degree of detachment" alone is often difficult to assess. We see this problem in medicine, thought by many to be the noblest of professions, when we notice that a questionable but prescribed treatment, if followed, has the effect, among others, of large financial benefits to the physician. Other difficulties have more to do with status than money, as in the case of the connoisseur or aficionado, who, driven by a large ego while bound to conventional standards and criteria received from high culture, possesses a psychological need to be "proper" and correct at all times. I believe this is what Wittgenstein meant when he wrote:

It is remarkable how hard we find it to believe something that we do not see the truth of for ourselves. When, for instance, I hear the expression of admiration for Shakespeare by distinguished men in the course of several centuries, I can never rid myself of the suspicion that praising him has been the conventional thing to do; though I have to tell myself that this is not how it is. It takes the authority of a *Milton* really to convince me. I take it for granted that he was incorruptible. -- But I don't of course mean by this that I don't believe an enormous amount of praise to have been, and still to be, lavished on Shakespeare without understanding and for the wrong reasons by a thousand professors of literature.³⁹

A problem in all of this, then, is that the criteria for invoking excellence in any particular language-game are often subject to the hardening effects of conventional ways of seeing and thinking, which invariably brings on a decreasing tendency to think, inquire, discover, explore, create, and reflect, either individually or through discourse. This is exactly the undesired tendency Dewey warns us of in his criticism of fixed curriculum and staid teaching.⁴⁰ Alfred North Whitehead calls it "inert knowledge."⁴¹

Except in certain religious or mystical language-games, a thing cannot be claimed to be 'excellent' in its

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own right, i.e., simply *as* it is, ontologically. Rather, a thing (T) is usually said to be excellent in its relation to other things of its genre. This is how the concept of excellence takes on primordial sense -- initial, rooted meaning. Criteria for judgment are later established and reaffirmed until, along the way, meanings become clearer, then conventional. In the process, rules of meaning are refined and altered, while others are discarded in favor of more appropriate ones, always in the light of fluid circumstances and new problems. This explains why both the standards or criteria *and* the content or object of any use of 'excellent' may be viewed as social or human constructions. Chomsky's linguistics notwithstanding,⁴² the standards and content of 'excellence' are always derivatives of human experience, forged through human intentions, and expressed in language, which broadly understood, means "any system of signs."

It is noteworthy that all SE notions of excellence, however expressed, embody the quality of competition, or competitiveness. If a thing (object, ability, process, activity, outcome, person) is judged or appraised as excellent, such judgment or assessment must be done in a comparative way. Except in the aforementioned religious or mystical senses, excellence is meaningful only in language-games involving better and worse. If one is said to be an 'excellent student', an 'excellent philosopher', or an 'excellent baseball player', it follows that most students, philosophers, or baseball players are worse. One might counter that, as in the educational language-games of student or program or institutional evaluation, there exist forms of judgment that do *not* involve competition between students or programs or institutions. This is the argument from what is commonly called criterion-referenced evaluation. (Most who read this paper will be familiar with the distinction between norm-referenced evaluation and criterion-referenced evaluation, the former being the type that places students in direct competition with each other.) Nevertheless, while competitiveness of this sort is less direct and ostensible in criterion-referenced evaluation, it is difficult to conceive of any form of criterion-referenced judgment which, at some point, does not bump up against, if not inherently contradict, the idea of symbolic success, as in grading or ranking or accreditation or funding. Grading, for example, implies value-driven gradation or classification, and it necessarily yields judgments of better or worse student achievement, *ergo*, winners and losers. Some argue that in criterion-referenced judgments of excellence, *all* cases can be excellent, an argument that is not possible in norm-referenced evaluation. But in an SE sense of

excellence, this cannot be a meaningful use of the word in as much as, statistically speaking, if every case is excellent, then no case is excellent. It is a simple tautology under SE meanings. It turns out that 'Excellence is what all students do' means the same things as 'What all students do is excellent.' We can therefore conclude what appears to most ordinary speakers to be patently obvious: That when we speak of something as excellent, we are claiming that it is better, of higher quality, or perhaps even iconic, compared to other cases of its genre.

It should be stressed that not all senses of better or worse involve competition in a strict sense, but that competition is consciously imputed after-the-fact. Take the sentence, 'This is an excellent peach', for example. If one peach is excellent and another not excellent, it is nonsensical to claim that one peach *won* over the other, notwithstanding a possible rejoinder from biologists informed by Darwinian theory. In this case, the excellent peach did not *intend* to prevail over the other peach, as in the case of a sword fighter or race horse jockey. Does this suggest, then, that consciousness and intentionality are not logical features of excellence? A quick answer is, Obviously, Yes! And this is accurate, perhaps, to the extent that one peach just *is* excellent while the other is not. In an adaptation of Popeye's famous declaration that "I *yam* what I *yam*!", We can all agree that "A peach *is* what it *is*!" But what is it that makes one peach "what *it is*" and another "what *it is*?" To the one we impute 'excellence', to the other 'not excellent'. It follows that 'excellence' is *not* in the *is-ness* of the peach, but is rather an ascription deriving from human judgment, an ascription conferred on the peach by minds replete with consciousness and intentionality. Thus, while not present in the *is-ness* of the peach, which possesses Heideggerian *being-in-itself*, qualities of consciousness and intentionality are imputed to the referential use of 'excellence', making it a perfect example of a social construction. This is what brings on forms and conventions of *graded-ness* in our language.

Adopting a Wittgensteinian technique,⁴³ one might imagine a society or tribe whose members prize peaches of a most irregular and misshapen contour, who prefer their peaches to be hard as apples, who enjoy smaller rather than larger peaches, who detest the sweeter peaches, who hate freestone peaches and appreciate those whose seeds cling to the juicy pulp, and who desire browner rather than redder peaches. In such a society, 'excellence' would be used in the exact opposite way from that commonly employed in the grading shed of the peach orchard where I worked as a

youth in my hometown. Is the proof of excellence, then, in the eating? Of course it is. But, more accurately, it is in the mind of the eater, which is ultimately inseparable from the body.

The Tragedy of Excellence

In previous papers I have endeavored to demonstrate the fallacy of SE as an aim of education by employing the lives and careers of two individuals whose accomplishments set the highest standards biographically available to us in their separate spheres: Ty Cobb in baseball and Ludwig Wittgenstein in philosophy.⁴⁴ Each constitutes a perfect example of a “logical extreme” in human accomplishment, accompanied by disorders of personality or character that most of us find haunting, if not disturbing. I submit them as counterexamples of the validity of SE-type excellence as an aim for education, and a basis for embracing PE-type excellence. In so doing, I trust that this audience will forgive my indulgence in the tragic side of these great men’s lives.

For the critical observer, it is not even controversial to claim that Cobb and Wittgenstein were the best *ever* at what they did. Yet both were beset with antisocial and authoritarian qualities of personality and spirit that precluded a “normal” life of conventional relationships. These qualities were so extreme that those who knew these men viewed them as personality disorders. These qualities, coupled with the level of demand each made on himself to be excellent, resulted in a certain unbridgeable “distance” between themselves and those who knew them -- including, in Cobb’s case, his own children -- but also a strange, uncanny fear of each by those who knew them. Both were driven during most of their lives by a neurotic obsession to excel, and each imposed an enormous strain on his personality, and, thus, on all personal relationships. In his recent biography of Cobb, journalist Al Stump, who spent the last year-and-a-half of Cobb’s life with the baseball player as ghostwriter for his autobiography,⁴⁵ gets right to the heart of the problem of Cobb’s character and personality:

I think, because he forced upon me a confession of his most private thoughts, along with details of his life, that I know the answer to the central, overriding secret of his life. Was Ty Cobb psychotic through his baseball career? The answer is yes.⁴⁶

Whether Stump’s diagnosis could stand clinical scrutiny is a moot question. But Cobb’s lifelong, consistently hostile and aberrant behavior is

incontestable, as are his bigotry and race hatred. With an uncharacteristic self-judgment during his later life, Cobb described his youthful self as “a snarling wildcat.”⁴⁷ Sports editor Paul Gallico, describing Cobb’s compulsion toward excellence with its ultimate expression in winning, writes:

There was a burning rage in Ty Cobb never far from the surface. He brought a fury, cruelty and viciousness heretofore unencountered even in the roughest kind of play.⁴⁸

Gallico shares Stump’s view concerning Cobb’s mental illness. Describing him as “savage,” Gallico saw him as “a mass of paradoxes with a life that reads like a Gothic horror tale.”⁴⁹ The lovable and modest Lou Gehrig even became angry enough to say that “Cobb is about as welcome in American League parks as a rattlesnake.”⁵⁰

Stump remembers how one of Cobb’s former teammates forewarned him of The Georgia Peach’s egotism, nastiness, and eccentric ways as Stump was entering into his journalistic relationship with Cobb. “In baseball,” the ex-teammate said, “a few of us who really knew him realized that he was wrong in the head -- unbalanced . . . he was a demon. . . . The public’s never known it, but Cobb’s always been off the beam where other people are concerned.”⁵¹ For Cy Young, the trouble was that “he takes life too seriously, . . . [he] is going at it too hard.”⁵² Revered baseball critic Bozeman Bulger put it poetically: “He is possessed by the furies,”⁵³ whereas Ernest Hemingway, who knew Cobb well, but in the way that Great Men are attracted to each other, is quoted by Stump, who tells this story:

[Cobb] had a loose screw. I never knew anyone like him. It was like his brain was miswired so that the least damned thing would set him off. On a bighorn-sheep hunt in the Wyoming back country, said the Nobel prizewinning author, their guide led them down a wrong trail into a swamp: “It was easy enough to climb back out, but Cobb went wacko, grabbed his rifle like a bat, and decked the guide. That was it for me -- I packed out next day and after that avoided him.” . . . Later, seeing no changes in his rages and indigestible actions off the field,” Hemingway expressed the opinion that Tyrus Cobb was the supreme player of all time -- but an “absolute shit.”⁵⁴

The connection I am seeking in my argument is perhaps stated most concisely by historian Charles Alexander: “Cobb was relentless in his pursuit of excellence.”⁵⁵ For him, baseball was “something like a

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war,” and excelling at the game constituted Cobb’s understanding of survival. “Jack Dempsey in spikes,” he was called.⁵⁶ When he retired from baseball in 1928 Cobb held more than ninety major league records, several of which remain unapproachable: a lifetime batting average of .367, fifty-five home-plate steals, and twelve American League batting championships.⁵⁷ By any measure of excellence understood in singular terms, Cobb’s accomplishments are paradigmatic. Still, there are haunting suggestions by certain baseball critics that Cobb’s excellence as a player must be superseded in any ranking of greatest players by consideration of the question, Who contributed most to his team? This is a question that moves the concept of excellence to a different level in the discourse, *viz.*, it introduces into the equation a new pluralism: “Affect on others” -- in Cobb’s case, on his team -- becomes an added criterion for ‘excellence’ as a baseball player. In this, some might detect an embryonic form of PE as I have outlined it. For others, it introduces a certain *soilure* into the concept of excellence. A number of baseball critics have viewed Cobb as other than the very best player of all time. These include the indomitable John J. McGraw, who placed Honus Wagner above Cobb,⁵⁸ as well as Jimmie Reese, who thought Babe Ruth was better.⁵⁹ In the case of McGraw, one might counter that he was too close to the situation, and held such animosity toward Cobb, that his judgment was clouded by that proximity. But whatever the case, Cobb was unarguably excellent in singular terms.

Those who lack imagination -- and perhaps some who do not -- will see no basis for comparing the all-consuming rage and pugilism of Ty Cobb with the intellectual discontent and unnerving emotional personality of Ludwig Wittgenstein. But I want to argue for that basis, mainly to illustrate the logical limits of SE as an educational aim.

Cobb and Wittgenstein were very nearly the same age, Cobb having been born on December 18, 1886, hardly more than two years before Wittgenstein’s birth on April 26, 1889. Each was beset with a troubling temperament which took its own peculiar form at the outset of their careers during this century’s first decade. One would choose baseball, the other philosophy. Each would go on to redefine those activities in ways theretofore unparalleled, becoming an exemplar at what he did. In fact, so much parallel do I see in their lives that I have referred to Wittgenstein, one of my philosophical heroes whose grave site I have visited in Cambridge, as “the Ty Cobb of Philosophy.” Each man set personal standards of excellence so exacting that he

could tolerate nothing less. Each evinced qualities of character that evoked an eerie combination of awe, respect, and fear in others.

Both men found it exceedingly difficult to sustain friendships or family relationships. Old-timer Nap Rucker, Cobb’s roommate for a time, pointed out that “Cobb was a loner by his own choice.” Rucker relates an interesting story of Cobb’s rage at finding Rucker bathing in their boarding house tub after a game. Incensed, Cobb attempted to wrest his roommate from the tub, wild and trembling. Rucker was shocked, angered, and amazed, realizing that Cobb was about to strike him. “You gone crazy?” exclaimed Rucker. To which Cobb gritted, “You don’t understand! I’ve got to be first at everything -- all the time!”⁶⁰

Wittgenstein’s rage had a somewhat different form, lacking in pugilism, though always near the surface in personal relationships. One of hundreds of recorded incidents occurred at a meeting of Cambridge’s Moral Sciences Club in 1946 following a paper by Sir Karl Popper:

According to Popper, he and Wittgenstein engaged in an animated exchange. . . . Wittgenstein, who had all the time been playing with a [fireplace] poker, then stood up, poker in hand, and demanded an example of a moral rule. ‘Not to threaten visiting lecturers with pokers’, Popper replied, whereupon Wittgenstein stormed out of the room.⁶¹

Personal accounts have it that neither Cobb nor Wittgenstein liked to be touched. Stump tells a story of Cobb’s referring to General Douglas MacArthur as a “sentimental old bastard” after the renowned Old Soldier, who claimed to be Cobb’s Number One fan put his arms around Cobb in a parting embrace in MacArthur’s Waldorf Suite in 1960. Cobb shrugged free and said “So long, Doug.” Concerning Wittgenstein’s forced chastity, Fania Paschal, who taught him Russian, comments that “. . . one cannot imagine anyone who would ever dare as much as to pat him on the back, nor imagine him in need of the normal physical expressions of affection. In him everything was sublimated to an extraordinary degree.”⁶²

For both men, practically all personal relations were turbulent. While Wittgenstein never married and was more or less homosexually oriented, though no hard evidence confirms this, Cobb’s “two wives . . . charged extreme cruelty in divorces, each deposing that The Georgia Peach was uncontrollable when crossed or drunk, or whenever he was reminded of how he had regularly bloodied opponents with his spikes -- ‘Cobb’s

kiss', as one victim, Frank 'Home Run' Baker, called his slashing."⁶³ Amusingly, Richard Bak, a baseball historian, in referring to Cobb's first wife, Charlotte, has observed that "staying married to Ty for some forty years undoubtedly qualified her for sainthood."⁶⁴

Wittgenstein was already regarded as something of a cult figure when he returned to Cambridge in 1929 following several years of soul-searching and self-imposed isolation. He remained such until his death in 1951, unwilling to publish any of his work, while building a cadre of loyal and deeply respectful followers, some of whom would be designated his literary executors. Upon Wittgenstein's return to Cambridge in 1929, John Maynard Keynes wrote to a friend, with acid wit, "Well, God has arrived. I met him on the 5:15 train."⁶⁵

Years later, in 1949, this image of Wittgenstein as the personification of excellence, somehow above and apart from others, had not abated. If anything, it had grown. Ray Monk provides an example: Wittgenstein had accepted an invitation from his former student, Norman Malcolm, to visit the United States for a lengthy stay. On one occasion, Malcolm took Wittgenstein to a meeting of graduate students in Cornell University's philosophy department. One of the students has recalled the impact of that visit:

Just before the meeting was to get underway Malcolm appeared approaching down the corridor. On his arm leaned a slight, older man, dressed in windjacket and old army trousers. If it had not been for his face, alight with intelligence, one might have taken him for some vagabond Malcolm had found along the road and decided to bring out of the cold.

. . . I leaned over to Gass and whispered, 'That's Wittgenstein.' Gass thought I was making a joke and said something like, 'Stop pulling my leg.' And then Malcolm and Wittgenstein entered. [Gregory] Vlastos was introduced and gave his paper and finished. Black, who was conducting this particular meeting, stood up and turned to his right and it became clear that he was about to address the shabby older man Malcolm had brought to the meeting. Then came the startling words; said Black, 'I wonder if you would be so kind, Professor Wittgenstein . . .' Well, when Black said 'Wittgenstein' a loud and instantaneous gasp went up from the assembled students. You must remember: 'Wittgenstein' was a mysterious and awesome name in the

philosophical world of 1949, at Cornell in particular. The gasp that went up was just the gasp that would have gone up if Black had said, 'I wonder if you would be so kind, Plato . . .'⁶⁶

This visit to America occurred shortly before Wittgenstein fell ill and died from cancer, a fate that would befall Ty Cobb a decade later. Both died of prostate cancer.

Wittgenstein's contentiousness, though it could descend to pettiness, lacked the qualities of bellicosity, pugilism, and outright cruelty seen in Cobb. But this might be only because his form of excellence did not require such demands. After all, Cobb had to give up his medium of excellence while barely in his forties, while Wittgenstein continued his literally to his death.

Numerous Cambridge dons, students, and others have recorded in vivid detail just how daunting and exhausting it was to engage in philosophical dialogue with Wittgenstein. Especially noteworthy were Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore, themselves first-rate philosophers of the highest stature. They describe Wittgenstein's intensity, keenness, rapier methods of argumentation, and purity of purpose -- all driven by an indescribable energy. In Russell's autobiography he recalls a conversation about Wittgenstein's dietary habits. It seems that Wittgenstein hated food, insisting that if he must eat, it must be the same thing every day. Someone in the conversation described, accordingly, how the genius subsisted on milk and vegetables or some such food. With characteristic wit, Russell remarks, "I used to feel as Mrs. Patrick Campbell did about Shaw: 'God help us if he should ever eat a beefsteak'."⁶⁷

Cobb never spoke of suicide, as did Wittgenstein, though several astute observers detected in his reckless, daredevil behavior a certain tendency towards self-annihilation. Wittgenstein, who had three brothers commit suicide, frequently spoke of taking his own life during moments of despair.⁶⁸

Apparent in each of these men's personality was an abnormal and chronic sensitivity to the nuances of human behavior that contributed to their excellence while causing themselves and others considerable harm. For Wittgenstein, a genius beyond question, this hypersensitivity resulted in constant, soul-wrenching introspection on moral questions, coupled with equally rigorous intellectual demands. One of his sisters described him during his early adulthood as "constantly in a state of indescribable, almost pathological excitement."⁶⁹ She continued, expressing fear that his

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former professor, Gottlob Frege of the University of Jena, then an old man, “would not be able to muster the patience and understanding needed to go into the matter [of Ludwig’s newly-developed philosophical insights] in a way commensurate to its seriousness.”⁷⁰

Wittgenstein’s biographers conclude that his turbulent philosophical encounters with Frege and Russell, and his later religious encounters while serving in the Austrian military during World War I, had the effect of reducing his suicidal tendencies.

For Cobb, the manic aggression, megalomania, acute self-worship, delusions of persecution, and dipsomania kept him in a state of rage and fury until his death on July 17, 1961. Early on he warned Al Stump, speaking softly, “To get along with me, don’t increase my tension.”⁷¹ So alone was Ty Cobb in his greatness that only three people from organized baseball attended his funeral. Stump writes:

They were Mickey Cochrane, old-time catcher Ray Schalk, and Nap Rucker from his minor-league days. Other than these and several hundred Little Leaguers of the Royston area north of Atlanta who lined the path to his twelve-foot-high marble mausoleum, the funeral of the most shrewd, inventive, lurid, detested, mysterious, and superb of all baseball players went unattended by any official representative of the game at which he excelled.⁷²

One historian explains that Cobb was “a man who set the highest standards for himself and consistently met them. . . . [He] was never able to understand why most other people failed to share his passion for excellence and refusal to settle for second best.”⁷³ It never seems to have occurred to Ty Cobb that, under this notion of excellence, winning also means losing, that this meaning of excellence implies many more losers than winners, and that his own excellence could not logically be shared.

The Aim of Excellence

The argument of this paper is that all uses of ‘excellence’ in the aim-language of education may be classified in two fundamental categories, which I have called singular-type excellence (SE) and plural-type excellence (PE). I have claimed, with a variety of cases and subjects, that, while PE is inclusive of all-important forms of SE, the reverse is not the case. SE uses of ‘excellence’ tend to be one-dimensional in scope, while PE uses always embody a putative multiplicity. Knowing what we now know about the social/cultural

construction of “good and bad” and “right and wrong,” as well as varieties of meliorism inherited from the eighteenth century’s Enlightenment Age and amplified in numerous contexts in our own Age, it is no longer possible to justify the aim-language of education in SE terms. The only democratically justifiable uses of excellence as an aim for education must be situated within the larger context of varieties of exceeding and excelling. The number and types of excellence(s) will always be a matter of human desire (intentions) and cultural context, and implicit, at least, in statements of educational aim. Ideally, if such aims are democratic, they will not only reflect roots in a Kantian ethic of “respect for persons,” but will also reflect a Deweyan perspective on right and good as suggested in his conception of democracy, coupled with his aim of growth, a mix which, when rightly understood, allows for Noddings’s ethic of care. To my mind, one current example of such a theory is Amy Gutmann’s book, *Democratic Education* (1987).⁷⁴ Let us continue to appreciate the Wittgensteins and the Ty Cobbs among us, who show us exactly what is meant by ‘excellence’ in a strict sense. But let us also be aware of their imperfections and undesirable qualities as expressed in their “I’ve-got-to-be-the-best” outlook toward life and social relationships. I love them both, in an abstract sort of way. Indeed, I have visited Wittgenstein’s grave site in Cambridge as well as Cobb’s shrine in Cooperstown. Admittedly, their imperfections compel as much of my interest as do their accomplishments. So there you have it! My appropriation of their lives -- especially their tragic side -- has been intended to demonstrate the dangers and limitations of valuing just any old statement of educational aim that singularizes excellence. As not only philosophers of education, but also practitioners of the noble art of teaching, I suggest, for starters, that we take another look at John W. Gardner’s treatise on *Excellence*.

Post Script: I am deeply appreciative of the invitation to deliver the 1997 William E. Drake Memorial Lecture, and want to thank the members of the Texas Foundations of Education Association for that honor. I knew Bill Drake fairly well at the time of his death,

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and I believe he would have taken kindly to my argument here. I trust that others find it interesting enough -- whether it's right or wrong -- to respond in

some way. My thanks to all of you.

Joe L. Green

October 2, 1997

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MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCES: THE REPUBLIC REVISITED

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Abstract

Howard Gardner is unquestionably one of America's premier psychologists. His theory of multiple intelligences has kicked the world of testing into a tizzy. Gardner's psychology has been scrutinized from many different points of view. What has been generally ignored, however, is how closely many of Gardner's ideas parallel those found in Plato's *Republic*. Both men, for example, share a common knack for penning thought-provoking metaphors. Gardner's metaphor of the seven intelligences bears a strong resemblance to Plato's metaphor of the three metals (gold, silver, and brass people). Similarly, both theorists agree that education must perform two essential functions: (1) To identify the talents (which are rooted in biology) that individuals bring with them into this world, and (2) to develop individuals' talents so they may be of service to their respective communities.

Introduction

Suppose Plato were to come back to life, reincarnate (a theory to which he subscribed), who might he wish to be? Given his predilection for seeking the "Good," Plato might very well feel more at home among psychologists than he would in the company of philosophers. (Wittgenstein would strike him as being just another sophist.) Works like Scott Peck's *The Road Less Traveled* and Thomas Moore's *Care of the Soul* would echo themes touched on by his beloved teacher, Socrates. Where might our "born again" Plato choose to live? Athens was the intellectual capital of the ancient world. Harvard University holds a similar status in our time. Thus, being a psychologist at a prestige university, Plato would be in an ideal position to refine and expand the ideas he so boldly outlined in the *Republic*.

There are a number of striking parallels between the ideas proposed in Plato's *Republic* and those developed in Gardner's *Multiple Intelligences*. Both men, for example, are passionate advocates for individual and social justice (Plato explicitly, Gardner implicitly). They agree also that the good society is one where the individual is placed in a vocation for which he or she is well suited. Both thinkers share a gift for formulating

mind-grabbing metaphors. Plato offers us the metaphor of the three metals (gold, silver, and brass people); Gardner proposes the metaphor of the seven intelligences. (Plato freely acknowledges his theory is a metaphor; it is not clear whether Gardner recognizes the same thing.) Both theorists seek to liberate humanity from the shadows of a dark cave. Plato wants us to see beyond the world of appearances; Gardner wants us to think beyond the realm of IQ tests. Both men agree on the importance of assessment in education. The first duty of the school is to identify each individual's natural (biological) talents. The second responsibility of the school is to train each individual to make a genuine contribution to the larger community. Finally, both thinkers are interested in devising a system of instruction that will enhance students' understanding.

Analysis and Synthesis Justice

The *Republic* revolves around one central question: What is justice? Plato was greatly distressed by the death of his beloved teacher, Socrates. Why had Athens condemned to death the wisest and best of its citizens? The answer to Plato was all too clear. Political power had been placed in the hands of those who were ill equipped to use it. Plato was convinced that majority rule (slaves excluded, of course) violated the basic principles underlying justice. Individuals, being born with differing abilities, should not be expected to perform tasks for which they were unsuited. Governing, being the most important activity of the state, should be reserved for those persons possessing the highest natures.

The discussion of justice in the *Republic* opens with an assertion by Thrasymachus: "'Just' or 'right' means nothing but what is to the interest of the stronger part" (Plato, 1968, p. 18). Socrates, of course, rejects Thrasymachus' proposition. In its place he proposes a universal principle underling all acts of justice: "That everyone ought to perform the one function in the community for which his nature best suited him" (Plato, 1968, p. 127). Hence the just society is one in which the three principal classes--guardians, auxiliary, and tradesmen--are all assigned different tasks. Injustice will occur when people are called upon to perform duties for

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which they are unsuited. Gardner's (1993) theory of multiple intelligences is in a larger sense an appeal for justice in the realm of testing. Gardner offers a ringing indictment of the one-track, uniform thinking that has given rise to IQ testing. Though both linguistic and logical-mathematical thinking are important, they do not constitute the whole of human intelligence. Psychologists have mistakenly focused their attention on those skills that are readily measured, and they have ignored other abilities that are harder to test. The time has come, Gardner believes, to rectify this situation by expanding our conception of intelligence.

Everyone from the time of birth exhibits a certain number of talents, strengths and weaknesses. Some individuals demonstrate great musical ability. Others possess strong spatial or kinesthetic gifts. Educators need to recognize the importance of individual differences. Schools are designed to perform a sorting function: to identify and train persons for appropriate vocational slots within their society. "There are many unfilled or poorly filled niches in our society," Gardner (1993) informs us, "and it would be opportune to guide individuals with the right set of abilities to these billets" (pp. 33-34). We live in a world filled with problems. If we have any hope of solving these problems, "we must make the very best use of the intelligences we possess" (p. 34).

The question of individual and social justice underlies Plato's as well as Gardner's theorizing. The two thinkers agree that people are born with differing talents and abilities. The state (through its principal agency, the school) is responsible for identifying individuals' natural gifts and for training them to perform the social functions for which they are best suited. The similarities between Plato's and Gardner's thinking can be seen in the following quotations. Plato (1968) says: "Everyone ought to perform the one function in the community for which his nature best suited him" (p. 127). Gardner (1993) asserts: "There are many unfilled or poorly filled niches in our society, and it would be opportune to guide individuals with the right set of abilities to these billets" (pp. 33-34). Gardner's attack on IQ tests is leveled as much against their unfairness (injustice) as it is against their lack of scientific validity. Such tests measure only a small fraction of the total spectrum of human intelligence. Gardner, like Plato, wishes to embrace the full range of human abilities.

Metaphor

Plato divided humanity into three separate classes of people (gold, silver, and brass). The *Republic* assigned each class a specific function. Plato (1968) recognized the need for a social myth (metaphor). Citizens were to be told:

All of you in this land are brothers; but the god who fashioned you mixed gold in the composition of those among you who are fit to rule, so that they are the most precious quality; and he put silver in the auxiliaries, and iron and brass in the farmers and craftsmen (pp. 106-107). Though most children will resemble their parents, sometimes golden parents will have a silver child or silver parents will have a golden child. The same principle applies to brass parents. The state must determine which metal characterizes every child's nature. If, for example, golden parents should happen to have a brass child, they must, without the smallest pity, assign him the station proper to his nature and thrust him out among the craftsmen or farmers. Likewise, if silver or brass parents should produce a golden child, he or she must be promoted into the ranks of the guardians. (p. 107)

The macrocosm is reproduced in the microcosm

What is true of the society applies equally to the individual. The balanced person reflects a combination of reason, emotion, and appetite. (Reason, because it is superior, governs over emotion and appetite.) Where this balance is established, inner harmony will prevail. Justice, therefore, is an individual as well as a social concern. Plato (1968) believes: "The just man does not allow the several elements in his soul to usurp one another's functions; he is indeed one who sets his house in order, by self-mastery and discipline coming to be at peace with himself" (p. 142). Injustice, on the other hand, is characterized by the opposite state of affairs. When disharmony dominates someone's personality, his or her life is filled with strife.

Gardner believes people are born with very different potentialities. Parents, contrary to behaviorist's doctrines, cannot shape their children into whatever they choose. Heredity, not training, is the all-important factor in determining which intelligences will govern a child's life. "These intelligences," Gardner (1993) believes, "are best thought of as biopsychological constructs" (p. 88). The various intelligences are like biological potentials, coming to express themselves

when they interplay with environmental factors. Though there is possibly a genetic limit to anyone's

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intelligence, "it is likely to be the case that this biological limit is rarely if ever approached" (p. 47).

Gardner, like Plato, wishes to classify people according to their respective natures. Gardner's metaphor is reflected in his celebrated theory of the seven intelligences. Gardner (1993) holds that these intelligences demonstrate "raw, biological potentials" (p. 90). Gardner presents the seven intelligences in the following way: (1) Linguistic intelligence is best reflected in the work of writers and poets. (2) Logical-mathematical intelligence is expressed in quantitative and scientific thinking. (3) Spatial intelligence "is the ability to form a mental model of a spatial world and to be able to maneuver and operate using that model" (p. 9). (4) Musical intelligence is found in the composition and expression of musical notation. (5) Bodily-kinesthetic intelligence is physical and athletic prowess. (6) interpersonal intelligence "is the ability to understand other people" (p. 9). Successful sales people, politicians, and teachers usually score high in this ability. Finally, (7) intrapersonal intelligence is found in persons who are able to look deeply into themselves. Spiritual leaders such as Gandhi exhibit this type of intelligence.

Plato and Gardner share a common gift, the knack for formulate mind-expanding metaphors. Plato offers us the metaphor of the three metals. Gardner updates Plato with the metaphor of the seven intelligences. The two theorists clearly agree on one thing: People are born (biologically) with whatever talents they later demonstrate in life. (The environment merely serves to facilitate development.) To justify placing people in different categories, Plato (1968) employs the metaphor that "the god who fashioned you" made you to be the way you are (pp. 106-107). Gardner (1993), like Plato, justifies his system of classification based on the "fact" that people are born with different "raw, biological potentials" (p. 90). Finally, both thinkers are interested in the question of balance. Plato wishes to balance the factors of reason, emotion, and appetite in a person's soul. Gardner seeks to discover the particular balance of intelligences that characterizes someone's life.

The Cave

The heart of Plato's (1968) philosophy is to be found in his analogy of the cave. He asks us to imagine a group of prisoners who have been chained in a cave for their entire lives. "Here they have been from childhood, chained by the leg and also by the neck" (p. 227). Visualize further a large bonfire burning behind the prisoners and a parade of people carrying two-dimensional posters of various worldly objects in front

of the fire so that shadows of these things are cast on the wall of the cave. "Such prisoners would recognize as reality nothing but the shadows of those artificial objects" (p. 229). Now suppose that one of the prisoners escapes from his or her chains and wonders out into the light. At first his or her eyes would be dazzled by the brilliance of the sun. Slowly, however, he or she would come to see things (Forms) as they really are. Plato (1968) offers us the following interpretation of the story:

The prison dwelling corresponds to the region revealed to us through the sense of sight, and the fire-light within it to the power of the Sun. The ascent to see the things in the upper world you may take as standing for the upward journey of the soul into the region of the intelligible. (p. 231)

Gardner (1993) seeks to liberate us from a more modern cave, testing. "The penchant for testing has gone too far. While some tests are useful . . . many tests have been designed to create, rather than to fulfill, a need" (p. 174). IQ and achievement tests are based on a faulty assumption: That they can measure inherent, genetic abilities. Besides being based on an erroneous assumption, IQ and achievement tests have limited predictive validity. They cannot tell us who will be successful later on in life. IQ tests, contrary to popular opinion, do not measure the reality of intelligence. In contrast to the unitary view of intelligence (which defines intelligence as the ability to score well on a paper and pencil test), Gardner proposes the theory of multiple intelligences. He offers us a contextual definition of intelligence: "The ability to solve problems or fashion products that are of consequence in a particular cultural setting or community" (p. 15). Gardner's theory raises as many questions as it solves. Are we limited to merely seven intelligences? When he is feeling charitable, Gardner (1993) admits "there may be anywhere from seven to several hundred dimensions of mind" (p. 228). Indeed, the total spectrum of human intelligences may reveal "an indefinitely large number of minds" (p. 228). Gardner (1993) insists that intelligences cannot be properly understood apart from the cultural context within which they are utilized. Additionally, intelligences are not restricted to processes going on inside the human head. Gardner endorses the concept of distributive intelligences. "Intelligence exists in significant measure outside the physical body of the individual" (p. 223). All the tools humans use in their daily lives (everything from pencils to computers) have their own distributive form of intelligence. Knowing how to function within a culture is largely a matter of knowing how to use these intelligences.

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Plato wishes to liberate humanity from the dark shadows of the cave. Gardner's cave, testing, is no less forbidding. Plato (1968) contends that most people are frequently misled by their senses. "Prisoners would recognize as reality nothing but the shadows of those artificial objects" (p. 229). Reality is not to be found in the sense experiences coming from the external world; reality is to be discovered by turning the mind inward, by contemplating eternal *forms*. Gardner seeks to liberate us from the false assumptions underlying IQ and achievement tests. The reality of intelligence lies beyond what is measured by standardized tests. The true measure of intelligence is to be found in the way in which people interact with their world. Humans demonstrate intelligence when they "solve problems or fashion products that are of consequence in a particular cultural setting or community" (p. 15).

Assessment

Assessment was an integral part of Plato's (1968) *Republic* (though he never used that word to describe the way guardians were to be selected.) The entire well-being of the state depended upon identifying "the natural gifts that fit men to be guardians of a commonwealth, and to select them accordingly" (p. 63). Plato charged educators with the responsibility of identifying children's natural talents and of placing them in the proper vocational tracks--guardians, auxiliary, farmers or merchants. Mistakes in the sorting process could have the most dire of consequences for the whole society. Plato, unlike most other Athenians, assigned an equal place to women in the *Republic*. They were not restricted to home and hearth. Women could become guardians if they were born of the right metal, gold. "All I have been saying applies just as much to any women who are found to have the necessary gifts" (p. 262). Not only was Plato ahead of his time on the question of gender, but he was equally advanced in his thinking about the instruction of young children. Consider the modernity of the following quotation:

Enforced learning will not stay in the mind. So avoid compulsion, and let your children's lessons take the form of play. This will also help you to see what they are naturally fitted for. (p. 258)

Though Gardner (1993) questions the value of testing, he strongly supports the need for assessment. Testing consists of assigning numerical scores to students' performances on paper and pencil tests. Assessment, on the other hand, helps to furnish useful "information about the skills and potentials of individuals, with the dual goals of providing useful

feedback to the individuals and useful data to the surrounding community" (p. 174). Whereas testing is imposed externally at odd times during the year, assessment is an ever present part of the learning environment. "As in a good apprenticeship, the teachers and the students are always assessing" (p. 175). Assessment is an essential feature of a quality school. Educators have the responsibility of determining "which intelligence is favored when an individual has a choice" (p. 31). Assessment helps educators to decide which type of education is the most appropriate one for each child. Plato and Gardner agree upon the importance of assessment in education. The assessment of children's natural abilities is the first task of the school. Plato viewed assessment as being an intimate part of the art of statecraft. Assessment for Gardner serves an individual as well as a social purpose. It provides "information about the skills and potentials of individuals" so that their abilities may be utilized by the larger society. Plato advises us to observe the play activities of children because in play we can see what children are "naturally fitted for." Gardner shares the same sentiment when he counsels us to watch and see which intelligences children favor when they have a free choice. Both theorists support a system of education that, through the judicious use of assessment, serves the needs of the whole community.

Specialization

We like to think of specialization as being one of the marks of the modern world. Plato (1968), however, was aware of the need for specialized knowledge. He wished to assign everyone to a specific task. "No one man can practice many trades or arts satisfactorily" (p. 62). Individuals should acquire those skills for which they are naturally suited. "We would not allow our shoemaker to try to be also a farmer or weaver or builder, because we wanted our shoes well made" (p. 62). By assigning everyone to a task that corresponded to his or her abilities, the republic would encourage economic efficiency as well as social justice. Gardner (1993), like Plato, recognizes the need for specialized knowledge. He believes schools must come to appreciate two truths about the modern world: (1) That not everyone is born with the same interests and abilities, and (2) "that nowadays no one person can learn everything there is to learn" (p. 10). The Renaissance man (or woman) is no longer a tenable ideal. The exponential growth in knowledge necessitates specialization. Hence the role of the school, according to Gardner (1993), is to match "individuals with the various kinds of life and work options that are available

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in their culture" (p. 10). If Plato and Gardner agree upon any one thing, it is this: (1) That individuals are born with differing talents and abilities, and (2) that in order to develop these talents and abilities, schools must teach different things to different individuals. "No one," Plato (1968) reminds us, "can practice many trades or arts satisfactorily" (p. 62). Gardner (1993) concurs with Plato when he asserts that "nowadays no one person can learn everything there is to learn" (p. 10). Specialization, for Plato, is linked to his theory of justice. When everyone is performing the task for which he or she is ideally suited, the end effect will be social justice. Gardner expresses a similar view when he asserts that schools must match "individuals with the various kinds of life and work options that are available in their culture" (p. 10). When individuals perform the functions for which they are best suited, the net effect will be a good society.

Understanding

For Plato (1968) teaching and learning are more than stuffing students' minds with information (for example, cramming for the SAT). Plato believes humans are born possessing certain "a priori" ideas ("mental seed" of all the Forms). Even if teachers wish to furnish their students with "the power of learning the truth and the organ to see it with," they will not be able to accomplish such an end (p. 232). The teacher's role is not one of placing "the power of sight into the soul's eye, which already has it, but ensure that, instead of looking in the wrong direction, it is turned the way it ought to be," inward (p. 232). Which instructional method holds the greatest promise of awakening the mind's understanding? Not surprisingly, Plato placed his faith in the Socratic method. Dialectics, he believes, "will stand as the coping-stone of the whole structure; there is no other study that deserves to be put above it" (p. 255). Gardner (1993) alerts us to a very disquieting fact: "Most students in the United States, and, so far as we can tell, most students in other industrialized countries do not understand the materials that they have been presented in school" (p. 188). When students are faced with an unfamiliar situation, they are not able to apply what they have learned to the new situation. Though students may be good at repeating back what they have memorized in the classroom, they are not able to use it in real-life situations. Today's challenge, Gardner (1993) believes, is to "create schools and school systems where education for understanding is in fact carried out" (p. 201). How can educators enhance students' understanding? "There is," Gardner (1993) admits, "no formula for achieving understanding" (p.

197). The best rule of thumb is: (1) To limit what we teach, and (2) to teach it thoroughly. Gardner (borrowing from Jerome S. Bruner) supports the idea of a spiral curriculum. "Understanding," Gardner (1993) believes, "entails the necessity of a 'spiral curriculum' in which rich, generative ideas are revisited time and again across a student's career in school" (p. 192).

Teachers have always sought to enhance students' understanding. Plato's and Gardner's comments merely reflect the ancient and modern aspects of this discussion. The two thinkers, however, approach the problem from different perspectives. Plato believes in the theory of innate ideas. Children are born with "mental seeds" already in their minds. Thus, according to Plato, we already have within us "the power of learning the truth" (p. 232). Just as the teacher cannot give the child "the power of sight," neither can he or she drum understanding into the child's mind.

Understanding is something everyone must come to on his or her own. Gardner is not as interested in the mind's ability to intuitively grasp the truth as he is in its facility for solving meaningful problems. Though individuals may be technically well-schooled, all too frequently they are unable to apply what they have learned when faced with an unfamiliar situation. Gardner confesses that teaching for understanding is never easy. Educators must limit what they teach, and they must teach it thoroughly. Plato believes the dialectical method used by Socrates offers the most effective way of promoting understanding. Gardner's answer, though differing from Plato's, can be traced back to the same source. By endorsing the spiral curriculum, Gardner also buys into Socrates' dialectical method.

Conclusion

Is Howard Gardner a Platonist? There are many striking parallels between Gardner's and Plato's thinking. Both men, for instance, share a common penchant for generating imaginative metaphors. Each man's metaphor, in turn, supports a similar design for education. Plato's metaphor of the three metals (gold, silver, and brass) has been used for centuries to justify the exclusive nature of European education. Gardner's metaphor of the seven intelligences (though of more recent vintage) is rapidly becoming doctrine in American education. [The current issue (September 1997) of *Educational Leadership* is devoted to exploring the instructional implications of Gardner's theory.] What does the theory of multiple intelligences mean for classroom teachers? Far less than many educators would have us believe. (The theory of multiple intelligences

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has become today's bandwagon for educational faddists.) Gardner (1993) cautions us against trying to convert his theory into a general philosophy of instruction. "There is no recipe for a multiple intelligence education" (p. 66). Gardner developed his model in order to better describe the

workings of the various human intelligences. It was not designed to serve as a general theory of teaching. Many different styles of teaching may prove to be equally compatible with multiple intelligence theory. "What Suzuki did for musical performance can be accomplished for every other intelligence, and indeed each intelligence may require its own specific educational theory" (p. 48). Everyone should receive the form of education best suited for his or her nature (intelligences or metals). What could be more Platonic? When the individual receives a tailor-made education that fits his or her native abilities, and when he or she is guided into a vocational slot that serves the whole community, then justice will reign supreme in the *Republic*.

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Ketcham: Machiavelli, the Misunderstood

MACHIAVELLI, THE MISUNDERSTOOD

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For four centuries, Niccolo Machiavelli has been a synonym for cynicism, wickedness, and cruelty. In the 1700's his name, Niccolo, was shortened to "Old Nick" the byname for Satan. Shakespeare referred to him as "Murderous Machiavel." Bertrand Russell credited the book, The Prince as a handbook for gangsters. Psychologists have developed the Mach IV test (Christie 1970) to study those who manipulate others. The list could go on and on. Simply think of what it means when someone is called, Machiavellian.

It may be helpful to compare Locke and Machiavelli through the prism of our postmodern condition. A contradiction arises because Machiavelli's reflections are beyond good and evil. In Nietzsche's work, Beyond Good and Evil, "aphorism #32" he writes of the "overcoming of morality." He sees morality as a "prejudice ... that must be overcome." I do not wish to confuse the matter with Nietzschean conceptions, but it is important to my argument to visualize Machiavelli's views (if you can) as extra-moral. Whereas, Locke can be seen as a modern social contract moralist. Generally, we view Locke favorably and Machiavelli unfavorably. The question is in our postmodern condition should we reconsider Machiavelli, and is he misunderstood in the first place.

With the above in mind, we can now look at our problem. First, Machiavelli's Prince must be read backwards. If we do that, then we see that Machiavelli's cornerstone is **peace**. Machiavelli writes of Italian peace with the stink of the barbarians gone; of love for the prince; and the final results of ennobling the Italians. So the goal of the Prince is not terror but peace and harmony for the people!

In the last chapter the prince is in essence a Christ-figure, but a Christ that is beyond good and evil. Machiavelli's prince has an understanding that the people don't have --- that the people can't have. The prince cares for his people so that they may be happy, even if, through his knowledge (the tree/fruit of knowledge), he cannot obtain the happiness that his subjects can. In the last paragraph of the Prince he calls the prince for the only time in the book the "redeemer."

Machiavelli's prince must suffer so that the people don't suffer. The prince is not honorable so that the people's "honor is not touched" (Chapter XIX). Can the prince be himself as others are? No. He must always be on stage and must learn to do "evil" things so that his so that the subjects can afford to be righteous, united and good.

The prince is a fragile thing. No one who also cares must "deprive him of his reputation" (Chapter XVIII). Everyone (the vulgar) perceives what is ostensible and apparent. The prince can never be known even if he wishes to be known --- therefore he must live in isolation. (Chapter XVIII).

The highest virtue (virtu) is forsaking the Christian or Platonic good. The prince is, in a way, the most good of all men, simply because he is not good so that his fellow man has the opportunity and the joy of being good! The people can have what is in the last chapter of the Prince (unity and peace) if the prince is strong enough to reject Christian virtues for virtu (vitality).

The Jesuits, among others, felt that tyrannicide at certain times was appropriate. Sometimes, Medieval theologians supported political ends that justified means not normally abided. However, this was not commonplace. Therefore, it could be said that Machiavelli was the first to transcend the Medieval and define what we call today, Realpolitik. Also remember that Machiavelli was writing about one man, the prince, not the masses, or general morality.

A Quick Look at Locke

Locke, on the other hand, lives morally amongst us, not beyond good and evil. Locke conceives of "all men" rather than just the prince. All men, in a state of nature, are obligated to make peace, maintain the species, and to refrain from harming one another. If anyone breaks the law of nature, then he has made war on the others and can be punished. It is important to note that the state of nature is not same as the state of government.

Man is born into a state of perfect freedom, with all of the rights and privileges of the law of nature; he is equal to any other man. (87) Man by being born is

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privileged to be under the law of nature, of true equality. This state of nature is not a license, but a state of obligation. It is the only law/restraint.

For Locke the state of nature is the good, something to be nurtured --- to be sought out. The state of nature happens at any time. Men that live via reason and without a common superior are in the state nature. True civil society is the opposite of the state of nature. Why then is the state of government a good?

The state of government is good because without proper authority crimes can go unpunished and disputes can lead to war; therefore, a contract should be made with a trusted authority --- government. For the government to be good, it must both understand and safeguard natural rights. Locke's important natural right is property. One is entitled to the property that one improves with his labor. With the wealth that one acquires with his labored-upon land, he may buy others' property and thereby become moneyed. As long as the law of nature is adhered to the expansion of one's wealth is a good.

Machiavelli, in BK XVII, also discusses property. He states that the prince must abstain from the people's property. Kill if you must but don't take property. For such a behavior leads to a life of robbery and it is difficult to stop, but it is easy to stop killing.

The Postmodern Machiavelli

In 1972, Gil Elliot published a book entitled, *Twentieth Century Book of the Dead*. His thesis may be summed up as: macro-death is now man-made and morality must bow to this reality. The number of man-made deaths in the first 70 years of the 20th century ranges from >80 million to <150 million people. The latest estimate for the number of people murdered by communist parties is 100 million, with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union murdering about 65 million.

There have been historical periods of great wars and upheavals but nothing on the scale of our times.

Most periods of true macro-death have been plagues - black death, etc. Elliot states that the replacement of disease-made macro-death by man-made macro-death is what Hegel meant when he said that a quantitative change, if large enough could bring about a qualitative change. This death-century effects us all --- it is a pressing side of what makes up the postmodern person.

Another concept that shapes postmodernity is the idea of massification. This term is hardly ever seen in English. It is a term used by Mexican intellectuals, and other South American writers. Their term refers to many matters. Two changes that the term refers to are the move from linear growth to geometric growth of the world population and the new focus on the masses rather than the aristocracy.

Among others, these concept shape our postmodern Weltanschauung, and I don't fancy it but postmodern tribalization, and growing offensive nature of social relationships may make a Machiavellian outlook more prudent in the future. Locke is always attractive, however because of the decline of "social contract(s) *his ideas are waning in their power.*" Machiavelli's ideas are waxing. Locke's views may not fit the new century.

Whereas Locke is certainly an 18th century man, somehow Machiavelli seems to transcend his time better than Locke. For example, let us look at one of Locke's assumptions: Locke assumes unlimited access to property; "Thus in the beginning, all the world was America ... " (49). Such assumptions seem weak in a time of the migration tent cities, drug shootouts in junior high, along the US southern boarder "Vietnam type" fire fights. The future does not seem to us of the 20th century as optimistic as it did to the men of the Enlightenment. Should we trust a Machiavellian leader or a Lockeian leader?

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TEACHING: WHAT'S THE MORAL?

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"Above all, people abhor an ethical vacuum, one of which all choices have the same standing and are equally legitimate, when all they face are directions among which they may choose but no compass to guide them."

Amatai Etzioni, *The New Golden Rule*

"In law there is nothing certain but the expense. In the end, it's less costly simply to act honestly and responsibly."

English Essayist Samuel Butler

Introduction

What constitutes a good society? Is it one that has rules and harsh strictures that demands conformity, or is it one that promotes individualism, pluralism and relative definitions of virtue? Are schools, therefore, places where children learn to follow their own insights or time-tested values? Is American history a model for freedom, or is it reflecting a "hidden curriculum" demanding conformity? It is true that American colonials first came here as much to escape rapidly changing lifestyles that were unacceptable and too liberal as much as relief from religious persecution? Maybe a good society is a combination of both a good set of guiding principles and laws for social conformity and tolerance and protections for individuals, as Amatai Etzioni suggests (Etzioni, Chapter 1). Is a teacher's lesson in morality to students just a matter of learning about consent and rules, or does it require a will, intent and cognitive analysis before it is called morality? Are teachers woefully inadequate in discussing even the first part of these questions, or are they competent to guide students today to moral resolution of problems being faced in life?

Many of the questions raised in the first paragraph are questions asked by many today in America. Are teachers moral agents for the society or not? This paper is an attempt to defend the proposition that teachers

must be active moral agents and further proposes a partiality toward a rule-utilitarian or reflective equilibrium perspective of morality for those in the teaching profession. If in fact teachers are to produce good citizens and/or tolerant, interdependent and other-regarding seekers of truth, the classroom should promote teaching and learning styles poised for moral dialogue and reflection. If teachers are to be moral agents for the society (and indeed there is historical evidence to support such a claim), teaching subject matter and enhancing student satisfaction are not the only results expected from a school experience. It is time for teachers to recognize their moral duty and take a more practice role in moral education of their students.

Teachers and Prescribed and Described Morality

It's probably easier to say what we don't want our children to be and do rather than what exactly constitutes "good" behavior. Robert Coles in *Moral Intelligence of Children* states we don't want children who are "self-centered, self-absorbed, mean, lawless, or violent" (Coles, p. 9). Coles believes moral intelligence for a teacher is "reflection of moral actions as well as intellectual caliber, emotional balance and/or emotional state" (Coles, p. 9). If Coles is right, then teachers have a moral stake in the educational enterprise expected by the public (the other "customer" often forgotten in the analysis of what our public schools should be doing)

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that is much more than just teaching right from wrong.

Do teachers merely prescribe moral behavior (what people should be doing) or is there also a descriptive element in morality (statements of fact that reflect judgment about what humans stand for and what fundamental values people hold)? Such discussion would produce what most call universals of morality. Universals of morality presuppose agreement, shared empathy and a consensus about what we value. Should there be an understanding of moral universals as rules of conduct and intent, -- a metaphysical ethic so to speak -- as part of the educational enterprise? Maybe moral statements are just a matter of style and preference as moral relativists suggest. But is there a need for more than relativistic notions of "the good?" If you strip away supposed facts or agreed-to universals of value from moral statements, do they become nothing but idiosyncratic preferences and need no resolution other than personal choice?

Living in a society of moral relativists is not only a tentative and troublesome existence to many, but it could also be dangerous to the citizenry as a whole, as Allan Bloom suggests (Bloom, Chapter 3). Moral relativism often leads to mere prescription of what should happen, and its danger lies in the open-ended non resolution of social values, mores and expectations. Moral relativism is dangerous because it reduces all discussion of moral rightness to a matter of personal preference (Kierstead, pp. 29-32). Because some believe we cannot agree on values, there is no need to come to any consensus about what is moral.

True, moral judgment is difficult. Moral decisions come from the clashes and gaps between ideals and principles decided upon by the group and by each and every one of us separately. Mary Midgley suggests we have become much too ignorant of each other and therefore have concluded it is wrong to interfere with another's set of moral principles. For this reason alone, people have wrongly concluded morality is a relative concept and needs no discussion. Exalting individual freedoms and total reliance on science has also made us skeptics (Midgley, pp. 3-9). Scientific scepticism reduces moral judgment to a level unverifiable, and therefore, unreliable in its analysis.

A reliance on ignorance as the excuse for not interfering and being politically correct has brought America to respect freedom for the wrong reasons. Teachers might be the most guilty perpetuating a lack of moral deliberation as part of a person's education. Midgley concludes that freedom should be promoted so we may

"trust and honor people, and think them capable of acting independently, because independent action has a special value" (Midgley, p. 9). Gilbert Ryle put it this way: science doesn't have the market on rightness and wrongness - there is a sense of it in all of us (Ryle, Chapter 2). Moral judgments are accountable. Not to judge could mean to some that we can't be held accountable for our inner deliberations. We must be able to give reasons for judgements, and indeed make them. A rule book is not enough to have when making moral deliberations. Morality must therefore, have a descriptive element and not merely a prescriptive element.

So --- teachers should really be both prescribers and describers of morality because of the need to not only know the categorical imperatives of the society (rules), but also to consider circumstances and consequences of acts to individuals and the group.

Teacher's Role in Inner and Outer Freedoms

As part of the discussion of teacher's moral role, it is important to remember that there are "inner" and "outer" components of freedom and choice. The outer components comprise the physical political and social determinants like protection of individuals from killing, maiming, oppressions, taxation and injustice. The inner components of freedom include free choice, privacy of thoughts and freedom of mind. The concept "freedom" should include both inner and outer components because of the need for consensus about how we regard each other, and because we should regard each other with a conscious choice rather than an automatic behavior. Without shared ideas and language, we would be all communicating by a series of grunts and noises, -- a most difficult way to improve the human condition.

With inner and outer freedoms included in the social determination of what we value, teachers are as much purveyors of those social values as they are protectors of privacy and individual rights and thoughts. But values and personal freedoms and rights require us to define them and defend them - not just to ourselves but to others as well. Ideas of "good" or "bad" require defensible partiality and deeper meaning than just agreement for agreement sake or viewing the discussion as a matter of preference. Being autonomous or free doesn't make one moral. Autonomy should not be the major goal of education, but neither should it be discouraged. There is a need for a person to get beyond self and recognize standards of value and conduct that reflect regard for others and an understanding.

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Teachers and Reflective Equilibrium

To be moral teachers may want to consider standards that are both prescriptive and descriptive and reflect moral universals as guideposts in teaching. Moral absolutes don't work because these cannot be proven to be regardless of conditions and consequences for all teaching circumstances. Nor should teachers defend moral relativism either, because these reduce all inquiry about morality into a set of preferences or skeptical analysis that defends noninterference with other or their values. Schools and classrooms are training grounds for moral dialogue, not battlefields for personal preferences. Moral relatives have an additional danger in that they cut off the need for any consensus or search for intersubjective agreement needed for a culture to survive.

Jacques Thiroux suggested years ago stated that any moral system should have some basic assumptions:

1. It should be rationally based, but also not devoid of emotion;
2. It should be logical, but not too rigid;
3. It should be universal in scope but also practical to real life;
4. It should be teachable (capable of being learned and applied); and
5. It should be capable of resolving human conflicts, duties and obligations (Thiroux, pp. 129-122).

Thiroux subscribes to the theory that there must be both rules of conduct, but also considerations related to the conditions and consequences of behaviors when they affect people. A "moral voice" is heard by the inner and outer elements of people because of education, experience and an understanding of what ought to be, as Etzioni suggests (Etzioni, p. 121). Teachers should be in the "business" of reflecting oughts and understanding why these oughts are important.

Moral universals in many ways place anyone who subscribes to them in the "reflective equilibrium" camp when it comes to moral perspectives. This means that being a consequentialist teacher morally (based on outcome, flexible rules, greatest good for the greatest number, and fitting punishment to crime) is not enough because it does not protect individuals from the masses or rely on intent as a measurement of moral behavior. The nonconsequentialist on the other hand relies too much on rules, intent and protection of the individual at

the expense of outcomes, protection of the group and recognizing extenuating circumstances when trying to make moral choices in a school setting (Kierstead, p. 37). Both of these extremes in the moral spectrum lack important components teachers must consider when making moral judgments and helping students learn moral lessons.

Because teachers are helping children in moral deliberation and dialogue, they have to take more of a rule - utilitarian (reflective equilibrium) perspective morally because it reflects standards and also recognizes extenuating circumstances; protects individuals but also maximizes gain for all; judges by outcome and considers intent as a measure of morality; and lastly, requires a cognitive element in moral analysis (descriptive) and a behavioral element (prescriptive) concerned with right outcomes of deliberation.

Conclusion

The biggest "problem" in schools today are people problems. Not money, not curriculum, not busing, or lunches, but people (Allen, pp. 37-38). Everything from student violence to equal opportunity to learn, and parental apathy fit in that problem area. If we define morality to mean "other-regarding" the role of teacher should be centered on humans and their regard for and accord with others. Knowledge and preparation in resolution of human problems requires guidance, instruction and yes, even correction. Ignorance of others can no longer be an excuse for being nonjudgmental. Being nonjudgmental means one really doesn't care. Skepticism cannot validate or prove values - it just continues to place science as the answer to all problems without evaluating it in relation to humans. Science must have guiding principles. These are developed through shared empathy and social dialogue. Guilt is learned and comes in degrees. It is "a natural response to a wrong doing" that most of us would want in a society, because without it social conditions would be untenable (Kierstead, p. 147-51). Without guilt a society lacks a rudder and is lacking in esteem for self and others. Responsibility requires reflection and an understanding of consequences of association with others. Courage of convictions is not an idle phrase (Halberstam, pp. 109-118). It takes honest and deliberate reflection and a willingness in today's society to stand for something of value.

The role of teachers in a child's life goes beyond passing standardized tests and curricular goals. All who teach recognize that as soon as they have contact with their students. Every school day is a moral drama, with

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many moral deliberations and protocols to be faced by teachers. At the same time a teacher is expected to be a purveyor of truth, honesty, responsibility, tolerance, justice, fairness and equal opportunity. A teacher is also a model for students to evaluate while also trying to make the best of moral universals come alive. "The moral" of teaching is simply put, moral prescription and description -- no easy task for those of us in the profession, but so necessary for a decent life.

these moral universals as a necessary part of a teacher's role, for without them it would be a very tenuous existence indeed.

Terms like honesty, responsibility, respect for others, interdependence, respect for truth, tolerance, fairness, and patience are not just descriptors of teachers, they are also moral protocols teachers aspire to as moral agents. They are also expected to promote these moral principles in students. Society still expects it. Lets hope the "moral" of teaching continues to accept

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Krawchuk: A Selected History of Educational Technology

A Selected History of Educational Technology

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Introduction

The purpose of this article is to provide an introductory glance at the field of educational technology and focus on how a handful of historical people and theories relate to the field. However, in order to begin to understand the history of educational technology, we must first define the field of educational technology. Only when we have a clear understanding of the field can we relate educational technology to historical educational events and begin to understand the connections.

Misleading Definitions

For years, the field of educational technology has been erroneously synonymous with the terms "instructional media" and "instructional technology". Even today, when individuals are asked to define educational technology, they typically respond with an answer that includes media of some sort (overheads, transparencies, etc.) or a piece of equipment, such as the computer. However, when properly defined, educational technology involves much more than media. The field has existed long before overheads or transparencies, or even the electricity to run equipment was invented. How then, you may ask, should the field of educational technology be defined?

Defining Technology

To provide an adequate definition of educational technology, we must first explore the term "technology". While this appears to be a straight-forward task, researchers such as Heinich (1995), Gentry (1995), and Saettler (1990) have spent a great deal of time and effort in attempts to properly define "technology". Of the aforementioned researchers, all agree that in the past fifty years, remarkable advances in equipment and machinery, such as the computer, have led many to equate the word "technology" with hardware and products. However, they argue that "technology" involves knowledge and has existed for centuries without reference to equipment or media.

In support of his argument, Saettler (1990) claims that Aristotle described *techne* (Greek translation for

technology) as the systematic use of knowledge for intelligent human action. Likewise, Saettler himself describes technology as involving a "system of practical knowledge not necessarily reflected in things or hardware" (Saettler, 1990, p. 3). He suggests that in the past, many technological innovations, such as the three-field system of crop rotation, have emerged that involve little or no machines.

In alignment with Saettler, Heinich and Gentry view technology from a "knowledge" standpoint. Heinich supports Galbraith's (1967) definition of technology which places an emphasis on knowledge by stating, "Technology means the systematic application of scientific and other organized knowledge to practical tasks" (Heinich, 1995, p. 68). Likewise, Gentry defines technology as "The systemic and systematic application of behavior and physical sciences concepts and other knowledge to the solution of problems" (Gentry, 1995, p. 17).

When viewed as a whole, evident in each of the aforementioned definitions of "technology" is the reference to a system of knowledge. Thus, for the purposes of this article, a combination of the preceding definitions will be used and "technology" will be defined as a system of knowledge applied to a problem in order to produce a solution.

Defining Educational Technology

Now that we have roughly defined "technology" as a system of knowledge rather than a piece of equipment, we can begin to define "educational technology". Following with theoretical trends, there are three predominant ways that educational technology has been defined; the media or product view, the process view, and the process/product view.

Product View. Thus far, this entire article has emphasized that technology is more than merely equipment or devices. However, this author would be remiss by failing to mention that there is a contingency of early literature suggesting the opposite. In the early part of the twentieth century, the Visual Instruction Movement began defining educational technology as devices or hardware used in instruction (Saettler, 1990).

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It is no accident that this definition coincides with the emergence of behavioral learning approaches, which focused on the observable. As the behaviorists were focusing on the observable, educational technologists also adopted this focus and viewed the field in terms of tangible objects or products. This definition was labeled the "Media Approach" to educational technology and was broadly accepted and researched until the middle of the 1960's (Saettler, 1990). Although this view was widely rejected by the field in the 1970's and continues to be rejected today, literature still exists promoting a product definition of educational technology. For example, as recently as 1986, Cuban defined educational technology as a product by stating,

"[educational technology is] any device available to teachers for use in instructing students in a more efficient and stimulating manner than the sole use of the teacher's voice." (Cuban, 1986, p. 4)

Process View When the product or media definition of educational technology began to wane, emphasis was shifted from the external observable product to the internal process. Just as learning theories shifted from behavioral (external) to cognitive (internal) approaches, definitions of educational technology evolved from a product to a process view.

Saettler (1990), from the late 1960's through today, openly opposes the product or media view of educational technology. He feels educational technology involves the systematic application of knowledge to instruction and views it as a process, not a product. This is evident in his writings as he states,

"Educational technology is a process rather than a product. No matter how sophisticated the media of instruction may become, a precise distinction must always be made between the process of developing a technology of education and the use of certain products or media within a particular technology of instruction" (Saettler, 1990, p. 4).

Process/Product View. While Saettler's process view focuses on the systematic application of knowledge to a problem, he completely dismisses the products which help to solve those problems. Ely (1983), in his article concerning the stability of a definition of educational technology, agrees with Saettler that educational technology involves a process. However, he also acknowledges equipment and products as important aspects of educational technology. He divides educational technology into a physical science (devices and equipment) and a behavioral

science (process or how-to). He considers the process as the knowledge and skills required for the how-to phase, and the product as the equipment and materials used in the process. For Ely, both the process and the product constitute educational technology.

Today, cognitive learning theories are giving way to the popular constructivist learning theories. Constructivism emphasizes interactions between learners and the environment, and stresses the importance of an interaction between the mental process and the environmental product. Ely's combination definition accommodates the learning theories of today and the need for the process as well as the product.

Influences on Educational Technology

Now that various definitions of technology and educational technology have been identified, a handful of theories and theorists influencing the field of educational technology will be recognized. For each theory or theorist, a brief description of how the theory/ist relates to the process/product view of educational technology is provided. Please note that there are literally thousands of people and ideas that have influenced educational technology and shaped it throughout the decades. However, this paper only addresses a few of what are perceived to be some of the most influential people and ideas.

Sophists. Dating back the last half of the fifth century BC, the Sophists of Athens are often considered the ancestors of educational technology. While they acted out against many of the social customs of that time, one of their biggest contributions to education was their "deviant" use of mass instruction. For the first time in education, instruction was not between a teacher and a single student, but between a teacher and a group of pupils (Saettler, 1990). This contribution altered the process of education in that it was no longer an individual occurrence, but a group event. Likewise, alterations in the products used during the process had to be targeted toward group instruction as opposed to individual instruction.

A second contribution of the Sophists that remains evident in today's schools is a recognition that various instructional strategies achieve distinct outcomes. This recognition effected both the process and the products used in their instruction. They were the first group of teachers to analyze modes of instruction and "research" the effects of various instructional strategies. The term "research" is used lightly because their research

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methods and instruments had yet to be refined and were not scientific in nature. However, they did attempt to investigate modes of instruction and took some of the first steps toward a science and technology of instruction (Saettler, 1990).

Socratic and Scholastic Methods. Several methods of instruction were developed between the last half of the fifth century BC and the 1600's AD. Two methods that truly impacted the field of educational technology include the Socratic Method and the Scholastic Method. Developed by Socrates, the Socratic method was used to draw out knowledge that he believed was inborn. By using the process of asking as a series of "skillful questions", Socrates helped guide the learner to the appropriate answer with his "inquiry method" of instruction (Gruber, 1961). Influences of the Socratic Method are seen today in what is now labeled "guided discovery" or "guided questioning" processes.

A second method, developed by Abelard and refined by St. Thomas Aquinas in the early thirteenth century, was the Scholastic Method. This method consisted of "rules of logic" that were used to examine conflicting ideas in a systematic and rational manner (Gruber, 1961). To accomplish this, Abelard provided his students with two columns of information. He placed the views of the authorities in one column and the opposite views in the second column. Students would then be required to reach reconciliation on the matter by using Abelard's rules of logic. When examining this method, both the process of acquiring information and the products used in this process were novel. This precise method later helped lay the groundwork for a system of scientific inquiry and exploration.

Comenius. Among the many contributors to the field of educational technology, Johann Amos Comenius is considered to be the first true forerunner of modern educational technology (Saettler, 1990). Of his many accomplishments, Comenius is most noted for his humane view of education and his emphasis on children's stages of development. He proposed that all people should have access to education from kindergarten through the university and that education based on social status was immoral--an idea that was centuries before its time (Saettler, 1990). Just as the Sophists altered the processes and products of instruction by introducing group instruction, Comenius altered the processes and products with his idea of providing education to all as opposed to a select ability group.

As another accomplishment, his work on children's

growth and development eventually led to schools organized according to children's stages of development. This was another great contribution to educational technology in that both the process and product were affected by these schools. For example, the products of this instruction spurred an emphasis on sensory education (Ornstein & Levine, 1993). Through his theories of sensory education, Comenius developed his famous *Orbus Pictus*, the first text using both words and pictures to teach a subject. Comenius felt that using both verbal and visual modes of instruction increased learning, an idea that forever influenced the products used in education.

Rousseau. Like Comenius, Jean Jacques Rousseau recognized stages of human growth and development and emphasized the use of the senses in education. While Rousseau felt that knowledge was based on sensations and feelings, he parted with Comenius when it came to identifying instructional materials. Comenius was a supporter of pictures and text, but Rousseau openly opposed textbooks. He believed that direct and immediate experiences with nature were the pathways to truth and knowledge (Ornstein & Levine, 1993). From his experiential process beliefs, he developed novel products and materials for use in instruction. Rousseau's experiential beliefs were far reaching and remain evident in today's discovery learning movement as well as current constructivist theories.

Pestalozzi. Like Comenius and Rousseau, Johann Pestalozzi advocated sensory learning. Through his beliefs, he developed "object lessons" which emphasized the use of physical objects in the teaching process. At the time when recitation was the primary method of instruction, the use of objects as products of instruction was a unique approach. Pestalozzi also devised a theory of instruction which asserted that content must proceed from simple to complex. His belief in this process theory of instruction led to changes in the way content was sequenced as well as the methods used for instruction.

While Pestalozzi developed many theories, he was not satisfied with merely the creation of his theories. He took it one step further and researched his concepts at various experimental schools. Using introspection, he was one of the first theorists to implement and examine his ideas in the classroom (Saettler, 1990). Pestalozzi's theories had a profound effect on educational technology and his investigations later led to the development of a science of instruction and the use of empirical methods in research.

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Dewey. One of the most famous educators of all time is John Dewey. His belief that learning involved an interaction between the learner and the environment led to the development of his Laboratory Schools. These schools were very different from traditional schools in that desks and benches were not arranged in rows, drills and recitations were never heard, and subject matter was not clearly separated (Saettler, 1990). Just as Rousseau used his environmental process theory to affect the instructional products, Dewey changed the process of obtaining knowledge by altering the products used in the process.

Dewey's theories centered on his idea that reflection promoted worthwhile thinking and he promoted reflection every chance he had. However, despite his development of a scientific method of instruction, empirical inquiry did not occur to test Dewey's hypotheses against predictions. Thus, while Dewey's contributions to the field of educational technology cannot be disputed, his theories are not considered "scientific" theories of learning.

Thorndike. At the same time Dewey was forming his theories, Edward L. Thorndike was developing a few theories of his own. The result was his theory of Connectionism, which included a system of rewards and punishments. Through this system, emphasis was shifted from the internal process to the physical products used as rewards and punishers. Thorndike methodically and empirically tested his theories both with animals and in the classroom. This testing led his Connectionism theory to be credited as the first scientific theory of learning. Because of this, Saettler calls Thorndike "unquestionably...the first modern instructional technologist" (1990, p. 56).

While Thorndike influenced and promoted the empirical study of theories, this was not his only contribution to educational technology. His theoretical

propositions and emphasis on products later led to the development of the theory of behaviorism.

Piaget. Perhaps the greatest contribution of Jean Piaget was the development of a series of models or stages of development. Using these stages, Saettler (1990) suggests that a teacher can predict the range of a learner's understanding and adjust accordingly. These "adjustments" are evidenced by the products used to assist in the process of obtaining knowledge.

As with Rousseau and Dewey, Piaget also asserted that cognitive development is a product of the learner and environment interaction (Ornstein & Levine, 1993). He supported the use of concrete materials for learners in the early stages of development and abstract materials for learners in later stages of development. His suggestions have had a great impact on the products used for instruction. Due to his stage-related theories, many feel that Piaget developed a process of instruction that can be based on an individual's rate of cognitive development and exhibited through the use of various products.

Conclusions

In summary, "technology" and "educational technology" have been defined and a few of the many influences on the field of educational technology have been briefly examined. This article does not go into specific detail about the relationships between the theories and the field of educational technology, but it does provide a surface view of how they are intertwined. For more explicit information regarding this subject, Saettler's (1990) text *The Evolution of American Educational Technology* is a great resource and suggested reading.

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Lipscomb: Floppy Disk Student Plagiarism . . .

FLOPPY DISK STUDENT PLAGIARISM

AND

POSSIBLE REMEDIES

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It has been the author's experience that college students often misunderstand the fact that they are in college to learn. Unfortunately, they believe that they are in college to pass, make good grades, and graduate. Students are under considerable pressure for good grades including scholarships, post graduation employment and of course not flunking out. Some students excel at studying and performing on tests and papers and other students excel at cheating. The wide abuse of the computer's ability to copy documents and then easily modify them is troubling to this educator. Students can easily copy documents from many sources such as CD encyclopedias, the Internet, and most often each other.

The Problem

In the School of Engineering Technology at the University of Southern Mississippi, many technical laboratories are taught. Each laboratory course involves about ten written laboratory reports that are graded for technical content, style, and grammar. Because the nature of the laboratories requires a specific phenomenon to be demonstrated with the laboratory equipment that is available, the laboratory reports are similar from semester to semester. Under these conditions, copying and modifying has become a way of life for some students. In fact, a black market has even developed selling old laboratory reports on diskettes -- rumored to cost \$10. Ultimately, the students print the laboratory reports and the hard copy is graded. They are returned to the students for their review, and then kept by some instructors. The author has encouraged all instructors not to return the graded hard copy to avoid a higher quality black market. However, the soft copy on disk is still available for abuse. Even requiring that the diskette be turned in does not alleviate because a copy can be kept. I believe most educators would be alarmed at the quantity and organization of "state of the art" floppy disk plagiarism. Because the contents can be modified by word substitution, cut and paste, font selection, line spacing, and heading formatting,

detecting an old laboratory report with new data installed is difficult.

Attempts at a Solution

Threats of dire consequences, lectures about personal ethics, frank talks about "you are only hurting yourself," "your friend won't be there on the job," requiring a signed statement saying it is your own work, and other ineffective methods have been tried with little apparent success. Solutions are not easy because students are generally intelligent and motivated. The following are some suggestions that may help.

Nontechnical Solutions

1. Make the assignments very personal so that the product can only be identified with one individual. An autobiographical sketch is one commonly used writing assignment that is resistant to copying. In the laboratory report environment this is more difficult but possible. Graphs of the letters in their name for spreadsheet practice are also resistant to copying.
2. Have the students present their papers to the class with questions afterwards. This can be a "pop" event to, hopefully, embarrass the plagiarizers or announced in advance to thwart copying.
3. In-class oral quizzes and student recitation can be used to check the student's knowledge about how the document was prepared.
4. Use in-class testing for evaluation rather than out-of-class work. The author no longer assigns any grade value to homework and it is no longer copied. Require the students to use the software to create the entire laboratory report during the class period where their entries can be supervised to be certain that no external files are copied.

Technical Solutions

Unfortunately, solutions that involve manipulating documents are usually software specific. Although these ideas may be generally employed, the following

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suggestions may not be directly applicable to your software. Technical techniques involve hidden text in a particular font placed in pre-named empty documents on a diskette. The diskette is then sold to the student and the hidden text sequence is identified on the student's record. When students submit a paper, they also submit the diskette containing a copy of the file. The file is then searched for hidden text which is then compared with the student's record.

5. WordPerfect allows hidden text to be inserted in a document. This technique is not secure because the "reveal codes" and the "view hidden text" options display the hidden text. This technique is too easily discovered and is not recommended.
6. Identical word patterns may be recognized by the instructor and by a computer. Unfortunately, computer searches involve searching all of the documents with selected word patterns from each of the documents. If * represents multiplication, the number of searches is $N*(N-1)$ *(number of word patterns searched). This is very time consuming even for one word pattern search. It is a testament to the human mind that some word patterns can be recognized during grading. This technique is not recommended except in emergencies.
7. WordPerfect also allows the document summary into which a large amount of information can be placed. The document summary configuration menu contains 50 fields, most of which can be used to contain information. All of this information is carried with the document. If random characters in a field such as "mail stop" are used, students would probably not realize that it was an identifying code. An advantage of using the document summary is that the information must be manually changed. Unfortunately, this also slows encrypting the diskettes.

8. Quattro Pro allows hidden text that can be placed in one of the many spreadsheets. Very rarely are any of the spreadsheets below the first one used by students. In Quattro Pro, 102 spreadsheets not counting the first one are available for hidden text. The total number of locations for hidden text is $102*103*8192 = 86,065,152$. It would be virtually impossible to ferret out the location of the hidden text among the many millions of cells. However, the instructor could use the "go to" command to jump to the block location to inspect the hidden codes.

Summary

If diskettes with pre-named files were sold to students and they were told that these files could be traced to them even if they were copied, "file copy plagiarism" would certainly be impeded. Although it is an additional burden on teaching to attempt to thwart plagiarism, the threat of apprehension may be enough. The chance of hard evidence identifying them as cheaters would deter many students. It would also be helpful to have undisputable evidence of cheating if challenged by a student. Of course, the "hacker" types would assume the challenge of finding the secret and publishing it. Consequently, particularly for word processing, techniques may have to be changed in the future. Further study and software development in this area is needed. Hidden password characters would be a helpful addition to word processor and spread sheet software. An Internet search for anti-plagiarism computer techniques was not productive although very many articles about plagiarism and cheating could be found.

McKellips: The Educational Populism of Alfalfa Bill Murray . . .

THE EDUCATIONAL POPULISM OF ALFALFA BILL MURRAY: DEMAGOGUERY IN THE PROGRESSIVIST ERA?

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Oklahoma came into the union, wrote its constitution, codified its laws, and established its educational institutions and policies during the Progressive Era. Danney Goble in *Progressive Oklahoma The Making of a New Kind of State*, said, "No other state combined so fully or so quickly the advanced notions of that reform era. Even if not a new kind of state, Oklahoma was an exemplar of a Progressive one."¹

William H. Murray's influence on these events was enormous as control of Indian Territory moved from five American Indian nations to the founders of the state of Oklahoma. Robert H. Henry said it was "largely through his efforts that Indian Territory [merged with Oklahoma Territory] became the state of Oklahoma."² His influence continued through the early years of statehood, and after a period of quiescence, re-emerged during the Great Depression and New Deal as progressivism made its last stand.

At the time statehood was achieved, populism was a strong force in Oklahoma. Murray, depending on the issue, was populist or anti-populist, progressivist or anti-progressivist, and sometimes all at the same time. He had strong opinions regarding education and used his positions as writer of the Oklahoma State Constitution, first Speaker of the Oklahoma House of Representatives, member of Congress from Oklahoma, and depression-era Governor, to influence the course of education in Oklahoma.

In attempting to assess William H. Murray's impact on education, the writer's belief that Murray is Oklahoma's most "colorful" and interesting character was reinforced. As Keith Bryant said in the preface of his *Alfalfa Bill Murray*, the name "conjures up an image of a seedy old man, wearing a wrinkled white cotton suit covered with cigar ashes, his face distinguished by an untrimmed walrus mustache, short trouser legs raised above his shoes, revealing bony legs, run-down white socks, and six inches of long underwear. A living legend in his own time."³

As the research progressed, a more complicated

personality emerged, one impossible to place comfortably in a box labeled demagogue, populist, or progressive. He shared many of the Progressives' views on political and economic reform but rejected many of their social beliefs. While adopting many of the positions of the Populists, he viewed parts of the Populist party's platform as dangerously socialist.

William Henry David Murray, Henry to his family, "Alfalfa Bill," "the Sage of Tishomingo," or "Cockleburr Bill," to others, was born in Toadsuck, Texas, November 21, 1869. His mother died before he was two and shortly before his twelfth birthday, unhappy with his stepmother, he ran away from home. He said, "At the age of twelve, I became a wayward son, and absconded from my home. Under the pretense of going to church I left my father."⁴

His schooling to that time had been minimal. He had been taught his alphabet from a "Blue-backed Speller" in Sunday School. His father taught him such things as "number of days in the month, principal characters in the Bible, forms of government, etc.," at home. Two summers he attended rural subscription schools for a few weeks where he learned to read from McGuffey's Readers.⁵

Working as a farmhand after he "absconded", he attended a few weeks of school. He had little respect for the learning or the ability to teach of his teachers, his principal accomplishment being learning penmanship. He asked himself,

What am I getting all of this education for? ... as I had devoted too much time to the school as short as it was, ... I pledged myself that I would gain a College Education, be admitted to the Bar and Practice Law, then marry and go to Congress. I wrote for all the catalogs of Colleges.⁶

When Murray was fifteen, College Hill Institute opened in a nearby community. He borrowed money and sold his horse to pay tuition. An "old Tennessee mountaineer type" boarded him on credit.⁷ The school, his last experience in formal education, offered a

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"country high school" education.⁸ Here his tenure was also brief. That summer he sold Rand-McNally books door to door, earning money to enable him to return to College Hill.⁹ The school, and Springtown Institute nearby, attracted students from surrounding Texas settlements and from Indian Territory. One was the (later) notorious Belle Starr; others became, like Murray, prominent men in early Oklahoma politics.

Murray distinguished himself as a debater, besting classmates and rivals from Springtown Institute in debates attended by members of the community. He said College Hill teachers taught him to reason and how to teach himself,¹⁰ and he decided to do just that. He was allowed to leave school with graduation contingent on reading assigned books and returning to be tested over them. This he did successfully, and throughout the rest of his life, he had faith that self-education through reading, validated by written exams, was a superior form of education.

He took the teacher's exam at College Hill Institute and earned a "first-grade certificate," which certified him to teach all subjects in Texas common schools. After passing his certification test with 100% scores on all sections except teaching theory and methods, he read the recommended text, *Theory and Practice of Teaching*, which he had not read. He concluded that his "answers were better than the book; that the book was impractical and lacked that degree of common sense, to promote the best interest of the pupil."¹¹

He worked briefly as a salesman for a schoolbook publisher and office supply company, perhaps because a good friend and former teacher at College Hill had become Texas State Superintendent of Education and the company was hoping Murray could influence textbook adoption. However, the company soon went bankrupt.

Knowing that unorthodox religious opinions that he had expressed in public debates would make it difficult to secure a teaching position, he attended "Campbellite" (Church of Christ), revival meetings at a school board member's church. As a diversion and mental exercise, he wrote an article for the local newspaper, using quotations from Alexander Campbell to make his points.¹² He secured a teaching position and boarded in this school board member's home where he was invited to "blister" the man's stepsons when they misbehaved at home or at school.¹³

Murray joined the church but never shared the man's Campbellite orthodoxy. He did not attend church

often and consulted the "King James Bible, the Roman Catholic Vulgate, and the Koran regularly,"¹⁴ an unusual religious position for a great-nephew of Lorenzo Dow, evangelist of the Second Great Awakening. A teacher's religious views "should be left outside the school yard gate" Murray would always maintain, and "religious creeds have no place in the school room."¹⁵

While teaching school and writing editorials for small town newspapers, Murray participated in public debates in Texas schoolhouses and churches, often against Populist speakers, sometimes under the auspices of the Farmers' Alliance. His stands tended to be popular in his community. His campaign biographer, Gordon Hines, described a situation in which "negro speakers," were brought to such a debate.

The imported darkies stood in a little group behind the Texans who fingered shot-guns, Winchesters, and pistols. The Populist leaders believed that discretion was the better part of valor. The "furin nigers"[sic] were not mentioned from the speaker's stand.¹⁶

Murray found newspaper work more to his liking than school teaching. Having taught in eight country schools, he "concluded that if I didn't quit, I should become nothing but a school teacher, with its poverty and narrow dependence."¹⁷ His opinion of school teachers was that,

The school teacher, who begins in his youth to teach school, thinks of nothing else and does nothing else, falls into a `gutter' of the impractical; ... He has thought nothing about business. He does not know anything about the farm ... [He] continues to teach school until he is 45 or 50 years old. He not only knows no business, but his mind is `set' and he is incapable of learning business.¹⁸

He compared school teachers to Jews,

The Jew having all of his original thought in business and making money, may master all of the curriculum in the college, but you find him, like the school teacher void of that ... rare virtue called common sense outside of his immediate business.¹⁹

Associate editor of *The Farmer's World* and reporter for several newspapers including the *Ft. Worth Gazette*, Murray became part-owner of newspapers in Coriscana, Texas, where his political association with then Populist Thomas P. Gore began. This association continued as both rose to prominence later in Oklahoma. His papers were Democrat in editorial policy but endorsed one Populist.²⁰

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Murray read law for a few months, then passed the Texas bar exam. He criticized law schools saying "philosophy and fundamentals," not "statutes and decisions," should be taught.²¹ While practicing law, he intensified his political activity. Explaining why he chose to be a Democrat rather than a Republican or Populist, he gave resisting racially integrated education as a major factor saying that "Republican fanatics were trying to pass the Blair Education Act for mixed schools of whites and negroes."²²

Like William Jennings Bryan, Murray adapted major portions of the Populist platform for use by the Democratic Party while adamantly opposing such Populist proposals as federal ownership of the railroads.²³ As a Democratic candidate for the Texas Senate in 1898, he appealed strongly to the Populists and the Farmers' Alliance. Defeated, he moved to Indian Territory.

Indian Territory was still the domain of people forced to accept these lands when expelled from their southeastern homelands before the Civil War. Within these nations, assimilation into white culture varied significantly from person to person, but intermarriage and adaptation had produced many Native Americans almost indistinguishable from their white counterparts in the east. In theory, entry into their lands required tribal permission, and the federal government was supposed to aid in keeping out unwelcome whites. In fact, frequent incursions had occurred. The Dawes Act of 1887 dissolved tribal ownership of land in favor of land allotment to individuals. Whites then came under the jurisdiction of the laws of the Territory (i.e., the federal government) rather than tribal law. The majority of "Indian land" was being opened to white settlement. Opportunities for white lawyers who could work well with tribal leaders were abundant.

Murray was one of many Texans migrating north at the time. He moved into the Chickasaw section of the Territory and began practicing law. He married Mary Alice Hearrell, niece of the Chickasaw governor, paying \$100 for a tribal marriage license (the price soon rose to \$1,000). He thus became an "intermarried" member of the tribe with full citizenship rights, eligible to practice law and hold Chickasaw office. His law practice, primarily land claim and allotment cases, thrived as he combined flamboyant courtroom technique with support from prominent Chickasaws.

Murray began promoting the education of whites in the Territory. He recognized that these American Indian nations had schools superior to those available to most

white Americans at the time--neighborhood day schools and boarding academies producing literacy rates of over 90%. However, there was no provision for the education of whites in the Territory. He remedied the situation by forming the "Indianola Educational Association" (actually himself and two lawyer friends), which sent a "resolution" to the Secretary of the Interior, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the Vice-President complaining that American tax money had been appropriated to educate Filipinos, but not U.S. citizens in Indian Territory. The next Congress made an appropriation for that purpose.²⁴

In 1901 Murray moved to a farm near Tishomingo, then to one on bottom land in the Washita River basin where he devoted himself to agricultural pursuits and to reading an extensive collection of constitutions assembled from all over the world. He developed "Murray's Corn" which he claimed doubled the yield as compared to other varieties and was first to plant alfalfa in the region. He made speeches and wrote newspaper articles on the crop. A Tishomingo newspaper editor said, "... they was talking about planting `taters,' but when I left `Alfalfa Bill' was teaching them how to grow Alfalfa." Murray decided to "adopt the title" even though some newspapers referred to him as "the Sage of Tishomingo."²⁵ One year his alfalfa crop failed and his fields became overgrown with cockleburrs. From then on he was "Cocklebur Bill" to his enemies.²⁶

Territorial leaders held the Sequoyah Convention to write a constitution in hopes of achieving statehood. Each Indian Territory tribe sent delegates, with Murray a Chickasaw representative. Murray's study of constitutions was put to use. Goble credits five men with producing the constitution, none of more than one-sixteenth Indian blood, and three, including Murray, with none at all. The constitution (and the convention) being "the handiwork of a few far-sighted and ambitious Indian Territory whites anxious to use the chance to boost their political fortunes."²⁷

Robert M. LaFollett and William Jennings Bryan were invited to the convention. Neither came, but Bryan sent suggestions.²⁸ Speaking often in the Oklahoma territories, he visited in 1895, 1897, 1902, and 1903 endorsing statehood. In 1906 and 1907 he appeared on the Chautauqua circuit. In 1906 he spoke in 17 towns in two days.

The Sequoyah Constitution was militantly Progressive, providing strict curbs on corporate power, especially the railroads. It was approved by 86 per cent of the electorate. Although rejected by Congress and

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President Theodore Roosevelt, it was the model for the Oklahoma Constitution, soon to be written in a convention controlled by basically the same men who had controlled the Sequoyah Convention. The Oklahoma Constitution was approved and Indian Territory (combined with Oklahoma Territory to the west) was admitted to the Union in 1907.

Murray called the Sequoyah Convention the "preamble to the Oklahoma Convention."²⁹ Scales and Goble say, "With the Sequoyah convention, progressivism had begun to merge with the Democratic party [in Oklahoma]."³⁰ Robert Owen, a Wilsonian Progressivist, Thomas P. Gore, former Populist, and Murray, all having migrated to Oklahoma from the same small area in Texas, were powers in this Oklahoma Democratic party.

Under the 1906 Enabling Act, the "twin territories" held the "Con-Con," the popular name for the Oklahoma Constitutional Convention. The constitution they produced was over 50,000 words long, the longest in the world at the time. Much was included that was not normally found in a constitution--the flashpoint of kerosene, for example (115°).³¹ Large portions of it were identical to the Sequoyah Constitution. The principal author was Alfalfa Bill Murray who served as convention president, an office he knew was his once he saw that the delegates were primarily "Sequoyah and Farmers' Union men," and he had the endorsement of the "red-card-paid-up Socialists."³²

To prevent anyone changing the newly-signed Constitution, Murray placed it in a tin box to which only he had a key. "I slept with it in the hotels," he said, "never let it escape me at any time."³³ When Territorial Governor Franz refused to call the ratification election until he had the document, Murray called it himself. To "guard" Murray and the box, a tongue-in-cheek paramilitary organization, the Chickasaw Squirrel Rifles, with Murray as "commander in chief," was organized by a Republican newspaper publisher, Walter Ferguson. Over 5,000 "officers' commissions" with a cocklebur seal were issued. There were no "troops."³⁴ (The original document is presently being restored at the Harry Ransom Humanities Research Center at the University of Texas.)

A history professor at Central State Normal School stated in 1907 that the key to being elected delegate to the Con-Con was to endorse Jim Crow laws.³⁵ In both Oklahoma and Indian Territories, beginning in the 1890s, there had been steady deterioration in opportunities for African-Americans to hold public

office, use public accommodations, and attend integrated schools. Segregation was mandated gradually with the first Oklahoma territorial legislature, in 1890, providing for county option in racial composition of schools. In 1897 Territorial legislation mandated separate schools. In one formerly integrated two-room school building, black and white children were placed in different rooms, and the teacher taught in the doorway. A furrow plowed in the playground marked the recess segregation line.³⁶ Although Murray and most other convention delegates were committed to racial segregation, they were fearful that President Roosevelt would veto a document which disenfranchised African-Americans. Territorial politics had been dominated by Republicans, but the tide had turned toward the Democrats, and there was concern that statehood might be denied on almost any basis.

Murray's beliefs regarding the education of African-Americans not only embraced separate schools, but also limited their educational opportunities to agricultural and vocational studies. At a meeting of the Con-Con, the president of the Negro Agricultural and Mechanical Normal University and Industrial School presented Murray a desk and gavel made by students. In his speech that day, Murray remarked that in the new state Negroes would have,

equality before the courts, their rights, their property and their liberty, ... [but they] should prepare for those tasks for which they were best suited, agriculture and mechanics, ... The false notion that the colored man can attain the same place in other lines is an absurdity, because he must take his place in society as the great God intended.³⁷

At the Con-Con he also said,

I appreciate the old-time ex-slave, the old darky--and they are the salt of their race--who comes to me talking softly in that humble spirit which should characterize their action and dealings with white men, and when they thus come they can expect any favor. He must be taught in the line of his own sphere, as porters, bootblacks and barbers and many lines of agriculture, horticulture and mechanics in which he is an adept, but it is an entirely false notion that the negro can rise to the equal of a white man in the professions or become an equal citizen to grapple with public questions. The more they are taught in the line of industry the less will be the number of dope fiends, crap shooters and irresponsible hordes of worthless negroes around our cities and towns.³⁸

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Murray opposed women's suffrage on racist grounds. He claimed that in school board elections, where women were allowed to vote, a higher percentage of African-American women voted than white women thus giving women the vote increased African-American power.³⁹

The African-American response to Murray's performance at the Con Con was put succinctly in an editorial in a black newspaper.

If the Savior of mankind should come to Oklahoma today and go before the Constitutional Convention and the color of his cuticle should show the dark tinge of one who had lived in the tropics, the cusses would crucify Him anew and Alfalfa Bill would provide the crown of thorns.⁴⁰

This "world's longest constitution" had several provisions affecting education. The section establishing public schools was in keeping with Plessy vs. Ferguson.

Provisions shall be made for the establishment and maintenance of a system of public schools, which shall be open to all children of the State and free from sectarian control; and said schools shall always be conducted in English: Provided, That nothing herein shall preclude the teaching of other languages in said public schools: And Provided Further, That this shall not be construed to prevent the establishment and maintenance of separate schools for white and colored children.⁴¹

The Constitution authorized a state printing plant, partly because Murray hoped textbooks could be provided without dealing with book companies. He saw the American Book Company as a corrupt "trust."⁴² Territorial Governor Thompson B. Ferguson believed that the book trust had bribed the 1903 territorial legislature and said Diogenes would have needed "an x-ray, not a lamp," to find an honest man. Ferguson himself had drawn the wrath of the public because his newspaper published a paid advertisement for the company. Local school boards were suspected of accepting bribes for adopting American Book Company textbooks. A near riot erupted in Tecumseh when angry school patrons learned that a school board member had been given a position by the company. The company representative was literally "run out" of the county.⁴³

The constitutionally created State Board of Agriculture, all of whose members had to be farmers, was designated Board of Regents for Agricultural and Mechanical Colleges.⁴⁴ The Constitution authorized ad valorem taxation (with limits on millage) for district

common schools and county high schools.⁴⁵ The Enabling Act granted township sections sixteen and thirty-six in the former Oklahoma Territory to support common schools, but no land was available in the former Indian nations. In lieu of land, the federal government granted five million dollars which the Constitution designated a permanent school fund with the interest to be spent on common schools and apportioned to districts on the basis of school population.⁴⁶ One-third of Section 13 of each township was to be "preserved for the use and benefit of the University of Oklahoma and the University Preparatory School," one-third for normal schools "now established or hereafter to be established," and one-third for the Agricultural and Mechanical College and Colored Agricultural and Normal University."⁴⁷ (In 1986 the President of a university not originally a normal school but which prepared teachers, argued successfully for the sharing of these funds with other institutions with teacher education programs.)

The Constitution limited the investment of educational funds to "first mortgages upon good and improved farm lands within the State," Oklahoma State bonds, bonds of Oklahoma counties and school districts, United States bonds, with "preference to be given to the securities in the order named."⁴⁸ Murray's proposal at the Con-Con to divide school land into 160 acre tracts and sell it, investing the money, was defeated. He hoped to reduce tenant farming by making the land available to those working as tenant farmers.⁴⁹

The Constitution directed the Legislature "to establish and maintain a system of free public schools, ... institutions for the care and education of the deaf, dumb, and blind, ... separate schools for white and colored children with like accommodation impartially maintained." The term "colored children," was defined as "children of African descent." The term "white children" was defined as including "all other children." (This wording was repeated in another article with "colored," "colored race," "negro," and "negro race" defined as persons of African descent and "all other persons" were considered "white." These definitions were so worded to prevent American Indian descent marking a person as "colored.")

The compulsory education section required "attendance at some public or other school, unless other means of education are provided, of all the children in the State who are sound in mind and body, between the ages of eight and sixteen years, for at least three months in each year." ("Home schooling" in Oklahoma is still

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unregulated and requires only parental assertion that children are being educated. Murray's wife "home-schooled" their children when she thought the local school unsatisfactory.) Article 13 established a State Board of Education with the State Superintendent, Governor, Secretary of State and Attorney General as members, charged the Legislature to provide for a uniform system of textbooks for the common schools, and provided for the teaching of the "elements of agriculture, horticulture, stock feeding, and domestic science in the common schools of the State."⁵⁰

Polygamy was forbidden as was corporate or alien ownership of farm land.⁵¹ Eight hours was established as a day's work in government employment and for miners. Females and boys under sixteen were barred from working in mines, and contract convict labor forbidden.⁵² Two positions were declared "open to females"--county superintendents of public instruction and notaries public.⁵³ "Manufacture, sale, barter, giving away, or otherwise furnishing ... of intoxicating liquor" was prohibited.⁵⁴

The Sequoyah and Oklahoma Constitutions, with pages devoted solely to restrict the actions of corporations and to empower farmers and small businessmen, were described as "radically progressive" and consisting of "largely populist doctrine" in an early Oklahoma history text.⁵⁵ William Jennings Bryan proclaimed the Oklahoma Constitution better than the U.S. Constitution.⁵⁶ The *New York Tribune* pronounced the "new commonwealth" more Populist than Democratic.⁵⁷ Murray's biographer says Populist and Progressivist ideologies were "so intermeshed" in the Oklahoma Constitution that "it is impossible to determine which was the more important."⁵⁸ Murray claimed to have pushed the ratification of the Constitution over the objections of "Corporations, Carpetbaggers, and Coons."⁵⁹ One "carpetbagger" was Vice President Taft whom the Republicans brought to Oklahoma to fight the Constitution.

Nationally, and in the Territory, organizations such as the Farmers Union had split into two factions, "dirt farmers," the poorer, often tenant, group and "progressive farmers," more prosperous ones allied with small town bankers and merchants whose prosperity depended on agriculture. Murray appealed to both groups although he claimed "the officers of the Farmers Union were against me. The only organized group for me was the Prohibition people yet I never mentioned prohibition in the campaign."⁶⁰

Murray was elected to the legislature and became

Speaker of the first Oklahoma House of Representatives. Two civil war veterans, one Union, one Confederate, and an African-American were his first appointments--two as doorkeepers and the third as janitor.⁶¹ He said he reversed the Republican Territorial Legislature's practice of "appointing white janitors and Negro clerks."⁶²

A plethora of populist bills were introduced, and some passed, by the first legislature. Best remembered is the Murray-Whitehead Bill which required nine foot long bedsheets on hotel beds. Again he unsuccessfully proposed selling school lands to tenant farmers.

In the area of school legislation, Murray's favorite cause, and it was to remain so throughout his life, was training in agriculture. The first legislature authorized five district agricultural high schools, later to become junior colleges. Four he named after friends, one of whom was the first State Superintendent of Public Instruction, E.D. Cameron. The fifth was named after Murray himself. Later, when Murray was in the U.S. House of Representatives, Oklahoma officials closed two of the institutions and tried to close Murray State College. The attempt was thwarted by Murray securing a federal appropriation to build dormitories at the college.

In his memoirs, Murray described the politics involved in establishing these schools.

One bill in which I was very much interested was the creation of these District Agricultural Schools to train the pupil in agriculture and mechanics, and in the matter of general education, stopped at the 12th Grade. This was because I had observed that the greater number of graduates of the A. & M. Colleges of the United States were so well equipped that they could go into different lines of expert work at much higher salaries. That took them away from the farms and these institutions were educating the farmer away from the farm.

District schools, extending no further than the 12th Grade, would be just right ... At my request the Agricultural Board located the first one at Tishomingo; and the second one at Goodwell in the Panhandle.... Lawton made them a proposition, and they were obligated under the law to accept it, notwithstanding the fact that State Senator J. Elmer Thomas had aided in the holding up of the bill. A friend said if I would come down to a little poker game they had in the Ione Hotel, they would talk. Poker games were the oldest methods of legislative

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corruption known in America. A group would form to operate a poker game; the lobbyists would participate and lose some money and then the group vote for the bill he [sic] desired.

[To a clerk of the Legislature] I said: "Do you know how to play poker?" He quickly replied: "Yes, but I have quit." I said: "I want you to go to the Ione Hotel and locate that poker game. Here is \$25. Play long enough to get the number of rooms they use, who seems to be the boss, the pictures on the wall, the bets, tables, etc. Lose this money, then give them a check if they will let you. Then have the check turned down at the bank, but immediately report to me." [Later] ... I told this clerk to sit down and write a complete description of that poker game. Clint Graham, who had fought the organization of the "Con-Con" and was then doing all he could to thwart my efforts in the Legislature, approached me and said: "Bill, one of your clerks gave me a 'hot check.'" ... I said, "Uh, huh, you admit that you have got that poker game down there. You go down there and tell Roy Stafford, Bob Echols, J. Elmer Thomas and take it home to yourself that if that Agricultural Bill, creating the Agricultural Colleges, is not passed next week, there will be a complete story of that poker game." The bill passed.⁶³

Like Jefferson, Murray believed a strong, enfranchised yeoman farmer class was essential to human freedom. An often repeated saying of his was, "Civilization begins and ends with the plow."⁶⁴

Murray believed that agriculture should be taught in normal schools, high school, secondary schools--everywhere except the university.⁶⁵ He deplored the emphasis on classical education. He said,

we teach that every American can become President while to know the utter hopelessness of such an exalted ambition is but to recall that out of the ninety-odd millions of American citizens and many other millions dead and gone we have had up to this date but twenty-seven Presidents ... while changing from the principle of limiting education to the few we did not change the substance ... and adopt that learning useful to those who never intend to pursue a profession or run for public office.⁶⁶

In 1915 in a linen duster, with a wad of tobacco and a pot of coffee, he shared this "Philosophy of the Plow," on a sixty-four day Chautauqua tour.⁶⁷

Running for governor in 1931, Murray made known

that he would not compromise this belief for votes.

After the Primary election I went to Lawton to make a speech the Chairman said: "We hope in the coming administration to see our college on the hill (Cameron State School of Agriculture) raised to a full college course." Then Senator James Nance from that District uttered the same declaration, as did Senator Thomas, whose home is near there ... I began my speech thus: "If you people expect in the next four years to raise that college grade any higher, it will have to be done over my veto. I wrote the bill that created these State agricultural colleges, providing the limit should be 12th grade. Since I have been out of politics they have been raised two grades, and these two grades are just two grades too high. You cannot put a University in every town. ... The ordinary farm boy who becomes a graduate of one of these state district agricultural colleges will go home. That is my reply to the ballyhoo you have given me."⁶⁸

Murray received national recognition as a delegate to the Democratic National Convention in 1908, where there was much interest in the Oklahoma Constitution. William Jennings Bryan remarked "Politically, I suppose I am nearer kin to Oklahoma than any other state."⁶⁹ Forty-four years later, Murray claimed Bryan was "the best political friend I ever had," but said he was "a little too dreamy to be President. His brother Charles would have been a better president."⁷⁰

A *Denver Post* writer described the Oklahoma Constitution as the most radical in the nation and the Oklahoma delegation the most powerful in attendance. He reported Murray's antics at the convention, saying he held meetings everywhere, even on stairways.

Tonight "Alfalfa Bill" Murray starts on his three hundred and thirty-third speech in the lobby of the Brown Palace Hotel. (His mission to explain the Constitution of Oklahoma, a comprehensive document that contains all legislation needed for setting up a new state, from the classification of the voters to the length of sheets--if he talks steadily, as he probably will, it is expected he will be through next Sunday afternoon at 2 o'clock. He is accompanied by two hundred other orators from Oklahoma, each with an explanation of the constitution.)⁷¹

Murray's influence was seen in a plank in the platform endorsing agricultural experiment stations and agricultural secondary schools.

In spite of extensive media exposure and speakers'

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platforms decorated with alfalfa, Murray's 1910 bid for governor was unsuccessful. In 1912 he was successful in becoming a U.S. Representative and was re-elected in 1914. In 1913 he spoke in Congress, saying vocational schools were being

mishandled by the professional mind, devoid of practical ideas for training farm boys and girls.... There are two systems of education--the classical and the industrial--the university and the agricultural and mechanical college. Both types are required, ... but they cannot be conducted on the same plan or united in their faculty or management.... I strenuously object to appointing university professors to frame the plan [Justin] Morrill was two hundred years ahead of his generation.⁷²

Defeated for a third term, and in a 1918 governor's race, he returned to farming. This was perhaps his most prosperous period as he owned 1,600 acres of bottom land, much of it farmed by tenants. In 1924 he took a group of farmers to Bolivia to start an agricultural colony. By 1929, most were broke and disillusioned, and all had given up the attempt to establish a Murray style agrarian colony and returned home. Murray, broke but not disillusioned, blamed the Bolivian government and border unrest for the failure.

Borrowing \$40 from a friend, leaving Alice with \$1 and assurances that their credit in Tishomingo was good, Murray began a hitchhiking campaign for governor.⁷³ He focused on cutting government costs in dust-bowl, depression-era Oklahoma. He denounced Oklahoma University and its president saying they wasted tax money on "football, town balls, and highballs. The University has the unmitigated gall to request a big appropriation for a concrete swimming pool. Those college boys can go down to the 'crick' if they want to swim!"⁷⁴ College Hill Institute did not have a swimming pool. He attacked the North Central Association, saying only the state should accredit schools.⁷⁵ He accused North Central (aided by State Superintendent of Public Instruction John Vaughn) of "driving out of the schools" the study of the Constitution. He would later add "Communist Russian professors of the United States" to the group preventing American children from studying the U.S. and Oklahoma Constitutions.⁷⁶ He accused President Bizzell of allowing the faculty to run the university and of tolerating bootlegging and faculty "philandering" with female students in "private rooms."⁷⁷

He charged the school land commission with

corruption, proposed distributing ad valorem taxes state-wide based on school population rather than in the district in which the taxes were gathered, and promised free school textbooks. He favored limiting to \$4,000 the amount of a land loan from the school funds with loans going only to people who lived on and farmed the land.⁷⁸ He proposed an income tax earmarked for common schools and the elimination of duplication of courses at Oklahoma University and Oklahoma Agricultural & Mechanical College.⁷⁹

His campaign was aided by the purchase of a small county newspaper, *The Blue Valley Farmer*, circulation 430, formerly published by a Socialist in Roff, Oklahoma. When he campaigned in an area, the first page of the paper would be written to appeal to the locals there, while the rest of the paper contained the same campaign material used elsewhere. It achieved the astonishing circulation of 300,000.⁸⁰ His primary campaign was ignored by the *The Daily Oklahoma* and *The Oklahoma City Times*, newspapers he always referred to as "The Twin Harlots of Fourth and Broadway,"⁸¹ yet in the five candidate primary he received twice as many votes as his nearest competitor and carried rural precincts by 3 or 4 to one. Murray's feud with the Oklahoma City newspapers was life-long. *The Oklahoma Farmer-Stockman*, published by the same publishers, failed to recommend "Murray's corn," so he called it "the minor triplet and half-sister of the twin harlots."⁸²

In duels with the press, his homespun wit won the voters' sympathy. Edith Johnson, society editor of the *Daily Oklahoman*, wrote an article in which she said he despised soap and water, lived in a home with dirt floors and outdoor plumbing, wore dirty shirts, ate with his hands, and wore two pairs of trousers through which dirty underwear showed.⁸³ Flyers were distributed announcing a speech to rebut the charges. Fifteen thousand people heard him say that he did not recall the woman ever seeing his underwear, that if she were a lady she wouldn't have, and that if he had seen hers, he was too much of a gentleman to mention it.⁸⁴ Most Depression-era Oklahomans identified more closely with the description of Murray given by "sister Johnson" as he called her, than with the social elite usually mentioned in her columns. A more serious charge made by the newspaper was that Murray's supporters were circulating pledge sheets among state employees asking for 2% of their salaries to finance his campaign.

After his election, he tried to implement his campaign promises. In his first address to the legislature he asked

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for an income tax apportioned statewide on a per pupil basis and spent only for teachers' salaries. He thought schools invested too heavily in buildings and not enough in teachers.⁸⁵ In his second address, he asked for \$2,000,000 for free textbooks and a textbook commission to select them. He proposed consolidating public schools with enrollments of less than 70. Schools were to cease using state funds on competitive athletics.

Unable to get his programs through the legislature, he conducted an initiative petition campaign, "the Firebells Campaign." He toured the state being greeted in each town with firebells and sirens. The "firebells" included establishment of a new state department of education and an appropriation for free textbooks. Anyone who was an agent, author, owned stock in, or was connected with, a textbook company would be prohibited from serving on the State Board of Education. School and college math books could not be changed more than once every fifteen years, readers every ten years, and other textbooks, every six years.⁸⁶ He asked for a \$2.00 campaign donation from every state employee, and for the support of the Oklahoma Education Association--which he did not get.⁸⁷

School administrators controlled the Oklahoma Education Association. State Superintendent John Vaughn, a bitter political foe, was not to be included on his textbook commission, and a "firebell" would have reduced public school administrator salaries. Murray charged Vaughn with corruption on the school land commission and in textbook adoptions and accused him of "leaving out" of school law publications laws he did not like. He said the office of State Superintendent should not continue to occupy a seat on the Board of Regents for the normal schools because of pressure on faculty to support the State Superintendent politically.⁸⁸

The O.E.A., John Vaughn, and many public school administrators fought the firebells campaign, and when the school issue was defeated at the polls, a headline in the *Blue Valley Farmer* announced, "State's School Children Victimized by Piratical Ring of Pothouse Pygmies."⁸⁹ Newspapers reported state employees had been threatened with dismissal if they failed to vote for Murray's "firebells" and that they had been required to rebate part of their salaries and to subscribe to the *Blue Valley Farmer*.⁹⁰ A letter to the editor of the *Blue Valley Farmer* from a man present at a speech at Oklahoma A. & M. rebutted the charge saying Murray did not threaten to fire those who voted the wrong way. He only threatened to fire those "who slander the governor."⁹¹ When teachers' pay checks were two weeks late, Murray

said it was what they deserved for opposing his educational reforms.⁹²

In 1931 Oklahoma banks announced they would not cash teachers' warrants. When Murray threatened to pay them with school land money deposited in these banks, they accepted the warrants at 15% discount. He suggested that teachers accepting a 10% pay cut made more sense.⁹³

Murray attempted to restructure higher education, explaining his plans in the *Blue Valley Farmer*. "Frills" to be abolished included attendance at professional meetings and buildings devoted to student social life and/or athletics. He saw the Oklahoma University Student Union as a "country club for students." The *Blue Valley Farmer* claimed, "The Union Building is used very little for educational purposes... There are loungers, loafers, smokers, pool players, card players, dancers."⁹⁴ He claimed he "never drew one cent of money for traveling expenses although \$10,000 was appropriated" for his use as governor, and that he returned over half the money appropriated for the up-keep of the Governor's mansion and bought himself no clothes except "handkerchiefs and hose" during his governorship.⁹⁵

Murray believed professors should teach eight hours a day, six days a week, twelve months a year. Faculty who worked outside of class time preparing lessons should have prepared "before accepting a job, not after." Committee, professional, and faculty meetings should be held at night and on Sunday.⁹⁶

Murray sent former U. S. Marshall Alva McDonald to investigate Oklahoma University and its president, William Bennett Bizzell, charging mismanagement of funds and faculty drunkenness. In spite of a 1,308 page report, all charges were eventually dismissed.⁹⁷ He sent the National Guard to collect tickets at the 1931 O.U.-Nebraska football game to assure that ticket money was not stolen. A letter to President Bizzell asking for "voluntary contributions" of \$2 per faculty member to Murray's "firebells" campaign was published in *The Nation*.⁹⁸

Other institutions were not immune from his scrutiny. The president of Southwestern State College was fired when some faculty members attended an anti-firebells rally.⁹⁹ At various times during his governorship, he also fired the presidents of Central State College, Langston University, Southeastern State College, Northwestern State College, Northeastern Oklahoma Junior College, Cameron Junior College, and Murray State College.

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Of all Oklahoma institutions, Murray's relationship was best with Oklahoma A. & M. While he was governor, a new dormitory was named Murray Hall. Concerned that the next governor would "cut his name off," officials had it cut into a stone placed so that if it were removed the roof would collapse.¹⁰⁰ Reminiscing in his eighties, he fondly recalled an A. & M. administrator's remark years earlier that Murray could make a speech "so simple a farmer could understand it," or one "pedantic as the most exact professor," a remark Murray believed accurate.¹⁰¹

Murray proposed a "Co-ordinated Board for the Co-ordinated Colleges of the Greater University," which would grant special diplomas to students attending public and private colleges. He believed both secular and church colleges were needed, and he claimed to have developed his plan with the help of Catholic Bishop Francis Kelley.¹⁰² Students would earn these diplomas by passing examinations written and administered by a Board of Examiners selected by this Co-ordinating Board. He believed that 60% of university students should not be in college and that their courses reflected "credits and hours" but no "real scholarship." His scheme was to validate student learning and identify which institutions were just issuing degrees. Students taking the examinations would be identified by a number until after the grading was done to eliminate favoritism toward any institution.¹⁰³ While the "Co-ordinating Board would not distribute funds or appoint faculty," it would "devise the course of study, the Code of Ethics and Morals, fix qualifications of graduates, make studies of floor space, and like matters and things."¹⁰⁴

Only juniors and seniors were to attend Oklahoma A. & M. or Oklahoma University. Lower division courses were to be taken at a junior college. He thought there were too many college graduates in the state and students were required to read too many books at one time. Students should study by subjects, not grade levels, learning thoroughly what is in a book rather than getting a "smattering" of information from several books studied at once.¹⁰⁵ No two students learn at the same rate so each should study a book on a subject, pass a test on it, and move on to another subject.¹⁰⁶

His explanation of how the Oklahoma Constitution was written included a suggestion for a method of study that he found satisfactory and inexpensive.

My method of studying was to arrange a pair of old bed springs tied to a tree at three corners, with a block under the fourth corner, using a pillow to

learn against one of the trees, while I read and wrote. With a tablet and pencil, from time to time, I made notes, which notes I would put on a hook hanging on the wall of the house on these bed springs was where the Constitution was written.¹⁰⁷

Murray believed that ability to learn is dependent on inborn capacity. He said,

There is a popular opinion that Colleges and Universities make brains. That is a serious mistake. An individual is given a basic brain ... pupils should be stopped at the end of their capacity, because to carry them on would mean merely 'cramming' and 'stuffing' the memory to its injury without developing other faculties and lessen that initiative and native ability given to all to take care of themselves.¹⁰⁸

He believed that use of the brain prevented deterioration of reason as one aged. He wrote,

[Some people] quit thinking and by the time they are fifty, feel they have solved all the problems of life. By sixty through non-use their brain becomes flabby soft and shows it from their "clabber-eye" expression; and they continue to grow senile. This flabby brain, like flabby soft muscles, become [sic] so through lack of use and exercise.

Those who do no thinking at all and content themselves with the propaganda of what they read or hear, have so dwarfed their brain by non-use that it shrivels up and amounts to no more than a "gristle" that floats around in the cavity of the skull, . . . they have sensations that cause them to believe they are thinking.¹⁰⁹

In 1933 Murray issued an executive order, never enforced, revising the curricula at Oklahoma University and Oklahoma A. & M. to end duplication. Pre-law and geology programs were to be offered only at O.U. and pre-medicine and engineering only at A. & M. Only teachers' colleges would be allowed teacher education programs.

While battling higher education, he also fought with the School Land Commission whose establishment he considered the biggest mistake in the Oklahoma Constitution.¹¹⁰ It had not been audited since its creation in 1908. Murray, as governor, was a member of the commission, and tried to select as secretary and land appraiser two of his friends. The other members of the commission removed Murray from the chairman's position, and the legislature refused to appropriate enough funds for a thorough audit. Finally in 1933, theft

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and fraud were revealed through audit procedures, and there was some improvement in the system.¹¹¹ However, insider dealing in land leases and school fund deposits continued long after Murray's term as governor expired.

The School Land Commission was one of the few state agencies he did not control. His control over federal relief funds was so pervasive that Oklahoma and Huey Long's Louisiana were the only states with federally controlled programs. Murray was criticized by the Civil Works Administration for failing to hire as many workers as authorized and by Oklahoma newspapers for requiring workers to subscribe to the *Blue Valley Farmer*.¹¹² Murray called state officials that he could not control, "Wentz Warts," for Lou Wentz, a Republican oilman and political rival.¹¹³ When "Wentz Warts" visited the governor's office, he had them sit in a chair chained to a radiator to keep them from getting too close to him.

During his term, he secured state jobs for many friends and at least thirteen of his, and sixteen of his wife's, relatives. His appointees were the majority on the State Board of Regents and the Oklahoma University Board of Regents. State agencies ranging from the state prisons to the wildlife department to the Oklahoma National Guard were staffed with friends and supporters. The *Blue Valley Farmer* was supported through advertising from state colleges and universities and subscriptions were solicited from state employees by their administrators.¹¹⁴

Murray achieved partial victories in two common school issues, providing free textbooks and equalizing per pupil expenditures through state collection and distribution of some school taxes. His textbook commission adopted cheaper books than were being used. However, the market for used textbooks, which were cheaper still, vanished. Money was appropriated to purchase textbooks for impoverished families only. Murray believed that they should be furnished to all children to prevent the taunting of poor children by those more affluent.¹¹⁵

He was unable to change the system of spending ad valorem taxes only in the district in which they were collected and thus to remedy the vast inequities between school districts which still persist in Oklahoma. Murray successfully taxed corporations for the first time and lessened the tax burden on the poor and middle class while raising taxes on the wealthy. A portion of newly-instituted sales taxes were earmarked for common schools, and ad valorem taxes were earmarked for common schools and city and county government.

During his term, Murray ran for President of the United States. The press emphasized his populist appeal and his tendency to call out the National Guard. They were activated 37 times for such tasks as preventing Texas from collecting tolls on Red River bridges, shutting down oil production to raise prices, preventing African-Americans from using an Oklahoma City park, and freeing Colonel Zach Miller, proprietor of the 101 Ranch, from jail where he was incarcerated for failure to pay alimony. An editorial in the *Dallas News* praised Murray for helping "an old cowboy down on his luck."¹¹⁶ Articles about him ran in *Nation*, *Collier's*, *American Mercury*, *New Republic*, *Commonweal*, *Christian Century*, *Literary Digest*, *American Magazine*, *Saturday Evening Post*, *Outlook*, and the *Independent*. Some criticized his meddling in the higher education system.¹¹⁷ The *Kansas City Star* called him the "'hitchhiking candidate' reminiscent of Populist days."¹¹⁸

At the Democratic convention, pajama-clad Murray entertained Huey Long, a former Oklahoma University student, in his hotel suite. Murray received Oklahoma's 22 votes for the Presidential nomination (and his brother's North Dakota vote) on the first ballot. Oklahoma switched to favorite son candidate, and Murray's long-time friend, Will Rogers for the second ballot. On the fourth ballot Murray released the delegates to vote for Roosevelt.

Murray did not own a home while governor. Out of office, he bought a farm with a four room house but no tractor or automobile. He and a hired hand plowed with a mule and hitchhiked to Idabel, twelve miles away. He ran for governor in 1937, coming in third of nine candidates in the primary. Roosevelt campaigned for an opponent, the head of the Oklahoma WPA, saying in a speech at the Oklahoma state fairgrounds that Murray was "nationally known as a Republican."¹¹⁹ Roosevelt's animosity was understandable considering Murray's attacks on him. For example, he claimed that Roosevelt did not suffer from infantile paralysis, but "locomotor ataxia" a degenerative disease which affected the brain and reasoning power.¹²⁰

Murray tried to get on the ballot for senator in an unsuccessful petition campaign in 1938, and ran unsuccessfully for Congress in 1940. Almost blind, he dictated increasingly incoherent and ungrammatical books attacking the New Deal, communism, and racial integration, and supporting the work of the House Un-American Activities Committee.¹²¹ In 1941 he published, *The Finished Scholar*. It sold mainly to friends who bought the book to help support him. His

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1940 income was \$925.30.¹²² Full of pseudoscience, virulent racism, inaccurate history, and unorthodox religious tenets, the book was aptly described by Bryant--"... a potpourri of homespun philosophy and erroneous information, *The Finished Scholar* demonstrated Murray's self-education, his faith in that process, and his vanity."¹²³

At the end of his life, Murray lived in a mental state bordering on paranoia, not a completely new condition for a man who had a "secret-service man" to "watch his crooks" while he was governor.¹²⁴ He opposed involvement in World War II and espoused his own version of Social Darwinism which claimed superiority for the British, Scandinavian, German, and French peoples based on their recognition of the yeoman farmer as the backbone of civilization. Southern Europeans he saw as more dangerous to civilization than non-whites. Eye color and curliness of hair rather than skin color were his markers for superior "races." Also, white men's skulls had "seams" which expanded as their brains grew while other races did not.¹²⁵ He greatly admired the biologist Luther Burbank whose work he thought compatible with his own beliefs.

Murray's 1,731 page memoirs are a mixture of accurate recollections of his earlier life and vignettes of Oklahoma history with nonsense on topics ranging from religion to medical home remedies. He claimed to have cured himself of illness through a diet of mustard greens, turnip tops, potato tops, lettuce, and buttermilk, and he touted three pounds of grapes (with seeds) as a cure for appendicitis.¹²⁶

His ruminations on Southern slavery would have pleased Edmund Ruffin--well-fed, happy, singing slaves, kindly masters who never mistreated them or broke up a family, mistresses who nursed them when sick and taught them Christian values. There was praise of "Black Mammy" who suckled and spanked misbehaving boys who grew up to be governors and senators. The Southern planter was a "cavalier," gallant and protective of (white) women. There were "good darkeys" and bad "blue-gum niggers whose bite was as bad as that of a mad dog." "The Negro is the white man's burden," he said, and "mixture of the two bloodstreams will destroy both races as in the sixth generation they become sterile."¹²⁷

He made the claim of sixth generation sterility frequently, including in an address in the all-black town of Boley, Oklahoma, where he also endorsed a Chickasaw penalty of thirty-nine lashes with a cat-o-nine tails for "illicit intercourse" between the

races, yet claimed opportunities for African-Americans were greater in Oklahoma than in Kansas.

He felt that he should "correct" errors written about Oklahoma history. He wrote,

I am the only person living who knows the "inside" (including the secrets) of all these movements which I experienced and saw, and much of which I was. I had no trouble recalling what I saw for 72 years, or since I was 18 months old.¹²⁸

Murray, distrusting school textbooks since his school teaching days, said,

The average school history will create the impression that we won every war we ever fought; when in truth in the War of 1812, we lost every battle, except the Battle of New Orleans, ... all of the material, relevant and competent facts, good and bad, of the past, should be learned; should be written; should be studied.¹²⁹

Commenting on textbook adoption, he claimed,

I have known one adoption some years ago where the samples submitted contained a typewritten copy of the title page and all of the remaining pages were blanks. The book was written after the adoption. In the first twenty pages there were twenty-two errors, common knowledge to men who knew the state's history.¹³⁰

Murray said the publisher, Scott, Foresman, asked him to write an agricultural text book on recommendation of the Kansas Secretary of Agriculture but he declined because he was too busy.¹³¹ While he was governor, faculty at Oklahoma A. & M. College wrote a college agriculture textbook for which he provided "direction and guidance" and wrote a chapter, "The Comparative Difference in the Production of Corn and Cotton."¹³² The same group wrote an agriculture textbook for common schools, and the college president and two faculty members wrote a set of graded arithmetics. The copyrights of these books and a literature anthology were transferred to the William H. Murray Educational Foundation which was to receive 10% of the books' royalties. Murray claimed not to have received any money or have any control over this foundation which made loans to poor college students. These texts competed for state adoption, increasing the enmity and political activity associated with textbook adoption. Murray compared this foundation to one in Philadelphia funded by a bequest from Benjamin Franklin's will.¹³³

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In reaction to *Sipuel v. Board of Regents of the State of Oklahoma*, desegregating the O.U. law school, he wrote his most racist book, *The Negro's Place in Call of Race*, in which O.U.'s President George Cross and other university administrators and faculty are attacked as vehemently as had been Bizzell in a time in which Murray was in a better position to cause them difficulty. Among the more bizarre items in the book is a "study," supposedly by a Civil War surgeon who claimed to have removed the brains of 303 soldiers classified as white, pure Negro, half white, quarter white, eighth white and sixteenth white and found brain weight decreased as the quantity of Negro heritage rose.¹³⁴ The book sold well in extremist bookstores.¹³⁵

In his last years Murray occasionally emerged from the motel in Tishomingo in which he was living to make speeches or publish a "book," his main source of income. (His wife had died in 1938.) In 1948 at the Dixiecrat convention, he endorsed Strom Thurmond for President, and again attracted national press attention, a seedy, tobacco-spitting, nearly blind old man spouting anti-Russian, anti-black, anti-New Deal--which he called "the Jew Deal"--conspiracy theories. Social Security he denounced as slavery--benevolent paternalism which robbed one of one's freedom.¹³⁶

Murray's son Johnston became governor in 1950, and he lived with him in the governor's mansion. In 1952, Murray made a last political journey, to New York City, carrying his belongings in a pasteboard box tied with a rope. He was there to present an award to General Douglas MacArthur for whom he would cast his last vote for U.S. President. MacArthur's name being absent from the ballot did not deter Murray who voted by pasting a picture of MacArthur on the ballot."¹³⁷

Murray died of a stroke and pneumonia on October 15, 1956. He died in poverty. In the last decades of his life he did not own a home. His populist appeal to the common man, especially the agrarian, had not resulted from a facade erected for political purposes. He lived much of his life in humble, rural surroundings, and seemed not to mind. When his farming ventures or law work were profitable, he used the profits in political causes or agricultural experiments such as the Bolivian venture. He had loaned the Constitutional Convention the money to do its work and had never been repaid.

Was Murray a demagogue? That depends on your definition of demagogue. Murray once defended himself from that charge with this statement,

They have accused me time and again of being a demagogue. Often when I'm making a public speech I'm actually making two speeches at the same time. I'm making one speech to the man who must be appealed to through his emotions and I'm making another one to the man who can understand what I'm talking about. So if that's demagoging, I'll have to plead guilty. But that's not my idea of what a demagogue is. A demagogue, to my notion, is a character in public life who deliberately makes promises to the people that he hasn't any idea of fulfilling, and appeals to the popular prejudice with an insincere purpose. No one has ever truthfully said that about me.¹³⁸

By this definition, William Henry David (Alfalfa Bill) Murray was not a demagogue. He meant what he said.

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THE EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY OF W.E.B. DUBOIS

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After being black listed for many years, the works of W.E.B. DuBois are once again being published, read, discussed and written about both in the popular cultural arena as well as within the enclaves of academia. To those who have followed his career this is a welcome turn of events which speaks well for a society and publishing industry that for many decades turned its back on DuBois' writings and, either deliberately or by default, foreclosed the hearing of whatever truths might lie within them. The 1993 Pulitzer Prize winning biography by David Levering Lewis along with the more recent two-hour television documentary biography by Louis Massiah (California Newsreel, 1995) are indications that DuBois' influence is once again being felt throughout the country. Harvard University now has a research center named for him (headed by Henry Louis Gates) and the University of Massachusetts' library now houses most of his important papers. This is nothing short of a minor miracle given the fact that at age ninety-one DuBois joined the communist party and gave up seeking freedom in America by moving to Accra, Ghana in West Africa.

Who was W.E.B. DuBois? What was his educational philosophy, and why is it important to us today? To begin to answer these questions, DuBois' life must be situated within the context of a society struggling with issues of race and class at the end of the nineteenth century. Born in Great Barrington, Massachusetts in 1868, DuBois died in Ghana in 1963 at the age of ninety-five. This period of time -- from 1868 to 1963, five years after the Emancipation Proclamation and seven years beyond the Brown decision -- were extremely significant years for African Americans. And it was DuBois who came to play a key role in helping to shape the direction of that community's fight for freedom during this period of time. After receiving his second B.A. degree from Harvard with honors in 1890 (he had received his first B.A. from Fisk University in 1888) he went on to become the first African American to receive a Ph.D. from Harvard in 1895. His dissertation in history (The Suppression of the African Slave-Trade to the United States in America, 1638-1870) ultimately was selected to be the first volume in the now famous Harvard Historical Series. Beside publishing some

twenty odd books during his long life, some of his other accomplishments include playing a major role in the founding of the NAACP in 1910, the founding of the Pan African Congress in Paris in 1919, founding and editing of the journal *Phylon*, and serving as editor of the Atlanta University studies which were among the first empirical studies done on the African American community in the United States.

Dubois Against Washington

DuBois is probably best known for his now famous encounters with Booker T. Washington. At the point in time when these encounters took place, Washington had become the unchallenged leader of the black community, and by many accounts, the most powerful black man in the country. No other African American could count among his friends such individuals as Andrew Carnegie, John D. Rockefeller and the railroad magnet Collis P. Huntington. These men became Washington's financiers and Washington's political power in large measure was a direct result of their influence and support. DuBois was a young professor at Atlanta University in 1903 when he decided to challenge what he considered to be Washington's program of appeasement and accommodation. And a key component of that program, which by and large had been designed to not ruffle any Southern feathers, was the type of educational curriculum Washington implemented at Alabama's Tuskegee Institute. Largely vocationally based, Washington's program primarily focused on agricultural and industrial education. And though DuBois did not necessarily oppose agricultural and industrial education, he did not feel that it should be the primary emphasis of a college education. DuBois felt that the intellectual training of the mind should be primary and that "the purpose of education was not to make men carpenters, but to make carpenters men." Consequently, in his 1903 book, *The Souls of Black Folk*, DuBois decided to publicly challenge Washington's program. In a chapter entitled *Of Mr. Booker T. Washington and Others*, DuBois not only took aim at Washington's educational program, but also, significantly, at the politics Washington engaged in to bring it about. Although DuBois wrote many articles

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and gave numerous talks on education both before and after his 1903 book, he is generally not seen as an educational philosopher. This is true perhaps because he wrote in so many different disciplines and on such a wide variety of topics. And he was so prolific that one biographer has estimated that he must have written something almost every day of his adult life. He wrote novels and poetry. He wrote journalism and served as editor of *The Crisis Magazine* for over twenty years. He wrote sociological treatises and his groundbreaking sociological study on the Philadelphia Negro is still considered a classic. Additionally, he was a historian and essayist and it is DuBois the essayist I want to focus this paper on. --- primarily the essayist reflected in the book *The Souls of Black Folk*.

The Influence of James, Santayana and Royce

One of the keys to understanding DuBois' opposition to Washington and to understanding *Souls* as an education text is to look at the influences he came under as an undergraduate at Harvard. While DuBois quite literally had become conscious of himself as a black person at Fisk University in Nashville, Tennessee, it was at Harvard that he acquired much of the philosophy that would guide him for the rest of his life. During his first year at Harvard he met William James who became his teacher and mentor. James was not nationally known at the time DuBois was his student, but he was well on his way to becoming the primary exponent of pragmatism that he is known as today. DuBois revealed in his autobiography that he was a visitor in James' home on many occasions and he acknowledged that it was his relationship with James that helped him to survive as one of only two blacks at Harvard in the 1890's. While at Harvard, DuBois would also come under the influence of Josiah Royce and George Santayana --- two Harvard faculty members, who also were destined to become internationally respected and highly influential. While a student in James' Philosophy IV class, DuBois wrote a fifty-two-page paper entitled *The Renaissance of Ethics* which impressed his teacher. And, according to DuBois' biographer David Levering Lewis, "By the end of the second semester . . . [DuBois] believed he might be about to crack one of philosophy's great perennial [questions] --- [the] justification of moral conduct through empirical observation (Lewis, 1993, 93-94)."

Dismissing metaphysics because it had abandoned the goal of the unity of knowledge, DuBois argued that both the study of science and the study of ethics had also gone their separate ways. . . . [His] proposed way out

of this dilemma was through what he called duty. The fundamental question of the Universe involved duty DuBois felt. Not the duty of the highest good but the duty of the obligation to know "how much better is the best that can be than the worst. . . ." "The whole purpose of duty hangs upon the Cause and Purpose of this great drama we call life . . . and to understand duty "we must understand ends." "Ethical science, [said DuBois] will come slowly . . . if the cornerstone of the world structure," guided by science, becomes "first the what, then the why --- underneath the everlasting Ought (Lewis, 1993, 94-95)."

The what for DuBois was the what one was to do with one's life; the why was the rationalization one used to justify to oneself one's actions; and the Ought was the Almighty Universal Moral Guide or Principle under which one conducts his daily life. In other words, for DuBois, "ethical imperatives arose out of the interaction of mind and matter as both became transformed and purposive through willpower (Lewis, 1993, 95)."

If James had caused DuBois to reflect deeply on the role of duty and will in life, it was George Santayana and to a lesser extent Josiah Royce who, by introducing him to a deeper understanding of Hegel, caused him to question even more deeply his mentor's view of the world. In the *Renaissance of Ethics*, DuBois had already started to critique James by questioning his rather passive view of the role that consciousness plays in one's life and his passive reliance on faith in shaping one's destiny. DuBois felt that this passivity amounted to giving in to the future as the ultimate master and king over one's life. Creative activity or work, for DuBois, then becomes the path by which one could shape one's life and influence one's environment. DuBois eventually comes to see this path as a tool that his people could use to fashion their freedom. DuBois' understanding of Hegel then becomes central to his project of freedom in *The Souls of Black Folk*.

The part of Hegel that apparently resonated with DuBois was Hegel's description of the master/slave relationship. Symbolizing two opposing forms of consciousness, the master and the slave for Hegel come to recognize that the freedom of the other is determined and limited by the other. The master can't be free, Hegel argues, because his consciousness has become dependent on the slave. The slave, on the other hand, comes to see that the possibility of his true freedom lies in his labor and the ability to see himself as a separate consciousness. Shamoan Zamir in his book *Dark Voices* gives an in-depth description of Hegel's view. "In the

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Phenomenology, [Zamir says], "the master does not seek recognition from the slave. Rather, he comes to recognize that his own freedom is dependent on the slave and his labor and is therefore a determined freedom and not an absolute and indeterminate one as he had thought:

. . . for, just where the master has effectively achieved lordship, he really finds that something has come about quite different from an independent consciousness. It is not an independent, but rather a dependent consciousness that he has achieved. He is thus not assured of self-existence as his truth; he finds that his truth is rather the unessential consciousness [of the dependent slave], and the fortuitous unessential action of that consciousness (Zamir, 1997, 130).

The master is brought to "an existential impasse," not by acknowledging the humanity of the slave and then seeking mutual recognition, but by recognizing that he himself is materialized through the property made by the slave. And just as the master comes to discover his dependency through the labor of the slave, so the slave discovers therein the possibility of his own consciousness passing "into real and true independence." [Zamir] then goes on to say that "Hegel is quite clear that 'for recognition proper there is needed the moment that what the master does to the other he should also do to himself, and what the bondsman does to himself, he should do to the other also.' Without this mutual labor, recognition remains 'one sided and unequal,' (Zamir, 1995, 130)."

The Souls of Black Folk

Zamir's recasting of Souls within a Hegelian context throws new light on DuBois' project. Although for many years now considered a classic, Souls until recently has been primarily considered as a book of loosely connected essays written to explain black life and culture to a largely white audience at the beginning of the twentieth century. What contributed to this perception was that many of the essays had been published in magazines like The Atlantic prior to their collective publication in Souls. What has been missed, however, is that DuBois reworked many of the essays especially for their publication as a cohesive work of art. And seeing Souls as a cohesive work of art cast within a Hegelian context reveals that DuBois had much more in mind than just a description of black culture and the black community to a white reading public.

Consciousness, self-consciousness, power, work, freedom and the role of creative resistance are all

addressed as tools of liberation for the master and the slave. These issues have been, for the most part, missed by scholars until now primarily because DuBois chose to dramatize them by looking at his own life experiences. Zamir says that the book starts off with DuBois growing up as a young child in New England and then moves logically to the end with the adult DuBois as a college professor, listening to and intuitively imbibing the meaning of the spiritual sorrow songs of slavery.

Without taking the time to go through the whole book, it is however, instructive to look at the first chapter which DuBois called "Of our Spiritual Strivings." This chapter opens with DuBois as a young child at a school function with his white classmates. On this occasion they are exchanging greeting cards when a girl whom DuBois describes as "a tall newcomer" refused to accept his card. These are his words: "In a wee wooden schoolhouse, something put it into the boys' and girls' heads to buy gorgeous visiting cards --- ten cents a package --- and exchange. The exchange was merry, till one girl, a tall newcomer, refused my card --- refused it peremptorily, with a glance. Then it dawned upon me with a certain suddenness that I was different from the others; or like, mayhap, in heart and life and longing, but shut out from their world by a vast veil. I had thereafter no desire to tear down that veil, to creep through; I held all beyond it in common contempt, and lived above it in a region of blue sky and great wandering shadows (DuBois, 1961, 16)."

This incident, for the adult DuBois who has now read Hegel, says Zamir, represents consciousness becoming self-conscious through a recognition of itself. It also becomes [for DuBois] the symbolized struggle for mutual freedom between the master and slave. For Hegel as for DuBois, the master and the slave are locked in a mutually interdependent consciousness they both somehow must move beyond. Through this school house incident DuBois instantly recognizes that he is behind a veil which will forever prevent him from being a part of the life beyond the veil. His solution to this problem, says Zamir, is to dwell above the veil where the sky is blue and there are great wandering shadows. The veil throughout Souls is used to symbolize an invisible barrier that separates the black and white communities. A barrier that allows a mutual visibility while at the same time preventing a joining of conscious understanding with true communication and knowledge.

Double Consciousness and Freedom

For DuBois, this sense of being a part of and yet

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separate from, becomes manifested as double consciousness in the black community. Something that the veil will prevent the white community from ever fully understanding. Here are DuBois' words:

. . . the Negro is sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with second-sight in this American world, -- a world which yields him no true self-consciousness, but only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other world. It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at oneself through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his two-ness, -- an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder (DuBois, 1961, 16-17).

DuBois then goes on to describe what an educational curriculum designed to liberate his people would accomplish. The experiences of the past had, according to Dubois, "changed the child of Emancipation to the youth with dawning self-consciousness, self-realization, self-respect. In those somber forests of his striving his own soul rose before him, and he saw himself ---darkly as through a veil. Yet he saw in himself some faint revelation of his power, of his mission. He began to have dim feeling that, to attain his place in the world, he must be himself, and not another (DuBois, 1961, 20)."

The Negro, for DuBois, had been changed into the Other through the experience of slavery which had stripped him of his cultural consciousness. The dawning of self-consciousness then was the beginning of this knowledge, and a true education based on his historical knowledge would fully restore "self-consciousness, self-realization, self-respect." The American world which had yielded him no true self-consciousness had let him see himself only through the eyes of the Other. Zamir says that what is true for DuBois is also true for Jean-Paul Sartre. Sartre in his commentary on Hegel described this same phenomenon as being the gaze of the "original fall" that fixes the freedom of activity into passivity. The appearance of the other is the disintegration of the self's world and a plunge into a state of vulnerability. By opening *Souls* when he is contemptuously rejected by the "glance" of the "tall newcomer" and forced into a new sense of self, DuBois like Sartre, acknowledges that the disintegration of the self's world is also part of its negative structure or

coherence: [Quoting Sartre, Zamir says]

Thus suddenly an object has appeared which has stolen the world from me. Everything is in place; everything still exists for me; but everything is traversed by an invisible flight and fixed in the direction of a new object. The appearance of the Other in the world corresponds therefore to a fixed sliding of the whole universe, to a decentralization of the world which undermines the centralization which I am simultaneously effecting (Zamir, 1995, 140).

Thirty years after writing *Souls* (1933), DuBois wrote an essay entitled *The Field and Function of the Negro College*. In this essay he was still addressing the issue of consciousness. He starts this essay by saying,

Once upon a time some four thousand miles east of this place, I saw the functioning of a perfect system of education. It was in West Africa . . . the education of the child began almost before it could walk. It went about with mother and father in their daily tasks; it learned the art of sowing and reaping and hunting; it absorbed the wisdom and folklore of the tribe; it knew the lay of the land and river. Then at the age of puberty it went into the bush and there for a season the boys were taught the secrets of sex and the girls in another school learned of motherhood and marriage. They came out of the bush with a ceremony of graduation, and immediately were given and taken in marriage . . . They sat in council with their elders and learned the history and science and art of the tribe, and practiced all in their daily life. Thus, education was completely integrated with life. There could be no uneducated people. There could be no education that was not at once for use in earning a living and for use in living a life (DuBois, 1973, p. 84). DuBois saw education as inextricably bound up with life, and to the extent that it failed to teach people how to live (morals/ethics/character), it was to that extent a failure for DuBois.

Dubois as Philosopher

As a philosopher, it could be argued that DuBois was always pragmatic --- taking from whatever tradition advanced his cause of freedom. For example, his empirical studies were clearly instrumentalist in nature, designed to gather data to support programmatic development and implementation. On the other hand, his historical studies, particularly *Black Reconstruction*, reveal a strong Marxist influence in using a class analysis for understanding forces of oppression. From pragmatism, particularly that of William James, DuBois

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sees agency and heroic energies at work in the black community through the use of creativity as a tool for freedom and liberation. Cornel West gives this description: "Like Emerson and other pragmatists, DuBois posits culture making as the prime instance of history making . . . In good Emersonian fashion, DuBois' democratic mores are grounded in the detection of human creative powers at the level of everyday life (West, 1989, p.144)." Through Hegel, DuBois sees consciousness becoming aware of itself as black people struggle against the consciousness of the oppressor reflected both in themselves and in their

oppressors. However, unlike Hegel, DuBois would agree with Sartre and embrace existentialism insofar as it rejects determinism, accepts human alienation as a condition to be overcome, and embraces the use of choice in defining destiny and freedom.

Knowledge would be the key instrument in determining and defining this destiny and freedom.

In the final analysis DuBois says that the Negro university must "expand toward the possession of all knowledge. It [must start] from a beginning of the history of the Negro in America and in Africa to interpret all history; [and ultimately], “. . . interpret and understand the social development of all mankind in all ages (Aptheker, 1973, 95)."

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Neighbors: Contemporary Theory of teaching: Plato's View

CONTEMPORARY THEORY OF TEACHING: PLATO'S VIEW

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Since the time of ancient Greece, whenever education and its particulars have been debated, Plato's philosophy in some way, shape, or form, has been a part of the discussion. This, however, is the twentieth century. Are the ideas of a Greek philosopher who lived more than two thousand years ago relevant to America's current technologically-based sphere of global communication and culture? Are his beliefs and questions concerning education still applicable to contemporary situations?

Although computers are replacing notebook paper and the slide rule is all but extinct, if an observer was to step into the classroom of America in 1997, one would still see the same basic form of instruction occurring that has existed since before papyrus: discussion . . . dialogue . . . lecture. When we ask whether or not Plato's ideas are still viable, the answer ought to be "I hope so," because teacher/pupil verbal interaction remains the dominant method of instruction in America today. Admittedly, there are a myriad of teaching styles, but conversation is an integral part of practical if not theoretical everyday teaching. As a result of much careful scientific observation regarding the act of teaching, prospective professional educators today are trained to differentiate the depth of thinking required to answer questions, how to pose a variety of questions, and even the appropriate "wait time" before necessitating a response. They are taught to analyze their own "teacher talk" and to reflect upon its sophist effectiveness. Current teaching may be a far cry from the Socratic method, but inquiry is still the basis of instructional method. Philosophers, educators, scientists, and sociologists continue to differ concerning Plato's arguments regarding many aspects of teaching and learning. Plato's theory of teaching suggested by the *Meno* dialogue, therefore, has much to say to education today.

First of all, Plato's theory of teaching does not separate itself from learning. Socrates and Meno, late in their dialogue, agreed that without teachers *and* pupils, a subject is not teachable. Educational research at present has shifted away from a scientific emphasis on teaching

in what has been termed the Learning Revolution. A semantic and paradigm shift toward learning as the goal, the aim, has replaced a desire to observe "effective" teaching behaviors. Even Webster's Dictionary (1991) concedes the reciprocating nature of teaching when it defines the verb teach: "to cause to know . . . to make to know . . . to guide . . . to seek to make known . . ." ⁷⁵ This last definition describes the entire dialogue between Socrates and Meno, as they attempted together *to make known* the meaning of the word virtue. Perhaps Plato was ahead of his time—the title of his dialogue did not glorify the teacher, it underscored the learner.

Plato would most likely support the modern notion of the teacher primarily as a facilitator versus one who doles out knowledge. Many educators begin with the correct answer or theorem and then attempt to explain *why* it is true, but, as Socrates noted in the debater's ⁷⁶argument, there is no need to search for what one already knows. For Plato, the search *is* the learning process. Plato would disagree that learning is the rote memorization of facts, for the essence of education to him is the search for Truth more than the acquisition of truths. In the process vs. product debate, Plato would most likely favor an emphasis on the learning process rather than upon student outcomes. Although Socrates during the interlude with the slave boy had a specific objective in mind, he paused midway through the "lesson" to reflect upon the status of the learner and observed that the boy's perplexity (the "torpidity" of the torpedo fish is more recently termed "dissonance") was a sign of positive growth from his initial state of peaceful ⁷⁷incorrectness. Shortly thereafter, Socrates says to Meno:

I would contend at all costs both in word and deed as far as I could that we will be better men, braver and less idle, if we believe that one must search for the things one does not know, rather than if we believe that it is not possible to find out what we do not know and that we must not look for it. ⁷⁸

Contrary to becoming reliant on referencing facts outside ourselves, Plato posited self-searching methods

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of discovering truth. Consistent with the arguably popular belief that “all children can learn,” Plato again quotes Socrates as saying:

As the whole of nature is akin, and the soul has learned everything, nothing prevents a man, after recalling one thing only—a process men call learning—discovering everything else for himself, if he is brave and does not tire of the search, for searching and learning are, as a whole, recollection.⁷⁹

Plato’s “recollection” is a discovery of truth in one’s self; for Plato, all Knowledge resides in one’s “mind,” if you will, but all is not conscious. Where Plato might lie along the genetics/ environment continuum would only be conjecture, but certainly it is apparent that even before “genes” were discovered there was the ideal of innate potential. In a few short passages, then, we are able to place Plato’s ideas within the context of modern educational debates and dilemmas concerning the role of the teacher and the relative impact that teacher’s educational environment exerts on the predetermined ability of the pupil.

Another emphasis of modern education is the importance of modeling those behaviors one wishes to see produced in others. Consistent with Plato’s distrust of the Sophists was his belief that one could not simply teach by example. When Antytus suggests such, Socrates countered with examples that disproved the hypothesis. Why, then, is role-modeling still being emphasized today? Does this mean that demonstration is useless? For example, we are all aware that *being* an esteemed scientist does not guarantee one’s understudies will be brilliant, *nor does it qualify one as being a good science teacher*. Simply being an expert does not make one a teacher, for it presupposes the interactive aspect of teaching—the facilitation or elucidation of learning. Any expert, in any field, ought to be able to verbalize countless facts and model desirous behaviors, so what prevents him or her from being a successful teacher? Is it not the ability to reproduce those *types* of behaviors in others? Is it not the ability to foster critical thinking concerning the knowledge base, not simply to cause a regurgitation of the facts? Giving and/or showing students the answers, then, does not make one a good teacher—causing *students* to give and show the answers does.

If knowing and exhibiting certain behaviors does not ensure their being teachable, then how can we teach those skills? What is to be our guide? Currently in America, standardized tests are the measures used to

evaluate students’ *potential* for learning. These aptitude tests are misinterpreted, however, as testing the acquisition of certain types of knowledge. Rather, those who do well most often are those who do well in reading comprehension, those who are able to adapt, problem-solve, and apply logical reasoning. The objectives to these tests mention words such as analyze, summarize, perceive, distinguish, and synthesize. More than a foundation of knowledge, they require critical thinking. The question, then, is not how we can teach knowledge, but how can we transfer the thinking process?

Plato’s teacher, Socrates, was a *guide* who led desiring pupils to the truth within themselves. He believed that the thinking process could not be *transferred* but must be *discovered* by actively engaging in a procedural dialogue. He never told Meno the definition of virtue nor did he tell him to “look it up in a dictionary.” Opponents of discovery methods such as those exemplified by Socrates argue that it is haphazard and that teaching by its very nature is designed to elicit certain specific outcomes. Plato did acknowledge a structure of learning (“recollecting things in order, as one must recollect”⁸⁰) but believed those outcomes could be divergent. Without an active engagement by the learner, no recollection could occur. Thus, Plato’s insistence that knowledge is not passed down from one being to another, especially by example. The philosophy of the teacher as a facilitator concurs with Plato’s writings, and Plato esteemed the learning process above its end product. He had a positive view of the learner and believed that the whole person consisted of more than conditioned behaviors: “That is the reason why they can not make others be like themselves, because it is not knowledge which makes them what they are.”⁸¹

Rather than question Plato’s relevancy, time and space question more his failure to address certain issues with which we grapple today. Socrates was outspoken in his denunciation of the Sophists, and it causes one to wonder what he would say concerning the proliferation of “professionalism” in education. From preschool to higher education, teachers are paid to dispense knowledge, a practice Socrates detested. Would Plato concede to the quality-control measures our society has chosen, or would he denounce our self-initiated attempts at respectability? Does paying teachers professional salaries invite people into the work force for the wrong reasons, or are teachers not paid enough for the countless time and effort they spend with students, especially considering the increasing demands of the

job? Would he praise the research and reflection aimed at teaching, or would he point to its ineffectiveness and criticize our methods of training teachers?

When Plato wrote, only the elite and their households received an encompassing formal education. Today in America, *everyone* claims the right to not only an education, but to a publicly-supported education. Are we producing responsible citizens with our tax dollars? Are we even trying? Also, what would Plato say about the efforts of the mentally-challenged? How would he propose guiding those who seem to struggle processing and communicating the most basic truths?

Other advancements, besides a broadening of the educationally eligible, are the technological changes which threaten the quality of the teacher/pupil interaction. Self-paced correspondence courses, televised classes, and computer-aided instruction all question the role of the teacher and beg the question: What is teaching?

Here we find the limits of Plato's theory, but not before discussing some of the basic tenets of

contemporary educational thought. In reading *Meno*, one realizes the timeless essence of a core of ideas yet to be satisfactorily resolved. For centuries thinkers have grappled with the very nature of teaching and learning, critical to our society and the collective experience from which each thinker evolves. Out of today's educational system will emerge the philosophers, educators, scientists, and sociologists of tomorrow—conditioned by their past and by their contemporaries. Hopefully, they will also consider the thoughts of distant Plato as well, an important contribution to humankind's thought and society's evolution still relevant today. Contemporary theories of teaching are product-based, place the majority of responsibility for learning on parents, teachers, and the environment, support equal educational opportunity for all, and promote modeling. Will return to a more Platonic education emerge from this generation? Will education return, and know from whence it came? According to Plato, the answer lies within each one of us, but it is not the answer which matters most—it is the search.

ENDNOTES

75 *Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary* (9th ed.). (1991). Springfield, MA: Merriam Webster, p. 1209.

76 Plato. *Meno*, trans. G.M.A. Grube. *Five Dialogues*. (1981). Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, p. 69.

77 *Ibid.*, p. 75.

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79 *Ibid.*, p. 70.

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81 *Ibid.*, p. 87.

Pike: R. Waldo Emerson: An Idealist's Influence Upon John Dewey

R. Waldo Emerson: An Idealist's Influence Upon John Dewey

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While preparing a lecture on the topic of pragmatism from the fifth edition of Ozmon and Craver's text, *Philosophical Foundations of Education* (1995), I was attracted to specific comments pertaining to R. Waldo Emerson (1803-1882). In the general discussion of Rousseau, Dewey (1859-1952), James, and Peirce, the authors mentioned Dewey's intellectual connection to Emerson as, ". . . little noticed by most scholars." Including a reference to Cornel West's work, the authors went on to say Dewey's own characterization of Emerson as "*the philosopher of democracy . . . (was) an accolade usually applied to Dewey himself*" (142). This paper, from the perspective of an education foundations instructor, represents an initial inspection of Emerson's Puritanical heritage, contains intermittent details relative to his personal temperament, and includes selected passages from Emerson's professional work that may have nurtured the pragmatic Dewey.

Specific contemporary scholars have documented Emerson's philosophical roots in Platonic idealism (Baker, 1996; Hughes, 1984; Goren, 1977). Biographer Leyla Goren's study of Emerson's papers, for example, includes Emerson's specific regard of Plato as "the greatest of philosophers . . . his (Plato's) brain was a perfect one" (37-38). Emerson did not favor materialism, particularly as it related to Locke's Unitarian materialism. He was contemplative. Even though there is almost endless evidence he was intimately in tune with nature, to Emerson, 'nature' was concrete evidence of "a supreme unconscious mind" (Duncan, 1). As early as about 1825, during his time at Harvard as a student, Emerson's study of a few Alexandrian philosophers furthered an interest in intuitive Oriental religions, literature and symbolism. Briefly, some reviewers believe the content of *Nature*, his first major work published in 1836, is substantive evidence of his idealism. Yet, again briefly, others who have searched his personal journals have detected only a "quasi" idealism.

Emerson's conservative religious roots originated from more than two centuries of ancestors. An early paternal ancestor, Peter Bulkeley, was an English

sympathizer with Puritan rebels and became a 1635 cofounder of Concord, Massachusetts. A former Cambridge scholar, Bulkeley settled a six-mile tract of land near the Musketaquid River, just west of Boston (founded in 1630 by the Puritans). This stern, but apparently rugged, relative was referred to by Native Americans as "Big Pray" (McAlee, 185). Bulkeley's granddaughter married minister Joseph Emerson, the great-great-great-grandfather of R. Waldo. One can find that Peter Bulkeley was descendent of an English baron who coerced King John to sign the Magna Carta in 1215.

Another early paternal ancestor was aligned with New England's New Awakening of the 1700s, an evangelical movement that promoted participants' interaction during worship services. One factual aside noted while examining seven generations of religious zeal, was the maiden name of Emerson's paternal great-great-grandmother -- Waldo. In regard to his own name, Emerson preferred to be addressed as R. Waldo. Two centuries of other clergy of Emerson's paternal ancestors were remembered as being eloquent, sober or stern, and independent. Emerson's Puritanical grandfather, William, seemed to be most noted for praying that none of his progeny would become wealthy.

Although, according to biographers, few of Emerson's *maternal* ancestors were clergy, most were devout. Emerson's maternal grandfather and grandmother were believed to be spared by providence from small pox and diphtheria when both were very young children. Coming to Boston from England during the early 1800s, a few generations of Emerson's maternal relatives became wealthy during later generations from barrel manufacturing. Emerson's maternal grandfather Haskins became even more prosperous as a distiller.

An exploration of complex sequential events in Emerson's life reveals a series of personal and professional disappointments along with his introspective struggles to discern both deeper and practical meaning from those events. He was well known for daily long walks, usually in the woods, or to the cemetery where his first wife was buried. His

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legendary comfort with solitude and a communion with a higher power could lead a reader to conclude that a wide gulf existed between the temperaments of Emerson and Dewey. In fact, in regard to educative processes, Emerson's love of solitude seems more related to Rousseau's somewhat antisocial bias than to Dewey's strong interest in social interaction. But, even though reports indicate Emerson could be consumed with introspective struggles, most of his New England colleagues valued his sunny disposition and strong sense of hope. Modern biographers have pointed out how Americans and Europeans who eagerly anticipated and attended Emerson's lecture circuits, remembered enjoying his elegant style, "deep sincerity and conviction," and his use of metaphor, a habit believed to be a "symptom of anti-authoritarianism" (Holmes, 94; Ellison, 9).

Although an early death of his father may have contributed to some of his personal and professional struggles, Emerson's religious beliefs and his study of classical literature must have been energizing. When a neighbor once commented on an unusual tardiness of a daily walk, Emerson placed the blame on his intense reading of Rousseau's *Emile*. Just before his twenty-first birthday, Emerson mentioned "being born too late" (Ellison, 46). Briefly, the comment is some evidence of his affection for the work of select, but numerous, historical scholars (secular and religious). Emerson's belief that contemporary life "competes with the past," is one of several indications of his appreciation for a practical "theory of use" as opposed to "subservience or abeyance" (24, 59).

One of Emerson's earliest crises was experienced at age nineteen in the early 1820s. According to his own journal analysis, a sense of his lack of accomplishment engendered emptiness, misery and a sense of hopeless inferiority compared to the accomplishments of his siblings and peers. This threat to his integrity was intensified by his feeling overwhelmed with a lack of time to read the vast quantity of texts left behind by the great thinkers of the past. The agony depicted in his journals at that time convinced Ellison (41) that Emerson discovered his own integrity during his confrontations with panic, anger and inner paralysis.

Born in Boston in 1803, Emerson lived later on in Concord, Massachusetts, during a time when the flow of immigrants encouraged the New England aristocracy to maintain their identity. Historical students recognize that at the time of Emerson's birth, Calvinism was beginning to be replaced by Unitarianism in New

England, especially in Boston. At age two, young Emerson was enrolled in a private dame school where he was taught to guard his emotions instead of express them. His father, William, was unhappy with R. Waldo's inability to "read well just before his third birthday" (McAleer, 16). Many reviewers have compared Emerson's temperament to his mother's gentleness. Some scholars trace the optimistic side of his disposition a bit further to his maternal grandmother. The gentleness seems even more apparent, especially, when his disposition is compared to that of his four brothers. His mother named R. Waldo after her own youngest brother, Ralph. After Emerson's father died at age forty-two, some financial assistance for the Harvard college education of Emerson and his four brothers was provided by Ralph Haskins, the maternal uncle.

Emerson's austere and demanding parents, a devout Anglican mother and Unitarian minister father, who lived simply but comfortably at the top of Boston's social ladder, were devoted to building the character of their four sons. After a strict childhood where disciplined study must have been the norm, biographers report, Emerson was able to enjoy the most optimistic phase of his life before the death of his own son, Waldo, in 1984. The son was age five years and three months.

William Emerson, R. Waldo's father, as pastor of the First Church of Boston, functioned as a scholarly orator rather than succumb to New England's rising social pressure to attend psychological and emotional needs of each member of a congregation. By the time R. Waldo entered the ministry in 1824, Unitarians continued to want even more from a pastor than spiritual guidance from the pulpit. A recent biographer recalls Emerson's discomfort at the deathbed of a parishioner. The dying man's response to Emerson's awkwardness at a time of such profound personal intimacy was, "Young man, if you don't know your business you had better go home" (Clayton, 127).

Emerson wanted to bridge the obvious personal and spiritual gap between himself and his congregation. Beyond his close, and evidently meaningful, relationship with his Concord neighbors and numerous literary colleagues in New England and even in Europe, his temperament prevented him from communicating comfortably in less familiar one-on-one contexts. Instead, Emerson absorbed himself in the delivery of his sermons with the hope of becoming a minister of "thought and action," and having a "bearing upon practice" (Cayton, 121, 122, 131). To him, religion was

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useless if it could not be integrated into daily life. By 1832, he made a troubling decision to leave the ministry after six years of practice.

Reading Emerson, other readers may agree, can become nearly a 'conversation' with the famous author as well as a 'study.' Even a brief examination of some of his vast range of work can be energizing, most certainly, as well as providing some academic insight relative to the philosophical foundations of Western education. Examining his romantic writing style and his legendary ease at communicating with his readers is a tempting consideration for another study. Becoming familiar with Cornel West's work, referenced by Ozmon and Craver, can become yet another project.

One can observe, over the years, that numerous authors, keynoters, greeting card companies, and various ideological 'movements' claim Emerson as a frame of reference. Less pragmatic ideologies can

recognize his strong conservative religious roots, classical educational grounding, and the independent dispositions of his ancestors. Emerson was a scholar of Greek and Eastern thought. He was known to be introspective and contemplative. The philosophical perspective of idealism is evident, of course, throughout the initial and search. Reviewers indicate, however, that Emerson insisted upon the practical implementation of religious belief. Supporters of Dewey can discern, also, Emerson's attraction to anti-authoritarianism. Ozrmon and Craver's mentioning the optimistic side of Emerson's temperament and the Deweyan connection fueled my own curiosity that remains somewhat unsatisfied. It was pleasing to find the Ozmon and Craver subtle connection.

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Technology Versus Rational Man: Revenge Effects and the Role of Educators²

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First, I know the program lists a title "Is the Human Race Innately Irrational?" But as I explored that topic, it became increasingly clear to me that this is a no-brainer. Overwhelming evidence of the irrational nature of man is seen daily. Take the amazing reaction to the death of Princess Di as one example: or the logic of supply-side economics: or U.S. Foreign Policy. Or such things as our government trying to discourage smoking, while it continues to subsidize the growing of tobacco and the legality of it, and has even worked out a deal whereby tobacco companies will have immunity from some antitrust laws. Or take even baseball fans who still believe the Chicago Cubs will go to the World Series in our lifetime

Perhaps the most succinct documentation of the innate irrationality of humans was that of Albert Ellis. When asked what empirical evidence he had that documented his repeated assertions that the human race is biologically, innately irrational, Ellis answered with one word: "Relatives." Case closed.

So I decided it would be preaching to the choir to devote this address to the redundant statement: irrational humans. Instead, I became curious about a slightly different question: how is it that when humans are behaving in their best rational fashion, trying to solve important problems with the best of science and technology, that this still often leads to unexpected bad results? Indeed, it appears that we often believe we have solved a problem, only to find that somehow a "revenge effect" takes place, and we eventually realize we have made the problem worse!

Some examples of this:

1. The repeated use of antibiotics, even when

useless, so that new strains of super-bacteria develop that are immune to drugs.

2. The computer revolution, which was to reduce the use of paper and save the environment. Guess how much additional paper is now needed for laser printers, photocopiers, fax machines?

3. The fact that many technological advances, while claiming to save human labor, end up requiring more rather than less work.

4. The invention of automatic teller machines, supposedly to save both money and time. Notice how banks now, charge extra fees for using ATM'S, and the long lines include air pollution from auto emissions, and seem to take longer than the old way of going inside the bank to face a real person.

5. The introduction of thousands of plants, flowers, trees to improve the environment, that usually end up creating far worse problems.

The poet Paul Valery had it right:

"Unpredictability in every field is the result of the conquest of the whole of the present world by scientific power. This invasion by active knowledge tends to transform man's environment and man himself - to what extent, with what risks, what deviations from the basic conditions of existence and of the preservation of life we simply do not know. Life has become, in short, the object of an experiment of which we can say only one thing - that it tends to estrange us more and more from what we were." (Valery, 1944)

Valery said that in 1944, not 1994, which makes him quite a futurist. He was certainly more accurate than John von Neumann, who predicted in 1955 that we

²A version of this paper was delivered as the Presidential Address at the Forty-Eighth Meeting of the Society of Philosophy and History of Education, October 1997.

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would have energy too cheap to meter by 1980! The "New Athens," a self-correcting world of machine-supported leisure, has not happened. Edward Tenner, after studying the history of technological advance, concluded that technology demands more, not less, human work to function, that it introduces more subtle, insidious, and often long-term problems to replace acute immediate ones.

"We are unhappy, I suggest, for two reasons. First, in controlling the catastrophic problems, we are exposing ourselves to more elusive chronic ones that are even harder to address. And second, our greater safety demands more and more vigilance. . . . It is the tendency of the world around us to get even, to twist our cleverness against us." (Tenner, 1996)

In using the term "revenge effect," I am not talking about a "side effect." A revenge effect refers to solving a problem but then having unanticipated consequences in exactly the same problem area -, i.e., things in the long run are worse! Let me repeat: **A REVENGE EFFECT REFERS TO SOLVING A PROBLEM BUT THEN HAVING UNANTICIPATED CONSEQUENCES IN EXACTLY THE SAME PROBLEM AREA.** It is the term for things biting back, a sort of "getting even" for mechanical, chemical, biological, medical, social, even political ingenuity.

If a cancer treatment causes baldness that is a side effect. But if the treatment cures the cancer but causes a new, equally lethal cancer, that is a revenge effect. If car alarms cause irritating, noise in the middle of the night, that is a side effect. But if advanced alarm systems cause neighbors to break into cars to silence them, or cause burglars to escalate by resorting to car-jacking rather than break-ins, that is a revenge effect. If warnings on cigarette packs cause the price of cigarettes to increase, this is a side effect. But if warning labels result in protecting the industry from liability, increasing their profits, and leading to an increase in smoking, this is a revenge effect.

I believe a key to revenge effects is **THE FAILURE TO CONSIDER ALL PROBLEMS TO BE SYSTEMIC**, rather than just specific problems. An example is the problem of intense summer heat in large cities. It is much hotter in St. Louis, or Cleveland, or Phoenix than it is in the surrounding countryside. But air conditioning solves this problem, by making it nice and cool in city buildings. The city is cooler - or is it? Air conditioning makes the ambient temperature on the street, in the subways, on the balcony much hotter, so that time spent outside is more unpleasant. It is also

extremely disconcerting when the air conditioning fails temporarily, as it does at peak hours. Furthermore, it is true that often you can do nothing about a building that is too cold, or too warm, because there are no windows to open and bring in outside air.

The IBM motto "Machines should work; people should think" sounds good, but Ruth Schwartz Cowan argues in her book "More Work for Mother" that vacuum cleaners, washing machines, and other "labor saving" devices did not really save time or effort for middle-class housewives. Women who had formerly sent soiled clothing to a commercial laundry or dry-cleaners began to do more and more washing, ironing, and other work at home. As various services became less available, choices were eliminated. (Try finding someone dependable to do yard work, house work, remodeling). In fact, it is even said that the "Women's Liberation" movement, while "freeing up" women from the drudgery of the duties of housewifery, has actually caused many women to be worse off, to be tied to an undesirable and underpaying job, forced to fight the day-care monster, and then come home to a second job as wife and mother.

Let's look closely at a few examples of revenge effects to see if we can learn any lessons. We all remember the Gulf War. Although it is easy to say that our efforts to support and strengthen Saddam Hussein in order to maintain peace and security in the Mideast, leading to this so-called war, is in itself an example of the revenge effect, I will look at something much more specific. Remember the Iraqi SCUD missiles, and the deployment of Patriot missiles to protect Tel Aviv? Studies after the war, comparing damage and injuries before and after the Patriots were deployed, concluded that damage to Tel Aviv increased with the shield of Patriot missiles. This was because some of the SCUDs hit by the Patriots would have landed without damage, and when a SCUD was hit in the air above Tel Aviv, it could produce debris over five kilometers. A missile hit in the air was transformed into numerous smaller projectiles, magnifying the damage. The very fact that weaponry can produce a false sense of security, a belief that the world is less dangerous when in reality it is more dangerous, is in itself a revenge effect.

Everyday examples abound. When a diet and exercise program to improve one's health and vitality results in a crippling heart attack, or leads to a divorce by one's spouse due to family neglect, this is a revenge effect. When a security device or weapon intended to increase one's safety instead injures or kills the installer, this is a

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revenge effect. (I guess these really aren't very humorous). When a chemical applied to one's lawn to increase its health and growth instead kills the grass and nourishes the weeds, this is a revenge effect.

An interesting historic example is the history of mirrors. In the eighteenth and even nineteenth centuries, mirrors were a luxury that only the wealthy possessed. But by the twentieth century, mirrors proliferated and today are everywhere. It appears that some of the personal reasons for mirrors were that they improved ones self-esteem, led to better appearance and grooming, perhaps even had health benefits, such as spotting a facial lesion and treating it. But today, mirrors often have the effect of causing insecurity, lowered self-esteem, obsession with ones appearance, even a draining of ones finances as they buy expensive cosmetics to combat imperfections in their appearance. Anorexics are sometimes advised to get rid of the mirrors in their house and avoid looking at their reflections. Children of kindergarten age are struggling with diets to achieve the in-look of extreme thinness.

Hospitals are an excellent example of revenge effects. Diseases caused by medicine itself are called iatrogenic disease. Robert Moser, in *Diseases of Medical Progress*, treats this topic in great detail, as has Ivan Illich in *Medical Nemesis*. The fact that we learn from medical disasters might be seen as a reverse revenge effect (or is it perhaps just a side-effect?). Still, it is alarming to read that a group of Harvard researchers who studied over thirty thousand selected records from fifty-one hospitals in New York State reported that 3.7 percent of all hospital stays included one or more iatrogenic effects, more than half of these resulting from physician error. Medical negligence injured almost one in every fifty patients. They found over 6,300 patients were permanently impaired from these mistakes, and over 13,400 died needlessly.

The project leaders estimated that one American hospital patient in twenty-five suffers an adverse effect from their hospitalization, and one in four hundred dies from it. This suggests that twice as many Americans die each year from avoidable medical injuries than from highway accidents. Perhaps the HMO's kicking people out of hospitals, or encouraging drive-by surgery, will eventually be seen as a great advance in health care!

Epidemiologist Abdel Omran sees a three-stage process of medical advance: The Age of Pestilence and Famine, The Age of Receding Pandemics, and the Age of Degenerative and Man-Made Diseases. Life expectancy increased greatly across these periods (at

least in developed countries). The West entered the Age of Degenerative and Man-Made Diseases by the 1920's, and there was a continuing increase in chronic and long-term illness and disabilities. Ernest Gruenberg saw this as an example of "The Failure of Success," in which "medical research was inadvertently impairing health by increasing the prevalence of disability and chronic illness." Certainly if the result of modern medicine for many individuals is the extending of decline, misery, the lengthening of suffering and dying, it could be called a revenge effect.

Revenge effects abound in the history of "advances" in technology. To paraphrase Henry Young man, "Take computers . . . Please!" I believe it's fair to say that the benefits of automated data and word processing have not been quite as expected. One revenge effect is physical: what had promised to make work painless unexpectedly attacks muscles, tendons, vertebrae, creating a host of "PC" syndromes. Other revenge effects are financial: What had promised to make services more efficient and economical has so far produced low net benefits. Of course, the two are related: work-related stress, health, disability are also reflected in financial statements.

It is said we have advanced from tool use to tool management. We press buttons, and the machine does it for us. But this also results in yet another level between us and the action. The pilot in the modern airliner has no direct physical contact with the plane's systems: he is no longer even managing tools, but managing tools that manage other tools that manage other tools. . . .

But back to personal computers and word-processing. We have spell checks, grammar checks, word checks, yet it appears that typos, incorrect spelling, grammatical errors have proliferated. Proofreading has become a lost art. Is this perhaps because an essay or paper. Is a system, and t computer can only look at specific bits? Is it also that writers have a false sense of security because of these devices? Has the quality of writing increased or declined? Has the ease and speed of producing literature on computers led to a decrease of sense and an increase of nonsense? Try visiting a chat room on the Internet!

It is claimed that computers are democratic, giving ready access to top management, more collegiality. But they also make it possible to read files surreptitiously, monitor activities, and even trace message traffic to discover malcontents. Robert Cringley, after studying computer networking and management styles, concluded that "there is no evidence that networks as

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such make managers different. Rather, people seem to build networks in their own image." (Cringley, 1993)

Another problem with computers is that they tend to lead to cuts in support services, while still increasing the management and professional levels and becoming top-heavy. Computers make it possible for managers to do more things for themselves, but many of these things could be done better by support staff. Peter Cession suggests that "The increased productivity of office technology has an indirect and unintended effect on staffing that may cause overall organizational productivity to decline." He calls this -The Law of Diminishing Specialization He claims that by reducing the formula and employing fewer managers and professionals and more support staff, corporations could achieve savings of \$7,400 per employee (Sassone, 1988)

One of my favorite examples of the revenge effect is the suggestion that while Computers, E-Mail, Cyberspace have increased access and the flow of information, they may be increasing access and flow of MISINFORMATION much more, maybe by a ratio of ten to one. And the new craze is multimedia, which means adding sound and fury to the smoke and mirrors!

And now, what about weeds? A definition of a true weed might be a plant with a built-in revenge effect. Cutting plantain triggers new shoots from its hidden rhizomes. Burning wetland vegetation to destroy purple loosestrife hastens the germination of still more loosestrife. Ripping out burdock leaves a taproot the spreads more burdock. In the 1930's, a Chicago physician led a campaign to eradicate ragweed. Volunteers killed thousands of plants, which dispersed pollen that increased the range and density of the city's ragweed crop.

For a change of pace, it is interesting that the cost of workers, compensation has increased greatly, in spite of all the improvements, better working conditions, safety, that we ave today. What is driving up the cost of workers' compensation? Certainly part of the answer is that we have replaced the hazardous conditions and tragic accidents with another type of physical problem - health problems that result from activities that in themselves appear harmless, such as sitting, typing at a keyboard, handling files and papers, looking at text or data on a screen. This has resulted in an amazing increase in cumulative Trauma Disorders ("CTD's."). These are repetitive disorders that come from thousands or millions of repetitive motions, or even from a position that requires no motion at all. They develop slowly and imperceptively, are sometimes difficult to

diagnose, and certainly difficult sometimes to prove legally.

But let's go back to weeds. Kudzu, which survives in the most neglected and abused soils, was introduced to the U.S. by government officials, to restore worn out pasture land, cotton fields, land devastated by insects, erosion, and the Great Depression. Channing Cope even founded the "Kudzu Club of America," and it was thought to be a Godsend. But agriculture soon changed, Southern landowners were restoring their forests, and kudzu climbs, overshades, kills saplings and even hundred-foot-tall trees. It pulls down telephone lines, blacks out neighborhoods by tripping local power transformers, shorts high voltage lines, obliterates traffic signs and spreads over bridges. By 1988, timber losses in three southern states alone were estimated at \$175 million.

I'm still not done with computers. The problems of stiff or sore neck, vision problems or headaches, pain in wrists and hands are something that all of you are probably familiar with, and those suffering from these problems often do nothing more strenuous or dangerous than peck at a computer keyboard all day. But why would there be such an increase rather than a decrease as we have moved from manual typewriters and other "crude" machines to the streamlined computer and wordprocessor? I believe this is a beautiful example of revenge effects.

Computer keyboards have reduced even the physical exertion of typing, striking keys, raising blocks of metal for capital letters, throwing back the carriage for each new line, feeding a sheet of paper into the typewriter for each new page. Wouldn't this be much harder on the worker and cause more pain and physical disorders? Apparently not, as it now appears that the old-fashioned typing, filing, record keeping was safer just because it was harder and slower! The need for more pressure distributed more force to shoulders and arms. Manual keys had a spring to them that prevented the sharp impacts that rapid strokes on a computer keyboard can bring. You could not type with the arched and poor hand position that many use on a computer keyboard. And the interruptions caused by returning the carriage, keeping keys from jamming, feeding paper into the typewriter, installing new ribbons actually helped prevent CTD'S.

Even the wonderful mouse that enables us to word-process so speedily and effortlessly has led to a new syndrome, "Mouse Joint." (I'm not making this UP). Nearly all the pointing devices to date have the revenge

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effect of requiring the removal of one hand from the keyboard to use the mouse and then returning it after each operation. Mouse users also tend to move it with the wrist rather than forearm, a no-no, and to do it over to the side, further stressing the wrist. The first case of mouse-joint appeared in a medical journal in 1991, involving a married couple both of whom used the mouse at work and at home. The male patient recovered in a month of rest, splints, and ibuprofen but then the condition returned after he went back to work. I don't know what happened to the female patient.

Microsoft spent millions in developing a newer, safer mouse, arched in the middle, fitting in the palm, with left and right switches. A long file of proper mouse use was included as part of the software. So far, this worker friendly mouse seems to be seen as more comfortable, but there is no compelling data that it is actually safer. The increase in CTD's and other physical problems resulting from what was supposed to be a much easier and more effective way of working, saving money to boot, could be called a revenge effect.

SOPHE is an education society. What does all of this have to do with education? I would say a lot. ALL ASPECTS OF EDUCATION FUNCTION AS SYSTEMS, NOT ISOLATED INCIDENTS. Jerome Bruner's statement that "Everything is not related to everything in this world of ours, but everything is related to something" (Bruner, 1962) certainly applies here. Any change that is made affects other parts of the system. Just the task of getting our students to see anything they do in education as systemic is an important step. But further, we academics must continually ask what the long-term, systemic results are from any change or "improvement" in education. What are the effects of raising tuition? Of changing federal aid to loans instead of grants? Of pursuing national goals and national testing? Of grade inflation? Of changing or eliminating tenure? Of Distance Education. Of the use of computers, CAI, the Internet in schools? Of the so-called reform movement? Of changing the name of a professional organization and going national instead of regional? Of everything we do or advocate?

Even trivial examples are important. If you strengthen the research and stat courses, make them sequential, change the times when they are offered, decide they cannot be offered in the summer, is this only a question about the quality and success of these courses? Or does it have serious implications for other programs, staffing, the recruitment of students, funding, enrollments in other programs, you name it. Does the

widespread use of student evaluations that we see now, often converted directly or indirectly into salary and rank, improve the quality of instruction, or does it actually lead to declining standards and even to ethical violations? Does the increased diagnosis, medication, and treatment of students with disabilities result in better education, improved lives for these students, cost savings for education and/or society, or is it in some ways counterproductive?

It is easy to see revenge effects in politics. Voters in a host of states have voted for term limits legislation, in the belief that this will make legislators, executives, even judges more honest, effective, productive. We will soon find out in Arkansas if this is true, or if instead the legislature is weakened, more dishonest, inept, pawns of the governor. And then, of course there **was** Richard Nixon and his recording system for preserving history!

The origin of Political Action Committees is another example. Campaign finance reform in the 1970's included limits on how much any individual could contribute to a campaign, reporting rules, the formation of Political Action Committees, among other things. Some very sincere and supposedly intelligent people lead this battle. But we now know that these reforms have backfired, and the campaign finance mess is worse than ever.

Another example is welfare reform, designed to help families get off welfare, join the workforce, increase their confidence and dignity. But if the long-term result of this reform were to be more misery, more children in poverty, increased abortion, child abuse and abandonment, this clearly would be a revenge effect.

There are many more, but I am running out of time. I haven't even described global warming as a revenge effect, or addressed sports, where we see changes in the rules, improvement of equipment, or technology such as the instant replay sometimes coming back to bite us. Let me end by a quote from Edward Tenner:

Revenge effects reached their peak in the hundred years between the 1860's and the 1960's, during the very acme of technological optimism. Clobbering nature into submission united North Americans and Europeans, Communists and Republicans. Explosives, heavy machinery, agriculture, and transportation seemed at last to be fulfilling the injunction of Genesis 1:28 to "fill the earth and subdue it." (Tenner, 1996)

Tenner believes that a major component for combating revenge effects is retreating from intensity,

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and also practicing finesse. In farming, this means foregoing applications of heavy fertilizer in favor of planting complementary crops in the same fields. In medicine, this means shifting away from the heavy reliance on a handful of antibiotics. In computing, it implies a healthy skepticism about the functional value of more powerful new releases of both hardware and software. In the workplace, it sometimes calls for deliberately slowing or interrupting the pace of work. Tenner concludes that *human* culture, not some

inherent evil in machines, has created most revenge effects. He calls for technological optimism to recognize bad practices early enough to do something about them. As the Red Queen said in *Through the Looking Glass*, "Now here, you see, it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place. If you want to get somewhere else, you must run twice as fast as that." And contrary to Satchel Paige's famous dictum, we must ALWAYS look back, because reality is gaining on us!

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A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY INTO TECHNOLOGY: EDUCATIONAL REFORM, SOFTWARE, CURRICULUM AND THE INTERNET

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When I was a student in elementary school, technology was a record player, overhead projector, or even sometimes if we were extremely lucky we were able to watch a filmstrip. Today technology in education means video tapes, distance education, and the computer.

. . . The phrase educational technology encompasses and is used to refer to the most advanced technologies available for teaching and learning at a given time. The notion of at a given time produces a distinct stressor for educators rushing to incorporate a dynamic tool into the learning environment (CASDA, p. 9, 1997).

If there is an epidemic in education, it is the computer. Because the computer is seen by many school districts as a means to create a level playing field, school districts spend an inordinate amount of money and resources to place computers in the schools. There is a rush by administrators and school boards to have their districts and students be a part of the technocratic elite, the computer literate if you will.

Computer literacy is a relative term. Computer literacy has different meanings for different school districts. Stoll (1995) points out,

To one person, computer literacy means that a student can type on a keyboard. Another sees it as the ability to use standard tools to send, copy, or delete files. A third expects students to be able to write a simple program in BASIC (p. 131-132).

All school districts and their students should be able to benefit from technology in their schools. High schools students, regardless of their personal and professional goals, must have the opportunity to use technology in their schools. Many entry level jobs do not require that applicants have a college degree but do require computer knowledge and skills. Students who have never been exposed to technology by their school districts are going to be behind other persons in the job market. According to the Arkansas Industrial Development Commission's survey on finding a

trainable work force, "In 1995, half of the companies said that this was an important issue compared to 67 percent of the companies in 1996" (1997). Knowledge of using technology is essential for students of public schools, but how are the schools implementing this into the curriculum?

What are the school districts, on average, doing with all of this information and equipment? Mehlinger (1996) in his article "School Reform in the Information Age," contends that "Computers in elementary schools continue to be used heavily to teach basic skills and this pattern is growing in high schools" (p. 403). Mehlinger also says, "Much technology is used for remediation, especially in the elementary grades; it provides drill-and-practice exercises that are boring for teachers to teach" (1996, p. 406).

Computers are expensive pieces of equipment. Hardware and software become outdated as soon as they are up and running. One should question why we are so enthralled by a tool. Why is there a rush to integrate technology into the classrooms of our public schools? With all of this money being spent on hardware, software, training, and upkeep, what is the justification in the eyes of school leaders?

Educational Reform

School districts, at an unprecedented pace rush to integrate technology into their public schools. Currently in the forefront of many educational reform packages is the implementation and integration of technology, or more specifically, the computer. We have the President of the United States who initiated the Goals 2000 package, which, in essence, will allow for all classrooms in America to have a computer hooked up to the information superhighway.

All of this is under the guise of educational reform. "Many reformers view technology as the vital link from the classroom to the workplace - Technology serves as a cornerstone to every reform package in America" (Baines, 1997, p. 494).

Software

Schoppmeyer, Jr.: A Philosophical Inquiry . . .

Less than 1 percent of all educational software has ever been field tested, "yet school boards seldom review software to make sure that it's appropriate and accurate -- unlike textbooks, encyclopedias, and library materials" (Stoll, 1995, p. 135). Current educational software is limited in its application. Stoll (1995) argues, "Since educational software is designed for single users, there's not much place for social interactions, like taking turns. Teamwork occasionally happens, but it's incidental to these programs" (p. 142).

The classroom becomes a quiet, secluded, preprogrammed existence. The sight of 28 students behind 28 computers with 28 pairs of headphones over their heads is a scary sight. There is no interaction with the main teaching element in the classroom -- the teacher. We are replacing our certified teachers with computer software. Stoll (1995) says "After all, what's a computer program except a construct of someone else's mind?" (p. 122). We replace our teachers with virtual teachers whose credentials we cannot verify. According to Stoll (1995), ". . . computer programs feed us someone else's logic" (p. 122). Unless computer software is field tested and reviewed by the teacher, computer software may not retain the same teaching style as that which the students have become accustomed.

Curriculum

According to James Swartz (1997), Technology is a delivery system and is a curriculum content delivery system, much the same as books and other traditional media, such as films and videos. We must consider how technology conveys curriculum content, but we must also question what technology does to the shape of the curriculum. Technology is the only part of education where the equipment precedes the vision. Technology and the purchase of such equipment should follow the curriculum and the set goals and objectives of a school district, not the other way around.

Technology should not define the curriculum, only enhance it. Technology should not enframe the district with its hardware and software limitations, it should allow the district to expound upon its vision with the implementation of another effective teaching tool.

Technology changes every aspect of learning, from transference of knowledge to the method and style of examinations. Going from a lead-based word processor to a phosphorous-based word processor directly affects the transference of knowledge. How effective can students be on a computer when they don't have adequate typing skills? It drastically slows down the

learning process! There is a significant difference between writing something out in long hand and typing something out on a computer screen. Some of the most productive scholars of this decade would be stymied if we walked into their offices and changed their method of creativity. Why, then, are we doing this in our public schools?

Computers not only change the method of instruction, they change the method of taking tests. How many computers have the ability to grade an essay? Computers are limited to right and wrong answers. This limits the student's ability to be creative and go beyond the lines in answers to questions by not allowing students to formulate and deliver complete, creative answers to complex problems. Stoll (1995) asserts, "Computers emphasize test scores, rather than accomplishment" (p. 126). The notion of partial credit is not possible using a computer. In math class, the method is as important as the final answer. Partial credit is given for the proper steps taken to reach an answer. This problem is only magnified by allowing sophisticated computer systems to administer nationally standardized exams such as the SAT and the GRE.

Every year, the Scholastic Aptitude Test asks graduating high school students "Which of these sentences is wrong?" They don't ask them to write an essay explaining how the European parliamentary form of government differs from the American congressional system or the Canadian parliamentary.

No, that problem has no right or wrong answer. It measures how well a student knows the subject. Gives her a forum to express an opinion or tell a story. Tells her about her ability to cogently express herself. The testing computers can't even read these answers, let alone score them (Stoll, 1995, p. 127).

It is a shame that in examinations such as the GRE and SAT with academic careers at stake are being trivialized by a mere "pick a winner" or a true/false statement. Creativity is thrown out the door. We are no longer concerned with what a student knows, we are merely concerned with whether or not a student is able to choose the correct, sometimes obscure answer. Computer generated examinations circumvent the process of composition.

The Internet

The Internet has become a paradigm shift for society in general, completely encompassing all areas of the public market. Businesses use the Internet to advertise their products and to make shopping easier for the

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consumer. The Internet allows businesses to save money on retail space. Virtual stores and catalogs are displayed on every search on the World Wide Web.

The Internet is falsely being touted as the World Wide Web. There is an inference that the entire world is connected and information is coming from all corners of our earth. Two-thirds of the world's population still lives on subsistence farming. In a recent report in the May 1997 issue of Harper's it is stated that, "A chance that a human being alive today has never made a telephone call: 2 in 3" (May 1997, p. 15). The United States only has about 5 percent of the world's total population (source: ABC news) I doubt seriously that some Shaman is sitting around in his grass hut with either a satellite link or direct connection to the Internet.

The truth is that the Internet is not a refereed journal or an edited book. Anyone one can put their own propaganda out on the web. It is desktop publishing gone berserk! The Internet is also cause for a moral, ethical, and value judgments for the educational leader of the 21st century. No one could argue that the Internet contains a wealth of information. One could, however, argue that most of it is unmitigated crap. Offensive, obscene, and tasteless material awaits anyone with a mouse, modem, hard drive, and monitor. Should this be the cornerstone of the addition of computers into the schools? What are the consequences of using the Internet? Stoll (1995) contends,

It is an unreal universe, a soluble tissue of nothingness. While the Internet beckons brightly, seductively flashing an icon of knowledge-as-power, this non place lures us to surrender our time on earth. A poor substitute it is, this virtual reality where frustration is legion and where - in the holy names of Education and Progress - important aspects of human interactions are relentlessly devalued (p. 3).

With that in mind, is there really anything out on the Internet that we can't find anywhere else? No! In fact Stoll argues that so called on-line libraries cannot replace the physical libraries in existence today. Stoll (1995) focuses on the impact of electronic libraries in the area of research.

If a system (on-line libraries) makes only some resources available - especially if those sources are superficial or of poor quality - then it can do real damage to the quality of research, for it will encourage users simply to make do with whatever sources are

readily available, regardless of their quality or completeness (p. 185).

How do we make the instructional leaders of the

district, the principals and superintendent, leaders of technology reform in education? Training. Training is the key for ownership in a vision. We must train superintendents and their principals together with a state wide initiative. We need to give all children the ability to use technology at their schools, but we need to inform those making the decisions about technology for their schools.

This is exactly what was done in Indiana. They have a state-supported technology training center for principals. There is a small fee involved but it provided for four days of in-service training on "a variety of software programs and computer hardware" (Rockman et.al, 1993, p.6). Participants of the program also felt that "it was time to stop dabbling in technology, time to stop wasting precious resources on piecemeal purchases, time to get out of the web of obsolescence and incompatibility - time, in other words, for coordinated long-range planning." (Rockman et al., 1993, p.7)

Educational administrative leaders need to be cognizant of technology. The educational leader of the school must be an active participant in the implementation of technology as well as with the in-service training. Educational Testing Service (1997) in its annual "Computers in the Classroom" report, gave the state of Arkansas high marks in its implementation of technology. The state of Arkansas was consistently above average in the hardware categories. Arkansas rated 48th out of 50 in the amount of in-service training given to our public school teachers. The implications for Arkansas are that we have the technology but we don't provide adequate in-service training. Untrained teachers using technology is short-changing the tax payer, the classroom teacher, and the student. The implementation of technology is a complete process which does not stop once the systems are up and running. Rather, for technology to succeed in Arkansas' public schools we must complete the process and properly train school personnel to ensure a successful product - successful students ready for the 21st century.

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Schoppmeyer, Sr.: Philosophy of Merit Rating

PHILOSOPHY OF MERIT RATING

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W. Edwards Deming, the guru of Japanese management, left little room for misunderstanding his dislike of yearly personnel evaluations. He found them useless, counterproductive, and of little or no worth. He felt, rather, that observing an individual's work over a long period could give one a pretty good idea of their value.

Probably in no other occupation than college teaching is Deming's attitude more correct. For attempts are annually made to determine the comparative contribution of individual faculty. The system leads to unhappiness, lowered morale, competition, and a lack of collegiality which college professors are supposed to have in large quantity. Therefore, it is actually counterproductive.

The system is usually triggered by a workload agreement filled out with the department head estimating the amount of effort to be expended in teaching, advising, research and service. Although these can best be made as rough estimates based on previous years, they are made into a sort of Procrustean bed against which the faculty member will be measured for the coming year. The impossibility and even immorality in trying to foretell the future is not considered. We must have something to use as a yardstick even though the measurements are in meters or even more likely ounces.

At the end of the year, or in actual practice around a half year, for the workload forms are usually completed at the start of an academic year and compared to actual productivity at the end of the calendar year, the cycle is completed. Faculty then recount in some form or another their accomplishments for the calendar year. The lugubrious list usually consists of student ratings (if any), and any attempt to improve teaching by the instructor.

Then there is research. Faculty must list whatever research they were involved in and more important publications, especially refereed publications. The fact that the most widely read publication in education is the *Kappan*, which is not refereed, escapes the notice of administrators who develop the forms. All other

publications, presentations, and appearances at professional meetings are then duly listed. A new faculty member is usually under more pressure to conduct research than a tenured colleague. This seems to be the major requirement for tenure at which point it can be forgotten.

Those who do not publish are threatened with lower raises but since there is little difference in yearly increments the threat is usually ignored.

The compilation of all the required materials which in addition to publication include classes taught, student ratings of their classes, improvements in teaching tactics, presentations, national state and regional membership in professional organizations, offices held, meetings attended, editorial board memberships, articles reviewed, grants applied for, grants received, and just about any other thing that the faculty member did during the year. The whole mess is referred to as a "brag sheet" and takes almost as much time to complete as it would to write a paper.

The assorted papers are then turned into the department head by a cut off date set by the latter. At this point because variously of state law, university regulation, college rule, departmental practice or a lily-livered department head, the documents are all reviewed by a few of the departmental members in what is termed peer review. These peers may have been elected by the department members or appointed by the department head. In either case they serve the purpose of spreading the blame if the ratings of a given instructor are lower than he or she had expected. The department head then has the final word and ranks his people from top to bottom on "merit."

All of this is kept a secret from the faculty as a whole for individual instructors are told one by one as to their ratings. Then the fun starts. In almost every department there will be one or two persons who feel that they have been cheated. They will make demands to see their ratings. They will insist upon knowing how each peer rated them, and claim that the whole process was too subjective. They claim that the peer group dislikes them. Quite often this is done when the complaining

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faculty have tried to hide the facts. They may have taught eight courses during the year but only submit student ratings for four that were acceptable, keeping hidden those that were not. Since the peers have available to them the other four ratings they may well have a negative effect on the score for the complaining member. Another basis for complaint are articles. Some faculty want credit for them when they are submitted, when they are accepted, and then also when they are published. This means getting high ratings three times for one publication. Many members of peer review committees and department heads scoff at this practice, and the person reviewed has his or her nose out of joint.

The actions of the discontented few are multiple at least in the form of threat. They range from threats of grievances to, in at least one department of my acquaintance, requests to change the system.

In that case a few of the unhappy staff talked a couple of not so dissatisfied colleagues into developing a whole new system of faculty evaluation. The ploy was to attach points to most faculty activities. This, it was claimed, would provide objectivity. The individual was then to total their points and be ranked accordingly. What seemed to escape the ad hoc committee which designed this is that the assignment of points is quite as subjective, if not more so, than a judgement by a faculty peer review group. Some of the point assignments were rather strange. A refereed article was good for 150 but a book only 325. It was evident that no member of the complaining group had ever written a book. Points flowed generously to activities favored and regularly undertaken by the designers while activities they did not undertake were either given but a nodding award or were ignored. For example, no points were awarded publication by ERIC. The entire attempt resembled nothing more than a ploy to better reward persons who in the judgement of their peers did not deserve much reward.

Such a move to numerical equivalents providing the impression of objectivity when in reality it is even more subjective. For instance, three professionals wrote an article. Each tried to claim half of the paper. This provided mathematical objectivity compiled with ridiculousness. Such a situation can occur with attempts to measure quality of Journals, quality of book publishers and even importance of meetings. It really leads nowhere save to more confusion.

The Root of the Problem

The undeniable fact is that all ratings are subjective. In a sense that is what makes horse racing. The money bet by the raters of the losers goes to the winners. At least in a horse race there is finally an objective test. Ratings of personnel never have an

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objective test so one must conclude that horse racing is more scientific. This weakness seems to have been recognized by Deming and others who have spoken out against it. It is impossible to tell whether an article in Journal A is superior or inferior to one in Journal B.

Student ratings are doubly subjective. The student gains perception of an instructor. They may or may not be fair. Then the review committee tries to make a judgement based on the student judgement. It becomes a subjective nightmare. There is no easy way to make it totally objective. Rating Professor A higher than Professor B is a highly nonobjective and thankless task. It also may not be true. At one time or another all faculty have felt that they have been mistreated. The make up of the dissatisfied group will usually vary from year to year. The trick is don't let it get you down.

Alternatives

There do not seem to be any viable alternatives to the system save one. This is a solution used by a few colleges. What they have done is to copy public school districts and develop a salary schedule. This would provide raises of given amounts depending on academic rank.

The faculty members are still rated but only to the extent of satisfactory and unsatisfactory performance. If the instructor demonstrates satisfactory performance, he or she receives the stated increase. If on rare occasions unsatisfactory performance is judged to be the case then the individual faculty member is not granted the increase.

Such a method will eliminate ranking and the creation of competition as well as much of the ill feelings that accompany the current system. There is one drawback and that is when the institution is unsure of its potential raises for the following year. Under such circumstances the satisfactory groups would be promised an average, depending upon rank, of the funds that are found to be available.

In Summary

In a given academic year it is almost impossible to find anything save extraordinary productivity or complete lack thereof. Most faculty are disgustingly average. Therefore a method that awards artificial subjective ranking is by far to be desired. University faculty may well object to being treated like public school teachers but in reality there is little difference.

University administrators should be forced to read W. Edwards Deming.

OLD ISSUES--NEW THINKING: THE COURTS AND DESEGREGATION

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Forty years ago, nine African-American students attempted to enroll at Central High School, Little Rock, Arkansas. That effort to attend a school segregated by legal policy represented a conscious and free choice on the part of these students. Although the Central crisis did not initiate legal efforts to desegregate schools, it came to represent the worldwide icon for all future students who would consciously choose the venue for their education. Initially, the courts seemed to contemplate the validity of that choice. As time and legal process progressed, it was deemed necessary to order children to sit side-by-side in order to learn. Today the courts appear to be moving back toward choice as the basis for educational opportunity in the American public school.

The pre-1850 education of a black Bostonian youngster, Sarah Roberts, provided the genesis for the well-known doctrine of separate but equal.¹ During her walk to the remote Smith Grammar School (established in the 1820s for blacks and now run-down and ill-equipped), five-year-old Sarah passed five elementary schools each serving only white students. Her father tried repeatedly, yet unsuccessfully, to place her in a better school--one where facilities and equipment were in good repair and one that was closer to her home, thus, at that time, one that solely educated white children. Finally, in 1850 and with the assistance of United States Senator Charles Sumner, Mr. Roberts formally challenged the notion of unequal treatment (*Roberts v. City of Boston*, 59 Mass. 198). It was in the Roberts' opinion that Justice Shaw of the Massachusetts Court established the viewpoint that was to affect education of blacks in America for over a century: school segregation was for the good of both races.

The Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868, eighteen years after the Roberts' decision. It included the Equal Protection Clause. The Supreme Court, however, continually determined that equal protection had no application to private enterprise, e.g., inns, restaurants, entertainment houses.² Moreover, with the

Mississippi state statute upheld that required segregated train cars--the Equal Protection Clause being circumvented--"state-enforced classification of citizens by race was made possible."³ As a result, Southern states began extending the private custom of discrimination into state law, and Jim Crow laws, originating in Florida in 1887, became prevalent.

The national standard for applying the Fourteenth Amendment according to local custom and tradition was established in *Plessy v. Ferguson*, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).⁴ In this decision, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that separate but equal was constitutionally acceptable, thereby establishing it as a legal principle. Although *Plessy* actually addressed the issue of railway accommodations, the opinion was extended to education by implication. Furthermore, the federal judiciary continually upheld the rights of states to determine their methods of education, e.g., in *Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education*, 175 U.S. 528, 20 S.Ct. 197 (1899), *Berea College v. Commonwealth of Kentucky*, 211 U.S. 45, 29 S.Ct. 33 (1908), and in *Gong Lum v. Rice*, 275 U.S. 78, 48 S.Ct. 91 (1927), the federal courts supported unlimited state discretion in maintaining a separate system of education for the races.⁵

The greatest challenge to the practice of separate but equal education was initiated by the N.A.A.C.P.⁶ As a result of its efforts in the 1938 case *Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada* (305 U.S. 337, 59 S.Ct. 232), the U.S. Supreme Court reasserted its judicial authority in applying the Equal Protection Clause leading to relief at post secondary school institutions.

A change in the direction of the court with regard to the common school occurred in a 1943 case: *West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette* (319 U.S. 624). The court held that state actions taken against that which the Fourteenth Amendment protects include actions by a state board of education. Although *Barnette* dealt with student pledge of allegiance and flag salute as compelled by the state and was, therefore, not directly on point with regard to desegregation, the decision did

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imply that state actions can limit Fourteenth Amendment rights, but that individual students have rights that may not be violated by actions of the state. The court asserted that “free public education, if faithful to the idea of secular instruction and political neutrality, will not be partisan or enemy of any class, creed, party or faction⁷,” and that “the very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and official. . . .”⁸

Continuing its assault on separate but equal education, the N.A.A.C.P. litigated cases in 1952 that resulted in decisions affecting elementary and secondary school-age students. The most well-known and far-reaching of these cases is *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas*, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), also known as *Brown I*.⁹ This was the first case to address student rights in public education rather than student rights in relation to attendance at graduate or professional schools. In this class action suit, a decision was made that segregation on the basis of race, in spite of the equality of physical facilities and other tangible factors, deprives the children of the minority of equal educational opportunities and violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.¹⁰ Chief Justice Earl Warren, writing for the court, stated: “We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of separate but equal has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.”¹¹

The case *Bolling v. Sharpe*, 347 U.S. 294 (1954), which addressed segregation as it related to children in the schools in the District of Columbia, was a companion case to *Brown*. In *Bolling*, the Supreme Court extended the term “liberty,” as it is used in the Fifth Amendment, to the full range of conduct that the individual is free to pursue and that cannot be restricted except by a proper government objective. Segregation was not such a government objective.

In 1955, *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka* (349 U.S. 294) (*Brown II*) was heard by the Supreme Court as it addressed the question of relief, i.e., the remedy for and enforcement of that which would bring about the end of desegregating practices addressed in *Brown I*. Chief Justice Warren in speaking for the court declared that desegregation efforts were to be approached “with all deliberate speed.”¹² The court also held that school authorities have the primary responsibility for solving problems that may require such solutions as are necessary to fully implement constitutional principles, but added that the courts

themselves “will [then] have to consider whether or not the action of the school authorities constitutes good faith implementation of the governing constitutional principles.”¹³ Furthermore, the court defined problem areas that were to be considered in a transition to a “racially nondiscriminatory school system,”¹⁴ namely, administration, physical plant, school transportation, personnel, revision of school district attendance areas, and possible revision of local laws and regulations. The court also found that the court of original jurisdiction could appraise progress made in desegregation. This, in fact, is the historical basis for the continued involvement of District Courts in the ongoing processes of desegregation.

The main struggle to secure racially balanced schools occurred in two phases, if you will, and took place in the courts. Initially, however, most desegregation occurred as a result of parents’ desire for their children, or students themselves deciding, to attend a particular school which was segregated by policy or law. Therefore, the earliest, first-phase attention was focused on the de jure segregated schools with the later phase focusing on de facto segregated schools. At this point, a distinction should be made between de jure and de facto segregation. De jure segregation is that segregation imposed by law and/or by the intent of the state to segregate. Many cases, especially early ones, address de jure segregation no matter what the vehicle used to initially cause segregation, e.g., racial quotas, racial gerrymandering of attendance zones. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the court’s attention would turn to cases of de facto segregation, namely, situations in which there was an absence of intent to segregate but in which segregation did occur due to community demographic patterns or past action not intended to segregate. While de jure segregation is unconstitutional, de facto segregation would be held as not violative of the constitution. Such situations had to be scrutinized, however, to ensure that in fact there was lack of intent, and that an observer would not be able to look at a school and identify the race for which it was intended.

During the early years following *Brown*, the focus was on de jure segregated schools in Southern states and comprised cases challenging the notion that *Brown* merely prohibited segregated schools. Using this interpretation, Southern states could use a myriad of plans to avoid desegregation.¹⁵ The most blatant example occurred early in the 1960s in Prince Edward County, Virginia where the public schools were closed and private schools operated using state and county monies. This strategy, a freedom-of-choice plan, was a

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school policy whereby a student's parents could select the school that they wished their child to attend without regard to attendance zones.¹⁶ In *Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County*, 377 U.S. 218 (1964), the Supreme Court struck down Virginia's freedom-of-choice plan and ruled that the closing of public schools and the contribution of tax funds so that students might attend segregated private schools was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Another approach, one of "token" compliance, was practiced in many Southern communities whereby a few, compliant black students were admitted to all-white schools while the remaining black children were left in "their" schools. According to Henry Perkinson, "twelve years after the *Brown* decision, less than 10 percent of the Negro school children in the South attended schools with whites."¹⁷

In Northern states, residential patterns had created racially segregated schools. In time, black families began moving and enrolling their children in all-white schools. In these cases, a multitrack system of education was generally introduced that separated the children into groups according to their learning ability. This approach, in effect, separated the students along racial lines and proved to camouflage a highly segregated educational program.¹⁸

Although no one questioned that *Brown* prohibited the government from compelling segregation, a question did arise as to the necessity of government intervention to promote integration. As such, attention was focused on defining the concepts integration and segregation, especially in the Northern courts.¹⁹ What resulted was the view that the Constitution forbade segregation but did not require integration. At the same time, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth District "held that there was indeed an affirmative duty on the part of government to integrate the schools where de jure segregation had existed prior to *Brown*,"²⁰ with de facto segregation being distinguished from de jure segregation. Subsequently, a rule of law evolved that required affirmative action by Southern de jure states, but did not force Northern de facto states to act affirmatively to move children to assure integrated schooling.

The passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act "gave teeth to federal desegregation efforts by decreeing that federal monies would be withheld from institutions that discriminated according to race, religion, or ethnic origin."²¹ It was not until 1966, however, that the U.S. Office of Education attempted to apply pressure for

racially balanced schools by threatening to cut off federal funds earmarked for education under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.²² According to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, no federal funds could be disbursed to programs practicing illegal discrimination.

Meyer Weinberg stated that during the four years following the passage of the Civil Rights Act much more desegregation occurred than in the years following *Brown* and ending with the Civil Rights Act itself.²³ Increased desegregation resulted from unprecedented numbers of boycotts, sit-ins, demonstrations, and picketing in protest of segregated schools. At the same time, the courts dismissed the previous distinction between integration and segregation.

A landmark case was heard in 1968 by the Fourth Circuit and then by the Supreme Court. In *Green v. County School Board of New Kent County* (391 U.S. 430) the school board was maintaining two schools on opposite sides of a community in which there was no residential segregation. The Board had chosen to remain eligible for federal funds by adopting a freedom-of-choice plan in which all but first and eighth grade students could choose where they would attend school. Both the District Court and Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals approved this plan. During the first three years of the plan, however, no white student chose to attend the all-black school. Although some black students elected to attend the formerly all-white school, 85% of the black students within the district still attended the all-black school. The Supreme Court stated clearly that "the burden is on the school board to provide a plan that realistically promises to work NOW."²⁴ The court found the New Kent plan to be wanting and, therefore, unacceptable not only for failing to dismantle the dual system that existed, but also for placing the burden of desegregation on the parents and students.²⁵ Freedom of choice was not found unconstitutional but as it was used in New Kent County, it was not acceptable, and school officials had the duty to formulate a plan that would promptly change the situation.

In addition, the Supreme Court used the terms dual and unitary for the first time as characterizations of school systems according to their desegregation status, with the term unitary appearing more as decisions were handed down during the 1970s and 1980s. Furthermore, the court suggested that in the "transition to a unitary nonracial system of public education. . . . consideration had to be given to administration, condition of the school plant, and the school transportation system,"²⁶ all

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of which figure prominently in the development of desegregation plans in the 1960s and 1970s. The often quoted statement in desegregation cases -- to remove the "vestiges of segregation root and branch"-- is found in the Green case.

In 1970, the Supreme Court heard the landmark case *Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education* (402 U.S. 1). This case, which was appealed from the Fourth Circuit, was the offshoot of a case originally heard in 1965 and a motion for further relief filed in 1968 in the same case. The District Court (1969) had ordered the school board to provide plans for faculty and student desegregation, but the court found the board plan to be unsatisfactory and appointed an expert to develop a plan for the schools within the district. In February 1970, the expert presented a plan, and the court adopted the board's plan as modified for junior and senior high schools as well as the expert's plan for elementary schools. The Appeals Court Affirmed the District Court's decision in part, i.e., the faculty and secondary school plans, but vacated the elementary plan fearing it would place too much burden on the pupils and on the board. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reinstated the entire District Court order. The importance of the case lies not only in its reaffirmation of the fact that District Courts have broad powers to fashion remedies in desegregation cases²⁷, but also in the use of an expert for the development of desegregation plans.

In *Swann*, the court stated: "The constitutional command to desegregate schools does not mean that every school in every community must always reflect the racial composition of the school system as a whole."²⁸ This decision provides some flexibility to districts that have a high percentage of minority students and that must deal with geographic and demographic anomalies. Additionally, the court spoke to the issue of majority to minority transfers, an idea that would appear in many future cases as a possible interdistrict solution to segregation. An "optional majority to minority transfer provision has long been recognized as a useful part of every desegregation plan."²⁹ The court further noted that Title IV of the Civil Rights Act does not take power away from the federal courts to deal with issues of desegregation. Moreover, the court defined clearly those aspects of the school and school system that would need to be considered in the development of desegregation plans for the 1970s and beyond.

Aspects to be considered addressed policy and practice in regard to faculty, staff, transportation,

extracurricular activities, and facilities.³⁰ All aspects were cited as indices of a segregated system and, conversely, of a desegregated system. Having dealt with these indices, the administrative practices of a district were cited as important, and the court noted that administrative practices should produce schools of like quality, facilities, and staffs. To that end, the court asked that care be taken to ensure that future school construction did not perpetuate a dual system. An important component in this case was the holding by the court that "the constitution does not prohibit District Courts from using their equity power to order the assignment of teachers to achieve a particular degree of faculty desegregation."³¹

Finally, *Swann* defined the four areas to be considered relative to student assignment in desegregation cases: (1) racial quotas, but only as a starting point; (2) one-race schools, these may not be indicative of a system practicing segregation in or of itself; (3) attendance zones, the pairing and clustering of zones was considered permissible; and (4) transportation, so long as it does not risk the health of children or the educational process itself.³² The full impact of *Swann* was that it was no longer simply sufficient to eliminate segregation, but rather that desegregation had to be achieved to the greatest extent possible, using "every available device." The issues of segregation and desegregation then came to bear outside the South as well as throughout the South (as had usually been the case since 1954).

Simultaneous to hearing *Swann v. Charlotte Mecklenberg*, the court also heard *North Carolina State Board of Education v. Swann* (402 U.S. 43) in which the court held that North Carolina's anti busing law, which forbade assignment of any student on account of race, was invalid as it was construed to prevent the implementation of desegregation plans.³³ This, of course, further opened the door to the use of busing for the purposes of transporting students to implement approved desegregation plans.

The second phase of desegregation shifted attention from the de jure segregation of the South to the de facto segregation in other areas of the country. "In 1972, 46% of all black students in the South attended schools where white students were in the majority, as compared to only 28% in the North and the West."³⁴ The turning point came in *Keyes v. School District No.1*, 413 U.S. 189, 93 S. Ct. 2686 (1973), in which the Court ruled that the de facto segregation of the Denver Schools was the result of intentional public policy and, therefore, in violation

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of Brown. Denver was mandated to racially balance its schools, even if balancing required busing. Following this case, other cities, either due to court order or voluntarily, adopted school desegregation plans.

Frequently in the 1970s, the courts began to consider any allowance of so-called freedom of choice to be a cause of defacto segregation. In fact, in the Green case, the court had made the point that “freedom of choice is not an end in itself in desegregation school districts.”³⁵ Freedom of choice was not seen as an acceptable or sufficient step in the transition to unitary status, i.e., release from the aegis of the court with the establishment of the fact that the district is not engaged in or tacitly approving segregative activities or policy and that absent any actions of the school district as represented by the board of education, de facto segregation will not lend itself to a re-intervention of court monitoring.

The state, as represented by the school board, must provide a remedy or remedies to address segregative activities and effects. Such remedy must be affirmative and positive and may include many forms of address including but not limited to busing and quotas; however, quotas may not be used as a single approach to desegregation. In the Swann Case, the court noted that in addition to busing, districts could close schools, build new schools, reassign students, reconfigure grade assignments, and racially mix faculties. These were but a few of the suggested and allowable approaches to desegregation. The 1971 *Davis v. Board of Commissioners of Mobile County* (402 U.S. 33) supported and clarified the issues in Swann.

Wright v. City Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972), was yet another national case that portended the end of freedom of choice. The court added to the equation for desegregation, in addition to the established standard of pairing and changing student assignments and attendance zones, that consideration of motives was not sufficient. In fact, the effects of actions taken would have to receive major consideration. The Denver case, *Keyes v. School District No.1*, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), addressed the issue, not unlike that raised in Brown I, of the quality of facilities of inner city schools and called for these facilities to be comparable to those found in predominantly white suburban areas. This decision addressed itself not only to the plight of predominantly African-American schools but also to that of Hispanic students in inner city schools. Furthermore, the decision placed the burden on the school district and its officials to prove that their actions were not motivated by

segregative intent. In fact, the court “observed that community and administrative attitudes must be taken into consideration.”³⁶

Other defining cases followed, each moving farther and farther from the use of “freedom of choice.” Within American society throughout the 1970s and into the early 1980s too, minorities and many white Americans continued to call for busing and mixing of the races by assignment. Charles Willie and Michael Alves from Harvard University began to suggest that the only choice school district patrons have in the schools which their children could attend should be one of controlled choice. The control had to rest with the school district officials who would attempt to but who could not guarantee the assignment of children, even if parents wished to send their children to neighborhood schools. Districts such as Cambridge, Massachusetts adopted controlled choice as an alternative to freedom of choice which allowed some choice and which guaranteed desegregative assignments for students. Although the concept of controlled choice did not make its way through the court system for consideration, it was approved in court orders in several districts including Cambridge, Little Rock, and San Francisco.

State-created district lines were recognized in litigation as potential creators of problems in attempts to desegregate. This was typified by the creation of a special school district by the Arkansas legislature and led to the eventual creation of a 70% minority district in a city which was 30% minority by encasing the city in a ring of county district not contiguous with the city boundaries. Little Rock could not “grow” the district as the city grew and, therefore, the financial base of the district eroded with the growth of the city. In the sixth circuit, the *Newburg Area Council v. Board of Education of Jefferson County, Kentucky* (95 S. Ct. 1758, 1974), a similar situation occurred. In a city bounded by a river and marsh land on two sides, growth could only occur in two directions. One of those directions was into the county school district, the other was back into the center city. The city was Louisville, Kentucky. In this case, the courts ordered that the state-created, school-district lines should and could be disregarded in order to ensure desegregation of the Louisville schools.

The Midwest was not immune from such legal decisions. *Milliken I*, a Detroit case (418 U.S. 717, 1974), focused on racial segregation in a city school district as well as on three other districts within the metropolitan Detroit area. Calling the existing district

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lines realities of political convenience, the court endorsed a metropolitan plan in which students would cross those lines in order to implement desegregation. The court did note, however, that local citizens should have the opportunity to participate in decisions with regard to how this would be accomplished in order to meet local educational needs.³⁷ In a similar case relative to a California school district, *Pasadena City Board v. Spangler* (427 U.S. 424, 1975), the Supreme Court held that a district court could not require annual adjustments of attendance zones, however. In a second incarnation of the Spangler case, not heard by the Supreme Court, an Appeals Court clearly stated that “the adoption of a neighborhood plan was not necessarily synonymous with an intent to discriminate.”³⁸ (This statement was not particularly noted as significant at the time of the decision. It has taken on major import in recent years, however, as the philosophical position of the courts has modified.)

1977 brought another rendition of the Milliken case, *Milliken II*.³⁹ The contribution of the courts in this case was the addition of educational components required in school assignment plans. Not only were educational activities required, but also the State of Michigan was directed to pay for the costs of these educational components at least in part. Those mandated programs were remedial or compensatory education programs for children who had been negatively impacted by the existence of or vestiges of segregation.⁴⁰ The idea was that since the state had at least partial responsibility for prior segregative activities, the state had at least partial responsibility for bearing the costs of remediating such practices. Under this and other circuit cases such as *Evans v. Buchanan* (582 F2d. 750, 3rd Cir., 1978), instructional materials must be free of racial bias. Further, human relations programs and staff development should be part of this effort, and the state may bear at least part of these costs.

The definition of unitary status clearly emerged from the combined cases of *Swann*, *Brown II*, *Milliken*, and others. The components of a unitary system were identified by the courts as the:

- elimination of a discriminatory system,
- resolution of all constitutional violations peculiar to the district,
- revision of district policies to prevent recurrence of these violations, and
- restoration of student status to that, which it would have been, absent segregative activities.

Once these parameters were clearly defined, the goal of most school boards presiding over school districts that had been touched by law suits became the achievement of unitary status. Throughout the 1980s, however, desegregation issues continued to arise in virtually every circuit. The remedies in some cases such as *Morgan v. McDonough*, a Boston case, became receivership for the school district. In the *U.S. v. Board of School Commissioners of the City of Indianapolis, Indiana*, 632 F2d. 1101 (1980), the court found the state to be at least partially culpable and ordered interdistrict remedies such as magnet schools and interdistrict transfers as the solution to segregation. In *Oliver v. Kalamazoo*, 640 F2d. 782 (1980), the state was ordered to pay the salaries of the staff of court appointed desegregation experts who would oversee implementation of remedies ordered by the court.

It seemed that with greater frequency during the 1970s and 1980s, the courts were taking the issue of desegregation out of the hands of citizens and their elected school boards via ordering rather than suggesting remedies, appointing “outsiders” or experts to oversee desegregation, or redefining the geographical boundaries or areas and populations which would figure into the creation of remedies to segregation. In 1983, two cases arose in New York state: *Arthur v. Nyquist*, 712 F2d. 809, and *Arthur v. Nyquist and Buffalo Teachers Federation*, 712 F2d. 816. In these cases, it was made clear that the court would monitor the expenditure or dollars ordered paid by the state as a partial remedy in order to ensure the appropriate expenditure of that money to address issues of desegregation--not to enhance the district.⁴¹ In its decision in the teacher federation case, the court allowed a plan that RIFFED or transferred teachers who had no role in past segregative activity was nonetheless valid. (New hiring practices had caused some teachers to be laid off or transferred in order to facilitate district efforts to racially balance staff within the schools.)

During the second half of the decade of the 1980s, the courts went even further and began to hold cities responsible for remediating segregative practices within their jurisdictions. One such case was *U.S. v. Yonkers Board of Education*, 624 F2d 1276 (1985). In this case, residential patterns had contributed to the problem of segregation. The city was joined in the case as having responsibility for this by virtue of past practice relative to housing subsidies within the municipality. However, even as the court seemed to be extending the area with regard to responsibility and remediation in segregation cases, in the *Yonkers* case, an inkling of a change in

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direction is noted. In the opinion, the court noted that the mere existence of racially segregated schools does not constitute a federal constitutional or statutory violation. Consequently, school districts that had no prior history of de jure segregation were not required to abandon neighborhood student assignment policy.⁴²

On the heels of this decision, petitions were filed in various courts asking for unitary status. In other cases, suits were filed and unitary status was found even though, on the face of it, the district appeared to be causing de jure segregation in its policies and activities. In *Whittenberg v. School District of Greenville County*, 607 F. Supp. 289 (1985), the district court found that a unitary system was being operated by the school board in spite of the fact that there were population variances based on race from school to school and grade to grade. In essence, the court found that the district had made efforts to maintain a racial balance and had written policies prohibiting discrimination based on race. In its opinion, the court noted that decisions with regard to conversions, closings, and openings of schools rested primarily with the district. In other words, the court chose not to intervene.⁴³

In 1986, the court in the Fourth Circuit went even further in this direction. In *Riddick v. School District of the City of Norfolk* (784 F2d. 521), the student assignment plan of the district, previously declared unitary, was challenged by black students. The court maintained the unitary status and noted that the school board could legitimately consider the presence of “white flight” in pursuing a voluntary plan to stabilize school integration, absent proof of a discriminatory intent. This decision had a sense of freedom of choice about it. The language of the court was that “although white flight cannot be the reason for failure to dismantle a dual school system, it can be considered in

devising a voluntary plan to improve racial balance of the schools.”⁴⁴ Subsequently, several other districts have gained unitary status. Among them are DeKalb County (Georgia) and Dallas (Texas). In the latter case, Judge “Barefoot” Sanders kept the district on probation for three years before providing full unitary status. Still, there is racial strife within the districts and in the case of Dallas, within the membership of the school board.

As more and more districts are released from court jurisdiction, there is a return in many of those districts to the concept of neighborhood schools and freedom of choice. Courts do not seem to be intervening in these cases. It is clear, however, that issues relative to desegregation continue to exist even in the face of significant changes in the philosophy of the courts away from freedom of choice and back toward it between the years 1974 and 1997.

Some researchers, such as Gary Orfield of Harvard University, are alleging that the change in the courts philosophical position to a return to allowing freedom of choice in districts that have achieved unitary status is evidence “that the nation is headed backwards toward greater segregation of black students, particularly in the states with a history of de jure segregation.”⁴⁵ Simultaneously, there is an increasing call from black leaders for schools that are not only all black but also, in some cases, single sex schools. Additionally, both black and white parents are tending to agree with the court that like freedom or choice, busing and other remedies have not managed to completely dismantle the old dual system even though both black and white parents may tend to favor integration.

“In 1997, the challenge (for citizens, and undoubtedly for the legal system including the courts), is to understand the present situation as it has arrived from the past and to chart a new path to a stable public school system.”⁴⁶ In an effort to do that, the courts and seemingly the public have come virtually full circle in terms of methodology for accomplishing the goal. Happily, however, there is an abiding conviction of the importance of integration and desegregation innate to society as a result of more than forty years of litigation and self-examination by our public school systems.

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Emerging Thought on the Preparation of Educational Leaders

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Just when a body thought he had the Ol' Miss mastered, why that old river, she'd shift and the Pilot he'd have to start learnin it all over again.

Mark Twain

Warren Bennis once commented that "Leadership is like beauty. It is hard to define, but you know it when you see it." This statement strikes at the heart of the leadership/administration dichotomy and to the dilemma that those of us who prepare leaders in an era of changing cultural norms. Even though "leadership" has been around in one form or another since the dawn of man, we know that as a field of study, "leadership" didn't appear in the literature on school administration until well after the turn of the century (English, 1994)

The most frequent targets of educational reformers has always been our system of public schools, but the implications for higher education are ever more important since we are charged with preparing young men and women for visionary, moral, and transformational leadership. One has only to listen to this "Tower of Babylon" to realize that there is very little consensus among reformers and critics about how this is to be done. This shifting consensus creates a formidable task, especially since not even all academics agree.

I was thrown into reviewing leadership preparation programs while serving on an NCATE steering committee shortly after joining a research university. Not having much experience with this process, I naively assumed I'd learn a great deal, and I did, just enough to know what I didn't know, and just enough to remain intrigued as I've attempted to reconcile a concept as old as man; *leadership*, with a relatively new discipline, *school administration*. My original goal was to develop a relatively seamless masters-specialist-doctoral program combining the best of the traditional knowledge base with a contemporary competency-based program that would prepare 21st century practitioners and still allow flexibility for state certification standards. What I've discovered, instead, is the analogy commonly used when speaking of public school restructuring. Trying to rebuild a Boeing 707 while it's in flight. (I

wish I could remember who said that) Perhaps a reader can enlighten me.

The past decades have taught both academics and practitioners, new theories concerning child development, learning theory, classroom management, effective leadership, how to motivate self-discipline. And added to all this we have one of the most powerful tools ever developed for education: technology. Nationally, we have substantial numbers of effective schools and numerous effective programs to observe, modify and emulate. Frankly, I'm proud of walking down the aisle at commencement and hooding my Doctoral candidates. They are bright, dedicated, hard-working men and women who leave our programs determined to make a positive difference in the lives of teachers and children. Many of them will be responsible for some of the educational beacons lighting the way for others. But they seem so few, and they must wrestle with educational systems that are conservative at best.

Why this discrepancy between what skills graduates leave us with and what they practice. Certainly not all of them, but enough to make one wonder if we are failing to prepare them adequately. Or, is it their inability to apply what they have learned, and whose responsibility is that? What is our role in administrator preparation programs? Have the requirements of scientific objectivity or replicability delayed the adoption of innovative models and delivery systems, or are the schools resisting their implementation? Or, perhaps, is it "all of the above?" Intriguing questions.

Educational administration began as an offspring of scientific management and its early adherents were imbued with the doctrine of efficiency, leading to what English (1994) calls "scientism." Later came the behaviorists, then the organizational sociologists, neither of which seemed to provide the predictive power to solve the myriad problems facing 21st century

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America. English and others believe that too many administrators see themselves as continuing the legacy of efficiency through systems theory. Over the course of the twentieth century, our understanding of leadership has changed rather dramatically since what leaders do is determined, in large part, by the nature of the organizations in which they work. And, as systems theory suggests, those organizations are influenced by and, in turn, influence the greater culture of which they are a part. Two hundred years of immigration, freedom of mobility, our unique political system, and our sheer geographic size have resulted in a diversity of cultural values unmatched few places in the world. That diversity, coupled with our absolute commitment to compulsory education, and a constitution that leaves education to the fifty states, poses an enormous challenge to local educational leaders: our graduate students.

The national movement toward devolution and decentralization as evidenced by continuing calls for more local control and site based management can best be described as an attempt to democratize some of our most conservative institutions, something anticipated by the French statesman, Alex DeToquerville in the 1700's. Since the "garden" model of education waned in the 19th century, the decades of the 20th century have seen school equated with the factory model due in part to the unique heritage of the industrial revolution. World Wars I, II, the Korean War, and, of course, the race to the moon, All conspired to mold schools in images of productivity as measured by the number of widgets rolling of the assembly line. Even today, many custodians have a check-sheet for the number of minutes it should take to clean the black boards, sanitize a bathroom, or mop a floor.

Yet an interesting zephyr new wind is whispering across the land. Management guru, Tom Peters has been admonishing corporate CEO's since the 60's to "listen to their customers" and "celebrate their employees," while political candidates in both parties speak of "dismantling big government" and shifting power to the states. In works spanning the 70's, 80's and 90's futurists Alvin and Heidi Toffler (1995) have carefully documented the transition first to an information, and then to a "symbolic society" where information is the ultimate currency. They credit the demise of the Soviet Union to the collapse of an authoritarian regime that could no longer control the information fed its populace. Will we, as educators, take advantage of this information paradigm shift? That remains to be seen. One critic, John Goodlad claims that the culture of education

has changed very little:

Teachers talk at pupils; students work on written assignments or answer specific narrow questions; there is very little feedback or guidance from the teachers; students work with textbooks and complete written homework assignments; and students are judged by how well they perform on paper and pencil tests. (1984)

Admittedly, Dr. Goodlad's comments are 14 years old, but he has been a student of education for many decades.

Historically, leadership has been seen to be based on power (Etzioni, 1961). Early leadership studies addressed leadership traits (Stodgill, 1948). Later, contingency and situational models (Hersey & Blanchard, 1982) looked at differences between effective and less effective leaders. Sergiovanni, (1991) argues that leadership style is driven by individual mindscapes, or by mediation abilities (Gregorc, 1981). From the wealth of literature in the field, one might conclude that leadership is structurally and behaviorally based (Likert, 1961), or one could subscribe to the emerging view that cultural or moral leadership must be the central focus of administrators (Cunningham, 1993), and that truly effective leaders are visionaries (Bennis, 1989). Sergiovanni (1992) suggests that the practice of followership provides the basis for leadership and that leaders play a vital stewardship role. Hodgkinson (1991) suggests that we re-center leadership in the humanities, while English (1994) insists that we look outside the confines of behaviorism-structuralism to moral leadership, and use literature and history to define it.

Leadership then, is a slippery subject in which questions come easier than answers. Given that students of educational administration are coming to believe, as English has stated, that "leadership without morality is simply bureaucratic technique," leadership seems a vital component of educational administration, and it certainly seems appropriate to ask: *What is the "fit" between leadership and administration, and what is our mission in their preparation?* This may not be as difficult as it sounds. Organizations like the Danforth Foundation, the American Educational Research Association, the University Council on Educational Administration, the National Council on Teacher Accreditation, and the National Policy Board for Educational Administration, as well as the national associations of elementary and secondary principals have contributed greatly to the knowledge base in educational leadership and have established a loose

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framework for determining the extent of administrator preparation reform in what McDaniel, (1996) terms the **political, professorial, and curricular** arenas.

Readers are encouraged to read additional appropriate administrator preparation in his and other books. (1996). In the interests of brevity, I'll focus primarily on curriculum and the indicators of curricular appropriateness: (1) *application to practice*, (2) *relevancy of content*, (3) *student experiences*, and (4) *professor/student interactions*. Some **specific curricular elements** relating to these indicators might include:

1. Replacing the dissertation with a structured field-based inquiry component that allows students to demonstrate their ability to arrive at and implement solutions appropriate for their work setting. (Pounder, 1993)
2. Restructuring the "internship" component with a field experience that corresponds with the student's research project (Chance, 1990)
3. Replacing individual courses that focus on administrative tasks with a set of core learning experiences designed to establish foundational knowledge, and learning and leadership skills. (Daresh, 1994)
4. Establishing outcomes that immerse students in investigations of cultural change (Barbour, 1994)
5. Establishing a data collection systems that elicits feedback from students and graduates about field experiences, and build this feedback into course planning and program design. (NCATE Guidelines, 1993)
6. Developing cooperative agreements with school districts for administrators to be away from their jobs long enough to conduct action research on-site. (Furtwengler et al, 1994)
7. Sharing the responsibility for creating course expectations with students (Harris and Graham, 1994)
8. Creating classroom environments that establish new norms of shared inquiry and collegiality (English, 1994)
9. Ensuring that students are **actively engaged** in the learning process through case study or role-playing methodologies (Merseth, 1997)
10. Actively seeking out a variety of **work-related learning experiences** to supplement and enhance classroom activities.

Because of space constraints, I would encourage the reader to study the **professorial** and **political** arenas as well as the ten suggestions we listed here. Dr. McDaniel's work is an excellent source of information as are numerous other texts contained in the reading list.

Looking at these elements in the context of public school reform has become almost axiomatic. Who can disagree, for instance, with the statement that students should be "actively engaged?" Yet, observers of public education often agree with Goodlad that schools haven't changed much. Teachers still talk, and students listen. Even graduate leadership faculty (who ought to know better) all too often revert to "professing" instead of modeling the desired teaching behavior, leaving our students with the message to "do as we say, not as we do." Again, the discrepancy between what we know, and what we do rears its ugly head. This may be what Goodlad was warning us about this when he commented, "*If there is one truism in education, it is that teachers teach as they were taught.*"

Some of these elements may cut against the grain of established programs, but some exciting trends are occurring in Georgia, Missouri, North Carolina, Texas, Ohio, and other states. Increasingly, regional institutions, are incrementally moving this direction. One promising model involves cooperating institutions coordinating services placed closer to the student's place of employment, and in fact, uses the students employment environment as a laboratory for learning. This can be a win-win scenario for the student, the university, and the school district. Another model involves the use of technology to overcome distance and lack of research facilities. Still another takes the classroom out of the institution to the student's work environment. Interactive instructional television or "distance education" is becoming commonplace as communication costs come down, and knowledge bases are proliferating on the internet. State departments of education, school districts, universities, professional organizations, and academic databases are increasingly making new electronic services available. The lack of a comprehensive research university library is not the handicap it was only a few years ago.

Even more exciting are programs that are using combinations of these efforts. In South Georgia, just 12 miles north of the Florida Border resides Valdosta State University, one of two regional Universities in the state. VSU encompasses 41 counties stretching from Camden county on the state's Eastern Seaboard through the

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Okefenokee Swamp in Ware county to the Chatahoochee River bordering Alabama on the west. Many of these 41 counties are rural by any definition. F. D. Toth is the Dean of the College of Education at VSU and has a vision for graduate programs including the doctoral degree in communities within a 90-mile radius of the University. He has developed a program that will meet the needs of the Kings Bay Submariners who spend half their time at sea. He has made possible the integration of a school improvement program at Ware County High School at the gateway to the Okeefenokee swamp with a graduate degree program that meet the needs of the entire faculty. At last count, 48 teachers had been admitted to graduate degree programs on campus. He and other administrators now have their sights set on a doctoral program stretching from the campus to the Alabama border. Dean Toth and the other administrators at VSU realize that a combination of outreach with state of the art technology is rapidly breaking down the barriers once reserved only for those who could afford four or five years of full-time study. They have recognized a lesson learned by business as well. Universities cannot afford to set back and wait for students to come to them. That may have been possible a decade ago, but with the widespread advent of cheap technology and the opening up of the world wide web, a whole new realm of opportunities confront us as we approach the

millenium.

For both startup and established programs these ten elements, as well as those for the political and professorial realms, are a starting point for institutional reflection and ensuing dialogue with our stakeholders which, in itself, is a healthy exercise. Periodic self-examination and critical reflection on the issues that drive the program mission are essential, and can lead established programs to incremental if not wholesale change. Such dialogue, if done rigorously and in good faith, will eventually result in a more client centered program. While maintaining the rigor, we will always want in administrator preparation programs.

In summary, we've looked at leadership in the most microcosmic of contexts: that of educational leadership. We may also want to take heed of English's (1994) invitation to study the biographies and writings of Moses, Constantine, Disraeli, Ghengis Khan, Hannibal, Joan de Arc, James Madison, Patton, Roosevelt, Sister Teresa, Martin Luther, and Martin Luther King, literally hundreds of heroes, villains, and disparate leaders who lead millions in the context of their times. Who knows what light might be thrown on this eternally illusive subject?

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**TOWARD AN ETHICS OF COMMUNICATION:
THE IMPORTANCE OF ETHICAL DIALOGUE IN EDUCATIONAL SETTINGS**

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Introduction

In *The Crucible*, Arthur Miller describes scenes during seventeenth-century Salem witch trials where fear and superstition and closed-mindedness and manipulation resulted in hysterical accusations against people, their incarceration and conviction, and, in some cases, their lynching. In the process, the silencing of accused persons was almost automatic as well as literal. Since the play was written during the early 1950s when Joseph McCarthy was cultivating suspicion of nearly anyone who was liberally inclined in social, economic, or political matters, it was not unexpected that people have seen similarities between the times of Joseph McCarthy and Abigail Williams.

The overall circumstances of Salem and Washington, of course, differed radically, but the brutality of ideological intolerance, false accusation, and assumed guilt is similar. Another striking parallel is that both periods were characterized by the inability of many people to communicate openly and freely, not to mention fully. The Abigails of those times-and of our own-only had to make two basic claims to silence many of the accused, their friends, potential defenders, and other interested parties. To begin with, there was the need of the accuser to identify with good. Abigail Williams explicitly identified the good she accepted as well as the evil she shunned by asserting:

I want the light of God, I want the sweet love of Jesus! I danced for the Devil; I saw him; I wrote in his book; I go back to Jesus; I kiss his hand.
(Miller, 1959, p. 45)

Going further, Abigail moved beyond her forgiveness and solidarity with Jesus to power over others. She claimed that she had a knowledge that others lacked and implied that her claims were not open to public scrutiny: she had seen the spirits of Sarah Good,

Goody Osburn, and Bridget Bishop with the Devil. She knew that they were committed to the Devil, were witches, and deserved death. She influenced like-minded people to make additional uncontested claims against Goody Sibber, Alice Barrow, Goody Hawkins, Goody Bibber, Goody Booth, and others (Miller, 1959, pp. 45-46). The accused stood largely helpless and apparently guilty even as their numbers continued to grow. They were silenced literally and figuratively as a mob mentality and a dictatorial atmosphere dominated attempts to discuss the charges against them.

Today, as Vogt (1997) notes, society has changed in many positive ways, but it is still plagued by intolerances that threaten to unravel society and schools. Issues concerning equity, funding, ethnicity, religion, gender, free speech, and justice are mixed with problems regarding personal aspirations, political ambitions, professional wounds, personnel decisions, and economic advantages. Questions are conflated and commingled in ways that are difficult to untangle, much less discuss in an educative manner. When someone claims in oblique or obvious ways the equivalent of the following,

I want the light of God, I want the sweet love of Jesus! I danced for the Devil; I saw him; I wrote in his book; I go back to Jesus; I kiss his hand. [And adds] "I saw Sarah Good with the Devil" (Miller, 1959, p. 45),

The chances for creating an educative atmosphere are greatly diminished if not lost. If a culture or subculture of absolute good versus one of absolute evil develops in a school, district, city, or community, the possibility of having reflective discussions in classrooms, staffrooms, and boardrooms becomes greatly impeded if not destroyed. Lest we forget, we should remind ourselves that there are people of diverse

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political and pedagogical viewpoints who want to silence others, for they do not want open, educative discussions of their views. Unhappily, their overwhelming antipathy for perceived and real evils influences them to set aside fundamental democratic and educational values.

While there are many ways of addressing challenges in this realm, the one taken in this essay is to encourage educators to give more attention to nurturing and sustaining atmospheres that are characterized by genuine communication. That is to say, the focus of this study is upon developing a rationale for and examining ways of cultivating a free and reflective examination of ideas that occur in settings that fall within the broad general sphere of public schooling. This work is a modest step in the direction of encouraging the development of greater understanding in the ethics of communication in educational settings.

Speaking ethically in educational environments, of course, is a difficult endeavor, but, fortunately, we are not in an intellectual vacuum. A rich history of thought related to democratic values, interpersonal relationships, and social interactions exists. Exploration of some aspects of this intellectual heritage is valuable from several perspectives, including that of laying a philosophical foundation for interpreting later practical suggestions. We turn now to an explicit identification of a general philosophical, democratic, and professional orientation that undergirds our beliefs. While these categories overlap, they are distinguished for the sake of convenience and, to a degree, clarity.

Philosophical Orientation

We begin by examining the intellectual substructure or philosophical framework that supports our view of communicating in ethically defensible ways. In pursuing this aim, we examine the connection John Dewey saw in ideas like communication, commonalities, community, and democracy. We attempt to show how our concept of a school community is not only characterized by learning, but that it is also identified by democracy, dialogue, and commonalities. Hence, we propose that school environments be democratic communities in order to support open communication and educative experiences. We think democracy not only suggests something vital about the nature of the school community, but that it also provides the ethical webbing that helps hold it together.

Conceptual Associations

Dewey (DE, 82) believed that there is a strong

connection between the word community and the terms *communication* and *common*. He thought a desirable or moral community is characterized by both communication and commonalities-- communication making possible many commonalities and commonalities emerging in large part because of communication. When there is little or no communication and few or no commonalities among people, Dewey considered it pointless to talk about people constituting a meaningful community.

Authentic Commonalities

The commonalities, Dewey (DE, 4-5) believed, that contribute to a group's becoming a community include a set of warranted beliefs, ends, aims, and understandings that are communicated to and affirmed by the young and adults as they interact in multiple settings. These common elements provide a minimal but freely and genuinely accepted like-mindedness in a community. These common components, by themselves, do not make a community. Only as the activities of the people in the group are consciously shaped by this set of beliefs and understandings does the group become a community. In time, Dewey thought that a community would and should change some beliefs as its understanding grew and its knowledge was refined.

Here it is easy to see how ideas of community and commonalities provide a conceptual lattice for educational renewal: a network of voluntarily and commonly agreed upon beliefs and understandings are important to a desirable community and provide a unity that energizes change. Consequently, any number of values might constitute part of a learning community's commonalities and help form the purpose of educating students in morally defensible and educationally productive ways.

To the degree that a cluster of educators develops common understandings and concerns and works to achieve aims that emerge from them, they constitute a community according to Dewey. When these understandings and values are a part of teacher and student cultures, they stimulate growth and direction, partially enabling a school to become a better educative community. When common beliefs and values are missing, there is insufficient grounds to think of a collection of teachers as a community and a school as a community of inquirers. Moreover, there appears to be inadequate reason for believing that when these elements are missing schooling will be focused and educative. Thus, the importance of a school using ethical and educative ways of encouraging teachers and

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other staff members to come freely to share a set of common understandings and beliefs is readily seen. In the context of a single school, the challenge to identify commonalities, to communicate clearly and openly about them, and to develop community is almost overwhelming at times. When parents and politicians are brought into the mix, the challenge becomes even greater and less certain. Consequently, school board meetings and, to a lesser degree, staff meetings can become battle grounds that lead nowhere or worse they divide people and destroy the fragile community that exists. Even so, we seem well-advised to cultivate community through encouraging people to communicate with one another.

Regular Communication

A question arises about how a group develops a common set of beliefs that consciously guide their activities. How does a group of people, teachers or parents, develop commonalities? Apart from the intrinsically human commonalities Dewey thought he saw, his short answer to this question is conveyed by the concept communication. As people communicate their ideas to one another, they come to understand the perspectives of their playmates, neighbors, friends, peers, colleagues, and acquaintances. As communication occurs on a regular basis, the grounds-or lack thereof-people have for specific values and beliefs also become more apparent. A common understanding of what others really think and why they think such may, therefore, be among the more important commonalities of a community or an emerging one. Differences of opinion as well as overlapping values and common understandings and needs become visible. This visibility of beliefs and interests enables greater comprehension and, ideally, appreciation of one another. Discussions of differences may lead to greater understanding, tolerance, and, sometimes, appreciation of diversity. A set of common attachments, so Dewey believed, grow among people living in a democratic society as they continue to communicate with one another. One of the attachments he envisioned was an interest in considering reasons, arguments, and data for assumptions and opinions. Routine communication, while essential, is not sufficient to ensure community. Communication may occur in only an honorific sense and may therefore divide people rather than bring them together around common values and practices. If communication is not greatly valued, nothing much may be learned, shared, or constructed. If communication is truly valued, priority needs to be given to establishing environments that allow people to learn from one

another. Sufficient time and adequate conditions must be provided for teachers, parents, central office personnel, and others to talk. If the conditions and time are not provided for genuine communication, then it is difficult to think that many pluralistic communities will work seriously toward a common good (Myers & Simpson, 1998, 43ff).

Diverse Communities

Dewey observed that growth toward commonalities and community occurs in pluralistic and diverse cultures if people live in a democratic society that values openness, reasoned inquiry, and equity. As far as he was concerned, a school or community distinguished by diversity supplies a great opportunity for people of different backgrounds both to avoid the confining elements of her or his own conventions and environment and to help others develop and avoid the limiting elements of their settings. "Intermingling" with others of diverse backgrounds is pedagogically valuable, he asserted (DE, 20-21).

Several of Dewey's ideas merit further attention. He (DE, 5) believed that the informal social interactions and the formal educational experiences of people play important roles in bringing about communication. This communication is educative in a twofold sense: the communicator and the listener share experiences that broaden their understanding, and students and teachers of diverse backgrounds help each other grow educationally. In one sense, then, Dewey seems to have seen diversity as a *commonality* of a healthy, thinking, and growing community, including a school.

For Dewey, then, differences of any kind are not necessarily considered a hindrance to developing commonalities and building community. To the contrary, diversity is an advantage, a prized commonality. Variances are valued, in part, because they are ways of developing understanding and escaping the confining features of our cultures. The expanded intelligence that flows from interaction constitutes a commonality, a means to other commonalities, and an agency to reach beyond other boundaries. Educative diversity, of course, is applicable to teachers as well as to students. Every educator's previous experiences are in some fashion both limiting and emancipating. When educators dialogue with others, they, like their students, can mature beyond their previous experiences and learn to value a more common pedagogical ground with their colleagues and students.

General Commonalities

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In society, Dewey (DE, 199, 215) found commonalities in considerations that some may consider mundane, even trivial, e.g., the need for housing, food, clothing, and furniture and the values associated with working and making a living. Of course, Dewey maintained, people will not find out how important these commonalities are to others if they do not communicate—if they do not discuss their interests as they relate to working, living, and buying basic material needs. Nor will they discover other related commonalities and develop even more commonalities as they live and grow together if they do not communicate.

Given this perspective, Dewey (DE, 84) thought that there should be no separation of peoples but, rather, a free and balanced conversation between those of different backgrounds so that there could be a rapid diffusion of social interests among groups. He was, we might say, opposed to dialogic apartheid. Everyone should be able to learn from and share with others what they believe and know. Dewey's list of commonalities, view of community, and concept of learning also partially explains why he (SSCC, 13-22, 194 ff) encouraged a study of manual training, weaving, sewing, cooking as well as of arithmetic, science, geography, music, history, and art in the elementary school. Revealingly, he (SSCC, 14-15; italics added) pushed this thought about general society and general commonalities further and observed that a society or community is,

. . . a number of people held together because they are working along common lines, in a common spirit, and with reference to common aims. The common needs and aims demand a growing interchange of thought and *growing* unity of sympathetic feeling. The radical reason that the present school cannot organize itself as a natural social unit is because just this element of common and productive activity is absent.

This statement reflects Dewey's interest in commonalities of "lines, spirit, needs, and aims." Likewise, he tied these commonalities to two requirements: a *growing* dialogue about personal and group thinking and a *growing* unity of appreciative and supportive feelings. He believed that the schools of his time lacked commonalities and productive activity when they lacked community and vice versa. They were incapable of genuine education, in part, because they lacked the means--commonalities and activities stemming from them--for such.

Desirable Communities

Dewey clearly thought some kinds of commonalities and communities and schools were more defensible and better than others. He drew this conclusion in part because of two ideas that help shape our philosophy: a desirable community is both an epistemological and a moral one (Simpson & Jackson, 1997, 79). For Dewey, a learning community is characterized by coming to a better understanding of matters as a result of the collective knowledge of the group. Together teachers and students constitute a community of inquirers. This community of inquirers comes to understand that some ideas, values, and beliefs are better warranted than others while complete closure on and final learning about a subject never occurs. From this perspective, each class and school is or should be like a broadly understood vigorous community of scientists: always learning about, adding to, and subtracting from what they claim to understand or know.

In addition, Dewey believed that a learning community is a moral one because it is founded upon the moral ideals embedded in educative experiences and democratic living. Such ideals include qualities of mind such as "open-mindedness, single-mindedness, sincerity, breadth of outlook, thoroughness, assumption of responsibility for developing the consequences of ideas which are accepted" (DE, 356). This moral dimension was apparent to Dewey (1909/1975, 2), for he said:

The business of the educator--whether parent or teacher--is to see to it that the greatest possible number of ideas acquired by children and youth are acquired in such a vital way that they become moving ideas, motive-forces in the guidance of conduct. This demand and this opportunity make the moral purpose universal and dominant in all instruction--whatsoever the topic.

In Dewey's community, then, we can see--even if we find the challenge greater today--why he concluded that there will emerge a "common mind," "common intent," and "common understanding" (DE, 30). The importance of these commonalities should be neither overestimated nor underestimated. Commonalities are critical to community, and community is critical to values and the pursuit of knowledge. Conversely, aiming for a common mind, intent, and understanding--as well as the common lines, needs, aims, and spirit noted earlier--can be misconstrued. Dewey did not mean that if someone thinks and acts differently, we should necessarily seek to change his or her mind or

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behavior. Nor did he intend that we should seek to force or manipulate individuals into accepting those understandings and behaviors that most community members embrace. Community is not enhanced by coercion or conformity. Thus, it cannot demand uniformity of values, thought, or practice.

Democratic Communities

Collectively the aforementioned interests reveal that Dewey was ultimately talking about the characteristics of democratic communities whether in general society or in schools. The cumulative effect of these ideas, then, is a democratic community and, consequently, an environment that militates against forcing, or even seeking, unanimity of thought and behavior. Given his overall philosophy, it is probably best to interpret Dewey as promoting a "democratic community of individuals," (Simpson & Jackson, 1997, 58, 72) and as suggesting that those individuals who form a community should retain their identities and their independence of thought. They should never lose their individuality, their individual distinctiveness. They are always autonomous people who think and choose for themselves. No healthy, democratic community, no desirable learning community exists where citizens or teachers or students are coerced into a particular mind set or set of practices. Neither an individual educator nor a group of teachers or set of politicians, therefore, can force community and commonalities upon others.

Even though this discussion appears to be an accurate interpretation of Dewey's overall viewpoint, his position is not without problems. Dewey may have underestimated the tension that exists between individual autonomy and community values and overstated--or at least unguardedly stated--the need for a commonality of mind, intent, and understanding as well as working for or along common lines, needs, aims, and spirit. For the moment, we are satisfied to counsel-as Dewey himself did-that democratic learning communities are unlikely to be formed by using undemocratic and unethical means.

Undominated Communication

Dewey (DE, 84; italics added) was explicit, if brief, in mentioning the need for open and full participation by people when communicating with others. In fact, he said, "all the members of the group must have an equitable opportunity to receive and to take from others" and there must be "free interchange" and "free and equitable intercourse" among people. He intended that everyone have the opportunity to communicate, to learn

through communication, and to experience an equitable communication environment. But he did not seem to sense fully the difficulty of what he proposed in such pithy terms. Fortunately, there are others who have pushed further into this realm, a domain that has implications for both general society and schools.

Strike and Soltis (1992), we believe, add some useful ideas to Dewey's thinking about communication and how these ideas assist in building new commonalities and communities without forcing people into some form of group think. While examining the topic of ethical discourse and controversy, they argue that "open, undominated dialogue" is essential to healthy interactions by people and help build community, develop reasoning abilities, and nurture ethical judgments (p. 87). In addition, they observe that the process of open and undominated conversations may contribute to decisions being ethical themselves. That is, a decision that is made in a closed and dominated atmosphere may well be a compelled or controlled one, not an ethical one.

Unpacking the ideas Strike and Soltis squeeze into these few words is important. First, what do they mean by open dialogue? How would their ideas be operationalized in social and school settings? From a positive perspective, the major thrusts of this idea are that (1) all interested parties are free and feel free to participate in discussions, (2) all thoughts may be frankly introduced and discussed, (3) all evidence and arguments are examined by those involved in discussions, and (4) all positions are fairly or impartially or honestly explained and examined. Negatively speaking, the notion of open dialogue suggests that discussions will not be characterized by deception, repression, or exclusion (pp. 86-87).

Second, what do Strike and Soltis mean by *undominated* dialogue? Essentially, they think an undominated dialogue occurs when everyone, including those who lead or guide, involved in a discussion is and acts as though every participant is a moral and power equal. Undominated dialogue occurs when those involved in conversations feel and act as if the interests and views of others have just as much right to be heard and considered as their own. Speakers neither engage in nor yield to coercion, indoctrination, or manipulation in deliberations. When undominated dialogue occurs, no one manipulates discussions by authoritative appeals to or by discussion blocking references to her or his status, authority, ethnicity, position, gender, religion, knowledge, experience, so forth. References and

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allusions to power differentials and relations or authority distinctions are avoided or minimized in discussions (pp. 86-87). The fact that authority figures and structures exist in schools and districts does not mean that this ideal should not be pursued. On the contrary, it only points out that the conditions we have created may need to be altered if we wish to have communities of learners contributing to the growth of others. If not, we may continue to waste the enormous talent and insight that others possess as well as continue to serve students and society in incomplete ways.

Strike and Soltis think these two criteria and their resulting conditions for dialogue create an environment in which people talk and interact in a manner that is consistent with the ethical principle of equal respect of persons. Everyone is treated as an equal; the interests of all are safeguarded or respected; all parties are free to participate in discussions (p. 87). Our immediate response to these thoughts is that these ideas do not appear to reflect the reality of much of society and many schools. If we expect to have fully functioning schools, the dominated communication cultures of many settings need to change. Dominated communication is, intentionally or otherwise, a step toward dominated and divided communities and schools.

Democratic Orientation

When many of us think of democracy, we seem inclined to think of a form of government or a set of values that protect people in some fashion or that allow people to vote in elections. Dewey thought differently, for he believed that "democracy is more than a form of government" and "is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience" (DE, 87). Notice in this description of democracy that Dewey injects his concepts of community and communication. Democracy is primarily a way of living and communicating our experiences with one another in communities. But, of course, it is also a form of government.

Democratic Conditions

Dewey's notion of democracy is also augmented by recent studies of Apple and Beane (1995, 6). They maintain that it is crucial that we understand what democracy entails, how it applies to schools, and why it is necessary for the maintenance of the values of freedom and dignity. In particular, they assert that conditions for a democracy include at least the following:

1. The open flow of ideas, regardless of their

popularity, that enables people to be as fully informed as possible.

2. Faith in the individual and collective capacity of people to create possibilities for resolving problems.

3. The use of critical reflection and analysis to evaluate ideas, problems, and policies.

4. Concern for the welfare of others and "the common good."

5. Concern for the dignity and rights of individuals and minorities.

6. An understanding that democracy is not so much an "ideal" to be pursued as an "idealized" set of values that we must live and that must guide our life as a people.

7. The organization of social institutions to promote and extend the democratic way of life. (6-7)

Democratic Schools

In schools, Apple and Beane, much like Dewey, assert that a democratic life is nurtured by opportunities both to learn about and to practice democracy. If they are correct, it follows that both students and teachers should be both learning about and engaging in democratic processes and practices. Experiencing democracy, from this perspective, is viewed as both a means (of teaching democratic ideas) and an end (to be pursued and practiced) for both students and teachers. Moreover, if schools operate in fully democratic ways, parents and other concerned citizens have a right to be informed about and participate in policy and program making decisions. This is not to say that every decision must be decided by a popular or parental vote, but it is to say that no one should be denied the opportunity to voice an opinion or to have fair representation of her or his views.

It is critical to remember that populist opinion does not necessarily serve democratic ends. A majority vote may be either well-informed, fair, and wise or it may be based upon ignorance, prejudice, and imprudence. Democracy is not the same thing as always doing what the majority wishes, for majority wishes may be illegal, unethical, or violate policies and regulations. Sometimes elected and appointed leaders have to take steps to protect individual students or teachers, the rights of women and minorities, and the well-being of the community as a whole (9). Likewise, it is crucial

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that professional pedagogical knowledge, ethical sensitivity, and experiential understanding play important roles in developing policies, programs, and practices for schools, even though open participation by all concerned parties should be welcomed in democratic schools. These thoughts make it obvious that democratic schools will involve controversies and tensions, but, in fact, controversy and tension are often vital parts of learning and growing, whether in the broader society or in schools. Consequently, controversy itself should not be viewed as an undesirable or negative development (7-9).

Democratic Foci

What exactly constitutes the heart of a democratic culture in educational institutions? According to Apple and Beane, two features are of paramount importance. First, the "structures and process" must be democratically designed and evaluated. Second, the curriculum--or educative learning experiences--must be designed to provide students with opportunities to learn about and engage in democratic discussions, activities, and decisions. A democratic approach to thinking about structures and processes means, among other things, that affected parties will be involved in and represented on standing and ad hoc committees, task forces, study groups, policymaking bodies, and advisory councils. Further, it means that questions of justice and equity, practices of cooperation and collaboration, and events in the outside community impacting schools will receive regular attention by the school learning community. A sense of shared purpose is enhanced through these processes, and democratic ideas are both learned and practiced. In the process, of course, it is necessary that we ask pertinent questions: Who will profit from certain decisions? Whose opinion has not been fairly represented and heard? Who is included "we statements," e.g., we want, dislike, and object?

A democratic approach to thinking about the curriculum involves cognitive and experiential lessons about "justice, power, dignity, and self-worth" as well as lessons about seeking the opinions of the psychologically, culturally, politically, religiously, philosophically, and paradigmatically silenced. Constructing views as a result of considering the best available evidence and argument--the thinking of the group--and the idea of the common good is also an important component of a democracy (13-15). Apple and Beane tie together the process and the curriculum when they say:

. . . the democratic way of life engages the creative

process of seeking ways to extend and expand the values of democracy. This process, however, is not simply a participatory conversation about anything. Rather, it is directed toward intelligent and reflective consideration of problems, events, and issues that arise in the course of our collective lives. A democratic curriculum involves continuous opportunities to explore such issues, to imagine responses to problems, and to act upon those responses.(16)

Note the attention these comments give to *extending* and *expanding* the values of democracy, conversing about problems that influence collective living, and exploring alternative solutions to common concerns. Educators can play important roles in extending and expanding democratic practices for themselves and for children and youth and, indirectly, for society.

Professional Orientation

Given the previous discussion of our philosophical orientation, what are the implications for the world of schooling? Actually, we have already mentioned a number of ways these ideas are relevant to and may be acted upon in schools. Here we simply wish to pursue these inklings in further detail.

Pedagogical Communities

Dewey (DE, 85) thought that community evolves out of communication that covers a wide range of topics, not merely conversation that is specifically intended to develop commonalities. Indeed, discussions that are intended to produce commonalities of beliefs and understandings may be counterproductive and run the risk of indoctrinating, brainwashing, or coercing people. At this point, it may be worthwhile to recognize that Dewey did not explicitly and systematically encourage commonalities of pedagogical thought and practice, although we think some desired commonalities are found in his writings and serve as important considerations in developing a learning community. While there are some general trends of pedagogy in his writings that he nurtured and praised--such as community-centered learning, democratic curricula and practices, education that is identified with the life of the child, the role of education in a democracy, and the engagement of the student in educative learning activities, he (MW8, 389) was delighted to see diversity of practice among thinking educators. He valued general pedagogical diversity in and among schools in part because he thought learning environments should

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be designed for particular children in specific schools in distinctive communities by certain professionals. Room for pedagogical and curricular diversity is a given in our minds.

We probably should not forget two other ideas that bear clarification: communities may have "a dark side" (Noddings, 1996) and desirable ones appear somewhat serendipitous. In order to avoid the dark side of community, attention may need to be given to nurturing freedom of thought and practice and equal respect of persons. Allowing serendipity to play its role in the cultivation of community is important too, for it will complement intentional efforts to avoid undesirable communities. That there is something serendipitous about community and about developing learning communities in schools is not widely discussed, but its influence appears much as it does in any social relationship or friendship. And serendipity is not by its very nature something that can be planned, much less forced. True, we may nurture community, even environments that enhance the possibility of serendipitous experiences, but commonalities seem to grow in large part out of candid, uncoerced, and uncontrolled discussions, including disagreements. Anything less runs the risk of undermining the notions of an independent thinker, a democratic society, a professional educator, and a pedagogical community.

Judicious Communication

When the aforementioned thoughts are applied to discussions among teachers, administrators, and central office personnel; among teachers and students; and among teachers and professors, a number of sensitive and controversial issues are likely to arise. Free speech, open-mindedness, academic freedom, tolerance, and censorship are topics that merit study and discussion by educators and policy makers (Hare, 1979; Hare 1985; Hare, 1993). Obviously an extensive study of these areas is beyond the scope of this essay. In our discussion, it will suffice to say very little, except that there are some topics that some people think ought not to be discussed. Even repeating certain hypotheses, theories, ideas, and terms are believed to be—and sometimes may be—demeaning to some individuals and groups or considered laced with explosive emotional connotations. Particular ideas and values are so contentious in society at times that it is difficult to raise a question about them much less openly discuss them. Whether one agrees with how these topics should be addressed or not, what seems clear is that certain topics are sometimes so inflammatory that they cannot be

openly discussed even among so-called educated people in universities much less in Pre-K-12 schools.

Tragically, even our relatively open and democratic society has few if any formal arenas where some so-called privileged, revered, and disdained ideas can be rationally and evidentially examined. Dewey warned against all dogmatism, saying, "any theory and set of practices is dogmatic which is not based upon critical examination of its own underlying principles" (EE, 22). In this sphere, then, there is surely room for the extension and expansion of democratic ideals.

In addition, fear of accusations and false charges, whether well-founded or not, may stymie other discussions. Some people are simply not willing to risk being called pejorative terms on occasions, such as a defensive person of color, an overly sensitive white, a latent sexist, an Uncle Tom, a closet Eurocentric, or whatever. They prefer to keep quiet, not fully express their opinions, bury sensitive questions, and remain silently curious rather than risk a misunderstanding or promote discord and dissension. Hence, they do not raise questions or make comments they would make if the discussion were indeed open or an environment existed where ideas were discussed as ideas. Closed discussions, therefore, are the only kind of discussions that occur on certain subjects in some settings.

What should schools, communities of inquiry, do with topics of this nature? How should they be handled? As we hope everyone recognizes, we cannot answer these questions in any definitive manner. Professional life and society are too complex to be certain about many matters in this realm. Conversely, several comments may offer helpful suggestions in determining if the characteristics of a community indicate that it is ready for a discussion. First, the context of the discussions is important. Is the context a kindergarten class, a teachers' meeting, a board hearing, or a planning committee? Is the kind of discussion developmentally appropriate? Our point here is that some discussions are more appropriate with some groups or populations than others.

Second, the relevancy of a discussion is important. Is the topic relevant to the subject or extraneous? Even if a topic is important, it may not be well-advised to discuss it. Why, for instance, would kindergarten teachers wish to discuss the pros and cons of using condoms in their classes?

Third, the level of community *trust* is a critical consideration. Has the community evolved to the point that a reasonable degree of trust is apparent or is the

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community still largely a superficial one, still in the early stages of development? Is the community healthy or fragile?

Fourth, has a *setting* been established for open discussions? Is it clear to everyone that they should thoughtfully express their ideas and encourage others to express their opinions? All of these and related considerations provide insight about whether the setting is appropriate for an open and discreet discussion to occur.

Authority Figures

Some so-called nonvolatile topics are also approached in a closed rather than open fashion when certain people or types of individuals are present, e.g., division head, union representative, program coordinator, assistant principal, combative teacher, board member, education professor, or president of the parent-teachers association. Some group members who possess an influence or power differential relish using it; others seem somewhat oblivious to the fact that they inhibit discussions; still others attempt to gain such influence through political maneuvers, authoritarian presentations, or psychological manipulation. Body language, facial expressions, voice tone, and physical posture are all incredibly important on occasions in communicating power. Thus, there are a multitude of ways that we may consciously or unconsciously influence others to be silent when we should be seeking their best thinking.

What does an educator do in such circumstances to nurture open discussions? An initial consideration may be to discuss briefly some key ideas regarding the silencing of particular groups, e.g., women, socioeconomic classes, ethnic minorities, religious groups. A discussion of these topics may make it easier to understand how we continue to run this particular risk and the additional one of silencing the voices of the paradigmatically, philosophically, and professionally different (Siegel, 1997). A second step may be to have a discussion of those factors that sometimes inhibit others from clearly expressing their opinions. Making a list of the inhibiting factors could help. Asking the question, "Is there anything unsaid that anyone will regret not saying later?" may be useful. A third step may involve reminding everyone that the group wants to avoid behaviors and comments (such as, "Oh, that's ridiculous!" or "We've tried that before and it won't work.") that discourage others from expressing and

developing their thoughts. Fourth, it may be a useful tool to ask each member of a group to reflect on her or his speech patterns, specifically noticing whether she or he tends to speak continuously, often, occasionally, or not at all and whether her or his speaking or not speaking seems to generate or inhibit discussion by others. After developing a self-consciousness about speaking habits, it may be worth encouraging each person, at least on occasions, to speak when she or he feels inclined to be silent or to be silent when she or he wants to speak. Finally, it may be beneficial to ask an individual or two to skip speaking a meeting or two so that other, less assertive individuals may have a better opportunity to speak. Or it might be advantageous to ask everyone for written comments or private reflections that will be utilized in follow-up sessions. Maybe even assertiveness workshops would be useful in some schools.

Progressive Openness

Hardly anyone is inclined to express the full range and depth of her or his opinions in a completely new situation or in a school that experiences multiple personnel changes each year. People need time to develop an understanding of institutional dynamics and the ethos and mores that guide interactions. Time is also needed to test the trust and care levels of a community. For instance, can a teacher trust other educators to accurately repeat her thoughts and feelings when she proposes unpopular curricular ideas or questions instructional traditions? Does the group of teachers see her as a valuable staff member, relate to her as a person who is truly cared for, or treat her as just another employee? Openness, then, is seldom if ever an instantaneous phenomenon in schools but is the result of the progressive growth of other qualities of a community, e.g., knowledge, fairness, trust, care, respect, and freedom.

These few considerations illustrate why it is difficult to establish a community that is characterized by open, undominated dialogue or communication. Even so, these conditions—openness and undominated dialogue—remain critical to a school if it is to be a genuine community where learning is highly valued and democracy is practiced.

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Here we want to push our discussion a little further and make two observations regarding communication in a learning community, school, classroom, or group. First, we think it is important to say that the problem of fearing people in positions of influence or authority appears to be a challenge that can be successfully addressed, especially where there already exists an equal respect of persons. Moreover, in some respects, dealing with this question is a more pressing matter for schools to address than are highly controversial issues themselves. If we or others in our community inhibit openness, then we need to take steps to cultivate a school environment that allows or cultivates open discussion. Imaginative and tenacious educators will think of a variety of ways to deal with this challenge. As they do so, they will frequently need to redesign school schedules to allow for regular formal and informal interactions among teachers. Models for such interactions already abound in schools, although the creation of school specific schedules will still be required in many cases. Still, existing models can be examined for informative alternatives. Perhaps we need to say that it is important to understand that neglecting this aspect of community-building is to ensure almost certain failure. Learning, growth, renewal, and community are practically if not actually impossible apart from teacher interaction and communication.

Second, we recommend that learning communities err on the side of openness rather than on the side of closedness, especially when the learning community under consideration is composed of adult professionals. We make this suggestion of open discussions, however, for communities that have gradually developed a strong degree of trust and care, not for just any school community. To attempt to practice such in weak or fragile communities would probably be ill-advised.

Let us pause to say what we are not encouraging. Like other ethically sensitive educators, we strongly dislike prejudicial and insulting statements being made among colleagues and among students. Nothing we have said should be construed to imply we favor environments where people are free to make educationally and socially destructive comments. Instead, we encourage openness for the sake of everyone's learning, engaging in ethical conversations, and avoiding the maintenance of existing and the creation of new groups of silenced voices. Consequently, we think it is important to be hesitant to accuse people of unstated beliefs and to be offended by what we read into others' comments. We think immediately of Joseph McCarthy and Abigail Williams.

We also think that there appear to be some views that are a waste of time to study, that these views have been examined and found deficient, and that they can be ignored by thinking people. But when a six or twelve year old child raises an honest question that reveals misunderstanding or familial bigotry, we think she or he deserves respect and a thoughtful answer, not a censorious response.

In a similar but somewhat less obvious way, we think educators who seem to be reflecting or actually are manifesting objectionable ideas to their peers need to be respected as persons and responded to as colleagues, not as people--or, perhaps better, things--to be humiliated. People who express or seem to imply abhorrent opinions are sometimes as guilty as they appear of racism, sexism, and similar ideas. On other occasions, however, they may just be thoughtless, unenlightened, or ill-mannered. Maybe some are morally insensitive too. Or perhaps they are simply stumbling to have questions answered, not covertly arguing for a repugnant idea. Whatever their situation, we think that assisting them to become better informed and ethically sensitive educators will help create better schools and a society. On still other occasions, people we may initially suspect of holding socially demeaning and harmful views actually are attempting to express insightful comments about complex societal and pedagogical issues. We may profit by asking ourselves if we stereotype speakers before we listen carefully to them. We may also ask ourselves if we should be moral educators in our schools rather than moral judges. In any case, being reflective suggests that we need to be slow to assess discussions in this realm and to avoid making impulsive and premature judgments.

Liberal Background

A few comments regarding the liberal tradition that is behind our previously expressed thoughts may be useful. Mill's (1956) argument favoring the freedom to express unpopular opinions, even obviously incorrect ones, as well as warranted ones still carries some weight with us, even if it is not a completely compelling one. He argued that to silence an opinion, no matter how obviously false it appears, runs the danger of (1) suppressing the truth since it is still possible that we may be wrong, (2) ignoring a significant fragment of truth that is contained in the largely erroneous position, (3) forgetting the intellectual grounds for our own position because we protect it from anyone who wishes to contest any aspect of it, and (4) neglecting the meaning and import of our largely defensible position

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as it becomes a mere formal profession, a dogma to be repeated but not one to be reconsidered. Mill believed, as did Dewey, that a community of inquirers and its individual members will make intellectual, moral, and social progress as they openly discuss ideas-rejecting, refining, and adding to them as they are examined by all members of society. They both had confidence that open discussions will gradually lead to a better understanding and world, not perpetuate error that will ultimately harm society. Hare (1993) contributes to this general theme by adding:

... we would all do well to remember that assumptions which once seemed solid and beyond question have been shown to be untenable. Stephen Toulmin is right to remind us that what we once termed inconceivable has turned out to be true more often than we care to admit. If we tell ourselves that our open-mindedness is restricted to modifications which leave our fundamental views in tact, then we set ourselves to avoid making changes to those basic views whatever arguments emerge, and that *is* closed-minded and short-sighted. Moreover, in the context of teaching, it is vitally important to consider rival views so that our students realize that the teacher's own position rests on evidence and argument and that other views are rejected because they fail to withstand critical scrutiny.(22)

We wish to add that it is all too easy to conclude that the views we have determined to be inadequate, based upon faulty evidence or argument, can be ignored forever by everyone. We may wrongly conclude that we are under no obligation to examine ideas, answer questions, or direct inquires when we think we have every reason to believe that the underlying views of such positions are patently false. But such thinking may be one of the hallmarks of a closed and dogmatic mind, e.g., we close our minds forever to the possibility that new evidence or argument may alter the grounds for or the positions themselves. Discussions concerning phonetics, whole language, and the teaching of language arts come to mind. Moreover, our behavior may also reflect a dismissive attitude, an attitude that shows no real respect for a colleague or a student and ignores the evidence and argument they provide. Certainly this attitude hinders communication, learning, and community. It deprives us of insights we should welcome as well as opportunities to alter thinking that would otherwise remain hidden.

Finally, we believe, as Dewey suggested, that each

generation, indeed each person, must be born anew into a world of intelligence. No one can enter this world of intelligence for another, but nearly anyone can block the paths of others. Refusal to attend seriously to earnest inquires and comments may not always reflect a closed mind, but it may help keep closed those that are stretching to open. We may be irritated or angered or enraged that someone still believes what is to us implausible, incredible, unbelievable, unwarranted, harmful, unsound, and detestable, but if we are interested in educating others-both our colleagues and students-and in their personal growth, we have little to gain by judgmentally closing down a discussion. As professionals, then, it is important that we are open and civil with one another about pedagogical experiences, traditions, beliefs, practices, trends, theories, and research.

Collegial Dialogue

When we experience a parity of authority, respect, and dignity, we are often more inclined to talk about ideas and issues in open, experiential, logical, and evidential ways than we would be otherwise. We are also frequently more interested in understanding another's position and reasons for it than in condemning that position because our worth is not threatened by ideas. So too we are less inclined to label a position negatively or to attack a person who expresses an idea if we genuinely respect one another. This is not to say, that passion should be absent from collegial dialogue; emotions have a legitimate place to play in educational discussions. But it is to say that in discussions where we feel accepted and respected, we are more likely to be interested in hearing-or at least listening to-the views of our colleagues and students. While we may reject some, even many, of the ideas of those with whom we interact, we are more determined to listen to their opinions because we (1) have respect for them as human beings, (2) want to understand what they think, (3) are interested in refining our own thinking, and (4) understand that we can better discuss and rebut even repulsive and unfounded ideas if we interpret them accurately. As collegial listeners, we also recognize that we need to pay careful attention to what others say if they are going to be able to (5) point out the factual errors, misunderstandings, and biases present in our thoughts. Listening and understanding not only are a foundation for personal learning but are also critical in informed efforts to discredit unsound thinking. Similarly, parity of authority, respect, and dignity provide part of the foundation for both community and communication, not to mention education.

Common Core

Nearly every writer on community discusses a purpose or core set of values that makes community possible. We, for instance, have given particular attention to Dewey's general set of commonalities. Others (Boyer, 1995) sometimes speak of a central set of processes, practices, values, or beliefs. Many of these same proponents of community caution us about the coercion and manipulation that may arise as we seek to identify and nurture commonalities. In view of these warnings, we suggest that schools or learning communities be cautious and reflective as they develop the conditions that will lead to more desirable kinds of communities. We advocate too that educators be critical of the various cores or ideas or values they examine, including the set of beliefs and practices that we have sprinkled throughout this essay. We further recommend that learning communities recognize the legitimacy—as well as potential challenges and tensions—of smaller or sub-communities within larger learning communities. For example, special educators or science teachers may compose a healthy or unhealthy community in the school community.

Our suggested core ideas and values fall roughly into two distinct but complementary categories, the philosophical and the pedagogical. Among the philosophical ideas and ideals that we have proposed as core commonalities are equal respect of persons, the personal dignity of each community member, a concern for the common good, and the practice of democracy. But we have also proposed that fairness, compassion, freedom, open-mindedness, tolerance, diversity, serendipity, trust, and openness merit special consideration.

The pedagogical ideas and ideals we noted build upon these implicit values. Schools, as far as we are concerned, should remember that they were created to focus on the learning of children. They are places which should imaginatively think of ethically justifiable and educationally sound ways of developing educative experiences for children and youth. Finally, we have implied that schools should also be undominated communities where open communication and personal growth by students and staff are highly valued.

Crucial Caveats

We have recommended that educators encourage open discussions of ideas even to the point of allowing unpopular and discredited ones to be discussed in certain kinds of learning communities when particular

conditions are met, especially when the trust and care levels are sufficiently high and the material is developmentally appropriate and professionally relevant. In large part, we have made this argument because we subscribe to the values of a liberal democracy and because we hope to discourage the silencing of voices that sometimes find it hard to be heard. We want to add several caveats, however.

First, if the discussions are truly destructive to an educational climate, we should expect to hear an unusually cogent argument for continuing them. We may have little to gain and much to lose by insisting that colleagues should be allowed to argue vigorously for or against an idea or practice if it disrupts the educational program of a school or class. On the other hand, we may have learned a great deal about a school's understanding of and commitment to democracy and education if discussions are stymied. This knowledge may lead us to make better informed staff development decisions in the future. Second, we want to distinguish the concept of a person's right to express a view from a person's right to the opinion expressed. In a democracy and a school that values freedom of speech, people have a right to suggest nearly any position they wish. Conversely, a person may not have an epistemological right to or have the appropriate evidence for the expressed viewpoint (Simpson & Jackson, 1984). In other words, a person may have a political and academic right to express an opinion without having solid intellectual grounds to support the viewpoint. Thus, we do not want to leave the impression that one opinion is always or necessarily as sound as another. In one way or another, modernists, postmodernists, feminists, and multiculturalists affirm this thought (Siegel, 1997).

Third, we think it is important to distinguish between respecting a person and respecting the ideas she or he expresses. Showing equal respect for persons is an important moral concept that has a direct bearing upon how we treat one another when we disagree, and we appear well-advised to examine the concept's implications for controversial discussions. Respecting ideas, however, should be based upon the soundness of the arguments made for them and the relevance of the evidence presented, not upon respecting the speaker as a person. Respecting a person's right to believe something as a person in a liberal democracy, however, does not force us to conclude that her or his opinion should become a part of the school curriculum (Hare, 1993, 7, 33).

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Conclusion

By now, it is probably manifest that building community in any school is not a simple, straightforward task. We will not further our desire to help build stronger learning communities, therefore, by underestimating the difficulty of doing so. On the other hand, we will not assist our goal by understating the value of community or by being pessimistic about operationalizing an open, inquiring, enthusiastic community of students, educators, and other interested parties. A realistic optimism is needed in community building as much as it is in learning and teaching.

A realistic optimism is based partially upon understanding that there are both inherent dangers as well as advantages in cultivating community. The negative side of the ledger is perhaps easier to see. We may become overly zealous about ideas, practices, and beliefs that we highly prize and unconsciously promote a stultifying unity and conformity. We may coerce and manipulate colleagues, students, and others into accepting changes and agendas that should be debated longer and, in many situations, left open for further debate or viewed as alternative ways of educating children and youth. We may lose a degree of humility that each of us needs about our opinions and what should be done, that which is preferred, and that which is optional. We may rush faster toward our goals than others are prepared to go. We may stymie open dialogue and inquiry and replace democratic structures and decision making with authoritarian processes. Ultimately, we may undermine the open, democratic learning community we wish to cultivate by either liberating a bigot or silencing a gadfly. We may unintentionally promote dialogical apartheid, combat, or retreat. We can, as we said earlier, become a contemporary Abigail Williams or a Joseph McCarthy.

Conversely, there is a positive side to community. Many, perhaps most, people want to work together with others, have a sense of belonging, feel accepted and cared for by others, contribute to the common good, and acknowledge their social, emotional, and intellectual interdependence. Many others are not opposed to these tendencies and desires, especially if they are complemented by an emphasis on the integrity of the self, the inviolability of the Other (Buber, 1970; Noddings, 1996). Given these realities and parameters, we may set into motion a growing, educative community that is propelled by a genuine desire to see ever student and educator think, choose, and create. We may nurture environments where people communicate

freely and regularly, live fairly and caringly, and learn enthusiastically and optimally. We may cultivate caring communities of inquiry that are characterized by diversity and tolerance, differences and civility, and freedom and respect. We may nurture school climates that are permeated by an eagerness for learning and teaching and thinking. We may contribute to the development of inquiring and courageous people who understand the importance of allowing disagreement with, and even withdrawal from, the community as well as agreement with and participation in it (Tillich, 1952). Being realistically optimistic about the importance and impact of such learning communities, we encourage educators to

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explore, create, and redesign them for the well-being of students and society, not to mention the profession.

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Snelgrove: Footnotes to Maxine Greene

FOOTNOTES TO MAXINE GREENE: THE QUEST FOR EDUCATIONAL PRAXIS

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Just how much influence does an individual have on any field? Certainly, it would be hard to overestimate the impact of Plato on philosophy or John Dewey on American education, especially the more abstract philosophical and theoretical aspects. Other individuals are much more difficult to assess though they may also have had a profound impact. I became interested in the work of Maxine Greene through the research on existential thought used in my paper on "border crossing." It struck me that Greene had said many of the things that critical pedagogues were saying. They were using some of the same language and ideas to reach different ends.

The basis of existentialist education is the authenticity of the wide-awake individual in the social setting, who recognizes conditions of hegemony and anomie, and makes a conscious effort to remain alert, think about the social environment, investigate forces of domination, and interpret their day-to-day experiences. This means becoming aware of all the ways that hierarchical social and political systems function to "mystify" and the ways in which demystification can occur. It requires that students be seen as individuals and that diversity be valued.

Critical pedagogy recognizes the political basis of education as an institution of society and asks teachers to become cultural workers, transformative intellectuals whose role it is to identify ideological and political ramifications of the education system's role of social reproduction. Such a pedagogy asks teachers to become activists in sensitizing students to racism, classism, sexism, marginalization, and subordination, to the grooming that occurs in the educational setting. It requires a rationalized political agenda on the part of the teacher and a political goal for the act of teaching.

If critical pedagogy follows the suggestion of Marx's thesis on Feuerbach that it is insufficient for philosophers to explain the world, the point is to try to change it, then the existential imperative must be that to change the world we must seek to change individuals, by changing one person at a time, beginning with

oneself. Such change includes as complete an understanding of the realities of social conditions as possible.

The metaphor chosen for the title of this paper suggests that some schools of educational philosophy owe a huge debt to the work of Maxine Greene. Other metaphors could have served the same purpose. "On the shoulders of . . ." has become popular of late, "in the footsteps of . . ." would have served a similar function, and there are several others. But footnotes to Maxine Greene seems to me somehow more appropriate, bringing to mind Whitehead's statement that all subsequent philosophy is a series of footnotes to Plato.

The title also refers to the way I have chosen to structure this paper, to look at the importance of the work of Maxine Greene in relation to the changing landscape, to use one of her words, of American education.

Maxine Greene, who will enter her eightieth year in December, is familiar to most of us as an educational philosopher involved in existential and phenomenological thought who has become interested in the development of critical consciousness on the part of teachers. But, her work of forty years or so also presents us with a wide range of scholarship including moral education, media studies, historiography, feminist perspectives, literacy, aesthetics in education, the place of dance, the arts and humanities, multiculturalism, curriculum, issues, and ideology, and other topics. Throughout these various works, she includes the observations and descriptions from literature that serve to illustrate points about the relationship of the issues at hand through their descriptions of society in poetry and prose. This theme has been used of late in the analysis of contemporary culture through the criticism of film and media, but Greene's work seems to always originate with the unique existential world view. In this paper I am particularly interested in aspects of Greene's work that impacts the educational history, arts and aesthetics in education, existential thought, critical theory and the place of praxis in education, and multiculturalism.

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Prevalent in her work is her knowledge and use of the work of John Dewey. Dewey serves as a baseline philosophy from which to analyze various features of American education. All of her work is grounded in Dewey's philosophy. Greene's training in history and philosophy and her experience in teaching English and literature serve her well as a means to structure and illuminate her work. The many vantage points of the humanities help her to explore the complex relationships of individuals to societies and their institutions. From her experiences she, "was convinced of the significance of imaginative literature when it came to the opening of new teachers' perspectives and their individual pursuits of meaning."⁴⁷ She writes,

... we need the sociologists' accounting and the researchers' documenting of lives in schools. And we need the demographers' listing of newcomers in the city and the evaluator's reports. (Literature) suggests the endless complexity and the incompleteness of all explorations. It enables us to see and feel, as seldom before, the textures of lives surrounding the schools and mediated by the schools, things that cannot be captured by lists, tables, administrative reports, even personal stories.⁴⁸

Greene also recognizes the necessity of understanding popular culture as an everyday means to impact students and as an external source of their outlook on the world and an important source of their interpretation of the age in which they live. She says:

(Teachers and) students cannot help living much of the time in a world others prefabricate for what they consider to be the public. On occasion (they) must be critically attentive; (they) must consciously choose what to appropriate and what to discard. Reliance on the natural attitude--a common sense taking for granted of the everyday--will not suffice. In some fashion, the everyday must be rendered problematic so that questions may be posed. (Teachers) should at least be acquainted with the movies (and popular culture) of (their) day. No matter what (their) estimate of them, (they) must understand (and try to help his students understand) that they are not instances of photographed reality; they are not empirically "true." For all their immediacy and impact, the individual must not confuse them with documents or see them as keys to the nature of things.⁴⁹

In *The Public School and the Private Vision*, Maxine Greene produced a history of the common

schools from their conception, largely in the mind of Thomas Jefferson up to their widespread acceptance and the progressive era. She said that the motivation for this her first book is found with the preoccupations with the development of technology and the depersonalization of people in American society as well as the civil-rights and antiwar protesters of the middle and late 1960s. The title extension of this book, "A search for America in education and literature," foreshadowed a long list of works that would include literary illustration for historical and philosophical insight. The use of imaginative artists as well as educational reformers drew attention to the contrasting views of American society that often go unnoticed. She writes,

Dewey and others had been critical enough of the injustices and cruelties of an industrializing nation; but it was our great writers who enabled readers to see further and, at once, to visualize alternative possibilities.⁵⁰

In "Identities and Contours," Greene analyzed the impact of revisionist historians who were "redefining the school" as the primary source of socialization, values, conduct, and stable societal relationships. About the revisionists she writes:

Their researches have taken them to open fields where they have learned to penetrate relationships between social structures and social purposes. They have demonstrated the long neglect of pluralism, the exclusion of immigrants and ethnic groups from concern, the curious conservatism of municipal and school "reforms." They have identified connections previously ignored between the school and politics, education and social stratification, class values and racism: they have exposed the rationalizations of professionalism. Questioning inexorability in the development of organizational structures, they have displayed movements for and resistances to local control. They have, in sum, forever invalidated what Lawrence Cremin described as the "narrowly institutional" approach, in the light of which their work is liberating and sound. Clearly, it has opened up inclusive perspectives on what was actually happening within and around the schools.⁵¹

But there are negative aspects to revisionist history. She continues:

The concern is almost exclusively with the patterning of individuals and the evils of social control. Little or nothing is said about the

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individual's own social reality and the possibilities of his transforming it. Little is said about the problematic of community life and the need to create culture as well as to perpetuate it. Yet these issues too have arisen in history, even if conditioning has been ubiquitous. The "masses" have chosen as well as acquiesced. Educational reformers have chosen in the context of the society they have perceived. Too frequently, the school system seems to have become the archetype of bureaucracy; its anomalous roles as reflector and producer of values and beliefs have been in some way overlooked. Perhaps because the new historians' professional concentration is on education, they have felt obliged to discover the prime source of the "plots" against the person within the public school. This has led them to some neglect of multiple causation when they come to tracing the effects of such ideas as those linked to progressivism. Preoccupied with images of monoliths and patterning, they see victimization, they see us all submerged in a system we never chose.⁵²

Greene recommends that,

Educational history . . . make room for incompleteness and "raggedness" . . . avoid historicism, . . . find explanations supplementary to determinist ones; allow for the insertion of free will at crucial moments of time . . . seek to encompass those who have dropped out of history, who cannot be subsumed under categories like "masses" and "minorities" and "ethnic groups" . . . venture now and then into imaginative literature, into oral histories and diaries and letters as well as into demographics . . . to confront the paradox that escapes measurement, the paradox of civilization itself.⁵³

In arts education, Maxine Greene, who remains active with the Lincoln Center Institute for the Arts in Education, believes that,

"Aesthetic education refers to a deliberate effort to nurture an informed awareness and a discriminating appreciation of art forms . . . not only talk about the arts but also genuine participation in aesthetic experiences. (As) "philosopher in residence," . . . I have been addressing teachers about the role of imagination, perception, feeling, as well as cognition in bringing works of art to life in human experience.⁵⁴

Greene supports " . . . a minimal "aesthetic literacy" in order to transmit . . . the sensibility we hope to nurture--where the arts are concerned . . ." ⁵⁵ In a 1994 article on the national standards she wrote,

"It may be that the unequal transmission of knowledge or culture is more evident in the arts than in other disciplines where "cultural reproduction" can be more easily disguised. Suburban and private schools frequently offer a traditional--largely canonical--arts education to their students. . . .the offspring of the rich are taught early to "crack the codes" that obscure the arts for so many. They feel a sense of entitlement when it comes to the great museums or dance companies or concert halls. Yet, it is rare to find people's art forms, folk arts, street theatre presentations, quilts, puppets, and other reflections of our multicultural society honored in arts education programs in typical schools.⁵⁶

Of course, the arts were not among the six goals identified by President George Bush and the states' governors and were not added as Greene observes, "until August 1991 when the National Assessment Governing Board voted to devise a consensus framework for a national assessment in arts education to be completed in 1996."⁵⁷

Greene suggests that the reason for the descent into the morass of national standards lay in the fear that "excluding the arts from public consideration and from the articulation of educational goals might drain away the small amount of support the arts had won over the years. Apparently, the popularity of standards setting was linked to considerations of mastery of relevant knowledge and skills. . . . arts educat(ors) decided to stress mastery in their own fields."⁵⁸

Although there is general agreement on the importance of achievement and content standards, there is difficulty in dealing with the wide range of performing arts in and out of schools. Greene, citing Dewey's belief, "that reliance on rules or models of the "masters" eroded the contribution of art experiences to the enlargement of personal experiences," observed that, " . . . standard setting does not and cannot allow for the unexpected and the undecidable, the startling ways in which works of art reveal facets of the world, nor can it account for the explorations and open-ended discoveries made by young people when they experiment with the media of sound and color, of words or film." And that, "Extrinsic standards do not infuse a life. They are not

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chosen; they are enacted or imposed."⁵⁹

So the curriculum resulting from the standards become rooted in desired skills and knowledge, "while," Greene observes, "nothing is said about values, preferences, or the lives of those affected and involved. ...the actualities of lived contexts: the neighborhood, the family, the surrounding agencies and institutions, the religious organizations, the media, and the streets themselves . . . the sounds of guns and crying children; the faces of forlorn teenage mothers; the homeless, the forgotten, the desperate. . . . It is difficult to accept recommendations for standards that do not pay heed to all this."⁶⁰

But for all this, Greene acknowledges, "the kinds of evaluations that communicate to the public the profound importance of arts education and aesthetic education, or the nurture of informed and critical understanding of various art forms . . . the kinds of standards that encourage students to construct meaning through disciplined inquiry and the use of imagination, . . . higher order thinking, . . . dialogue and eager transactions in the classroom, . . . (and) an atmosphere of regard for young people on the . . . margin as well as at the center of the classroom."⁶¹ As she has written elsewhere, "In making central to our teaching the arts and the symbol systems that present them, we may render conscious the process of making meaning, a process that has much to do with the shaping of identity, the development of a sense of agency, and a commitment to a certain mode of *praxis*."⁶²

The concept of *praxis* interested Maxine Greene. In her book, *Landscapes of Learning*, a chapter was devoted to the term and it was used throughout the book for various purposes. She wrote,

The contemporary notion of *praxis* probably stems from Karl Marx's writing. Recall his *Theses on Feuerbach*: "The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-changing can only be grasped and rationally understood as revolutionary *practice*." Or, a few paragraphs later: "All social life is essentially *practical*. All the mysteries which lead theory towards mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice." As Lukacs and Freire both see it, there must be a critical intervention in reality by means of *praxis*. (99) *Praxis*, while emancipatory in its purpose, is not a purely therapeutic exploration of consciousness.

With our Deweyan past, our familiarity with participant knowing, with learning as "the reconstruction of experience," we are sometimes tempted to treat the concept of *praxis* as an elaborated form of Deweyan knowing.

(But) *praxis* involves critical reflection--and action upon--a situation to some degree shared by persons with common interests and common needs. Of equal moment is the fact that *praxis* involves a transformation of that situation to the end of overcoming oppressiveness and domination.

These, then, are the three aspects of the predicament I see confronting the critical educator and the radical professional: the temptations of malefic generosity, the distancing from the culture of everyday life, and the implicitly revolutionary meaning of *praxis*. No matter what the context or frame.⁶³

In other parts of *Landscapes of Learning*, Greene defined the term *praxis* as, "a type of radical and participant knowing oriented to transforming the world,"⁶⁴ "for bringing the world closer to heart's desire,"⁶⁵ "a deliberate mode of action to bring about change."⁶⁶ Finally, Greene suggested that teachers, ". . . work within the system for the kinds of critical understanding that will feed into *praxis* and bring about change. She wrote, "I am interested in trying to awaken educators to a realization that transformations are conceivable, that learning is stimulated by a sense of future possibility and by a sense of (4) what might be. . . .the need for social *praxis*, about critical consciousness, about equality and equity, as well as about personal liberation."⁶⁷

With respect to critical theory, Greene wrote a short history of the development of the idea of critical pedagogy as a form of educational reform and the critical impulse as it developed in the Western tradition. By fitting critical pedagogy into its proper historical place, by identifying and following the strands of social development and the efforts to create schools responsive to existing social conditions, Greene sought to establish the social role of the school as it has evolved from the dominated institution of the past about which she says, ". . . their effectiveness assured the continuing existence of systems of domination--monarchies, churches, land-holding arrangements, and armed forces of whatever kind."⁶⁸

In linking the educational past to the development of radical pedagogy, Greene expresses the evolutionary

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nature the social institution,

"Without an Emerson or a Thoreau or a Parker, there would not have been a Free School movement or a "deschooling" movement. Without a Du Bois there would not have been liberation or storefront schools. Without a social reformist tradition, there would have been no Marxist voices asking . . . for a "mass-based organization of working people powerfully articulating a clear alternative to corporate capitalism as the basis for a progressive educational system. Without a Dewey, there would have been little concern for "participatory democracy," for "consensus," for the reconstitution of a public sphere.⁶⁹

But the development critical pedagogy is most often related to the conservative backlash of the 1980s and 90s. Greene writes,

Yes the silence fell at the end of the following decade; privatization increased, along with consumerism and cynicism and the attrition of the public space. We became aware of living in what Europeans called an "administered society." . . . Popular culture, most particularly as embodied in the media, was recognized . . . as a major source of mystification. . . . no population has ever been so deliberately entertained, amused, and soothed into avoidance, denial, and neglect. The schools were recognized as agents of "cultural reproduction," oriented to a differential distribution of knowledge. Numerous restive educational thinkers . . . turned towards European neo-Marxist scholarship . . . they were concerned for the individual, for the subject . . . the humanist dimension of Frankfurt School philosophies held an unexpected appeal.⁷⁰

Greene reminds us, however, "that European memories are not our memories . . . a critical pedagogy relevant to the United States today must go beyond--calling on different memories, repossessing another history."⁷¹ She outlines the meaning of critical pedagogy as, ". . . calls for justice and equality, . . . resistance to materialism and conformity, . . . recognition that what we single out as most deficient and oppressive is in part a function of perspectives created by our past, . . . understand(ing) that the freedom we cherish is not an endowment, that it must be achieved through dialectical engagements with the social and economic obstacles we find standing in our way, . . . that a plurality of American voices must be attended to, that a plurality of life-stories must be heeded . . ."⁷²

Greene calls for teachers to, "undertake a resistance, a reaching out towards becoming *persons* among other persons, . . . moving the young into their own interpretations of their lives and their lived worlds, opening wider and wider perspectives as they do so.

. . . make the range of symbol systems available to the young for the ordering of experience, even as they maintain regard for the vernaculars. . . . tapping the spectrum of intelligences, encouraging multiple readings of written texts and readings of the world.⁷³

For Greene, these *dialectical* engagements are existential in nature. She writes,

That is what I mean by the dialectic: the recognition of the determinants and of the inevitable tension between the desire to *be* and the forces that condition from within and without. Not to deny these forces is, very often, to acquiesce in oppression.⁷⁴

Throughout her extensive body of work, the unifying concept has consistently been an existential notion of the role of the reflective wide-awake teacher in the lives of students. In *Landscapes of Learning*, Greene writes,

... wide-awakeness ought to accompany every effort made to initiate persons into any form of life or academic discipline.

Therefore, I believe it important for teachers, no matter what their specialty, to be clear about how they ground their own values, their own conceptions of the good and of the possible. Do they find their sanctions in some supernatural reality? Are they revealed in holy books or in the utterances of some traditional authority? Do they, rather, depend upon their own private intuitions of what is good and right? Do they decide in each particular situation what will best resolve uncertainty, what works out for the best? Do they simply refer to conventional social morality, to prevailing codes, or to the law? Or do they refer beyond the law--to some domain of principle, of norm? To what extent are they in touch with the actualities of their own experiences, their own biographies, and the ways in which these affect the tone of their encounters with the young? Teachers need to be aware of how they personally confront the unnerving questions present in the lives of every teacher, every parent: What shall we teach them? How can we guide them? What hope can we offer

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them? How can we tell them what to do?⁷⁵

For Greene,

The teaching problem seems to me to be three-fold. It involves equipping young people with the ability to identify alternatives, and to see possibilities in the situations they confront. It involves the teaching of principles, possible perspectives by means of which those situations can be assessed and appraised, *as well as* the norms governing historical inquiry, ballet dancing, or cooperative living, norms that must be appropriated by persons desiring to join particular human communities. It also involves enabling students to make decisions of principle, to reflect, to articulate, and to take decisive actions in good faith.⁷⁶

Greene seeks to,

...connect the undertaking of education . . . to the making and remaking of a public space, a space of dialogue and possibility. All this has meant a continuing effort to attend to many voices, many languages, often ones submerged in cultures of silence or overwhelmed by official declamation, technical talk, media formulations of the so-called "true" and the so-called "real." The aim is to find (or create) an authentic public space, that is, one in which diverse human beings can appear before one another as the best they know how to be.⁷⁷

Since,

It is through and by means of education, many of us believe, that individuals can be provoked to reach beyond themselves in their intersubjective space. It is through and by means of education that they may become empowered to think about what they are doing, to become mindful, to share meanings, to conceptualize, to make varied sense of their lived worlds . . . The dominant watch-words remain "effectiveness," "proficiency,"⁷⁸

In this regard, Greene views multiculturalism also as an extension of the existential nature of education. Multiculturalism breaks down the absolutes of the society, leaves everything open for negotiation. She says,

We are challenged to come to terms with

conceptions of difference and heterogeneity . . . We are asked to acknowledge contingency, meaning the dependence of perspective and point of view on lived situation, on location in the world. We are only beginning to realize the significance of perspectivism, of the rejection of objectivism, of fixed authorities, of standards residing in some higher realm . . .⁷⁹

But,

How do we solve the problem of inducting the young into what Dewey spoke of (in *Democracy and Education*) as a "homogenized and balanced environment"--or, better, accustom them to a "unity of outlook upon a broader horizon than is visible" to the members of isolated groups? Once we recognize that situation--"depression, war, and fear" perhaps, color perhaps, class perhaps--cannot but affect vantage point even on shared experience, we can no longer take for granted the easy achievement of a unity of outlook.

There will always be difficulty in affirming plurality and difference while working to build a community. . . . Multiculturalism sharpens the dilemma in many ways, once the distinctiveness and passion of multiple voices are attended to, and once the need for conformity or, at least, common agreements becomes urgent.⁸⁰

Finally, Greene observes that,

There are two streams (of education) running side by side: the stream of collaboration, teacher research, whole language, aesthetic education; and the stream of computerization, technicalization, measurement, control. In some manner, we will have to find a way of uniting those streams . . .⁸¹

The life work of Maxine Greene has certainly aided in our understanding of some of the problems of unifying various streams of education. Maxine Greene's quest for education as reflective practice, wide-awakeness, and social concerns, seeks, "to open up our experience (and, yes, our curricula) to existential possibilities of multiple kinds . . ."⁸² This means posing questions about education in this society. The questions having to do with defining education, determining educational purposes, (and) achieving democracy.⁸³ Future work in these areas will certainly contain many more **footnotes to Maxine Greene.**

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GEORGE S. COUNTS' CONCEPT OF THE PERFECTIBILITY OF MANKIND AND SOCIETY

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Much has been written about George S. Counts and the educational philosophy associated with him known as social reconstructionism. Most writers seem to agree that Counts advocated a kind of radical progressivism or perhaps that Counts was a radical Dewey. While there is some truth to that argument, I am not so certain that Counts' educational thought is as close to Dewey's as I once believed. Nowhere is that more clearly shown than in Counts' concept of the perfectibility of mankind and society.

Counts' writings about the perfectibility of both mankind and society suggest a position other than that generally associated with modern liberal thinkers.

Nevertheless, it is an important idea not only because it is directly centered in the educational philosophy that has come to be associated with him, namely, social reconstructionism, but because his argument seems to be such a sharp departure from what many consider his pragmatic roots. Interestingly enough, it is not a concept that is clearly defined in the literature about Counts, nor is it particularly well-explained by Counts himself. My purpose in this paper, then, will be to examine the writings of George S. Counts on the perfectibility of mankind and society in an attempt to clearly define what he meant, and then assuming his thoughts on this subject can be clearly defined, to analyze it in terms of whether the idea has any merit.

I begin the paper with an attempt to define perfectibility of mankind," so that I might, in turn, use that definition to establish a standard by which to measure any reference Counts might make to such a concept. To that end, I have decided to use Owen's definition of perfectibility found in the *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*¹ where he tells us that generally speaking, philosophy assigns two meanings, oftentimes overlapping, to the term "perfection." Those definitions are as follows: First, it means "completeness," "wholeness," or "integrity." Thus, something is perfect when it is free from all deficiencies. Second, perfection means the end or a goal. Aristotle said that once an entity is perfect it has reached its goal by actualizing its potentialities and realizing its specific form. Owen says that when these two meanings are brought together . .

. a thing is complete or entire when it has fulfilled its nature and thereby reached its end."² (87) Thus, the perfectibility of mankind and society is complete when it has fulfilled its nature and thereby reached its final end. I turn now to Counts' concept of the perfectibility of mankind and society.

When looking at Counts' rather impressive list of publications, the most cogent reference to the perfectibility of mankind and society is found in his book, *Education and American Civilization*.³ Here he says that the "humanistic spirit proclaims the doctrine of the perfectibility of man and society."⁴ Specifically, the human spirit rests, he says, in faith in human powers.⁵ Now this idea could suggest an acceptance of classical liberalism, namely, a faith in reason to uncover the secrets of natural law which, in turn, will unlock the secrets to the perfectibility of man and society. Counts clearly acknowledges his debt to those Enlightenment thinkers here when he writes the following:

Yet the humanistic spirit proclaims now, as stoutly as it did in the Age of the Enlightenment, its belief in the possibility of human progress and the perfectibility of man and his institutions. It might even contend that the intervening years have strengthened the conviction that man can increasingly surmount his infirmities and become free. It certainly would insist that man, by his own efforts and through a process of self-discipline, may lift himself to an even higher and finer state of being."⁶

Although Counts refers to the unbroken bond between his concept of the perfectibility of mankind and society and that of classical liberalism, there is no evidence that he believes the concept exists a priori as natural law. He pointed out, for example, that progress toward the perfectibility of mankind, taken for granted by the Enlightenment scholars, was not at all certain. On the contrary, progress could, Counts said, take the direction of fascism or communism, hardly an end that is good. This suggests he was positing something quite different from that of Enlightenment thought but unfortunately muddies the waters when he attempts to explain what he means.

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Clearly influenced by modern liberalism, Counts believed that the method of science in tandem with the humanistic spirit mankind can perfect itself and its institutions. Counts himself says it this way: "In common with the humanistic spirit, it (science) proclaims that only through the development and discipline of his own powers can man master his earthly home and shape his destiny, perfect both himself and his institutions."⁷ Yet, with all of his respect for the method of science, Counts goes on to tell us that science is not enough. "...science is less than a philosophy of life, of history, and of civilization."⁸ He goes on to write:

Although there is perhaps no realm of experience to which the scientific method cannot be fruitfully applied, it can never usurp the functions of art, ethics, religion, and politics. In a broad sense both science and scientists are subject to the moral law. This much we have learned during the past century, since those now almost forgotten days when the early devotees of science saw the gates of the kingdom of God swinging open at their magical touch. To be sure, we may still be confident that those gates will not swing open on the earth for the great masses of mankind without the assistance of science. But, science is not enough."⁹

Clearly Dewey would part company with Counts here. For Dewey, science is enough; it is the method of intelligence, the method of life, the method of history and of civilization. Furthermore, Dewey does not agree with Counts when Dewey explains the difference between "End" as final and perfect and "end-in-view" as infinite.¹⁰ Dewey and most modern liberals say that there is no evidence that an End exists. Rather, they say, all the evidence points to end as end-in-view. That is to say, an end once reached is not final. It then becomes the means to reach new ends in an unending process of means and ends.

Counts, on the other hand, brings in the idea of both Final Ends and a higher law when he tells us that science and scientists are subject to the moral law. What is this law and where does it come from? Counts cites Albert Einstein's well-known argument that science can tell us what *is* but never what *should be*.¹¹ We must seek another source for the latter, Einstein says. That source, says Counts, is integrated among the other great values of our civilization, particularly the rule of law and the democratic faith, an idea that sounds more like the classical liberalism of Hutchins and Adler than perhaps anyone else. For if there is an American way of life," Counts said, "its essence is to be found in

employing those values to bring social change and even social revolution under the rule of law."¹² It is our Constitution that legalizes the political struggle and endeavors to direct that struggle through peaceful channels by means of the ballot and majority rule."¹³ If we do that, we will be on the way towards the perfectibility of mankind and society.

The closest Counts comes to telling us what he means by the perfectibility of mankind and society is found, I think, in his classic work, *Dare the Schools Build a New Social Order*. Here he tells us that the perfectibility of mankind and society is firmly grounded in both the moral law and social democracy. As for the latter, it is important to remember that we should not identify democracy with political forms and functions--the Constitution, popular election of officials, or the practice of universal suffrage. He writes:

The most genuine expression of democracy in the United States has little to do with our political institutions: it is a sentiment with respect to the moral equality of men; it is an aspiration towards a society in which this sentiment will find complete fulfillment. A society fashioned in harmony with the American democratic tradition would combat all forces tending to produce social distinctions and classes; repress every form of privilege and economic parasitism; manifest a tender regard for the weak, the ignorant, and the unfortunate; place the heavier and more onerous social burdens on the backs of the strong; glory in every triumph of man in his timeless urge to express himself and to make the world more habitable; exalt human labor of hand and brain as the creator of all wealth and culture; provide adequate material and spiritual rewards for every kind of socially useful work; strive for genuine equality of opportunity among all races, sects, and occupations; regard as paramount the abiding interests of the great masses of people; direct the powers of government to the elevation and the refinement of the life of the common man; transform or destroy all conventions, institutions, and special groups inimical to the underlying principles of democracy; and finally be prepared as a last resort, in either defense or the realization of this purpose, to follow the method of revolution."¹⁴

Counts says that although these ideals have never really been fully realized or even accepted anywhere in the United States, they do have authentic roots in the past. Indeed they do. One can find sprinkled among his words the teachings of Jesus, the writings of Marx, the

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thoughts of Locke, Jefferson and Madison, as well as the mind of Dewey, to mention only a few. Without question, Counts' rather eclectic view of the perfectibility of mankind and society is centered in the great values of our civilization which means it is consistent with the classical liberalism of the modern perennialists Hutchins and Adler. Not surprisingly, we also see similarities and differences with the classical liberalism of Enlightenment thought.

Counts seems to agree with both the Perennialists and the Enlightenment scholars that the perfectibility of mankind and society is an "End" that once reached is complete and final. All agree that once the perfect society is reached it will remain forever since there is nothing beyond the End. This, of course, is the concept of perfectibility described by H. P. Owen above. They part company, however, at this point: Enlightenment thinkers assigned the perfectibility of mankind and society to the realm of a priori natural law. In other words, perfectibility is out there waiting for us and if we place our faith in reason and use it properly humankind will arrive at the perfect society. Progress, then, is inevitable toward that End. Counts and the modern Perennialists, on the other hand, are saying that the perfectibility of mankind and society is found in the great values of civilization and that if we use our intellects to examine those values we have it in our power to perfect ourselves and our society. Progress is

not inevitable, however. On the contrary, we must be vigilant in our efforts for if we are not, humankind and its social orders can be shaped by the forces of evil. None of this, of course, is consistent with Dewey's instrumentalist thought.

Counts is to be commended for his faith in humankind to perfect itself and its societies, but I think, his concept of perfection as an End is shown to be naive in light of Dewey's ends-means relationship. Perfectibility as a final End is simply not possible in the temporal order. Perhaps the best we can hope for on this side of the grave is Dewey's idea of the Great Community(ies) that he suggests in *The Public and Its Problems*.¹⁵ Even that, however, seems further and further distant to me at times.

I am led to believe for the most part, George S. Counts was a modern liberal in some ways but a classical liberal in others. As a result, I concur with Lawrence Dennis in his book, *George S. Counts and Charles A. Beard: Collaborators for Change*¹⁶ that Counts was not a philosopher. Be that as it may, perfectibility of mankind and society was at the center of his social thought. He was convinced that we have it in our power to perfect ourselves and to build perfect societies if only we would set about to work toward those Ends in a peaceful and rational way. His suggestion for doing that, of course, is his well known educational philosophy, social reconstructionism.

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Social Abrasion: What Does it Mean to be Present?

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Introduction

This discussion about social abrasion was written to think about how mediated communications might be used for education and for communication in general. It is not an attempt to discourage or denigrate the used of mediated communications but to rethink, on my part, what it means to be present in the world. What value should we place on being physically present? What kind social interaction do we need to be mindful of in school? What should be mediated and what should be left to a social abrasion that wears down barriers between people and allows them to form useful and productive social solidarities.

Social abrasion means being present, which implies physical proximity and the social abrasion that such physical presence produces (Polanyi, 1966). For this discussion, social abrasion has been broken into the following categories: physical presence, emotional distance, simultaneous two-way verbal and visual access, private communication, and local knowledge.

Physical presence is an important part of social abrasion. In western civilization each person maintains approximately a three-foot distance between their body and the bodies of other people. This distance is either reduced or expanded based on interactions with others (Goffman, 1974). The expansion and contraction of this physical distance is an example of the abrasion between one person and another. Social abrasion means contact and social exchange - a contact that wears away the social distance between individuals over time and allows us to create useful alliances. Abrasion occurs socially through verbal and nonverbal communications. If people are separated physically as they are in mediated communication (any communication that separates teachers and students by time and space), social abrasion is reduced or nonexistent because there is little possibility of physical contact. Physical distance also decreases interpretation of nonverbal communication. For example, in a long camera shot facial gestures are lost, hand gestures become smaller, and a coherent sequence of body movements becomes less visible to viewers.

Emotional distance is decreased through the possibility of physical presence. For example, the threat of being physically harmed or the pleasure of being physically touched are eliminated through distance education. Emotional identification with someone who is simply an image on screen may be more difficult (Altheide, 1976).

Trust, in part, may also be a function of physical distance. According to some researchers (Fleming and Levy, 1992), credibility is a product of appearance and personal identification and is problematic when mediated. Leiter (1980) states that authenticity can be achieved by the handling of real objects and the sharing of those objects in a common space. Personal narratives delivered by instructors or guest speakers may be less realistic when conveyed through a media (e.g., television, film) often associated with fantasy (Altheide, 1976). Simultaneous two-way verbal and visual access are standard in a traditional classroom environment but are not guaranteed in "distance education," especially when visual access is limited to one site at a time in a multi-site communication. Social abrasion also means the possibility of one-on-one oral and written conversations. This is extremely problematic with distance education because what one person says is heard by all. Also important to social abrasion is the honoring of local knowledge (Greene, 1986). It is possible that knowledge, like bread, is best made locally (Taylor and Swartz, 1991). For example, the classroom experience and interpretation of the meaning of course content can vary from site to site (Anyon, 1981). Meanings can vary from site to site because different sites may represent clusters of people with similar experiences that are unique to their areas. The ability to bring everyone together in one location to produce a common discussion seems impaired by mediated communication. The combination of these elements: physical distance, emotional distance, simultaneous two-way verbal and visual access, private communication, and the maintenance of distinct knowledge bases (local knowledge), may reduce the social abrasion which seems to be a crucial characteristic of social exchange.

Swartz: What Does it Mean to be Present

Physical Presence

Fleming and Levie (1992) note that objects and events that are encountered close together in time or space, or in the same context, will tend to be perceived as somehow related. In fact, those who edit motion picture film and television video manipulate proximity in time, space, and context to establish relationships between scenes in dramatic and informational programs (Bordwell and Thompson, 1997). A character may be shown in New York City, on the Staten Island Ferry; then, in a phone booth; next, on an airplane; and, finally, on a beach with palm trees in the background, walking with his wife. In less than fifteen seconds, the relationship between time, context, and space have been altered dramatically by placing four images on a short strip of video tape or motion picture film. This is fine for the entertainment industry but could become problematic when we use media for everyday human-to-human communication.

The problem of physical distance from another person is a case in point. It is difficult to edit physical presence. We cannot change the physical aspects of time, space, and context so easily. It might even be harmful to our understanding of the world. Richard Rorty (1991) in his volume of philosophical papers titled *Objectivity, Relativism and Truth* stated that our beliefs are not obstacles between us and meaning, they are what makes meaning possible. When we describe the physical world, the issue is what language we shall use to tell the story. The key term here is language. The weaving and reweaving of language is local. It occurs within a meaning-making group which Rorty refers to as a solidarity or ethnocentrism. Meaning is what is done in terms of action, and language about action. He describes a text and lumps as artifacts that can help us to cope with the world through the meaning we make of it. A lump is something that you would bring for analysis to a scientist, while Rorty's text is something that might be a phonetic or graphic feature of an inscription. Text and lumps can be known physically but only given meaning through the weaving and reweaving of stories about them. One recent example that comes to mind is the comet, Shoemaker - Levie 9. Its impact on theories about the composition of that lump were as explosive as its impact on the surface of Jupiter. Much reweaving of the stories about Jupiter in the language of Astronomy has taken place since the collision of comet with planet. The physical properties revealed by the collision indicated that previous ideas and theories about Jupiter were wrong. A new context for understanding Jupiter needs to be generated. Rorty made a relevant

observation on meaning and physical objects: "We pragmatists must object to, or reinterpret, two traditional methodological questions: 'What is appropriate to this object?' and 'What is it that we are putting in context?' For us, all objects are always already contextualized" (p. 97). Meaning, it would seem, is defined by actions and stories within an ethnocentrism. The stories, language, and interpretations of the lump known as Jupiter have changed quite a lot within a short period of time. Someone not a part of the ethnocentrism / solidarity of Astronomers would not be aware of the exact nature of that recontextualization. It is a product of that context and its language. Rorty, in an essay on non-reductive physicalism, extends this argument of an extant context for understanding texts and lumps. A context which is generated by a solidarity of common language and action and gives meaning to the world, also defines our physical (lump) and mental (textual interpretations) existence.

...that to have a belief or a desire is to have one strand in a large web. The "I" which is presupposed by any given representation is just the rest of the representations which are associated with the first - associated not by being "synthesized" but by being parts of the same network, the network of beliefs and desires which must be postulated as inner causes of the linguistic behavior of a single organism. (p. 123)

For Rorty, physical texts and lumps are contextual. To separate the physical from the interpretive realm of its solidarity of origin, is to remove the physical from understanding. We weave and reweave meaning from networks or webs of beliefs and desires which are contained in our language or stories. The farther we remove the physical and mental from its solidarity, the farther we are from understanding them.

George Herbert Mead and John Dewey had similar ideas. Mead talked about stimulus, response and manipulation of stimuli through past experience and present circumstances, in order to rehearse an appropriate response from others. In this view, every act is a socially defined and motivated act. We consult our network of past ideas to address a possibly novel set of present circumstances in order to rehearse actions that will be acceptable to a web of meaning and beliefs held by our those within our solidarity. Dewey (1984) does something similar to Mead. His observation, inference, and action bear a strong resemblance to Mead's stimulus, manipulation, and response. "Inference is possible only when we have had past experience

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comparable to the present situation, since it is a comparison to similar past experience and the present situation" (p. 122). What Rorty has done is to extend the tradition of pragmatism to the milieu of current discussion.

While it may be advantageous for film makers and video producers to manipulate physical presence, it has the potential to decontextualize what is being viewed and obscure meaning. Andre Bazin, the enormously influential French film critic and philosopher, who inspired Jean Luc Godard, Francois Truffaut and Alin Resnais to produce the New Wave films which combined criticism and art on the screen, addressed the concept of presence in an essay (Bazin, 1967). He raises the following issues. In theater, the stage welcomes every illusion except that of presence. Film on the other hand, accommodates every reality save on the presence of the actor. Bazin asks:

Can the photographic image, especially the cinematographic image, be likened to other images and in common with them be regarded as having an existence distinct from the object? Presence naturally, is defined in terms of time and space. "To be in the presence of someone" is to recognize him as existing contemporaneously with us and to note that he comes within the actual range of our senses - in the case of cinema of our sight and in radio of our hearing. Before the arrival of photography and later of cinema, the plastic arts (especially portraiture) were the only intermediaries between actual physical presence and absence. Their justification was their resemblance which stirs the imagination and helps the memory. But photography is something else again. In no sense is it the image of an object or person, more correctly it is its tracing. (p. 96)

In a footnote, Bazin also notes that the actor spectator relationship is incomplete in television and film. The viewer is a voyeur who can see but not been seen. There is no return flow of discourse. Physical disconnection is complete on both sides of the screen. In the case of a computer, there is at least the possibility of an algorithmic imitation of a human response as long as the viewer's input stays within the program's parameters.

John Berger (1973), in *Ways of Seeing*, states that we never see just one thing. We are always looking at images through the lens our of relationship to it and ourselves. In early art, paintings, statues, and murals, were part of the building in which they were seen. You had to go there to see them. There were a few contextual clues as to their meanings. Reproductions, whether by

photographic, video, or digital imagery, lose their context and are changed by what one sees in sequences before or after it.

What does it mean to be physically present? We gain the meaning of what we see and hear. By degree, when we are physically separated from the ethnocentrism / solidarity that through action and language created meaning for a picture or sound, we lose the original meaning of the text or lump. In mediated communication, the new meaning is ours or the person who is borrowing the tracing of the original object or text. Mediated communication may be an experience but it is a communication separated by time and space if it can said to be communication at all. Communication separated by technological time and space gives power to a producer removed from immediate accountability to the viewer. C. S. Lewis (1947, p. 143), in an essay titled *The Abolition of Man*, warned that "What we call man's power is, in reality, a power possessed by some men which they may, or may not, allow other men to profit by." A message which cannot be understood can be, it would seem, easily manipulated.

Emotional Distance

Emotional distance can be the result of physical separation between those who are engaged in mediated communication. The physical separation can take place when participants are separated by time. A presentation is produced at one point in time and presented a later date. Most films, videos, computer programs, or CDs are produced with a later dissemination date in mind. Physical separation can also take place in space, as in the case of two-way interactive video. In this type of distance education, people are separated by a very small amount of time, but they are usually separated by a large measure of space. Emotional distance is increased greatly in cases were there is no interaction between participants, as in the case of most film and video products. Limited physical availability reduces the threat or delight of physically managing objects or people. It removes us from the immediacy of human interaction and the social abrasion that wears down the emotional space between individuals so that meaningful alliances can be made. There is a great deal of literature about classroom climate and long term association between teachers and students. Research by Brown et al. (1982), about the British Open University, suggested that emotional bonds between students were facilitated when they could be in personal contact, and that a great many students preferred being present to distance

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education strategies that imposed physical separation.

Even when distance education means two-way interactive video communication, most literature recommends that distance education instructors make personal physical contact with their students at "remote sights," at least two or three times a semester. What may be more important, is that this separation in time and space forces us into accepting the limitations of the mechanical environment, to the extent that we must use the logic of machine protocol to access information. We even talk of virtual communities. Richard Stoll (1994) responds to the idea of virtual community:

But what an impoverished community! One without a church, cafe, art gallery, theater, or tavern. Plenty of human contact, but no humanity. Cybersex, cybersluts, and cybersleaze, but no genuine, lusty, roll-in-the-hay sex.

And no birds sing.

Even ignoring everything palpable - children's laughter, plum jam, my sister Rosalie's green sports car - what's missing from this ersatz neighborhood? A feeling of permanence and belonging, a sense of location, a warmth from the local history. Gone is the very essence of a neighborhood: friendly relations and a sense of being in it together.

Oh - I hear you: It's only a metaphorical community. Much of what happens over the networks is a metaphor - we chat without speaking, smile without grinning, and hug without touching.

On my screen, I see several icons - a mailbox, a theater, a newspaper. These represent incoming messages, an entertainment video, and a news wire. But they're not the real thing. The mailbox doesn't clunk, the movie theater doesn't serve popcorn, and the newspaper doesn't come with a cup of coffee at the corner cafe.

How sad - to dwell in a metaphor without living the experience. (p. 43)

Joy, according to C. S. Lewis (1955), is not a concept and it cannot be mediated. Joy is an experience which must be lived. And for Stoll, education is like joy, which cannot happen over a speaker, a television, or a computer screen. Stoll's version of education comes to children when they experience warmth, human interaction, and the thrill of discovery which he believes occurs only with a teacher, live, in a classroom.

Simultaneous Two-Way Verbal and Visual Access

We wave our arms, move our hands, smile, frown, stomp our feet, slump. These nonverbal cues provide a more trustworthy comment on the verbal message (Bateson, 1972). This sort of metacommunication provides a great deal of information. During speech, we vary tempo, hesitations, intonation, volume, overtones of the voice and pitch. In addition, we expect that verbal and nonverbal (visual) communication, as well as the content of language, to coincide. Making sense of language lies in understanding cultural meanings, rules, and patterns of talk (Spradley, 1980, Wolcott, 1995). Rorty's ethnocentrism of action, language, and local knowledge, is in agreement with the practice of qualitative researchers, who define communication by observing and recording local communication in order to understand and analyze data about specific cases (Yin, 1994). As we step back from the original time, space, and context of communication, we step away from its meaning.

Letters and email exclude visual and verbal qualities. The remaining text is separated from its original time and space, which would provide a great deal of information about the relationships surrounding and giving meaning to the message. Television shrinks nonverbal communication. Both television and film decontextualize the original event or object of communication through editing and shot selection. Telephone conversations capture voice but eliminate visual information. The point is that mediated communications reduce information and contextual interpretation of meaning.

Simultaneous two-way visual and verbal information is a quality of social abrasion that defines and enriches our understanding of messages. Mediated communication can limit simultaneous two-way visual and verbal access, and when it does, the sense of "being present" is diminished or lost.

Private Communication

Private communication means the opportunity to personally confront another individual. Social abrasion, at a minimum, allows for the potential of such an exchange.

In a recent study on distance education, I noticed that a private conversation was only possible for the person who was at the originating site. There were a number of students at four locations across the state. Instruction was being conveyed through two-way interactive video via statewide fiber optic networks. Instructors and students could see and hear each other.

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The students could always see and hear the instructor, providing the equipment was functioning correctly, but the instructor could only see one site at a time. The remote sites were voice activated. If someone at the remote site made a sound, the system would switch to that site, allowing the instructor to see the speaker. One-on-one communication was possible if the other sites remained silent, but the conversation was not private because what one site heard, all sites heard. Telephone conversations are one-on-one, but anyone with a scanner can listen in on a telephone conversation - they are not private. Internet communications are only private if the network administrator is not interested in them or is not asked to track them on an ongoing basis. In the study, the only student who actually had an opportunity for a private conversation with the course instructor was the one who was physically present with the instructor. On at least two occasions he came to talk to the instructor privately, in her office, before or after the class session. Interactive mediated communication offers an opportunity for immediate one-on-one interaction, but does not allow for private conversation.

Our realities are defined by personal, sometimes private interactions (Hall, 1969, 1977). For example, we learn the use of space and intimacy as babies and children from our parents and other primary groups (Miller, 1973). This is done physically and, in the case of parents, sometimes privately at four in the morning. It is through the use of context, and time that we learn the difference between intimate distance, personal distance, social distance and formal distance, as Edward T. Hall (1969) defined the terms. Most of our actions (I cannot think of an exception.) are social actions (Patton, 1994). Our use of space, nonverbal and verbal communication are all learned behaviors transmitted to us from primary groups.

Being present means the possibility of private one-on-one communication with another human being to discuss issues that can be of significance to both people. Meaning can be very personal and intimate (Bruner, 1990). Without the opportunity for private communications, in homes, schools, churches, and businesses, some intense and important communications would not happen. Private communication is part of being present.

Local Knowledge

The classic discussion of curriculum contained within the covers of the Saber-Tooth Curriculum (Benjamin, 1939) stressed the importance of relevant local curriculum - that is, relevant through current social

action. While fish-grabbing, tiger-scaring, and horse-clubbing, may be a good curriculum in some parts of the world, stone-stacking and counting may be valuable to learn in other areas. Knowledge is not value neutral. It exists because some solidarity, to use Rorty's term, thinks it of value. Physicians from modern Western societies have invented Ethnomedical studies which focus on local naturally derived medicines of indigenous cultures. Ethnomedicine seeks to discover local medical remedies before the cultures that use them become extinct and the habitats which are the source of local medicines are destroyed. These medicines are the result of local knowledge and medical experience and are only found in the ethnocentrism of their origin. The value of this particular kind of local knowledge can be measured by the millions of dollars that drug companies are spending to bottle it. Ethnomedical studies require that researchers be physically present for extended periods of time in order to learn local medical practice and to discover the natural pharmacies that help to heal local patients. It is not the accumulation of facts that is sought but rather the experience and beliefs of local physicians that is the prize.

Krishnamurti (1953) was very clear about his view of education:

The accumulation of facts and the development of capacity, which we call education, has deprived us of the fullness of integrated life and action. It is because we do not understand the total process of life that we cling to capacity and efficiency, which thus assume overwhelming importance. But the whole cannot be understood through the part; it can be understood only through action and experience. (p. 20)

Action and experience produces local knowledge and requires our physical presence. Local knowledge requires our participation. Rorty refers to a bazaar of ideas in which people of different ethnocentrisms can shop for ideas that might enrich their own ethnocentrism. He appears to be concerned about how human beings can survive together on this planet. How can we establish enough communication so that we do not destroy each other because we have not lived in every ethnocentrism and, therefore, may not understand differences of other ethnocentrisms sympathetically? Enrichment of an ethnocentrism may simply be gaining enough understanding to avoid going to war with people of a different ethnocentrism. Finding meanings for negotiation may be enough. Rorty (1994) urges us to keep the bazaar open: "By attending to the reports of our

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agents of justice, we can see how such strong,
ethnocentric, exclusivist selves might cooperate in
keeping the bazaar open, in keeping the institutions of

procedural justice functioning." (p. 210)

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FOR WOMEN: THE LONGEST BATTLE

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All the major civilizations predating the Golden Age of Greece assigned subordinate social and educational roles to females. As part of social structures, education reflected these differentiations. Although the earliest Sumerian women were probably polyandrous -- suggesting an equal if not dominant social role -- the civilization from 3500 B.C. forward was male dominated. Select Sumerian boys were taught government and law in formal schools, while girls learned cooking and child care from their mothers at home. Wellborn Egyptian boys, from 3100 B.C. forward, began their education at 5, but girls, wearing pigtailed and playing with dolls, received none except informally at the hands of their mothers.

From earliest times, therefore, and with few exceptions Western females have been regarded as homemakers, ornaments, helpmates and conjugal partners. Almost none received the same kind of education as males. Similarly, the early Eastern civilizations of the Indus and Yellow River valleys, which flourished from 2700 to 1500 B.C. were patriarchal, and females were generally cast in supporting roles. The Hebrew prophet Moses, credited with writing the *Pentateuch*, believed that God had commanded women to submit both to their husbands' affections and to their rule. Indeed, throughout most of the *Old Testament*, virtuous women are portrayed as being submissive to men and supportive of them. The ideal wife, King Solomon wrote, worked to the advantage of her husband, satisfied all his needs and never hindered him. This Judaist idea of female subordination in educational and social matters carried forward into the early Christian church. Although Jesus, as founder, had seemed to dignify women as full persons, thereby attracting large numbers of them to his movement, he made no explicit call for their social parity. Nor did Paul, who organized the early church. Indeed, Paul's views on women were entirely traditionally, and his writings tended to set women off as an inferior and dependent class. Confucius required wives to obey their husbands *and* their husbands' parents. And Mohammed, and probably his 12 wives and three concubines as well, believed that in Paradise men would be waited upon by beautiful sloe-eyed

virgins called *houris*. With each religion, substantive education was a male prerogative. Boys were educated in the laws and the classics -- and girls, separate and apart, were trained in the domestic and household arts.

Much of the non-sacred literature of antiquity also shows a male bias and male orientation. In his *History of Animals*, Aristotle had noted that females by nature were "more jealous, querulous, prone to despondency, more apt to scold and strike, more deceptive and false of speech, more void of shame and self-respect, and more shrinking and difficult to rouse to action." Males, by their natures, Aristotle believed were "more spirited, more savage, more simple, more hopeful and less cunning." Even among lower animals, "nature makes a differentiation in the mental characteristics of the two sexes." Males are "more courageous than females, and more sympathetic in the way of standing by to help," he declared. Thus, in the animal kingdom, the "male is superior and the female inferior; the one rules and the other is ruled." Of necessity, this principle of male predominance "extends to all mankind," the "true intentions of nature" being revealed in the behavior of lower species. In the human family as in the animal kingdom, "the male is by nature fitter for command than female."

In the Middle Ages, Thomas Aquinas wrote that if God had intended women to govern, Eve would have been created from Adam's head, not his rib. Reflecting a more enlightened age's questioning, Shakespeare's Katharina condemned women who sought "supremacy and sway" when they were bound to "serve, love and obey." Jean Jacques Rousseau, called females "the sex which ought to obey." The whole education of girls, he wrote, "ought to be relative to men, to please men, to be useful to them, and to make their lives sweet and agreeable." Rousseau's *Emile* prescribed quite a different kind of education for boys. Dr. Samuel Johnson, remembered for his prejudices and personality, was aghast that women should enter into the ministry, and agreed with James Boswell, his biographer, that the sexes would probably never be equal, "even in heaven." Yet, Johnson believed that women would be "none the worse" for a man's education, even though the idea ran counter to "the common notion." For Boswell's part, it

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was enough that women be “sensible and well-informed. Charles Darwin, grandson of a ranking English feminist, believed males to be clearly superior to females in matters requiring “deep thought, reason and imagination.” “Whatever men took up,” he wrote, whether science, history or philosophy, they clearly attained “a higher eminence” than women.

It was argued that schools would harden and deform girls and make them unattractive and unmarriageable, militating against the home and family. It would come to race suicide, many complained, if girls should become so independent that they had no need to marry and produce children. An educated woman would be disrespectful to her husband, it was believed, and no man with even a semblance of pride could long tolerate an “uppity” woman. They would refuse to do housework and turn their children over to schools as babysitters.

Physically, it was believed that girls’ brains were “too light, their foreheads too small, their reasoning powers too underdeveloped, and their emotions too easily worked upon to make serious students.” Girls had a certain amount of “superficial cleverness,” it was widely agreed, and they could “pick up” a little of almost any subject. But they were far too shallow to go into anything very far. Intellectually, they were not up to the mark. But even if they could pass their courses, their health would fail in the process; girls simply could not study as many hours per day as boys could. They could not be put through the same rigorous intellectual course as boys; they would die in the process. And even should some survive the training, the intellectual rigor would make them harsh and competitive, when in fact they were meant to be soft and submissive. Finally, on physical grounds, the most competent medical authority stated that female study would impede the milk supply of mothers and interfere with their nursing capabilities. The philosopher, Hubert Spenser, wrote that strenuous study might even cause infertility in women.

Even at the beginning of the present century, G. Stanley Hall, one of the foremost scholars of his day and founder of the child studies disciplines, opposed coeducation of the sexes in American high schools. “Bookishness is a bad sign in girls” he wrote, and “suggests artificiality.” Indeed, coeducation might make boys effeminate and “attract them out of their orbit,” and it could “functionally castrate girls” and cause them to “lose pride in their sex,” and lapse into “mannish ways and ideals.” In any case, girls were weaker, especially during menstruation, Hall believed, and might not bear up under the strain of a male education. They

should not “pluck the apple of intelligence at too great a cost of health. Accordingly, Hall recommended a “humanistic and liberal” education for girls focusing primarily on “wifehood and motherhood.” Certainly chemistry and physics were “too complex” for females and should be kept “at the elementary stages,” he wrote. Zoology should be taught with plenty of pet animals, and botany should emphasize flowers and gardening. Again, Latin and Greek were too complicated, but conversational dinner French was not. And in no case should girls be trained to independence and self-support. In fact, Hall wrote, “excessive intellectualism instills an aversion to brute maternity,” and this could doom the race to extinction, much the same as the celibacy of early Christian monks (an elite intelligentsia leaving no posterity) contributed to the arrival of the Dark Ages. The only advantage to coeducation -- if indeed there was one -- Hall wrote, accrued to boys. For they would probably study harder to outscore the girls, and their conduct, in the presence of girls, would probably be more refined.

Early support for female education began in England during the 17th Century. One of the first to speak out was Bathusa Pell Makin. Ladies of leisure and intelligence should be granted full educational opportunities with men, Makin wrote in 1673. No public or social use would be made of their education, she assured her readers, for indeed God had “made man the head.” Instead, the purpose of women’s education would be to polish their souls and make them better helpmates to their husbands. Learned women would not be overbearing or “impudent.” Even men stood much to gain from female education, Makin wrote; for men, “becoming ashamed of their own ignorance,” would take up studies themselves so as not to be outdone by the weaker sex. Why should women settle for the curling iron and fashion, she asked, when they could become “philosophers, poets and mathematicians?”

Mary Astell, a London essayist, complained that although much time, care and expense were given to the education of boys, girls were given little or none. Indeed, boys had “every imaginable encouragement,” she wrote in 1697. By their education they gained “title, authority, power and riches.” Yet, girls, whose minds were equally worth training, were driven from the “tree of knowledge” by the “never-failing scarecrow of laughter and ridicule.”

Early in the 18th Century, Philip Stanhope, the fourth Earl of Chesterfield, expressed the wisdom of the times regarding women in a letter dated September 5, 1748. “Women are only children of a larger growth,” he

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wrote. "They have an interesting tattle and sometimes wit; but for solid reasoning good sense, I never knew one that had it, or who reasoned or acted intelligently for four and twenty hours together." A man "of sense only trifles with them, plays with them, humors and flatters them, as he does with a child," the earl wrote, and he "neither consults them nor trusts them with serious matters; though he makes them believe that he does, for they love mightily to be dabbling in business which they always spoil."

Later in that century, Mary Wollstonecraft produced *Vindication of the Rights of Women*, a work whose influence on the history of women has yet to be equaled. Writing at the time of the French Revolution, which she feared would not materially alter the position of women, Wollstonecraft condemned the practice of educating girls only in the "miscalled accomplishments." Among the more popular of those were subjects like music, dance, reading, art, conversational French and Italian, writing, needlework, and works of travel and poetry. Only a few of the better women's schools permitted more than "a peep" at the barest outlines of mathematics, science, and language. (One tongue was quite enough for a woman, it was sardonically claimed.) The accomplishments, Wollstonecraft wrote, mutilated the "mind and spirit," and reduced girls to the role of sexual beings and kept them in a state of "specious innocence" and "perpetual childhood." Indeed, the trivial attentions and "regal homage" men heaped upon women (attending to doors, picking up handkerchiefs, etc.), only "insultingly support(ed)" their own superiority. As long as women were beguiled by such "ludicrous ceremonies" which continue to live in a state of "gilded slavery." Furthermore, a national system of coeducation catering to the middle and lower classes -- and not to "ladies" only -- was needed, she argued, so that women could be taught to be "rational wives" instead of "alluring mistresses."

How much better to converse with men as friends and equals, thereby challenging them to higher, more noble thought, than to seek to "impress" them by watching to turn an apt French expression, or work in some obscure line of Greek poetry. Indeed, educated women could rid themselves of their "gay and giddy" stereotype and stamp out the old humbug linking femininity and frailty by which woman had so long been given to swooning and delicate health. Why labor "to be weaker than nature intended," she asked, when muscular strength, the main source of male superiority, had long been renounced by men themselves as inimical to the

character of a gentleman?

Wollstonecraft roundly denounced sexist intellectuals like Rousseau, the Reverend James Fordyce, and Lord Chesterfield. Rousseau was only a "learned pig," she wrote, whose imagination had "run wild." How his "mighty sentiments" were lowered when he spoke of women, e.g., that girls, by nature, were fonder of dolls, dreaming and talking than boys. Such "ridiculous stories" were "below contempt," she wrote, and they did not merit "serious refutation." Neither would Wollstonecraft have girls read the sermons of Dr. Fordyce since they depicted virtuous women as being little more than "house slaves." Such "sentimental rantings" were "indecent and disgusting," she wrote, and indeed they entirely "moved [her] gall." Chesterfield's views on women were "unmanly, frivolous and immoral," she declared.

A remarkably liberated woman for her time, Mary Wollstonecraft did not fit into the conventional mold of 18th Century womanhood. Indeed, she rejected fashion, accomplishments "undue adornment," chivalry, ballroom courtesies and belittling patronage, and her message was that women were more than frail barks on a storm-tossed sea. They could take charge of their lives, she believed, and refuse to be pets or clinging vines inspiring only paternal and degrading epithets like "baby" and "doll." With education, they could change the "kiss me and be quiet" attitudes of men, and gain happiness, self-mastery and financial independence, never again being reduced to "pocket searching" for miscellaneous expenses. Wollstonecraft declared war on every cliché of her day. It was *not* clever of girls to pretend ignorance in the company of boys; it was *not* masculine to want a male education; and education would *not* lower a woman's charm value, nor would it diminish her capacities as a mother. Written in just three months, *Rights of Women* created a sensation in Europe and the United States, and gave Wollstonecraft worldwide fame and recognition.

Charles Darwin's grandfather had no interest in educating girls for their future emancipation, but only for their personal development and possible later stand-by use. Education, he wrote, should instill in girls the "mild and retiring" virtues, as opposed to the "bold and dazzling" ones, and it should reinforce the "youthful timidity" and "blushing embarrassment" of young girls, these being, he wrote, "the most powerful of their charms." Darwin did not intend that girls be given a full boys' education. But his plan came closer to providing one than any other plan then proposed.

Teeter: For Women: The Longest Battle

But the prevailing sentiment in the United States at this time still took its inspiration from John Winthrop, the first governor of Massachusetts. Winthrop had written that a "godly young woman" of his acquaintance suffered a nervous breakdown because she had given "herself wholly to reading and writing." Had she attended "to her household affairs," the governor wrote, "and such things as are proper to women, she might have kept her wits." With the development of the concept of gentility in the early Victorian period, such objections to female learning gave way to a new set of objections; namely, that education would coarsen girls and render them masculine and unmarriageable.

But the rise of an entirely new class of working women in America was more important than any of the foregoing writers in the educational emancipation of women. The rise of industrial manufacturing changed the basic fabric of everyday life for virtually the entire country. Power looms, for example, gave rise to a new textile industry, and removed the production of clothing from home to factory. Increasingly, women and adolescent girls moved to large cities, where factories were located to take advantage of power and cheap labor supplies. As young girls were exploited in the mills and sweatshops of the period -- northern capitalists were making more from hiring labor, it was said, than southern planters were making from their slaves -- the traditional view of women as delicate flowers fit only for hearth and home could not long survive. In effect, the position of women changed from that of a parasitic class, which was generally *acceptable* to men, to that of a vast oppressed vassalage, which was *unacceptable*-- particularly to men socialized in Victorian ethics, i.e., possessed of gallant and chivalrous instincts. It did little for their idealized view of girls as "graceful creatures" to watch them shovel coal in 160-degree heat at a smelting plant, naked from the waist up, or to see young women grow old before their time working 80-hour weeks, and often falling asleep at their machinery in the mills of the day. Indeed, education came to be seen as a means by which girls and women might obtain more "gentle" employment. An increasingly large number of men came to see education as a means by which girls could escape the degradation of this new serfdom, and also as a means by which they could hold on to or regain their natural femininity and womanhood. Whereas the view had been that education would coarsen girls, it came to be that education would reinforce and strengthen their femininity. A far greater number of men began to look at female education in a softer light on moral grounds.

At first, a few schools admitted girls for an hour's instruction before and after school, while the boys were away. Others paid teachers a small additional fee to teach girls during the boys' lunch hour, or on Thursday afternoons which was then a holiday from school. Still others admitted girls to studies from 5 until 7 in the morning during the summer months -- May through September -- while most boys were away on harvest or vacation. Some schools simply gave the long term to boys and the short summer term to girls. But usually rooms and teachers were different; and usually girls were taught in inverse proportion to a subject's true importance. Music and dancing were the subjects most emphasized for girls, while the boys' forte -- Latin and mathematics -- were hardly emphasized at all. Girls copied pencil drawings, memorized poetry, and studied some of the rules of grammar, but in the latter case, emphasis was superficially placed on the exceptions to the rules. Very slowly, the traditional views concerning girls and education began to change, and imperceptibly, the place and position of women began to change. Personal loveliness came to mean something more than grace at pouring tea, or kindness, obedience, loyalty and usefulness. It came to embrace to a small extent the qualities of intellect and reason. Learning need not be acquired at the expense of femininity, many came to believe. It was not necessarily assertive, mannish, uppity or conceited for women to want to develop their intellects beyond the point of mere literacy.

But increasingly after the Civil War, high schools began to admit girls, especially those in the large cities; by the end of the 19th Century about half the grammar schools in the country educated boys and girls together, in the same rooms at the same times and under the same teachers. But beyond grammar schools of seven or eight year's duration, and beyond high schools of two, three or four years' duration, Americans opposed collegiate education for girls.

Here, at the collegiate level, men drew the line. Indeed, many complained, it was difficult to imagine that a girl could be so self-destructive as to want a man's *real* (higher) education. They simply would not hear of coeducation at the undergraduate level.

But a few women began attempts to bypass undergraduate education altogether and break into graduate and professional schools for the learned professions -- education, medicine, law and the Christian ministry. (The same tack -- breaking into graduate schools in advance of undergraduate schools -- would be taken by African-Americans a century later as they pressed for higher education.) When Elizabeth

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Blackwell applied for admission to a medical school in the 1840's, the entire medical profession was aghast. What woman of modesty would even suggest such an indecency? What proper woman could ask men to remove their clothing for a physical examination? (The reverse situation was, of course, acceptable.) Any real man would rather go untreated than submit to a female examination. What man would stoop to hire such a woman? The study of the human body was not a fit study for a woman of refinement. It would bring impure thoughts to her mind, and her presence both in the classroom and in the examination room would unnecessarily stimulate both sexes. As a compromise, most women candidates for medical school agreed in writing to only treat other women and children below the age of puberty.

Men doctors also feared that women would overpopulate the medical profession and thereby destroy it. No one would hire a woman doctor, not knowing if she could be depended upon in an emergency since her own home naturally came first. Home duties were bound to interfere with a medical practice, many concluded. Women should stick with the Bible which had not recommended them beyond the nursing and midwifery roles. Medical societies, hospitals and medical schools agreed that such professional education would destroy women's delicate feelings and refined sensibilities.

Similarly, spokesmen for the legal profession claimed that women could never master the complicated subject of law; there was a vast difference in the sexes as to the ability to apply and understand legal principles. How could women practice law when they themselves were dead in the law? (The legal existence of a wife was suspended during marriage at the time, so that in most states she could not make a will, sue or be sued in her own name, nor could she inherit property, control her earnings or sign legal papers.) Moreover, a woman's duties were incompatible with public life. The law dealt with coarse, brutal and repulsive affairs, and was therefore not a proper calling for women. Even worse, with legal training women would be able to manage men's property, and they would soon teach other women how to become financially independent of men. This could destroy marriage, the home and the family. Women would be too lenient with criminals; once trained in law they could clamor to become judges, sheriffs, even governors.

Not surprisingly, the profession most opposed to the admission of women to its schools was the Christian ministry. Methodism's founder, John Wesley,

considered it a scandal for a woman to preach, and even Anne Hutchinson, a religious leader in colonial America, had been banished from the church by men who considered her and her doctrines heretical. Quaker women had always preached, but this was a minor sect. Did not the Bible speak clearly on the subject? preachers intoned. Many women answered these admonitions by pointing out that there was no Biblical justification for the inferior position of women, that the scriptures necessarily reflected the agricultural, patriarchal society which had produced them. *True* respect of women did not entail bowing and scraping, but rather respecting them as full persons. If men were *truly* noble, they said, they would raise the position of women, not keep them pinned to the ground with dirty boots. Preachers reminded women that Paul had admonished, "Let your women keep silent in the churches." Women should cleave to the church-related work customarily available to them: mission and social work, teaching, religious, and music education, and even as deaconesses in some instances. Women would have to devote so much of their time overcoming public opposition to their presence in the pulpit that there would be no energy left for God's work.

By the late 1840's, some women were admitted to theological seminaries as special students. First, they could take courses but not degrees, then they could take degrees but not be ordained, then they could be ordained, but preach only if they could find a congregation willing to accept them.

Only seldom did women graduates in any of the professions find work; when they did work, the pay was less than half what their male counterparts earned. If women graduates found work, and subsequently married, they usually gave up their professional lives, on the principle agreed to by both sexes -- that no married woman should take work from a man.

Some of the strongest objections to female education came from men who thought the movement was "anti-man" in its motivation. It wounded their dignity that what women were really objecting to was the patriarchal family, the kind sanctioned in the Bible. A coming matriarchy was predicted, and this would completely explode the husband's conjugal authority. Education would destroy romance, it was said; it would compromise a woman's femaleness and lead to disillusionment. It would lessen a girl's conjugal attractions, lead to an irregular sex life, and cause both men and women to lose their mutual dependence upon the other. It might even become necessary for American men to send to Europe for their wives, wrote Dr.

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Edward H. Clarke of the Harvard Medical faculty in 1873. In sum, girls differed from boys in their tastes, games, family relations and occupations. So why should schools seek to wipe out that distinction.

Coeducation thus seemed to be an acceptable compromise. Marriage partners-to-be could take the measure of each other in school. Marriages could be more reciprocal with neither sex owning or dominating the other. Boys *and* girls could obtain a more balanced or “symmetrical” view of questions under study. Discipline should improve with the coeducation of the sexes. Costs should go down since it was doubly expensive to maintain a dual set of schools.

Increasingly in the late 19th Century, coeducation in high schools and colleges came to be seen as normal, natural, economical, convenient, and judicious -- and of positive benefit to *both* sexes. The next step was to let women have their own *programs*, with the idea that it would preoccupy them and forestall greater ambitions. Indeed, there were many kinds of higher education, conservatives began to say, and college girls need not always pursue the same *courses* as boys. An entirely new course of studies (now called “home economics”) was introduced into the colleges that women were beginning to attend. New courses in child care, cooking, sewing, and budget-making were justified in that they could not help but improve home life and elevate the housewife beyond the menial factory worker. The ultimate expression of this separate-but- equal reasoning was the establishment of women’s colleges which did not admit men. Among these were Vassar, Smith, Wellesley, Bryn Mawr, Mt. Holyoke and Randolph-Macon, and all appeared on the scene during the 30-year period, 1861-1891. All had high admissions standards, all attracted top-rate faculty, and all were handsomely endowed. The minimum age requirement was 14. These schools came into being because even in the late 1850’s, major American universities such as Harvard, Columbia and Yale had little good to say for coeducation. The president of Harvard had stated that “an immense preponderance of

enlightened public opinion” was against the college coeducational experiment. The president of Yale could see “no possible use” for a college degree for a girl. (Keeping the sexes apart at night would require “constant, sleepless vigilance” another president feared.) Girls simply were not welcome at the major universities. But as a compromise, Harvard did permit some of its professors to leave on their own time and hold classes for a few girls, who except for their sex, met all Harvard’s other admissions requirements. In time this unofficial affiliate school came to be called “the annex.” No degrees were awarded, but the annex did confer a certificate of attendance, and it did state in writing that the recipient had pursued a course of study equivalent to that for which the B.A. was conferred at Harvard. Finally, in 1893, the annex gained an official Harvard endorsement as Radcliffe College. The school’s degrees were countersigned by the president of Harvard. Finally, in 1943, Harvard itself was open to girls.

Almost all the affiliate and women’s schools had preparatory departments to offer a kind of compensatory education to their students, since few girls arrived at college as well-prepared as boys. They simply had not received a good enough secondary education to pass a rigorous “man’s curriculum.” The affiliate colleges helped break down the prejudices of many professors who thought they would be obliged to water down their courses if girls were admitted to them. The majority of professors fought coeducation to the bitter end. Women were “divinely endowed with the faculty for seeing only their own side,” open professor said. And another complained that because of their “passion for side issues,” they would always be getting professors off the subject.

But these were only beginnings. The most appalling evidence testifying to the persistency of inertia are modern-day statistics: only 9% of all doctor and lawyers are women; only 2% judges; 3% dentists, and less than 2% chemists, engineers or physicists. College educated women earn \$7,000 less than men with a similar education, and \$1,700 less than a man with only a high school diploma. The vast majority of women are still confined to “pink collar” jobs --teachers, typists, cashiers, nurses, bookkeepers, etc. Perhaps as meaningfully as African-Americans, the nation’s women can still chorus at the beginning of the new millennium, “How long, Oh Lord, how long?”

CONSIDERING THE PROCESS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

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This paper might reasonably fall under several categories. (1) A study of the administrative contributions or activities of one of the most successful leaders in the history of higher education in the United States. An individual, Charles Eliot, who at the helm of Harvard University for four decades, piloted it to a position of flagship rank among its peers at the beginning of the twentieth century; (2) A kind of test case for the great man theory, vis a vis "propitious times" view, to explain or to account for why events occur as and when they do; or (3) Use this individual and this institution with the dynamics of the changes that occurred during his "reign" as a situation that might provide some insight from which we might learn about the process of institutional change. How is it brought about? How do individuals active in such events (either working to promote particular kinds of changes or questioning or working actively against such changes) see their roles? What traits/skills we might look for in those most successful in such activities, and what might be included or emphasized in preparing individuals themselves for such change?

While the first two categories are of interest, the last seems of more import in the contemporary world of education. The authors, therefore, will primarily consider this category in this paper.

There have been alternative schema set forth by historians to explain events. Traditionally two major orientations as well as combinations of these two have been articulated. One such view points to the significance of the individual as the "force" that moved and shaped events along a certain course, and hence should be used as the key explanatory piece in solving the historian's puzzle. Simply put, advocates of this view, in searching for the "cause" of some event (or series of events that were thought to be related) would seek out a forceful figure, a gifted and charismatic leader that had emerged at a particular crucial time, and hold that the very presence of this individual lead to or even more strongly, was the primary cause of a particular event or chain of related events.

A contrary view tends to diminish the significance of individuals as the causative agents claiming that an

individual, no matter how able or dynamic a persona, was relatively impotent as a cause in the scheme of things, that the significant factor is searched for elsewhere, namely in the environment. Advocates working from this perspective would claim that the individual (or even a group of individuals) could only realize their ambitions and live up to their potential to bring about changes in the state of affairs if the times were "ripe" for such change.

In the real scheme of things, these views represent polar explanatory extremes rather than strictly observable phenomena. However, since even the most cursory reflection reveals that the "times," the environment in which the figure lived, were likely crucial in "creating" the mature person (with all the ability, ambitions, and charismatic persona) or the "great man" that had such a marked impact on subsequent events. Thus, the great man (person) view stated as an extreme position, fails to take into account the impact of the "times" on the development of individuals, "great" or not. The opposite perspective suffers from a similar exaggeration as well. The "collected" actions of a series of individuals, none apparently noteworthy in their own right, may nevertheless have played a role in influencing the course of events that laid the foundations in creating the "times" propitious for the great individual to emerge on the scene and make an impact significant enough to gain recognition by future historians.

While this debate usually concerns the broad canvas of human history, it might also prove illuminating on a more restrictive scale. When trying to explain (or understand) why institutions change along certain lines (or are marked by certain courses of development) one might use this traditional conceptual scheme of historians to take note of individuals who were in positions of authority or leadership within the institution or community under study. Changes that occur within an institution, and the relative impact of individuals working within such institutions when contrasted with the environments (external and internal) that exist at particular times in the life of the institution can prove enlightening.

This study examines the possibility of controlling

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factors that might lead to - or less rigorously, "influence - the course of development of an institution. That is, if institutional change is desirable, and some consensus exists concerning the nature and direction of such change, then deliberations about the means of bringing about such change are in order. To what degree can human agents of change influence the course of events in the dynamics of the institution, and to what degree will the impact of individuals be limited by the "times" that mark the more general institutional environment?"

Depending on one's ideological leanings (regarding the "great person" view), the strategies for bringing about changes within the institution would vary. For example, deliberations and ultimately decisions concerning funding of particular types of programs to bring about changes or "reforms" within educational institutions, could depend on the qualities or abilities of individuals to be involved in such projects. Their position of authority would need to be considered.

If this study is to have some practical import, then it should provide some insight to those involved in establishing policies or making decisions in the future. While the primary concern of this study is not on the past; it may prove helpful to focus on an historic figure and his role within an academic institution in juxtaposition with a description of that institution's development during the time when he lived within the academic community. The particular example to be used as the historical exemplar is Charles W. Eliot, President of Harvard University from 1869 to 1909.

During his tenure, often called the Golden Age of administration at Harvard, many major changes occurred. Many of these major changes became benchmarks of quality education at many colleges and universities across the country. Among the changes were:

1. the role of faculty from disciplinarian and father figure to that of lecturer and scholar;
2. new, and tougher, admission requirements that created an older and more responsible student body;
3. on campus living requirement dropped creating opportunities of choice;
4. allowing students to congregate in large groups on campus;
5. an increase in course offerings;
6. an expansion of the faculty, and
7. the elective system.

How Charles Eliot was able to provide leadership in these decades of sustained change will be the focus of this discussion.

Change

All institutional organizations, including academic ones, are complex systems, whose parts are closely interrelated; a change in one part reverberates throughout the system, often with unexpected consequences for the whole. If innovations are made with the intent of improving the overall quality of the institution, changes may have to be implemented in other parts of the system to ensure the success of the change contemplated (Thomas & Vanderhoof, 1997, p. 78).

Eliot sought to change both the academic and social culture of Harvard. He saw a need to create an environment at Harvard that was dedicated to developing not only a knowledgeable but also an educated and more mature graduate. He realized that if innovations were to be made to improve the instructional process, changes would also need to be implemented in other parts of the organization. Changes would need to successfully have a significant impact on the institution in, at least, four major areas (Fullan, 1991).

1. Active Initiation and Participation

More often than not, a core group of people is involved at the initiation stages of change. Expansion of the core becomes a point of focus. Key factors include the opportunity for active involvement and input from all constituents and the issue of empowerment. We will come back to this last issue a little later.

2. Pressure and Support

Successful leadership relies on the blending of these two activities in order for change to occur and be sustained. "Successful change projects always include elements of both pressure and support. Pressure without support leads to resistance and alienation; support without pressure leads to drift or waste of resources" (Fullan, 1991, p. 91).

3. Changes in Behavior and Beliefs

What we believe greatly impacts our behavior. Time spent on activities, such as the change process, can cause participants to either turn away or support initiatives. Therefore, there must be careful attention paid to creating supportive and successful experiences within the organizational environment.

4. The Overriding Problem of Ownership

Most members of the organization must become active participants in the change process. They must also begin to feel a part of the changing system. A sense of ownership must begin to develop for change to be sustained. Individuals must feel a sense of obligation and commitment to the mission of the organization.

All the above areas must be linked to experiences with high levels of success during the change process. However, often one area leads, creating the environment for the other factors to succeed. Eliot, it seems, chose the first of these four areas as the engine pulling all the other links along. The notion of empowerment, it seems, took center stage as Eliot led the change process during the Golden Age of administration at Harvard.

Empowerment

The word empower is defined by the American Heritage Dictionary as: To invest with legal power; authorize. To enable or permit. This process places a person or organization in a position to grant, bestow, enable, authorize, commission, permit, allow, give, etc. and individual or group something. In other words, in order to empower others, leadership should provide opportunities for active and meaningful involvement, a real voice in decision making and recognition of individuals for work well done.

The premise of empowerment is enhanced when it is defined as the obligations and commitments an individual makes to the community or organization. Empowerment becomes a challenging proposition when individuals have opportunities to make many of their own choices and have a voice in the decisions made by the organization of which they have membership. Individuals develop a more conscious awareness of their ability to see themselves and the organization more clearly. They also are better prepared and willing to help move the organization towards what it can become.

Charles Eliot's leadership in the changes implemented at Harvard seem to embody the premises discussed here concerning empowerment. By designating an administrator to handle most discipline issues, faculty could spend more time on scholarly activities. Faculty began developing better class activities and creating new courses. A new excitement about teaching and research emerged. The more stringent admission requirements also challenged faculty to work harder in their academic pursuits.

Allowing students to live off campus and to congregate on campus provided a new level of freedom.

They were able to freely discuss issues with the assurance that their opinions would be seriously considered before decisions were made. Students, liking what they were experiencing, began to take on the responsibilities to ensure the continuation of these newly acquired freedoms. Students began to enjoy the ability to select from a growing list of course offerings. Due to these changes, more faculty were needed and hired.

By any measure or standard, Charles Eliot's impact on this premier institution in American higher education is indisputable. This may seem to beg the question, since the proponent of the "times" view on explaining the changes in institutions would claim that we give too much "credit" to Eliot as an individual, and insufficient "credit" to the institution before and during his tenure as president. In any event, Harvard was marked by significant changes (typically viewed as positive) in size (both student body and faculty), institutional reputation, expansion of course offerings (both in terms of the number of such courses and also a marked increase in the level of specialization characteristic of the courses being offered) and significant intrainstitutional changes in terms of structure, support, and administration.

By any standard, Eliot could be claimed to be a "Great Man" in terms of development of the University he led for decades. Particular examples of such changes as were wrought during his administrative leadership have been discussed in more detail elsewhere, but a reiteration of them in general terms may give one a keener awareness of both the scope of these institutional changes as well as provide data for further examination given the particular focus of this study.

Eliot offers us an example of the "Great Man" in action during his four-decade reign. However, an examination of his earlier career as student and academic at Harvard "muddies the waters" when used to support the "Great Man" position relative to institutional change. His mentoring by a previous Harvard president gave him entree into the problems confronting the institution. This mentoring combined with his personal family background and the "connections" that these relationships provided young Eliot may account, to a significant degree, for his being able to be an effective agent within the dynamics of the institution.

There were also a number of other individuals present on the scene without whom Eliot might not have been able to bring about the significant improvements to Harvard. In addition, changes within the tenor of the American academic community, e.g., the pool of

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scholars available to be recruited as specialist scholars for an institution that wished to improve the rigor and sophistication of its curricular offerings was due largely to developments within German universities, and the attractiveness that these institutions held for young aspirants to academic glory in the United States.

While the term "change agent" was not one in common parlance in the 19th century - one can imagine that Eliot, the ultra correct New Englander, would likely have physically cringed if the term had been used to describe him. It (change agent) nevertheless is the idiom of our own day, and from our own perspective, he might justifiably be called a potent and dynamic agent of change in higher education.

We are so often disappointed in our collective efforts to bring about changes in institutions - both individual colleges or schools as well as "education" in general. Gaining some understanding of the types of factors that seem to influence the course of institutional life (its social, political, and cultural dynamics), even if one is still left less sure about the relative impact of such factors may prove of some worth for policy makers and those who implement such policies.

For the purposes of our inquiry, it seems helpful to make a distinction between two variants of this term or phrase, namely between "agents of change" on the one hand, and "agents for change" on the other. An agent "of" change is one who, as a matter of fact, has influenced a situation, or in our case, an institution, and as a result of such influence, the institution has been altered in some way. The actions of this agent may have been non-deliberate or unintentional. Indeed, in extreme cases, the changes brought about by the person's actions may have been undesirable ones from that individual's perspective.

An agent "for" change is one who acts to bring about changes in a deliberate and purposeful way, quite

consciously intending such change. This person would likely be committed to such actions, having thought out such activities using effectiveness and efficiency as criteria for judging among the courses of action that would lead to the attainment of such changes.

One might use the following historic example to illustrate the difference between these two uses of the term. It is usually believed that the German government abetted Lenin in his efforts to return to Russia, culminating in his arrival at the Finland Station in St. Petersburg. Assuming this course of events to be true, then one might say that the Germans were agents of change in that they did, as a matter of fact, bring about significant changes in the course of Russian history. The changes that these agents hoped to bring about, namely that of bringing about the collapse of Russia and signing the treaty that would remove them as an active enemy in the conflict was achieved. However, the longer term effects of their assisting Lenin in returning to his homeland, namely that of eventually endangering the political, economic, and social stability of Germany was not among the intended changes that they planned. They were thus largely agents of change at least in long range terms. Lenin, on the other hand could be said to be in a more significant way, an agent "for" change, for it seems safe to hold that his intentions were to return to Russia and bring about a revolution in the basic structure of that country.

What is to be learned from such a study? While Santayana's dictum (learning is history) may not be wholly applicable in this case, for perhaps only a small minority of Harvard alumni would ever admit that mistakes had (or could) be made in that institution's August past, it does seem appropriate to the extent that it might help us to become clearer about the process of institutional change, and what we might look for in potential agents of such change and more particularly, how desired traits of character and skills might be developed in those who showed promise of being effective agents for change.

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PROTAGORAS : A PROTOTYPICAL HUMANIST

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Background of paper:

Many of us tend to soak up the prejudices against sophists and sophism as we are nursed with our Platonic mother's milk. After successive readings of Plato, however, one may come to note that there is a marked difference in treatment within the Platonic dialogues of Protagoras on the one hand, and the bulk of the sophists on the other.

Plato's trenchant critiques and denigration of the sophists may stem not only from purely intellectual grounds, but also understandingly, from the possible motive of attempting to establish a clear line of demarcation between the sophists (clever and cunning though they may seem to be) and his master, Socrates.

Parenthetically, one wonders what might have happened if Protagoras had been fortunate enough to have had as able and as articulate a disciple as that of his antagonist Socrates. It is unlikely though that Protagoras would have been a figure that would have generated the same feelings of veneration in a young Plato as Socrates had apparently done. Certainly one cannot imagine Protagoras allowing the Athenians to put him to death. However, in fairness to Protagoras, he was not in the same position vis a vis Athens as was Socrates.

The intellectual history of the West might have been somewhat different if someone of Plato's stature had chosen him as one worthy of "starring" in the dramatic dialogue genre. He might also be better known if more of the works that are attributed to him had survived, rather than the tantalizing fragments that are credited to him. Under such circumstances, in time I think that one would be led to a more equitable view of this most noted and noteworthy of the Sophists. A few words are certainly in order concerning the title of the paper. The entries found in the dictionary under the term "prototype" offer the following meanings: - an object or device not "finished" in some substantive sense; - a model to be tried out, demonstrated, or tested.

These meanings seem appropriate for use in the context of this paper, since it might be claimed that the sophists could not be considered to be "finished"

humanists since they were among those charting the very intellectual course to be pursued by their intellectual descendants. With regard to the term "humanist" the case is a little less clear, since it usually is associated with the group categorized under this label during the Renaissance period. This term is, of course subject to a variety of interpretations. Cicero may be given credit for the notion of *humanitas* that serves as a term closely associated with the humanist. Humanists have tended to view their fellow human beings as the focus of and the orientation point for study; we are the intellectual, spiritual and moral center of things. One might propose as a starting point for this inquiry a conceptual link between the sophists and the term "humanist" by citing the attributes mentioned by Professor Jarrett in his work dealing with the educational theories of the sophists, namely,

The sophists exhibit humanistic tendencies in their

1. rejection of theology in favor of a man-centered ethic;
2. crediting humans with not only the possibility of, but also the power to improve their condition.

In our search for a prototype, one might ask why we would select Protagoras from this group credited with being the first professional teachers? He is usually taken to be the best known of this group and the individual of greatest intellectual stature, i.e., the "best of the lot." Incidentally, this should not be taken to imply the best of a bad lot. If we designate them as representatives of the "teaching profession" of the time, then it would be safe to say that teaching and teachers certainly had their critics then as now.

They were not without their critics among their contemporaries. We have already alluded to Plato's caustic view of them, but he was not alone for many other individuals had no trouble in compiling a list of suitable adjectives for these sophistes. A selection of these are as follows: "disputatious, controversial, pugnacious, combative, acquisitive" - they were classified as dissemblers and word jugglers along with other equally "complimentary" labels.

Vanderhoof: Protagoras . . .

Xenophon has Socrates (in *Memorabilia*, I, vi, 13) label them as "prostitutes of wisdom," and Aristotle (*De Sophisticis Elenchis*, XI, 165A) brands the sophist as "he who makes money from an apparent but unreal wisdom" and, "the semblance of wisdom without the reality." Rather strong pejoratives, yet these verbal "tars and feathers" from such notables are probably mild compared to the less articulate, but more forceful and unprintable oaths and groans uttered by Athenian aristocrats whose sons may have been "corrupted" by these sophists. In this regard, one might take note of the pitiful father caricatured by Aristophanes.

Ah well, one can't please all of the people . . .

We do, however, have a problem with reconstructing this figure Protagoras. As is common with many fascinating figures of the period, our sources are somewhat limited. What is interesting, is the fact that though we have mere tantalizing fragments remaining there is a consistency among the sources; there is little doubt about what he wrote, though there is certainly a range of interpretations as to what these writings meant.

The reconstruction must be accomplished with literally bare skeletal remains of what was perhaps a modest but not inconsiderable body of writing. This problem should not be completely unexpected, given the tendency of the period and the sophists emphasis on oratory, the spoken word.

What do we have?

1. Fragments of the pre-Socratics (edited by Diels-Kranz);

2. Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic philosophers (Kathleen Freeman);

3. A few pages of material (almost "gossipy" in tone, from Diogenes Laertius);

4. An assortment of other second and third-hand recollections, attributions, descriptions, quips, quotes, etc. Perhaps a more gifted writer than I could cast his life more in the form of a docudrama, that genre that is in such vogue in the contemporary medium of television.

Though he certainly shares similarities with other sophists, he is different enough so as to incline Plato to compose (within the limits that might be expected of one who was attempting to refute his position) a rather respectful portrait of him. One might gain a clearer understanding of the validity of using Plato's description

of him by considering an analogous situation. Letters of reference or reports written by one's close friends are typically accepted by skeptical scholars (or search committees) only at a sharp rate of discount. Positive or complimentary reports by those whom one might not expect to be so favorably inclined to the subject may very well be valued at least at their face value and perhaps even with a slight premium. If your "enemies" or ideological opponents respect you, then this phenomenon merits our attention.

The story of his life may be sketched out quite quickly, since again the relevant material is scanty. He is believed to have been born in Abdera, a city of some renown in Northeastern Greece; a city characterized as "an Ionian island in a sea of Barbarism." It is interesting to note that ethnic insensitivity is nothing particularly new.

While there is general agreement regarding his place of birth, there is less on other aspects of his life. There is significant dispute about the dates of his birth and death though a date around 485 might be safe compromise for his birth. This becomes important, for if this is at all accurate (or even more so if he was born later than this), then he is not all that much older than Socrates (perhaps even an older brother type).

There is also disagreement about his parentage and the socioeconomic standing of his family. Among the many variants, one story tells of a father rather wealthy, someone who had even entertained Xerxes and received the King's permission to have his son educated by the Magi. Another narrative has Protagoras as the son of a family that was quite poor, and that he worked as a common laborer as a young man. Still another variation adds a bit of drama to his life story and credits him with being "discovered" by Democritus (another Abderan of note) and mentored by him to some extent. As is often the case, the paucity of data allows for the "creativity" of the biographer to emerge.

It also seems evident that he visited Athens several times, and was a close friend of Pericles. It may be likely that he was selected by Pericles as a tutor for his son.

The fragmentary nature of the remains of his works has already been noted. The most significant fragments attributed to him come from two of his major works. His most notable assertion is found in "On Truth," that man is the measure of all things, of those things that are, that they are, and of those that are not, that they are not. Few statements of relativism are expressed so briefly, though

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there are varying interpretations as to exactly what he meant. Another of his works, "On the Gods," contains an equally concise view of the agnostic position, namely, "with regards to the gods, I cannot know whether they exist or do not exist, nor what they are like in form; for the factors preventing knowledge are many including the obscurity of the subject and the shortness of human life."

Though brief and sketchy and severely limited, they are a significant intellectual legacy, being among the most pithy statements of the relativist position and that of the agnostics ever recorded. For someone who had the reputation of being wordy at times, these statements are short and to the point, though certainly open to multiple interpretations.

Among the other works, since lost with which he has been credited by contemporaries and others are the following: "On Ambition," "On Virtues," "On the Errors of Mankind," "On Constitutions." It is evident that he was an individual of broad interests.

For Protagoras, man is not only the measure of all things, but indeed the "inventor" of much of what had been naively attributed to the gods or Nature, e.g., civil law. This view, when juxtaposed with the position mentioned above, i.e., the possibility and power to bring about improvement, implies that humans both possess the power (to bring about change) and are the inventors of institutions that had previously been thought to have been the creation of the gods. Further, they must also bear the moral burden of being the agents responsible for the appropriate use of such power and the consequences of the "inventions" that are created. We humans can no longer evade this responsibility by attributing such events to the capricious actions of the gods, or by claiming that the "devil made me do it."

Protagoras was an individual who was actively engaged in the affairs of mankind, not a theoretical recluse and deliberately so; one cannot envision him in Plato's academy. Parenthetically, it is interesting to compare his efforts and experience in the real world of human affairs and Plato's rather disastrous forays into the world of real politics. Nor would one think, that if he were alive today, that he would be quietly contemplating abstract questions in a "think tank" of some sort. Indeed, it would be interesting to speculate about the "career path" that this gifted, ambitious individual would pursue in the 21st century.

He seems to be a rather radical figure, bursting on the Hellenic scene, an era that was already embroiled in

a tumultuous course of affairs throughout the fifth century. While he might be labeled a radical from one perspective, it should be noted that it is likely that, in any conflict between the existing *nomos* (customs or traditions of the culture) and the individual's propensity to "go it on one's own" he, like the perplexed father in the "fiddler on the roof" would likely come down firmly on the side of "tradition."

In order to set his life in some broader perspective it might be appropriate here to sketch in the general background as a means of more clearly articulating his life and predicament in the overall *Zeitgeist*. It should be noted that this portrait will be quite speculative; indeed the dominant pigment used in this rendering might be seen as a vivid shade of hyperbole.

A brief summary of the situation in this century might be expressed by citing the following characteristics of the period. The Greek *poleis* [1] had chased out the Persians, certainly not easily, and not without cost. They were as the circumstance warranted in such cases, "flexing their political and economic muscles." There was an increase in the traffic between the Greeks and their neighbors, and an expansion across the Mediterranean and even into the Black Sea. This economic and social intercourse with strangers (*barbaroi*) led to an acquaintance with laws and customs markedly different from their own. This situation set the stage for those so inclined to scrutinize existing norms and standards that might have remained unexamined in the absence of such exposure. The question arose as to whether these customs and traditional ways of thought were man made or were in the nature of things.

In addition, individuals had been speculating about the *ousia*, the fundamental "stuff" out of which things are made. There had been no general agreement about this question either. Thus, in both the moral or value realm and the physical realm, the question was emerging as to whether there were any foundations or standards that were fixed and universally valid. This uncertainty might very well lead one to adopt the position that there was no certain knowledge possible in this area, and that many opinions were not only possible, but perhaps even more disturbing, were equally valid. Such an intellectual atmosphere was an excellent breeding ground for the sophists. Incidentally, it was a period that shared these traits in common with our own era.

It was also a period in which new groups of Athenians (and Greeks as a whole) were gaining economic power and hence looking for their just share

Vanderhoof: Protagoras . . .

of power and prestige within the polis. The increase in Athens' wealth contributed to the potential expansion of the powerful class in Athens, and the nouveau riche were able and committed to provide the wherewithal for their sons to compete with those from older aristocratic families.

A traditional path to fame and fortune for the scions of the aristocratic classes was public service, but while he was serving the needs of the polis, he would at the same time be looking out for the interests of one's family and self. One aspect of this task was, while participating in the affairs of the assembly or in discussions in the agora, to persuade others of the validity of one policy over another or to defend one's own interests in law courts. In this environment, the skills associated with oratory were crucial, since this was the main mode of social and political discourse.

Given an environment that was ripe with the possibility for turmoil and change, and with the increased likelihood that people might entertain the possibly of multiple views on significant value issues, the oratorical skills of an adversary might come to be more significant and persuasive than the "truth."

Enter Protagoras and the other sophists, a group that claimed to be able to develop in those that had the money to pay for such a service, the skills that would enable them to act as "wise" individuals in a world in which there might be no eternal verities, no ultimate and absolute touchstones of what is true or right. These sophistes might be characterized as the "jet-setters" of the fifth century. As a result of their travels through the world of Hellas, they developed friendships and cultivated social contacts in many places.

Most were inclined towards skepticism with respect to moral standards or customs, and believed that in a world in which there is even the possibility that there are no absolute standards, then the prudent, if not the wise man is faced with a quandary. The cunning and unscrupulous will act to determine first, what is in his own best interests, e.g., what particular course of action or policy should be followed, or what view of some situation would be most beneficial to him or his friends; then one would use his skills to persuade others of the rightness or validity of that particular view of things. As an individual Protagoras was not quite as blatant as this however. He debated with Socrates whether "virtue" could be taught in the Platonic dialogue named after him, but he believed that something, whether an "excellence" (arete) or "art" (techne), can and should be taught. From Protagoras' perspective the end or goal of

this educational process is to develop an individual who can care properly for one's personal affairs, so as to best manage one's own household, and also the state's affairs, so as to become a real power in the polis, both as a speaker and as a man of action.

The emphasis in this program is on practical matters and implicitly, the search for first principles or the *ousia* tends to be denigrated. It may after all, be rather fatuous to search for something about which we cannot be certain. To accomplish this task, that is, promoting the development of such individuals, the use of language as a tool to be honed and a technology to be refined had to be a crucial concern. It is not surprising then that we find the sophists attempting to develop in a more deliberate and disciplined manner language as the knowledge base and the tool to be used in discerning "virtuous" action. For humans it is the most significant vehicle to promote social and political interaction, and for Protagoras it will also become the primary instrument of learning and instruction.

According to Greek mythology, Prometheus gave fire to man and this proved to be significant in man's development. For this gift he earned the enmity of the gods. Perhaps it is not too extreme to claim that Protagoras and the sophists turned language "loose" in the world, a technology with great potential for good and for evil.

It must be said that he is not a very significant prototype in the sense that he did not provide a deliberate model to be emulated by later members of the species. He may have passed on his humanistic DNA to many humanistic descendants, but few are willing to grant a legitimacy to this influence. [3]

In summary, one might take note again of his humanistic tendencies, namely his orientation point is a human one, not a divine focus. Humans are the agents of their own destinies, and these become the core and center of our concerns and the focus of our inquiries. His inclination is to address these human problems and concerns in a highly practical way.

Language is perceived as the primary "tool" both to articulate and "sculpt" these issues, and to provide insight for humans in addressing their concerns and affairs.

One notes his propensity to be individualistic, one held in common with later humanists - examples of many of the Renaissance humanists come to mind. Many members of this class tend to have egos that extended rather farther than their concern for others at

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times.

Another attribute possessed by Protagoras and shared by other humanists is the recognition (perhaps quite self-serving in his own case) that the most crucial activity to which humans should direct their energies has to be an educational in essence.

Professor Guthrie offers an insight into his character when he points out that Protagoras' distinction "was to achieve a reputation as a political and moral thinker without supporting any political party, attempting political reform, or seeking power for himself, but simply lecturing and speaking and offering himself as a professional advisor and educator to make others better and more successful in both their personal and professional careers." [2] For one who was able and ambitious, yet born in a relatively unimportant city far

from "where it's at" and of modest parentage, whose alien status precluded his active participation in the political life of Athens or other leading cities, but who nevertheless desired reputation, wealth and the interaction with his intellectual equals, this type of career offered a brilliant solution.

Notes:

1. I have exhibited my biases here of course by using the Attic formulation of the plural rather than the Ionic dialect.
2. This point was made clearly in the paper by Lou Goldman on the Sophists.
3. Guthrie, William K.C., *A History of Greek Philosophy, III*, Cambridge, 1969, pp 266-67.

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PURITAN VALUES REVISITED

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Be ashamed to die until you have won some victory for humanity.

Work to overcome some false opinion or cruelty or guilt.

Horace Mann

Although one may easily view Puritan values as representing a narrow-minded intolerance of a pinched fanatical group of evangelicals, their struggles for religious freedom represented dissidents within and without Protestantism. During the Puritan period (1530-1700) in England there was intellectual turmoil, dissent and questioning of theological positions. Although conservatism reigned supreme in Old Massachusetts Bay Colony, there were liberal Puritans who were affected by the intellectual turmoil in England. The conservatives believed as fundamentalists today in the literal interpretation of the Bible. As is true now, so it was then, that each of us is a prisoner of the age in which we live. What today is labeled intolerance, narrow minded prejudicial behavior, was from the Puritans point of view acceptance of the best ideology for an ideal society.

As Rippa (1997) points out Protestantism was a dominate force in Old Mass. Bay Colony. John Calvin, born in France in 1509 studied law and theology. He wrote the Institutes of Christian Religion and sought church reform from within. Followers of Calvin were puritans in England, Presbyterians in Scotland, Huguenots in France and Dutch Reformed Church in Holland. Their colony was a bible commonwealth, a theocracy of church state. Their ideal society was a class society with Harvard students arranged in order of social class until 1772 and with harsh discipline as well as social ostracism to bring about social conformity. Erikson (1966) points out that there were many contrasts in Puritan ideology. Pride versus humility and conviction versus uncertainty were two sides of a coin. Puritans were plowing new ground in New England (1630-1700) and unwittingly their ideology developed to model the very church doctrine that they were protesting in England. Partially due to their isolation in the new world, they developed a theology designed to be a step above peoples understanding, Church elders

had the only answers and wanted to protect their power and position.

Nathaniel Eaton, one of the first professors at Harvard, not only beat students excessively according to the custom of the day, but embezzled funds as well as selling bad food to students. He was fulfilling the theocracy's ideology by beating the devil out of students. But in his ethical conduct he was a wayward Puritan.

Pilgrims wanted to live in their own isolated communities and rejected the authority of the state over the church. Both Puritans and Pilgrims influenced future generations of Americans. John Winthrop and the Puritans wanted to propitiate God and encourage unity, conformity and subservience to authority.

Wee shall be as a City upon a Hill, the eyes of all people are upon us; so that if wee shall deale falsely with our God in this worke we have undertaken and soe cause him to withdrawe his present help from us, we shall be made a story and a by-word through the world (Rippa: 14).

Curti (1959) noted that Governor John Winthrop felt women should content themselves with the feminine skills and refrain from meddling in such things as are proper for men, whose minds are stronger. Erikson (1966) reported that Mrs. Anne Hutchinson's intellectual questioning of church dogma and authority, threw the father divines into a turmoil. They became more aggravated when she indicated there were only two or three clergymen who knew the Bible well enough to lead congregations and later stated that none of the ministers were competent to preach. Without television, theater and other activities to balance their intellectual debate, theological discussions were the main theater of the day. Mrs. Hutchinson stirred up so much interest,

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churchgoing began to fall. This plus her criticism of father divines was too much. Winthrop explained a woman of his acquaintance had become mentally ill as a result of reading too many books, for:

. . . if she had attended her household affairs and such things as belong to women, and not gone out of her way and calling to meddle in such things are proper for men, she had kept her wits, and might have improved them usefully and honorably in the place God had set for her (Winthrop, Journal II: 225.)

Erickson (1966) noted that the father divines whose power and influence was starting to wane called a religious synod in 1637 to clarify the challenge to authority. During the meeting there was heresy hunting and the clergy in attendance issued eighty-two 'unsafe opinions' and nine 'unwholesome expressions'. There was a purge leading to banishment of Mrs. Hutchinson from the colony. Anne had a civil trial in November of 1637 during which she defended her positions with skill and intellect. Finally Thomas Dudley set a direction for the inquiry by noting that everything was peaceful until Mrs. Hutchinson riled everyone up with strange opinions and questioning authority of the clergy.

Finally, during her civil trial, Mrs. Hutchinson spoke of direct revelation experiences with God, which led to her banishment since she threatened the position of the church as the route to understanding the Bible and God. She had a few defenders such as John Cotton who eventually wavered, then deserted her and, after the trial and being kept in confinement for four months in a house of one of the leading men of the colony, a church trial was held during which time Anne saw the light, confessed and repented. The clergy did not accept her repentance, indicating her expression lacked sincerity, that she was lying, and expelled her from the church and the colony.

Later the Quakers were faced with the same thing and finally the witchcraft hysteria in Salem Village. Erickson (1966) suggests it may have originated in the home of Reverend Samuel Parris, a local clergy. He had a slave girl Tituba who may have influenced children through voodooism and the magic arts. Many of the children exhibited irrational behavior after being influenced by Tituba. Again the clergy was in an uproar and eventually twenty-two persons were hanged from the gallows or died in jail. Finally Governor William Phips put an end to the hysteria and eventually jailed persons were released. It was a timely act since the jails were becoming too full. Erickson (1966) pointed out

that many of the crimes for wayward Puritans were those against the public order, threatening symmetry and orderliness of nature itself.

Winthrop felt that the schools were a safeguard against 'the fiery darts of Satan.' The duty of parents was to educate children in useful trades so they would not become paupers and burden the well-to-do of the community (p.171).

Puritans saw individuals as inherently evil. Their chief concern was with the welfare of the soul. Ozmon and Craver (1995) note that idealists find truth is inherent in the soul of the individual. Thus, education is the process of bringing these truths to the surface. Since many of these truths are directly related to God, education is the process of salvation. Puritans gave us Harvard College, the first college in the colonies in 1636, the Old Deluder Satan Acts of 1642 and 1647, which provided for the common school and Latin Grammar School as well as the Dame School for pre school children. Puritans' educational efforts were all designed to bring out truths already possessed by the soul. Textbooks such as the New England Primer and the McGuffey readers were designed to inculcate respect for religion as well as authority. Pupils' duty was to serve God, honor their parents, and be courteous to all. Pulliam (1995) notes that Puritan values included:

- * respect for authority
- * postponing immediate gratification
- * neatness
- * punctuality
- * responsibility for one's own work
- * honesty
- * patriotism and loyalty
- * striving for personal achievement
- * competition
- * repression of aggression and overt sexual expression
- * respect for the rights and properties of others
- * obeying rules and regulations

These were typical middle class values of the 1950's and 1960's. Curti noted that as Puritan values began to be rejected, father divines such as Cotton Mather lamented the passing of the good old days and saw change as the cause of all black and sad omens

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(Mather 1820). In Connecticut, home to conservative clergy, a law was enacted in 1742 during the revivals to prohibit the educational work of the challenging 'new lights.' Textbooks of the period including Noah Webster's famous Blue Back Speller and the New England Primer stressed God's government of the world with infinite wisdom. Patriotism, loyalty to country, and worshiping with prayer at the beginning and end of the day were part of the ideology of Puritans. The New England Primer contained the alphabet, the Lord's Prayer, Creed, Ten Commandments, and Names of Books in the Bible (Belok 1959). Puritan strictness came through in Horace Mann's belief that mirthfulness should always be associated with the higher faculties. The true student finds a "thousand-fold compensation for all the coarse buffooneries and vulgar jollifications of the world. But let him remember that his wit, in order to be enduring, must be genuine, heart-exhilarating, truth flashing, virtue protecting, vice exposing (Mann: 208-209).

In an address to a graduating class at Antioch, Mann asked "where do immoral students go when they graduate, and what do they become? If not entirely consumed by their vices, and so cast upon the dunghill . . . they usually seek the professions, aiming at wealth in them, or for political distinction through them" (Baccalaureate Address of 1857: 214). Mann believed obedience was indispensable to one's permanent well being. In all cases God commands the performance of duty at all hazards and all sacrifices. Man felt that morality was at the base of a valid education and that the physical university was a patent witness to the need for principled living, healthful living, and social living.

Contributions

In England as in New England, for all of their prejudices, superstitions, and sinister behavior, the Puritans stressed universal education for all classes. They saw connections between economic, social and political institutions. They raised essential questions regarding that we continue to explore:

Who should control education?

How should it be financed?

What should be taught?

Who should be educated?

How is excellence measured and maintained?

The liberal Puritans for all their shortcomings moved to integrating Bacon's Advancement of Learning

and Comenius' (1592-1670) concept of a Didactic College where foremost scholars of the world could advance the arts and sciences and Gloria Dei (Greaves, 1969).

As Greaves (1969) noted, Puritans in England held prestigious positions in universities. The Didactic College was to stand in relation to other schools that the belly bears to other members of the body-worship, supplying blood, life, strength to all.

In 1972 Harry Broudy wrote that systemic and pervasive reform in education awaits changes in the success routes of an epoch and a change in the ideology of the dominant groups of society. He continued by noting that to the dominant groups of our time, the Puritan ethic and the values of classical humanism are still reality, not ideology.

For these reasons, it is incumbent upon educational statesmanship and leadership not to think of educational reform in terms of the pressures exerted on the schools by the foundations, the education industries, or the current regime in the U.S. Office of Education. For systemic reform the leadership has no choice but to guess as shrewdly as it can the shape of the world of the future . . . What ethic will replace the Puritan Ethic? Will the new humanism replace the old? Can we continue to mature technologically and still remain divided into elites and masses? What sort of schooling will a technologically nature society require if that society wishes to maintain some for of democracy? Can such a society find room within the interstices of its web of interdependence for individual freedom? (Broudy: 38).

Broudy called for rediscovering the need for Civitas or good citizenship and Humanitas or the disciplining of thought and feeling through the study of the products of human genius-the classics of literature, philosophy, history, and the fine arts.

Puritan Values Rediscovered

Although as we approach the 21st century and a new millennium, new technology is making our world smaller, creating new innovations for better living, but citizens face the future in a subdued atmosphere of national pride tempered with doubt. The tumult of change that has occurred in society and its institutions, remains to be fully understood. The elements of an open interdependent, interconnected global economy may result in a more open international arena which has yet to be encompassed in national governments.

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Efforts are made to create ideal behavior patterns in language and behavior in the United States. Landay (1997) points to military leaders struggling to deal with verbal and physical sexual harassment problems. Sensitivity and values training is found to be inadequate. Perhaps our concern with using the politically correct language now is reflected in the Puritan divines identifying eighty-two 'unsafe opinions' and nine 'unwholesome expressions'. Public schools are currently including character development in their curriculum to address issues of violence and crime.

As Cotton Mather longed for the good old days, so many in our society long for a caring, people centered society, educational system and workplace. Violence and vandalism plague our society. Even in an economic upswing in our cyclical economic system, there is perpetual fear of downsizing, restructuring, termination of employment reflecting mergers in a highly competitive world economy. This reflects a 'survival of the fittest' mentality in society. Litigation confronts every individual in every action on every front from the home, to the highway, to the workplace. Social fragmentation threatens the nations delicate fabric of unity. There is an ever larger gap between the financial secure and the poor of society. There is a gap between generations since each of which seeks a larger piece of an ever smaller fiscal pie. The ruthlessness of the Puritan society with its excesses was under girded by the desire for social order.

Thus, harsh physical punishment in schools and society was used to deter behavior that threatened the social order. Citizens had a license to watch over their neighbors, to spy on them, so long as their main purpose was to protect the morality of the community (Erickson 1966). Wearing a big D on the back of the coat of a drunkard was an example of social control. Law professor Lino A. Graglia's opinion that black and Hispanic students could not compete with white students at selective colleges and that the cultures from which those students emerged did not emphasize academic success the way others did, resulted in calls for his punishment by minority lawmakers and students. One wealthy member of the board of regents called for his immediate termination white students urged boycotting classes and treating the tenured professor as a 'moral and social pariah'. Social

ostracism is operating now as in Puritan times (Mangan, 1997). Then, as now, our highly publicized court trials exposed deviant behavior for all the world to see, and for the legal rulings to punish. Reputations, careers, lives are destroyed through publicized trials. Sexual verbal and physical harassment and hostile working environment are currently popular themes for litigation. Then as now, those with the deepest pockets had the best protection from punishment for real or imagined deviancies. Although as Marv Albert's, O.J. Simpson's, and Texaco's trials indicate, the cost of litigation over alleged misbehavior can be devastating to reputations.

Other traditional religious societies as in the Middle East use beheading to bring about conformity while public hanging monthly in mainland or extended jail terms in Mainland China is used to punish unacceptable political or economic offenses. One might mention again political correctness, together with a western liberalism's acceptance of the conservative Puritan values of blood, toil, tears, and sweat which Queen Elizabeth recently saw as a trend of the future. The Puritans may have relevance for our time when social fragmentation threatens the social fabric of our society. There are no easy answers to deal with society's disunity, but Civitas and Humanitas are always in order and the search for these universal values are as applicable in our time as in the Puritan day. Then, and now, there was a quest for reforming the whole of society.

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Yunker: Reflections on the Moral Development of Character . . .

REFLECTIONS ON THE MORAL DEVELOPMENT OF CHARACTER IN THE CHILDREN WHO LIVE IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY

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As human beings we want
to care and be cared for.

Nell Noddings
Caring, p7.

Governmental statistics prove conclusively that there has been a sharp decline in the character of the American people during the period 1950 - 1990. Before examining figures from the Department of Justice, let us first as teachers, parents and grandparents consider the life and makeup of the child: the budding person whom David Elkind called years ago *The Hurried Child*¹: Possible suggestions for the revitalization of our culture abound. Yet the problem of our value system and what Robert Coles refers to as the moral intelligence of children² are the concern of this paper.

Human beings, according to Robert Coles, are growing emotionally before the infant utters his first word to his proud parents. Emotional development is prior to the cognitive both in the baby and in the course of evolution. Sequential thinking develops in the neo-cortex and is yet another part of the total organic personality.³

Recently the most popular bookstore in Edmond, Oklahoma, which is the most affluent community in the state, featured two books prominently in window: Siegfried Englemann's latest work along with *How to Help Your Kid Move Ahead* (presumably of others) *In School*. Last summer, while observing Little League baseball, it appeared that our parents including mothers, are more combative than the youngsters.

In August of 1997, Mother Teresa a saint known for charity among the poor, was mourned with an official state funeral in India, a traditionally Hindu national country. Across the former British Empire, in London a thirty-six-year-old mother was mourned. The initial

attitude of the royals, particularly Prince Charles a man of privilege and intellect, but lacking empathy with his people, may threaten the monarchy itself.

In pondering the question of morality in community, Amatai Etzioni, past president of the American Psychological Association, joins our concerns as citizens and teachers. Etzioni documents the "Fall and Rise of the American Condition," from 1950-1990, a period during which many members of this society passed from youth to maturity. In his most recent book, *The Golden Rule*,⁴ Etzioni disputes the classic sociologist, Max Weber, that once a society's moral foundations deteriorate they will continue.

J. Ronald Oakley in *God's Country America in the 50's* examines national pride which peaked in the 50's:

It was a time when America still reigned the strongest nation in the world . . . It was a time when people were proud to be Americans, trusted their leaders and shared a consensus on basic beliefs and values.⁵

In his inaugural address in 1961 President John F. Kennedy boldly challenged the American people: " Ask not what their country can do for them, but what they can do for their country."⁶

Nell Noddings later wrote in *Caring*: "Some things in life must be undertaken and sustained by faith."⁷ Yet the proportion of the people who feel that most people can be trusted declined from 58 percent on 1960 to 17 percent in 1991⁸; in 1998 only 50 percent of Americans voted, alienation from Washington officials arose.⁹

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In today's society it is sociologically impossible to precisely describe the term "family." There are single parents, blended families from prior marriages and in California gays and lesbians unite in matrimony. Formerly shared values gave emotional and intellectual protection to the guidance of children participating in the larger society. In a recent publication: *The Moral Intelligence of Children*,¹⁰ Harvard psychologist, Robert Coles finds that both elite and minority socioeconomic students turn to the peer group "to learn how to take care of yourself." Many become gang-members -- the gang fosters lying, cheating, drug abuse, vandalism and a cynical meanness towards others. These adolescents are seeking a "connection" according to Coles' mentor, the late Anna Freud."¹¹

Teenage girls of lower socioeconomic classes are particularly vulnerable. Becoming pregnant they are immediately dropped by the boy who then carves another notch in his belt. This is true not only of the inner-city, but a typical American hometown. In Ardmore, Oklahoma, several years ago, one stud sported a belt with twenty-five notches -- the girls considered him a prize breeder.

Between 1960 and 1990 the rate of divorce doubled, with nearly half of all marriages ending in divorce in 1990. Both the rate of illegitimacy and its significance are difficult to determine. Etzioni estimated the percentage of all births to single mothers rose by a factor of five from 1960 to 1990.¹²

At the Herbert Hoover Middle School in Oklahoma City, where I served as a consultant for the N.A.A.C.P. last year, one fifth grade of twenty-five youngsters had only four living in an intact home.

Coles writes in the *Moral Intelligence of Children* on the importance of the early years of life. A mother should think of the unborn child with an attitude of caring:

"This attitude is lived out daily, as she establishes regular medical contact with an obstetrician, watching her daily habits of nutrition and avoiding cigarettes. All this has direct consequences for the unborn fetus. The man must take interest in the approaching birth, offering her comfort, reassurance and affection as someone deeply involved in this new life."¹³

The First Methodist Church of Edmond, Oklahoma, helps sponsor Rain, an organization dedicated to AID's patients, a red-haired four year old boy, born to an HIV positive mother is a frequent participant in the children's

hour and an adopted mascot. Although this child is doing fine now, a time will come before he reaches maturity that he will become a cherubim.

A few years ago, I came into a contact with a young married couple from Miami, Florida; both A.P.A. certified child psychologists. She is working to help save the lives of "crack babies" who occupy a large hospital wing. He is trying to place the more promising older children in public schools. The children's attention span is abnormally short, almost nil.

Lawrence Coles in a chapter entitled: "The Moral Archaeology of Childhood" writes that moral life precedes language development. The spoiled child, the withdrawn child are victims of mother-infant symbiosis. "We start sending signals to our kids from day one"¹⁴ one young mother observed in a group meeting. Even in feeding, the infant must learn that the world does not revolve around him; yet, he responds lovingly if cared for with concern. In the first months of life, we set limits for our children.

Once the child learns to use words, come the life of a talking, conceptualizing creature. In the growing vocabulary of the child, there are two important words "yes" and "no." In 1974 Anna Freud in a taped interview with Coles raised the issue of character:

We have learned, I, think, that the yes that goes with understanding a child's drives has to be balanced by the no that goes with understanding something else, the requirements of a reliable conscience.

Think of the narcissism that will come to a child that has been given everything at all times.¹⁵

A recent bestseller, *Emotional Intelligence*¹⁶ by Daniel Goleman traces the evolution of the emotional brain in mankind. The emotional brain which taught early man how to bond with his family, seek protection and discern edible food developed centuries prior to the neo-cortex which performs cognitive analytical functions. The emotional brain can move us to rage or tears, stir us to make war as well as love.

Goleman writes in *Emotional Intelligence*:

Our genetic heritage endows us with an . . . emotional brain that develops our temperament . . . Millions of years later in evolution, from these emotions areas evolves a thinking brain or "neocortex" . . . but the brain circuitry embedded is malleable. Temperament is not destiny . . . This means that childhood and adolescence are critical

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windows of opportunity for setting down the essential habits that will govern our lives.¹⁷

Plato, a great idealist claimed that "Virtue is knowledge" or to know the good is to do the good. Aristotle, in the *Nicomachean Ethics* discovered the good life of happiness for man was a course between excess and deficiency. The supreme happiness for Aristotle is to be found in a life of philosophic contemplation.

In *Teaching and Deed*, Martin Buber distinguishes between the narrowness of the Greek term *Sophia* when contrasted with the Hebrew concepts of *Hokemah* which involves thought translated into action, possible only in the full wholeness of man's being.

William Drake, a Deweyan pragmatist, also rejected the philosophy of idealism, believing ideas must be manifest in action.

John Dewey wrote in "Effective Thought in Logic and Painting" that traditional theories in philosophy . . . have accustomed us to shape separations between the psychological organic process and the higher manifestations of culture on the other. The separations are summed up in the common division made between mind and body.¹⁸

Evidence presented by Goleman indicates that the emotional brain can bypass the neo-cortex and trigger action, particularly when man feels endangered. An example is given of a man entering his home late at night, thought it empty, heard noise in a closet, then shot into the closet killing a young daughter playing a childish prank.¹⁹

Goleman states fundamental ethical stances in life stem from underlying emotional capacities.²⁰ Can we not recall for example, people of high IQ who floundered miserably in life?

Evidence also exists according to Nell Noddings, who pioneered this field a philosophical significance of moral viewpoint between men and women. In *Caring*, she wrote:

"Moral decisions are, after all made in real situations. They are qualitatively different from the solution of geometry problems. Women's reasons for their acts, often point to feelings, needs, impressions

and a sense of personal, ideal rather than universal principles.²¹

This indeed in contrast to Kant's categorical imperative and is a weakness to male thought. And again Noddings writes women recognize human encounter and affective response as a basic fact of human existence.

Lawrence Coles in *How to Raise a Moral Child: The Moral Intelligence of Children* offers many sound practical suggestions; whereas from a pedagogical standpoint Goleman's chapter on schooling and the emotions seems often impractical.

Yet the question of how teachers might encourage our students (and ourselves) to take that big step from thought to action addresses American society if there is to be an upturn in character.

As Coles writes in the "Letter to Parents and Teachers":

The irony that the study of philosophy, say even moral philosophy or moral reasoning, doesn't by any means necessarily prompt in either the teacher or the student a daily enacted goodness.²²

Moral reasoning is not to be equated with moral conduct. Blaise Pascal wrote in *Les Penses*²³ regarding religion: "Le Coeur a ses raisons" that analytical reason will never know.

NOTES

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2. Coles, Robert. *The Moral Intelligence of Intelligence* (Random House: New York, 1997).
3. Ibid., p.73.
4. Etzioni, Amatai. *The New Golden Rule* (Basic Books: New York, 1996) p. 59
5. Ibid., p.61.
6. Ravitch, Diane, (ed.) *The American Reader* (Harper Perennial: New York, 1996), p. 317.
7. Noddings, Nell. *Caring* (University of California Press: Berkeley, Calif. 1984) p. 22.
8. Etzioni, op cit., p.67.
9. Ibid., p.68.
10. Coles, p.63.
11. Ibid.
12. Coles, p.70.
13. Coles, p.89.
14. Coles, p.70.
15. Coles, p.89.
16. Goleman, Daniel. *Emotional Intelligence*, (New York, Bantam Books) 1995
17. Ibid., p.8-10.
18. John Dewey, *John Dewey on Education*, ed. Reginald D. Archambault.
(New York, Modern Library, 1964) p. 141.
19. Goleman, p. 4.
20. Goleman, p. 106.
21. Noddings, p. 3.
22. Coles, p. 181-182.
23. *Seventeenth Century Readings*, ed, Albert Sching and Helen Maxwell King (New York: Henry Hall & Co. Company, 1931) p. 30.